Garfinkel, H. (1963). A Conception of and Experiments with, "Trust" as a Condition of Stable Concerted Actions.
In O. J. Harvey (Ed.), Motivation and Social Interaction (pp. 187-238). Ronald Press.

Chapter 7

A Conception of, and Experiments with, "Trust" as a Condition of Stable Concerted Actions[1]

HAROLD GARFINKEL

In accounting for the persistence and continuity of the features of concerted actions, sociologists commonly select some set of stable features of an organization of activities and ask for the variables that contribute to their stability. An alternative procedure would appear to be more economical: to start with a system with stable features and ask what can be done to make for trouble. The operations that one would have to perform in order to produce and sustain anomic features of perceived environments and disorganized interaction should tell us something about how social structures are ordinarily and routinely being maintained.

The Point of View

Parsons' (1953) decision to incorporate the entirety of common culture into the superego has as its obvious interpretive consequence that the way a system of activities is organized means the same thing as the way its organizational characteristics are being produced and maintained. Structural phenomena such as income and occupational distributions, familial arrangements, class strata, and the statistical properties of language are emergent products of a vast amount of communicative, perceptual, judgmental, and other "accommodative" work whereby persons, in concert, and encountering "from within the society" the

[1] This investigation was supported by a Senior Research Fellowship SF-81 from the Public Health Service. Particular gratitude is due to Drs. Egon Bittner, Aaron V. Cicourel, Erving Goffman, Henry W. Riecken, Jr., Edward R. Rose, and Eleanor B. Sheldon for their generosity with criticisms and suggestions.

environments that the society confronts them with, establish, maintain, restore, and alter the social structures that are the assembled products of temporally extended courses of action directed to these environments as persons "know" them. Simultaneously these social structures are the conditions of persons' concerted management of these environments.[2]

This conception may be restated as several plausible assumptions upon which the program described here is predicated.

1. The organizational and operational features of concerted actions are importantly determined by whatever the personnel of the system treat as actual and potential displays of perceivedly normal events of their interpersonal environments and relationships of interaction.

2. A person responds not only to the perceived behavior, feelings, motives, relationships, and other socially organized features of life around him, but more relevantly for the purposes of this program, he is responsive as well to the perceived normality of these events. By the "perceived normality" of events I refer to the *perceived formal* features that environing events have for the perceiver as instances of a class of events, i.e., *typicality;* their "chances" of occurrence, i.e., *likelihood;* their *comparability* with past or future events; the conditions of their occurrences, i.e., *causal texture;* their place in a set of means-ends relationships, i.e., *instrumental efficacy;* and their necessity according to a natural or moral order, i.e., *moral requiredness.*

3. On the occasions of discrepancies between expected and actual events, persons engage in assorted perceptual and judgmental work whereby such discrepancies are "normalized." By "normalized" I mean that perceivedly normal values of typicality, comparability, likelihood, causal texture, instrumental efficacy, and moral requiredness are restored.

4. The occasions of "nasty surprise" as well as the work of normalizing do not occur either idiosyncratically or independent of the group's routinized social structures. Such occasions and such work not only are determined by but are determinative of routinized structures.

5. The persistence, continuity, reproducibility, standardization, uniformity of social structures—i.e., their "stability" over time and turnovers of acting personnel—are emergent products of the perceivedly normal values of interpersonal events that members of a group seek through their adjustive activities to maintain.

[2] This doctrine is illustrated in the delightful story by Robert M. Coates, "The Law" (1947). One fine spring evening the Manhattan entrance to the Triborough Bridge is jammed with cars for the length of Manhattan Island. Drivers consult each other to learn the reason for the jam but no one knows. Says Coates, that was the night "the law of averages failed." On that night every car owner in Manhattan decided it was a perfect night for a drive to Long Island.

6. The reconciliation of the stable features of social structures on the one hand with the treatment of interpersonal environments "seen from within" on the other is recommended with the use of two theorems that Parson's systematic theory (1961) explicates: (a) The social structures *consist* of institutionalized patterns of normative culture; (b) the stable features of the social structures as assemblies of concerted actions are guaranteed by motivated compliance with a legitimate order.

Our task is to learn what it takes to produce for members of a group that has stable features perceived environments of events that are "specifically senseless." This term, borrowed from Max Weber (1946), refers to events which are perceived by group members as being atypical, causally indeterminate, and arbitrary in occurrence, without a relevant history or future, means character, or moral necessity.

Ideally speaking, i.e., in terms consistent with such a theory of social organization as Durkheim's (1951), the behavorial states accompanying perceived environments with such properties would consist of the total cessation of activity. Short of this ideal terminal state, one should encounter the behaviors of bewilderment, uncertainty, internal conflict, massive incongruity, psychosocial isolation, acute general anxiety, loss of identity, and various symptoms of depersonalization. In short, one should encounter what Paul Schilder (1951), in a brilliant phrase, referred to as "an amnesia for social structure." Disorganized features of the social structures should vary accordingly. The severity of these effects should vary directly with the enforceable commitments of persons, i.e., with the conditions that guarantee motivated compliance to a legitimate order. Such a commitment appears from within as a grasp of and subscription to the "natural facts of life in society." Because such "natural facts of life," i.e., common culture, are described from a member's point of view as a world known and taken for granted in common with other members, the severity of these effects should vary independent of personality characteristics, as they are conceived and sought by most of the conventional personality assessment devices.

In pursuing the program on which this paper is based I have proceeded under the notion that in the course of routinized actions, anomic states are transient, of short duration, and are irregularly distributed through a person's biography of interactions as well as among social structures. I seek the operations that will increase and regularize the frequency and duration of such states so that their occurrence can be convincingly detected with the crude methods of immediate observation.

What can we do to a scene of events to produce for a person a situation in which he is unable to "grasp" what is going on?

Operating with the Concept of "Trust"

I shall exercise a theorist's preference and say that meaningful events are entirely and exclusively events in a person's behavioral environment, with this defined in accordance with Hallowell's (1955) usage. Hence there is no reason to look under the skull since nothing of interest is to be found there but brains. The "skin" of the person will be left intact. Instead questions will be confined to the operations that can be performed upon events that are "scenic" to the person. To aid in locating events that must be altered to produce anomic states, I have conceived the phenomenon of trust. I shall begin by consulting games. From an analysis of their rules, the concept of the "constitutive order of events" of a game will be developed. Compliance to this order will be developed as a general definition of the term "trust." I shall then support this concept by presenting some findings from the game of ticktacktoe. After some appropriate criticisms of the use of games, I shall extend what we learn about how trust is a condition for "grasping" the events of games to the case of how trust is a condition for "grasping" the events of daily life. Preliminary results will then be cited in support and criticism of this conception.

Basic Rules as Definitions of the Constituent Events of a Game. The stable situation I want to start with is a game. A game is selected because the basic rules of play serve each player as a scheme for recognizing and interpreting the other players' as well as his own behavioral displays as events of game conduct. The basic rules of a game define the situations and normal events of play for persons who seek to act in compliance with them (a *player*).

If the rules of any given game, e.g., baseball, chess, or any other described in a book of games, are examined, one set of rules of that game can be discriminated from all the others by the fact that they exhibit the following three properties.

(1) From the standpoint of a player, out of alternative territories of play, numbers of players, sequences of moves, and the like, they frame a set that the player expects to choose regardless of his desires, circumstances, plans, interests, or consequences of choice either to himself or to others.

(2) The player expects that the same set of required alternatives are binding upon the other player as are binding upon him.

(3) The player expects that, as he expects the above of the other person, the other person expects it of him.

Call these three properties *constitutive expectancies.*

Some Definitions and Remarks

1. These three properties constitute as a set the rules they are attached to. Call the set of such rules *basic rules.* Illustrative basic rules of ticktacktoe are: Play is conducted on a three by three matrix by two players who move alternatively. The first player makes a mark in one of the unoccupied cells. The second player, in his turn, places his mark in one of the remaining unoccupied cells. And so on. The term "ticktacktoe player" refers to a person who seeks to act in compliance with these possible events as constitutively expected ones.

2. It is possible to assign constitutive expectancies to any number of players, sequences of moves, territories of play, and the like. I shall refer to the fact that the three constitutive expectancies are assigned to some particular set of possible events and not assigned to others as the *constitutive accent* of the events to which they are assigned.

3. Call the *related* set of possible events to which the constitutive expectancies are assigned the *constitutive order of events* of the game.

4. Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) point out that a game is defined by listing its basic rules. In our terms, a game is defined by listing its basic rules to which constitutive expectancies are attached. In addition to the basic rule, there are at least three other features which are necessary to describe the game as a normative order or discipline: (a) an "et cetera" provision, (b) an enumerated set of rules of *preferred* play, and (c) an enumerated set of "game-finished" conditions. Beyond these, there are two further features which describe a game as people actually play it: (a) the "validity" of this discipline, i.e., the likelihood that persons will act in motivated compliance with the discipline, and (b) the non-game conditions which, whatsoever they consist of, determine the likelihood of motivated compliance.

5. The constitutive accent can be removed from one set of possible events and assigned to another. This operation produces a new game. For example, a basic rule of ticktacktoe provides that the first occurrence of "three in a row" is a win and terminates play. If this rule is changed to provide as a constitutive possibility that three in a row only on or after a player's *fourth* move is a win (and if provision is made that players use only three marks which they may erase one at a time to move to an unoccupied cell), the resulting game is known as "noughts and crosses." Similarly, in chess the constitutive accent is assigned to the possibility that the pieces retain their identical colors throughout play. By providing that at the time of a player's choosing a preselected combination of the opponent's pieces can be declared to have changed colors, F. R. Kling invented "Chess With Traitors" (1958).

6. The rules that remain after basic rules have been recognized are

exclusively either one or the other of two types. Either they are *rules of preferred play* or they are *game-furnished conditions.* Rules of preferred play are discriminated from basic rules by the feature that elections of alternative territories, sequences of play, number of pieces, number of players—i.e., *any* possibilities, including those that might in "another game" be constitutive of that game—are treated as within the player's discretion to comply with or not in accordance with whatever definitions of "correct procedure" he might invoke, as for example considerations of efficiency, efficacy, aesthetic preference, conventional play, precedented play, traditional play, and the rest. The possibilities that preference rules can deal with are provided by basic rules. For example, that any of the pawns or knights but no other pieces may be moved on White's first move in chess is provided by the basic rules of chess. But which among these alternatives the player can choose is a matter of the player's election. Apart from the fact that preference rules must deal with possibilities that basic rules provide, definitions of correct play provided by preference rules are in no way necessarily controlled by the basic rules.

While basic rules furnished the definitive criteria of legal play, rules of preferred play furnish the definitive criteria of effective, or aesthetic, or conventional, or for that part, poor play if the player seeks to play poorly. The decisions that the player makes *must* satisfy the basic rules and *will* satisfy *some* set of preference rules. It goes without saying that the set of preference rules may consist of very odd mixtures of efficacy, aesthetic correctness, conventionality, and the like. Basic and preference rules serve as conditions that a player's elections either must or will satisfy.

In addition to these conditions, there exist a number of further conditions that his decisions must satisfy. These additional conditions, however, are *not* criteria which define the correctness of a decision, nor are they provided for by the basic or preference rules. Nevertheless, it is the case that of necessity a player's decisions will be constrained by them. These conditions have the following features: (a) they describe characteristic features of play in the game; (b) they are independent of the chances of a player's success or failure in the game; (c) they are invariant to the changing states of the game in the sense that they hold as conditions for his decisions for every situation in which a decision is to be made; (d) they hold insofar but only insofar as the player treats the basic rules of the game as maxims of his own as well as his opponent's conduct, which is to say they hold insofar and only insofar as the person refers his and other players' actions for definition and interpretation to the normative order of possible events defined by the basic rules of the game.

A set of game-furnished conditions corresponds specifically to each set of basic rules of a game. Game-furnished conditions are illustrated in chess by the fact that every situation of play is one of perfect information or that every present state of the game is altered in an all or none fashion by an actual play and never by a supposed play. Kriegsspiel contrasts with chess in these and other respects, e.g., its situations of play are ones of imperfect information; a present state of the game can be altered by a supposed play.[3]

7. For the theorist, the interpretive rule is proposed that any and all game events are members of the set of constitutive or of preferential possibilities, or of the set of game-furnished conditions. To say that the constitutive accent is "removed" from one set of events is synonymous with the statement that the events have been moved to the set of preferential possibilities. Conversely, to say that events have been removed from the set of preferential possibilities necessarily entails that they have become members of the set of constitutive possibilities. The case where all possibilities are constitutive possibilities such that the set of preferential possibilities is an empty one defines a ceremonialized game.[4] To speak of the set of constitutive possibilities as an empty set and simultaneously to intend a game is formal nonsense.[5]

8. Say of persons, in that their treatments of interpersonal environments—whether they be game environments or otherwise—are governed by constitutive expectancies, that they *trust* each other.

9. The concept of trust is related to the concept of perceivedly normal environments as follows. To say that one person "trusts" another means that the person seeks to act in such a fashion as to produce through his action or to respect as conditions of play actual events that accord with normative orders of events depicted in the basic rules of play. Alterna-

[3] These contrasts are illustrative, not definitive. The topic of game-furnished conditions is treated definitively in a series of the author's unpublished works, e.g., Chapter 5 in *Parson's Primer* and Chapter 6 in *Essays in Ethnomethodology*.

[4] The conditions of a ceremonialized game of chess would be satisfied if two persons, A and B, agreed to play and played as follows. Prior to play A and B agree that when A moves, e.g., KP–K4, B will move QP–Q3; then A will move QP–Q4, to which B will reply KP–K4; after which A will move *X*, and B will reply *Y;* then A moves such and such and B in return moves so and so, and so on until a play of the game shall have been constructed by agreement. A and B then agree to treat the agreed program as a set of basic rules. The only contingency that would remain would consist of whether or not their actual play abided by the agreement. Responsive readings in church resemble a ceremonialized game.

[5] By formal nonsense is meant that one can speak of a game consisting of no constitutive rules, but the result is a juxtaposition of terms each of which has a meaning in its own right, but the object that is intended through these terms as specifications of the object cannot be grasped. One can speak similarly of a round square, or a triangle whose angles sum to more than three straight angles, or a refrigerator that has no capacity, or a sound that has intensity and amplitude but no duration with identical results.

tively stated, the player takes for granted the basic rules of the game as a definition of his situation, and that means of course as a definition of his relationships to others.

Perceivedly Normal Environments of Game Events

Several further features of basic rules must now be mentioned in order to show that the events depicted in the basic rules of play (i.e., the constitutive order of game events) provide the person who seeks to act in compliance with these basic rules the definition of normal events of game play.

1. The events depicted by the basic rules are categorical possibilities. As such, they define the environment of game events as a domain of possible observables which, in the same manner that the events of the idealized experiment, as Feller (1950) uses the concept in his discussion of a sample space, consist of rules of relevance whereby essential features of particular actual observations are recognized. The events that are provided by basic rules are intended events such that they delineate the essential uniformity in all actual observations that may be brought under the jurisdiction of intended events as particular cases of the intended events.

2. As categorical possibilities, the events provided by the basic rules have the property of remaining invariant to the changing actual states of the game.

3. Being invariant to actual courses of game play, these expected uniformities serve as standards, i.e., as definitions of correct play. Thereby they serve as the basis for recognizing the strange move, the move that is "outside the game."

4. The matter of bringing actual observations under the jurisdiction of intended observations provided by the basic rules consists of the procedures for justifying the claim that actual-observed-appearances-of-an-object and the-object-that-is-intended-by-the-particular-actual-appearances correspond. The problematic character of this correspondence consists in providing the rules whereby it may be decided for the two, standing as they do in a relation of signification, i.e., a sign relationship, what this relationship of signification consists of. For example, is the sign relationship one of mark, sign, symbol, index, icon, document, trope, gloss, analogy, or evidence? Or is the actual observation not an event "in the game" in the first place?

The basic rules provide the solution to the problem of jurisdiction by providing themselves the meaning of "adequate recognition" of actual appearances as recognized appearances-of-the-object. In that basic rules specify the domain of game-possible actions, they define the

domain of "game-possible actions" to which the variable of "mere behaviors" [6] can be assigned. Basic rules frame the set of possible events of play that observed behaviors can signify.

To illustrate, bridge players respond to each other's actions as bridge events, not behavioral events. They do not treat the fact that the other player withdraws a card from his hand and places it on the table as the event "putting down a pasteboard" or "effecting a translation of position of a card." Instead, through the translation of the card's position the player signalizes that "he has played the ace of spades as the first card of the trick." From the player's point of view the question "What can really happen?" is for him correctly decided in terms of basic rules.

5. Each different set of basic rules defines a different domain of possible game events that an otherwise identical behavioral appearance can be set in correspondence to.

6. From the player's point of view, not only "What can happen?" but "What happened?" is correctly decided as far as the player is concerned, in terms of these rules. Basic rules serve as the terms in which the character of the events of play not only *can* be recognized but as far as players are concerned must *necessarily* be recognized. More generally they serve as the set of presuppositions—termed by Schutz (1945) as a player's "scheme of interpretation and expression"—whereby the player's own behavior, as well as the behavior of the other person, is identified by the player as a *datum of action.*

This property may be stated in its general form as the following theorem. A sign correctly corresponds to a referent in terms of the assumed constitutive order that itself defines "correct correspondence."

What holds for sign-referent relationships holds for the relationships of term and word, term and concept, phoneme and lexeme, word and meaning, behavior and action, sentence and proposition, appearance and object. All of these pairs are formally equivalent. A behavior signifies an action in terms of an assumed normative order.

The last several points may be summarized as follows: The basic rules provide a behavior's *sense* as an action. They are the terms in which a player decides whether or not he has correctly identified "What happened?" "Subjective meaning" is "attached" to a behavior in terms of these rules.

Insofar as a player refers for the correctness of his decisions about the meanings of rules to other players as meanings known in common with them, we may speak of the objective character of rules and thereby of the *objective* character of game events. Insofar as a player refers

[6] By "mere behaviors" I refer to all events of overt conduct regarded under the auspices of their definition as "translations of positions of an entity with respect to a system of physical coordinates."

for the correctness of his decisions about the meanings of rules to his or the other players' personal interpretations of the rules, we may, as Kaufman does (1944), speak of the *subjective* character of the rules and thereby of the subjective character of game events.

7. For the person who seeks to comply with the constitutive order of play, an action—and it need only be *one*—that breaches the basic rules is incongruous in a particular way and its *occurrence violates the game as an order of activities.*

(A) The action that occurs contrary to that prescribed by the basic rules of the game is specifically senseless, i.e., it acquires the *perceived* properties of unpredictability, arbitrary occurrence, indeterminateness, lacking causal texture, means character, and moral necessity. We say of the person whose behavioral environment of events shows these properties that he "is confused." Behaviorally, we should expect him to act in the fashion described at the beginning of this chapter.

(B) It is a property of the action that breaches the constitutive expectancy that the player cannot recognize the action without altering the "constitutive accent" that is placed upon the events of play, i.e., without making them preferential. For example, consider that the constitutive order of sequential play in ticktacktoe is A,B,A,B, . . . Player B might move A,B,B,B. When the constitutive order provides that players move in the sequence, A,B,A,B,A . . . , the expectancy is provided that the normative sequence is followed and the actual sequence is produced irrespective of the player's motives, desires, calculations of self-interest and the like. The player who moves "out of turn," i.e., A,B,B . . . , presents to his opponent the incongruous possibility that the sequence, A,B,A,B,A . . . , is within the player's discretion.

(C) The disorder consists in this: The action which breaches the basic rule invites treatment as constitutive of the order of the game. But assigning to it a constitutive accent is synonymous with transforming the rules of the game. Sociologically speaking, it invites a redefinition of "social reality" or, alternatively, of "normal play."

8. The physical stimulus field may be regular and definite, yet the field of game events may be without sense.

A distinction between ambiguity and senselessness may help the point. By saying that the field of *game events* becomes ambiguous, I mean that the player's distribution of bets as to "what happened" over the set of alternative possibilities becomes more equiprobable.

By the state of senselessness of the field of game events is meant that the player is without a frame of possibilities to which the physical stimulus field may be decided to correspond. In the case of an ambiguous field of game events, the person is unable to decide which among a set of alternatives a person meant in a move or an utterance. In a sense-

less field, the person, although he hears an utterance that has been delivered in clear and correct English, does not recognize it as an English sentence. What holds for an utterance holds for any behavior, since the sign-referent relationship that holds for the relationship between utterances and propositions holds as well for the relationship between behavior and action.

The difference between ambiguity and senselessness may be illustrated in the following procedure. Subjects were invited to play ticktacktoe. After the subject made his move (X), the experimenter made his move (O), thus:

In some cases the subjects responded by rebuking the experimenter: "Don't be sloppy. Put your mark in the square." In other cases, however, the subjects responded with "What game are you playing?"

9. If the player adheres to the constitutive order of the game, the anomic effects of breaching a basic rule are not attenuated by the player's knowledge that a basic rule has been breached.

10. Regardless of what the rule specifically provide as possible events, whether they specify nine cells in ticktacktoe, sixty-four positions in chess, five cards to a poker hand, hidden boards in kriegspiel, etc., the three definitive properties of basic rules are invariant to the actual content of the rules.

There are two important consequences of this feature. (a) With respect to the question of what must be done to produce confusion, it permits us to recognize in different fields of game events, i.e., in different games, those events whose breach will produce identical consequences, hopefully, confusion. (b) It is a condition of confusion that the parties be reciprocally identified members of the same community, that is, that they treat each other as persons presumably bound by the same constitutive order of actions, i.e., "playing the same game."

11. The set, "All the basic rules," defines a game. This property yields an important consequence as well as an important task. (a) The important consequence is that constitutive structures are integral to *all* game events. (b) The important incomplete task is that of investigating the logical properties of the set, "All the basic rules" of a game.

Further remarks are needed about each of these points.

(A) *The important consequence.* The conception that constitutive structures are integral to all game events differs from currently used sociological conceptions of the rules of action. According to current

sociological usage, the rules of action classify actions as disjunctive sets. For example, the events of conduct depicted in the incest rule are members of the "mores." The rules that prescribe allocations of duties in the household are members of the "folkways." The instructions that accompany a radio kit are technical rules. Emily Post has written the rules of etiquette.

As a consequence of such usage, current conceptions of the conditions of social order stress in common as a critical condition of a stable social order the extent to which rules are sacredly regarded. But should it turn out that the constitutive properties of events are not confined to games, one would then have to suppose that the uniformities of events depicted in the mores, the folkways, and the like are constituted through a set of "more fundamental" presuppositions in terms of which behavioral instances are attended by actors as instances of *intended* actions that a group member assumes "anyone can see." A line of reasoning then follows as an immediate consequence, and, because it is not reconcilable with current notions, presents the prospect of a crucial experiment. The alternative reasoning is this. If these constitutive properties extend to everyday events, then with respect to the problematic relationship between the normative regulation of action and the stability of concerted action, the critical phenomenon is not the "intensity of affect" with which the "rule" is "invested," or the respected or sacred or moral status of the rule, but the perceived normality of environmental events as this normality is a function of the presuppositions that define the possible events.

When the work with games was begun, we took for granted that the omnirelevance of normative regulation was peculiar to games, and that it was this feature that was frequently meant when scholars, e.g., Huizinga (1950), contrasted the well-regulated and orderly character of game events with those of "serious life." When, however, incongruity-inducing procedures were applied in "real life" situation, it was unnerving to find the seemingly endless variety of events that lent themselves to the production of really nasty surprises. These events ranged from those that, according to sociological commonsense, were "critical," like standing very, very close to a person while otherwise maintaining an innocuous conversation, to others that according to sociological commonsense were "trivial," like saying "hello" at the termination of a conversation. Both procedures elicited anxiety, indignation, strong feelings on the part of experimenter and subject alike of humiliation and regret, demands by the subjects for explanations, and so on. It was conjectured therefore that *all* actions as perceived events may have a constitutive structure, and that perhaps it is the threat to the normative order of events as such that is the critical variable in evoking indignation and not the breach of the "sacredness" of the rules. The conception is

plausible, at least if one considers that the common factor to both the threat to the normative order of events as well as the breach of sacredness is the person's assumption that he, like his partner, is a competent member of the same community, which is a shorthand way of referring to the three definitive properties of the basic rules.

(B) *The incomplete task.* With respect to the set, "All the basic rules," one would like to know what the properties are of the boundaries of this set. More specifically, is the set a well-ordered or only a partially ordered one? And does it make any difference for the accomplishment by actual players of legitimate plays of recognizable games that the set is well ordered or not?

Several points seem to be worth putting into the record.

With regard to the well-ordered character, I have been unable to find any game whose acknowledged rules are sufficient to cover all the problematical possibilities that may arise, or that one cannot with only slight exercise of wit make arise within the domain of play. For example, although chess would seem to be immune to such manipulations, one can at one's move change pieces around on the board—so that, although the over-all positions are not changed, different pieces occupy the squares—and then move. On the several occasions in which I did this, my opponents were disconcerted, tried to stop me, demanded an explanation of what I was up to, were uncertain about the legality (but wanted to assert its illegality nevertheless), made it clear to me that I was spoiling the game for them, and at the next round of play made me promise that I would not "do anything this time." They were not satisfied when I asked that they point out where the rules prohibited what I had done. Nor were they satisfied when I pointed out that I had not altered the material positions and, further, that the maneuver did not affect my chances of winning. If they were not satisfied, neither could they say to *their* satisfaction what was wrong. Prominently in their attempts to come to terms, they would speak of the obscurity of my motives. One subject remarked that it reminded him of the way the Harlem Globetrotters played basketball, and that he had never considered that they played real basketball.

I suggest that one is in the area here of the game's version of the "unstated terms of contract," consisting perhaps of one more rule that completes every enumeration of basic rules by bringing them under the status of an agreement among persons to play in accordance with them, a rule which formulates the list as an agreement by the final "finely printed" acknowledgment, "et cetera."

With regard to the question of whether or not its well-ordered character makes a difference to the accomplishment of recognizable play,

I am struck by the fact that, while the rules of scientific inquiry are easily compared to the basic and preference rules in games, there operates in all scientific inquiries the inquirers' knowledge of the conditions under which they are permitted to relax the basic and preference rules and still claim for the product that it is an adequate scientific solution to the problem of inquiry. For games, one would have to find the conditions under which players could relax the basic and preference rules and still recognize their play as a legitimate play of the game. Thus far, at least, I have been unable to find a case of this, which is strange, given that the qualifying effect of the et cetera rule is easily discernible for every game that I have considered.

Finally, I have been unable to find any game that permits the time of occurrence, duration, and phasing of moves to be defined entirely as a matter of the player's preference.

Should it turn out that the boundaries of the set are essentially vague, that no matter how explicit the rules are, the set of them is essentially partially ordered, that every game contains its "unstated terms of contract," and that time is a parameter of the meaning of a move, then we have important grounds for optimism. These are precisely properties of those situations of events that sociologists have referred to as actors' "definitions of the situations" of "serious" life, and that inquiries have documented to the point where these properties may be safely assumed. It leaves open, too, the immensely important possibility that the constitutive accent is an integral feature of all events irrespective of whether they are events in the domain of games (referred by Schutz as the "finite province of meaning"), scientific theorizing, theater, play, dreaming, or whatever.

The Problem Again

Regardless of what the rules may provide as specifically possible events, whether they specify nine cells in ticktacktoe, sixty-four positions in chess, or five cards to a poker hand, the three constitutive expectancies are invariant to the actual content of the rules. They permit us to recognize in different games those events that are functionally the same with respect to the question of what must be done to produce confusion. Therefore, an operation that should produce confusion in one game holds for any game. If the constitutive expectancies operate in everyday situations, the operation that produces confusion in one concrete setting holds for any concrete setting. The operativeness of these constitutive expectancies in games or in everyday situations thereby serves as an important condition of stable features of concerted actions.

It is my purpose to show through experimental demonstrations that events that breach the constitutive expectancies multiply the anomic features of the environment of game events as well as the disorganized features of the structures of game interaction; that these effects vary directly with the extent of motivated compliance with the constitutive order of the game; that these effects occur independent of the personality characteristics of players; and that these statements hold not only for game interactions but for interactions of "serious life" as well.

We now ask:

1. Is the breach of a basic rule in a game a first-order determinant of anomic effects?
2. Is the breach of a basic rule in everyday life a similar first-order determinant?

Studying the Basic Rules Through the Use of Ticktacktoe

Sixty-seven liberal arts students in several of my classes served as experimenters. Each played ticktacktoe with three or more persons from among the 253 Ss, which included children, adolescents, young and older adults, of both sexes. The *S*, who was acquainted with *E* in varying degrees (from membership in the same family, through gradations of friendship to complete strangers), was asked, after his acceptance of *E*'s invitation to play, to move first. After *S* made his mark, *E* erased the mark, moved it to another cell, and made his own mark while trying to avoid any indication to *S* that the play was in any way unusual. The *E*s were asked to report in behavioral detail what Ss did and said and to obtain from Ss, as well as to report for themselves, how they felt when invited to play, when the incorrect move was made, during the entire course of play and afterward. 67 *E*s reported on 253 instances of play.

Scoring Procedure. A standard reporting form was used by all *E*s, who were asked to report *S*'s behavior immediately after *E*'s own move.

If *E* reported that *S*

(1) Showed surprise, was startled, looked up, the account was scored "yes"; otherwise, "no."

(2) Showed or expressed bewilderment or was puzzled, the account was scored "yes"; otherwise, "no."

(3) Showed irritation, pain, or anger, the account was scored "yes"; otherwise, "no."

(4) Grinned, smiled, or laughed, the account was scored "yes"; otherwise, "no."

(5) Expressed suspicion or demanded an explanation, the account was scored "yes"; otherwise, "no."

(6) Showed some response but none of the above, the account was scored "yes."

Where the protocols did not contain sufficient information for a judgment, the account was scored as "No information."

The extent of S's disturbance was then scored as follows:

(1) If neither response nor laughter was noted and/or S showed surprise, was startled, or looked up but nothing more, the disturbance was classified as "None or mild."

(2) If the S showed responses (1) and any *two* others among the alternatives (2), (4) and (5), the disturbance was classified as "Moderate."

(3) If S showed responses (1), (2), (4), and (5), the disturbance was classified as "Severe."

Sometimes the sense that S made of *E*'s move could be obtained from the subject's behavior and spontaneous remarks at the conclusion of play. Sometimes *E* had to elicit this by asking S "What do you make of it?" The *E*s varied in whether they asked this before or after the experimental intent had been disclosed.

The Ss' remarks were evaluated as follows:

(1) If the S: (a) acted as though nothing required an explanation or that there was no problem and/or (b) if he said that he felt that the *E* was trying a new way of playing, was a bug on ticktacktoe, or was playing or trying out a new game, this was scored as S's abandonment of ticktacktoe as an order and the election of a new order.

(2) If S said (a) that there was some undisclosed trick involved (e.g., that it was a gag, that *E* was acting like a character or a prankster, that it was a test or an experiment of some sort) and/or (b) that *E* was playing an "unknown game" (e.g., *E* had mislead S or was not really playing ticktacktoe, there was some trick or joke being played on S, *E* was using this way of playing as a masked sexual pass or comment on S's stupidity, or *E* was acting like a wise guy), S was scored as perceiving *E* to be playing an unknown game. Both 2 (a) and (b) were regarded as S's abandonment of the order of ticktacktoe but without deciding an alternative order.

(3) If S said that *E* was playing ticktacktoe but cheating, this was scored as S's retention of the order of ticktacktoe.

The S could have continued to play; refused to continue to play; or played "no-game," i.e., retaliatory play or reciprocal spoiling (e.g., duplicating *E*'s mode of play, or acting as if "you're playing any way you

like, I can play any way I like," "you're spoiling the game for me, I'll spoil the game for you," or "you think you can win that way so I'll put in all my marks now and win.")

Findings. Tables 7–1 through 7–7 report the results. The following gross findings showed up with sufficient prominence to invite at least an initial credence.

TABLE 7–1

What Difference Did the "Wrong" Move Make?

	Age grade									
	5–11		12–17		18–35		36–65		All subjects	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Some response to the unusual character of the move reported	54	94.7	19	95.0	138	94.5	29	96.7	240	94.9
No response to the unusual character of the move reported	3	5.3	1	5.0	8	5.5	1	3.3	13	5.1
All subjects	57	100.0	20	100.0	146	100.0	30	100.0	253	100.0

TABLE 7–2

Did the Move Motivate an Immediate Attempt To Understand What Was Going On?

	Age grade									
	5–11		12–17		18–35		36–65		All subjects	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Anything from request to demand for explanation	20	35.1	14	70.0	82	56.2	15	50.0	131	51.8
Makes charge; sees through the move; criticizes or rejects experimenter	29	51.0	0	0.0	28	19.2	9	30.0	66	26.1
Evidence of effect but neither of above	5	8.7	5	25.0	28	19.2	5	16.7	43	17.0
No immediate difference or response noted	3	5.2	1	5.0	8	5.4	1	3.3	13	5.1
All subjects	57	100.0	20	100.0	146	100.0	30	100.0	253	100.0
All subjects who made requests, demands, and charges	49	86.1	14	70.0	110	75.4	24	80.0	197	77.9

TABLE 7–3

Where Did the Subject Locate the Responsibility for the Character of the Game?

	Age grade									
	5–11		12–17		18–35		36–65		All subjects	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
You don't play correctly	43	75.5	14	70.0	101	69.2	26	86.6	184	72.7
I don't play correctly	6	10.5	2	10.0	12	8.2	0	0.0	20	7.9
We could both play correctly but we don't (spoiling play)	8	14.0	4	20.0	33	22.7	4	13.4	49	19.4
All subjects	57	100.0	20	100.0	146	100.0	30	100.0	253	100.0

TABLE 7–4

What Difference for the Extent of the Subject's Disturbance Was Made by the Nature of the Subject's Subscription to a Definite Normative Order?

Extent of subject's disturbance	Subject normalized the wrong move within the							
	Election of a new order		Abandonment of tick-tacktoe but without deciding an alternative		Retention of order of ticktacktoe		All subjects	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
None or mild	26	86.7	36	30.8	20	19.4	81	32.8
Moderate	3	10.0	46	40.3	32	31.1	81	32.8
Severe	1	3.3	33	28.9	51	49.5	85	34.4
All subjects	30	100.0	114	100.0	103	100.0	247	100.0
No information							6	

$X^2 = 55.43$ at 6 d.f. $p < 001$ under the assumption that extent of disturbance and election of normative order varied independently.

TABLE 7–5

What Difference for the Extent of the Subject's Disturbance Was Made by the Subject's Age Group?

Extent of subject's disturbance	Age group									
	5–11		12–17		18–35		36–65		All subjects	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
None or mild	14	25.5	3	15.0	54	37.2	11	36.7	82	32.8
Moderate	14	25.5	8	40.0	51	35.2	9	30.0	82	32.8
Severe	27	49.0	9	45.0	40	27.6	10	33.3	86	34.4
All subjects	55	100.0	20	100.0	145	100.0	30	100.0	250	100.0
No information									3	

$X^2 = 11.39$ at 6 d.f. $.10 < p > .05$ under the assumption that age group and extent of disturbance varied independently.

TABLE 7–6

What Difference for the Extent of the Subject's Disturbance Was Made by the Degree of Acquaintance Between the Subject and Experimenter?

Extent of subject's disturbance	Degree of acquaintance									
	Stranger		Acquaintance		Friend		Family		All subjects	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
None or mild	17	32.7	29	31.8	25	38.4	10	25.7	81	32.8
Moderate	18	34.6	27	29.7	21	32.3	16	41.0	82	33.2
Severe	17	32.7	35	38.5	19	29.2	13	33.3	84	34.0
All subjects	52	100.0	91	100.0	65	100.0	39	100.0	247	100.0
No information									6	

$X^2 = 3.89$ at 6 d.f. $.70 < p > .50$ under the assumption that degree of acquaintance and extent of disturbance varied independently.

TABLE 7–7

What Difference for the Extent of the Subject's Disturbance Was Made by the Fact That Subjects and Experimenters Were Same or Different Sexes?

Extent of subject's disturbance	Sex of subject (S) and experimenter (E)									
	MS and ME		MS and FE		FS and ME		FS and FE		All subjects	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
None or mild	26	32.9	20	33.3	12	30.0	20	29.9	78	31.6
Moderate	27	34.2	18	30.0	13	32.5	24	35.8	82	33.4
Severe	26	32.9	22	36.7	15	37.5	23	34.3	86	35.0
All subjects	79	100.0	60	100.0	40	100.0	67	100.0	246	100.0
No information									7	

$X^2 = .67$ at 6 d.f. $p > .99$ under the assumption that sex of the subject and experimenter, and extent of disturbance varied independently.

1. That the "wrong" move had an effect on Ss' behavior is clear from Table 7–1.

2. Table 7–2 indicates that three quarters of the Ss were motivated immediately by the wrong move to try to understand what was going on.

3. Table 7–3 shows that three quarters of the players located the responsibility for the character of the game with *E*.

4. Tables 7–4 through 7–7 encourage us to proceed. Ideally, we would have wanted only the fact of the wrong move to produce the anomic effects within the condition that the person attempted to restore the normal character of the move within the normative order of tick-tacktoe.

Table 7–4 shows that persons who interpreted the move as a move in a new game showed little disturbance. Those who abandoned ticktacktoe but did not decide an alternative order showed more disturbance. Those who attempted to normalize within the order of ticktacktoe showed the most disturbance.

Tables 7–5 to 7–7 show that the extent of disturbance varied indepent of the *S*'s age group, the degree of acquaintance between *S* and *E*, or the fact that the *S*s and *E*s were of the same or different sexes.

The ticktacktoe findings supported two important theoretical points. First, a behavior that was at variance with the constitutive order of the game immediately motivated attempts to normalize the discrepancy, i.e., to treat the observed behavior as an instance of a legally possible event. Second, under the condition of a breach of legal play the discrepant event seemed best to produce a senseless situation if the player attempted to normalize the discrepancy while attempting to retain the constitutive order without alteration, i.e., without leaving the game or orienting a "new game."

We also found that the ticktacktoe produced a convincing and enduring bewilderment for children, particularly those from five to eleven years old. The procedure was less efficient in producing bewilderment for adults, though for them it was very efficient in producing an ambiguous situation of events. Protocols of both adults and children, however, were filled with expressions of distrust. This held across the board regardless of age, sex, or familiarity with the experimenter.

Limitation on the Further Use of Games

We are, after all, not interested in producing confusion in games, but in producing confusion in "serious" situations. Since constitutive expectancies proved useful in ticktacktoe, we now ask whether constitutive expectancies can be found for the events of everyday life.

They can be found, but to find them we must look to other situations than games.

We cannot consult games because game events are not structurally homologous with events of yesterday life. Several features of situations of game events contrast so markedly with situations of events of daily life that not only is the assumption of their structural equivalence difficult to justify, but the differences render any talk about norms of everyday situations as "rules of the game" mere figure of speech. If this were not enough, we would still be barred from using the findings on ticktacktoe to tell us how to multiply confusion in everyday situations because many adults were able to abandon the game without disrupting their relationship to the experimenter.

If we use Huizinga's (1950) analysis of situations of play as a point of departure, the following features of situations of games stand in marked contrast to those situations involving the routine social structuring of events of everyday life.

1. As compared with the events of everyday life, game events, both in process as well as in retrospect as accomplished products, have a peculiar time structure which consists in the fact that as of all present states of the game the time in which the game is played is essentially circumscribed. Over the set of all present states of the game, either in process or played, an integral sense of any present event is provided by an assumed future that consists of a definite time by which the game will have been completed, e.g., in a number of moves, or when the runners have reached the tape, or when sixty minutes of play have elapsed. Thereby an accomplished play of the game consists of an encapsulated episode. Basic rules and an actual accomplished course of play furnish the episode its entire character as a texture of relevances. Characteristically too, success and failure are clearly decidable so that one or the other outcome is very little subject to reinterpretation as having been something else. Nor are assessments of success or failure subject to waiting for later developments *outside* of the episode or the play of the game or the game itself in order to permit decisions as to what the episode "really amounted to." Finally, the knowledge that by a time the game will have been completed is actually and potentially available over every present state of the game to each player in identical fashion.

2. Any discrepancy between the "official" definition of the game and the person's private conceptions and reservations is of little moment in deciding the range of possible game events and outcomes. The game is for the players a public enterprise whose possibilities exist by reason of the person's motivated compliance to its basic rules, and these rules define a consensually understood domain. Basic rules are essentially objective rules, in the sense of Kaufman's (1944) definition of "objective." The events they provide are essentially objective events.

3. To be "in the game" involves by definition the suspension of the presuppositions and procedures of "serious" life. Many commentators on games have taken notice of this feature by speaking of the game as an "artificial world in microcosm."

4. Such a suspension is characteristically a matter of the person's preferences. It is essentially possible to exercise an option to "play the game." Characteristically, too, it is essentially possible, should things go badly, for example, for a person to "leave" the game or to change it into another one, and again as a matter of the person's preferences.

5. Characteristically, to "leave" the game is synonymous with reinstating the world of everyday life as an environment of events and the

attitude of daily life that constitutes this environment. The presuppositions of the game seem to be the product of certain modifications of the presuppositions of daily life which are provisionally and optionally suspended, i.e., made irrelevant, to the course of the game.

6. Although strategies may be highly improvised and the conditions of success and failure be unclear to the players over the course of play, the basic rules of play are known over the course of play, they are independent of the changing present state of the game and of the selection of strategies, and they are available for use by players and presumed by players to be available as required knowledge that players have prior to the occasions under which these rules might be consulted to decide among legal alternatives.

7. The basic rules of play are not altered by the actual course of play. For games, as ordinarily understood, players not only know the basic rules of play prior to undertaking the game, but they do not learn more about these rules as a function of their participation in the game. Clearly, such a situation has to be discriminated from one in which the basic rules are themselves learned by the player only in the course of play as a function of his playing and only insofar as he participates, i.e., that makes his actions subject to recognition, review, and correction according to an unknown set of basic rules.

8. With respect to basic rules of play, there is a practically perfect correspondence between the normative descriptions of game conduct and actual game conduct. Empirically this correspondence is found not only within a play of a game but between plays of that game. A similar correspondence between normative descriptions of everyday conduct and actual everyday conduct is exceptional.

9. Insofar as players are committed to compliance with the basic rules, these rules provide for players the definitions of rational, realistic, understandable actions in the environment of game events. Actions in compliance with basic rules define in games "fair play," while game-possible outcomes define "justice."

10. Within the basic rules that are presumed by each of the participants to be binding upon themselves and other participants in a more or less equivalent way, strategies that accord in the strictest fashion with norms of instrumental efficacy are in principle [7] adoptable by either

[7] It seems to me, although I am not able to prove it, that in games, but not in everyday activities, a player's wit or optional willingness alone limits the possibility that his strategies of play accord with strict considerations of instrumental efficacy. In games, the basic rules, and only the basic rules, impose the equivalent of "institutional constraints on rationality" that operate in "serious life" activities. The substantive rationality that Max Weber spoke of occurs in market transactions as an essential condition of stable calculations in and concerning such transactions. In such a "practical setting," attempts to establish and sanction activities in compliance

player. Further, it is essentially possible for each player to assume or insist upon this for himself or for his partner without impoverishing his grasp of the game that is being played.

The Constitutive Order of Events of Everyday Life

Can the "constitutive accent" be found for situations of events of "serious" life? I propose that the three properties that are definitive of the basic rules of a game are not particular to games but are found as features of the "assumptions" that Alfred Schutz, in his work on the constitutive phenomenology of situations of everyday life (1945, 1951), has called the "attitude of daily life."

Before listing the features imparted to events by this attitude, it is helpful to review the point that assumptions and rules may be translated into the language of expected events. To say, for example, that a player assumes the rule of ticktacktoe that players move alternately A,B,A,B. . . means the same thing as saying that his actions are governed in their course by the normative sequence of events, A,B,A,B. . . What a person is said to "assume" is equivalent to what he is said to "assume about the possible fall of events" which is equivalent again to saying that his actions are governed by a restricted way in which possible events can occur. What he is said to "assume" therefore consists of attributed features of events that are "scenic" to him. He attends their sense as a restricted frame of alternative specifications of the scene of events. The actor is therefore capable of experiencing "surprises" when actual events breach these expectancies.

The following formula defines the constitutive accent. It can be fitted to each of the features of the situation of events that Schutz talks about in his list of assumptions of the attitude of daily life. Each of the features carries the prefatory attribution: "Out of the alternative possibilities, the person (a) expects that. . . (insert the relevant feature); (b) expects that as it holds for him it holds for the other person as well; and (c) expects that as he expects it to hold for the other person, the other person expects it to hold for him."

---

with the ideal of formal rationality, as Weber speaks of it, would impoverish the person's grasp of his real situation, anomicize the perceived environment of actual and possible transactional events, and disorganize the interaction. In games, by contrast, substantive, as compared with formal, rationality occurs because players may opt for one or the other; or substantive rationality in game play may occur because the players may not know enough to play otherwise.

The Attitude of Daily Life

In a series of classical writings in sociological theory directed to the constitutive phenomenology of situations of daily life (1932, 1943, 1944, 1945(a), 1945(b), 1951, 1953, 1954, 1955), Schutz described those presuppositions whereby scenic occurrences were assigned by an actor the constituent meanings for him of the scene's feature, "known in common with others." In accordance with the program, attitude, and method of Husserlian phenomenology (Spiegelberg, 1960), Schutz looked for the presuppositions and the corresponding environmental features intended by them that were invariant to the specific contents of actions and their objects. The list is not exhaustive. Further research should reveal others. Like any product of observation they have the provisional status of "so until demonstrated to be otherwise."

1. Schutz found that in everyday situations the "practical theorist" achieves an ordering of events while seeking to retain and sanction the presupposition that the objects of the world are what they appear to be. The person coping with everyday affairs seeks an interpretation of these affairs while holding a line of "official" neutrality toward the view that one may exercise a *rule* of doubt about *any* objects of the world that they are as they appear to be. Instead the person's assumption consists in the expectation that a relationship of undoubted correspondence exists between the particular appearance-of-an-object and the intended-object-that-appears-in-this-particular-manner. Out of the set of possible relationships between the actual appearances of the object and the intended object, as for example, a relationship of *doubtful* correspondence between the two, the person expects that the presupposed undoubted correspondence is the sanctionable one. He expects that the other person employs the same expectancy in a more or less identical fashion and expects that, just as he expects the relationship to hold for the other person, the other person expects it to hold for him.

2. Schutz refers to a second assumption as the person's practical interest in the events of the world. The relevant features of events that his interest in them selects carry along for the person as *their* invariant feature that they can actually and potentially affect the person's actions and can be affected by his actions. Under this presupposed feature of events, the accuracy of his orderings of events is assumed by the person to be tested and testable without suspending the relevance of what he knows as fact, supposition, conjecture, fantasy, and the like by virtue of his bodily and social positions in the real world. Events, their relationships, their causal texture, are not for him matters of theoretic interest. He does not sanction the notion that in dealing with them it is correct to address them with the rule that he knows nothing, or that he can assume that

he knows nothing "just to see where it leads." In everyday situations, what he knows is an integral feature of his social competence. He assumes that what he knows in the way he knows it personifies himself as a social object to himself as well as to others as a bona fide member of the group. He sanctions his competence as a bona fide member of the group (i.e., he and other members take his competence for granted) as a condition for his being assured that his grasp of his everyday affairs is a realistic grasp.

3. Schutz describes the time perspective of daily life. In his everyday activities the person reifies the stream of experience into "time slices" with the use of a scheme of temporal relationships that he assumes he and other persons employ in an equivalent and standardized fashion. The conversation that he is having consists for him not only of the events of his stream of experience, but of what was, or may be said at a time that is designated by the successive positions of the hands of the clock. Not only is the "sense of the conversation" progressively realized through a succession of realized meanings of the thus-far accomplished course of the conversation but every "thus-far" is informed by *its* anticipations. Further, as of any here-and-now, as well as over the succession of here-and-nows, the conversation for him has both its retrospective and prospective significances. These include the as of here-and-now references to beginnings, duration, pacing, phasing, and termination. These determinations of the "inner time" of the stream of experiences he coordinates with a socially employed scheme of temporal determinations. He uses the scheme of standard time as a means of scheduling and coordinating his actions with those of others, of gearing his interests to those of others, and of pacing his actions to theirs. His interest in standard time is directed to the problems such specifications solve in scheduling and coordinating interaction. He assumes, too, that the scheme of standard time is entirely a public enterprise, a kind of "one big clock identical for all."

There are other and contrasting ways of temporally punctuating the stream of experience so as to produce a sensible and known-in-common array of events in the "outer world." For example, the person engaged in the activities of scientific theorizing uses standard time as a device for constructing one out of alternative empirically possible worlds (assuming of course that the theorizer is interested in matters of fact). Thus, what would, from his interests in the mastery of practical affairs, involve the person's use of time to gear his interests to the conduct of others, is, for his interests as a scientific problem which consists of clearly formulating such programs of coordinated actions in the fashion of relationships of cause and effect. Another contrasting example is found in attending the events in the theatre play. Interests in standard time are

put aside as irrelevant. When he attends the social structures portrayed in a play like *Ethan Frome,* the playgoer allows the lovers' fate to come before, and as a condition for appreciating, the sequence of steps that led up to the lovers' fate.

4. Schutz describes the et cetera assumption. By this is meant the assumption that as events have occurred in the past, they will occur again in the future.

5. A closely related assumption is that the appearances of events can be intended again by the actor as an ensemble of constituent appearances. Thereby, the constancy of the intended object throughout variations in actual appearances consists in its temporal identicality. The person assumes that the intended object is the same object now as was intended in the past and can be intended again in the future despite the facts of time sampling, and changes of context, circumstances, and actual appearances.

6. The person assumes a commonly entertained scheme of communication. He is informed as to the sense of scenic events by a presupposed background of things that "Anyone like us knows." He assumes that such a background is used by himself and others in the manner of coding rules in terms of which the question of correct correspondence between the appearance of the object and the intended-object-that-appears-in-this-particular-way is decided.

7. Schutz found the "thesis of the reciprocity of perspectives." This thesis consists of two assumptions: (a) the assumption of the "interchangeability of standpoints," and (b) the assumption of the "congruency of relevances."

(a) By the person's assumption of the interchangeability of standpoints is meant that the person takes for granted, assumes that the other person does the same, and assumes that as he assumes for the other the other assumes for him, that if they were to change places so that the other person's here-and-now became his, and his became the other person's, that the person would see events in the same typical way as does the other person, and the other person would see them in the same typical way as he does.

Stated in another way, the person attends a situation that has as its "background" feature that, given the specific actual appearances of a scene, if each were to exchange places with the other, each would recognize the scene in a manner that was for all the practical purposes of their interaction more or less similar. As the person attends the scene, the particular, actual here-and-now appearances of the scene are different for him than they are for the other. The person *knows* this. But even while knowing this, the scene has for him *at the same time* its char-

acteristic feature that what *actually* appears here-and-now is the-potential-appearance-it-has-for-the-other-person-if-the-two-were-to-exchange-positions. He assumes that what each actually sees can potentially be seen by both under an exchange of positions. Thus, Schutz found, the person assumes that there are different appearances but assumes too that these are due to different perspectival positions in a world that is identical for both. But this identical world, Schutz found, is the accomplishment of the assumed possibility of interchangeability of positions—physical and social—under which the presupposed interchangeability can be entertained with manageable incongruity. Hence, the feature of a scene for the actor that it is the identical scene for him and the other person can be modified by modifying this presupposition, e.g., by a change of interest, by ceremonial arrangement, by such instrumental manipulations as brain surgery, drugs, and the like. The identical world is guaranteed by the person's "ability" to retain this presupposition under the contingencies imposed by the factual world. This point will be discussed again later in the paper.

(b) By the assumption of the congruency of relevances is meant that the person assumes, assumes that the other person also assumes, and assumes that as he assumes it for the other the other assumes it for him, that differences in perspective that the person knows originate in his own and in the other person's particular biographical situations are irrelevant for the purposes at hand of either, and that both have selected and interpreted the actually and potentially common objects and their features in an "empirically identical" manner that is sufficient for all their practical purposes.

8. The person assumes a particular "form of sociality." Among other things, the form of sociality consists of the person's assumption that some characteristic disparity exists between the "image" of himself that he attributes to the other person as that person's knowledge of him, and the knowledge that he has of himself in the "eyes" of the other person. He assumes too that alterations of this characteristic disparity remain within his autonomous control. The assumption serves as a rule whereby the everyday theorist groups his experiences with regard to what goes properly with whom. Thereby there corresponds to the common intersubjective world of communication unpublicized knowledge which, in the eyes of the person, is distributed among persons as grounds of their actions, i.e., as their motives or, in the radical sense of the term, their "interests" as constituent features of the social relationships of interaction. The person assumes that there are matters that one person knows that he assumes others do not know. The ignorance of one party consists in what another knows that is motivationally relevant to the first. Thereby,

matters that are known in common are informed in their sense by the personal reservations, the matters that are selectively withheld. Thus, the events of everyday situations are informed by this integral background of "meanings held in reserve," of matters known about self and others that are none of somebody else's business: in a word, the private life.

The Definitive Features of Events Which Are Members of the Commonsense Environment

Each of the foregoing presuppositions assigns to a set of scenic events a feature that the members of that set share. A commonsense environment is defined by the feature, attached to all members of the set, "known in common with any bona fide member of the collectivity." Schutz' findings explicate the compound character of the feature "known in common." This feature was analyzed by Schutz into several features that are the constituent meanings of "known in common."

Whatever an event may specifically consist of, whether its determinations are those of persons' motives, their life histories, distributions of income in the population, the conditions of advancement on the job, kinship obligations, the organization of an industry, the layout of a city, what ghosts do when night falls, and the thought that God thinks, *if and only if the event has for the witness the following additional determinations, is it an event in the commonsense environment.*

1. The determinations assigned to the event by the user are, from his point of view, assignments that he is required to make; the other person is required to make the same assignments; and just as the user requires the same assignments to hold for the other persons, he assumes that the other person requires the same of him.

2. From the user's point of view, a relationship of undoubted correspondence is the sanctioned relationship between the-presented-appearance-of-the-intended-object and the-intended-object-that-appears-in-this-presented-appearance.

3. From the user's point of view, the event that is known, in the manner that it is known, can actually and potentially affect the knower's actions and circumstances and can be affected by his actions and circumstances.

4. From the user's point of view, the meanings of events are the products of a standardized process of naming, reification, and idealization of the user's stream of experiences, i.e., the products of the same language.

5. From the user's point of view, the present determinations of the events, whatever these may be, are determinations that were intended on

previous occasions and that may be again intended in identical fashion on an indefinite number of future occasions.

6. From the user's point of view, the intended event is retained as the temporally identical event throughout the stream of experience.

7. From the user's point of view, the event has as its contexts of interpretation:

(a) a commonly entertained scheme of communication consisting of a standardized system of signals and coding rules,

and

(b) "What anyone knows," i.e., a pre-established corpus of socially warranted knowledge.

8. From the user's point of view, the actual determinations that the event exhibits for him are the potential determinations that it would exhibit for the other person were they to exchange positions.

9. From the user's point of view, to each event there corresponds its determinations that originate in the user's and in the other person's particular biography. From the user's point of view, such determinations are irrelevant for the purposes at hand of either, and from the user's point of view both have selected and interpreted the actual and potential determinations of the event in an empirically identical manner that is sufficient for all their practical purposes.

10. From the user's point of view, there is a characteristic disparity between the publicly acknowledged determinations and the personal, withheld determinations of events, with this private knowledge held in reserve. From the user's point of view, the event means for both the user and the other more than the user can say.

11. From the user's point of view, alterations of this characteristic disparity remain within his own autonomous control.

The Commonsense Environment of Events

It is the case that what an event exhibits as its distinctive determinations is not a condition of membership in the commonsense environment, whereas its features would be seen by others if their positions were exchanged, that its features are not assigned as a matter of personal preference but are to be seen by anyone, and the rest, i.e., the constituent features of "known in common with others," are the conditions of membership.

The eleven features enumerated above, and these alone, define the commonsense character of an event. These eleven features are the critical conditions for the use by societal members of events as sanctionable

grounds of further inferences and actions.[8] For members these features are constitutive of "actual events in a real and common world" irrespective of whatever other determinations these events may exhibit. Thus, if such events as "Husbands provide the primary support for their families," "If you jump in the water you'll get wet," "All Jews are rich," and "Christ will come a second time," are said to be members of the commonsense environment in general, then this is equivalent to saying that for the users they exhibit the above eleven features.

For users, these attributed features are necessarily relevant ones. That is, they are invariantly presupposed, or better, invariantly understood features of what the users are looking at and what they see. For example, the picture on the wall behind my fellow conversationalist which I see, but which he does not see as long as he is turned toward me, has for me as one of its features, along with the likeness of the scene it portrays, that it-would-be-seen-by-him-if-he-were-to-turn-his-head. In fact, I treat as an evidence of its "concrete" character, i.e., as a potentially testable specification of the picture, that it is the-picture-he-would-see-if-he-turned-his-head. But, for a multitude of situations in which I am involved, such a specification of the picture may be "merely taken for granted," a potentially testable feature by a variety of possible operations. The feature remains unproblematic, and not only beyond awareness but perhaps even beyond my inclination or ability to verbalize it. That it is nevertheless a matter that I am responsive to can under an appropriate operation (like an incongruity-inducing procedure) be demonstrated to be operative.

Such attributed features inform the user about any particular appearance of an interpersonal environment but without their necessarily being recognized in a conscious or deliberated fashion. Instead, these attributions are characteristically "seen without being noticed" features of socially structured environments. Although they are demonstrably relevant to the recognizable character of environing events for the person and, from his point of view, for others around him, they are rarely attended by him. As Schutz (1954b) points out, a "special motive" is required to bring them under review. The more the setting is institutionally regulated and routinized, the more does the user take for granted their feature "known in common with others." Hence such features are critical not only to the purposes of this paper but to sociological inquiries generally, for a perennial task of sociological inquiries is

[8] A common theme that runs through the many definitions that sociologists and anthropologists use for the term "common culture" is the reference to the socially sanctioned grounds of inferences and actions that persons, thought of as members of a society, use in the management of their everyday affairs and which they assume that other members use in the same way. Thus one may think of these eleven characteristics as constituent features of common culture, and may treat the various definitions as theoretical versions of commonsense knowledge of social structures.

to locate and define the features of their situations that persons, while unaware of, are nevertheless responsive to as *required* features.

The assumptions that make up the attitude of daily life are constitutive of a situation of events as a world known in common and taken for granted. This means that such an environment of events for the person includes these attributions as necessarily relevant ones, i.e., as invariantly presupposed, invariantly understood, in exactly the same way as the ticktacktoe player, throughout the alterations of the game, understands that the field of play consists of nine cells. These attributions to the field of events inform the ticktacktoe player about any particular event of play but without being a conscious part of his deliberations. Similarly for the person in everyday environments. And just as it holds for the game of ticktacktoe that such attributions are demonstrably relevant to the player's judgments but are rarely problematical, so does it hold for the events of everyday life. Such attributions are features of witnessed events that are "seen without being noticed." They are demonstrably relevant to the sense that the actor makes of what is going on about him but they are rarely attended to by him. In a person's situation of events such features are integral specifications of these events, and are essential to his recognition of an environment as consisting of real and understandable events and for his recognition of rational and reasonable actions occurring in and upon that environment.

These expected features of events that we have listed are conceived as features of domains of events about which the actor, even though he may be unaware of them, is capable of experiencing severe and nasty surprise. *Indeed, in proposing that they are features which receive the constitutive accent, the operation for multiplying the senseless character of his situation involves breaching them.* And in correspondence to the definition of "trust" in games, the constitutive accent placed upon these events provides us our general definition of "trust" in everyday situations.

What Conditions Must Be Established in Order To Induce Confusion?

Merely taking an action that breaches a constitutive expectancy will not by itself get us the results that we desire. To see that this is so consider once more the picture on the wall that my conversational partner does not see as long as he faces me but that he could see if he turned his head. Imagine that when I ask him, "How do you like the picture behind you?" he turns his head, scans the wall, turns back, and asks, "What picture?" Nothing is less obvious than that I must thereupon fall into bewilderment even though this is a procedure for breaching the

constitutive expectancy of the interchangeability of standpoints. It is not obvious that confusion must result because nothing has been provided so far in this paper that would permit a decision as to which of my alternative responses to his remark are possible, let alone likely. I might suffer a disorientation, but I might take his remark as a rude comment on my taste in pictures, or I might ask him in a playful fashion how long he has been blind. As yet, no rule has been proposed that would restrict in any but an eclectic commonsense way the set of alternative responses. For example, for each alternative that I might select it is necessary that I assume something about the kind of relationship that I have with the person. If it is proposed that he is a status superior, then one might be inclined to "predict" a different reply on my part than if he is a close friend.

Some further decisions therefore are required in order to arrive at the conditions under which as a matter of logical necessity confusion must be predicted.

To help, I shall again borrow from Schutz (1945b) by accepting his findings that the situations of games, of play, of scientific theorizing, of dreaming, of staging in the theatre, of theatre going, are produced by modifying the presuppositions of the attitude of daily life. Just as one ceases to attend events in the "usual way" in favor of "getting into the play," in reverse one "leaves" the theatre, or one "puts aside" the scientific problem, or one "wakes" from dreaming, or one is "done" with the game, or one "stops" play-acting, only to return to the "everyday" events of the social order. The presuppositions that are constitutive of the feature of a situation of events "known-in-common-with-others-and-with-others-taken-for-granted" are "fundamental" in the sense that all alternative domains of events—of dreaming, of scientific theorizing, of play attending—are modifications of the attitude of daily life. For example, the presuppositions that constitute the sense for the playgoer of Caesar's death at the hands of the disaffected senators are produced by treating the time that it takes to put on a performance of Julius Caesar as a known but essentially irrelevant condition for "appreciating" the events of the play, e.g., for recognizing what Antonius is really telling the crowd about Caesar's assassins. But when the curtain comes down the presuppositions of the "mundane temporal order of things" is reinstated, i.e., "the play is over."

"Fundamental" and "derivative" accents upon an order of events are changed as one changes around between the attitude of daily life and alternative attitudes as modifications of it. The environmental product of each change, as the case varies, would be the domain of "the play," of the "scientific problem," of the "dream." Each of these is a "subdomain" of

events whose sense is the product of a modification of the sense that events acquire through the attitude of everyday life.

To decide the conditions of confusion, we encounter first the fact that each of the possible modifications of the "sense of a situation" involves a particular suspension of the normative orders of events of everyday life. A person, therefore, who encounters a breach of the constitutive accent of everyday situations may cope with the "incongruity" by "leaving the field," e.g., by "making a game" of his situation or turning it into "an experiment" or "playful exchange" and the rest. But as we have just proposed, each involves the suspension by him of the relevance of ordinary structural constraints.

In the game of ticktacktoe we saw that confusion and bewilderment was most marked for those who sought to resolve "surprise" while retaining the order of the game, i.e., without leaving the game or attending a new game. Thereby a first condition is at least initially recommended. If we are going to confuse our subject, we have to prevent him from leaving the field. Concretely this means that, if we begin with a situation that is structured according to the presuppositions of everyday life, we must somehow prevent the person from turning the situation into a game, or treating it as an object of mere theoretic interest, or from "seeing" it as an experiment, and so on.

But, even if this condition is met, our subject would still have an important alternative open to him. If, however, we assume the "fundamental" character of the assumptions of everyday life, it would be the *only* other course open to him: He could place the constitutive accent of everyday life upon a new set of events. As was the case for games, this means exactly the same thing as redefining social reality.

But with respect to the possibility of a single person by himself achieving such a redefinition of social reality, there is much data to recommend that although such a process of redefinition can occur (a) it would seem that it is best done in concert with others; (b) it takes time; and (c) it has as its product the person's assumption of the consensual validity of the redefined reality.

We have arrived now at the conditions that would need to be established if we are to program a set of manipulations that will multiply the anomic features of a person's situation. If the person cannot leave the field, and if he cannot place the constitutive accent upon a new set of events because he must manage the redefinition by himself in insufficient time and without being able to assume that the new accent is a consensually supported one, then he should have no alternative except to normalize the breach of constitutive expectancies within the normative order of events of daily life. The result should be confusion.

Some Preliminary Trials and Findings

Since each of the presuppositions that make up the attitude of daily life assigns an expected feature to the actor's environment, it should be possible to induce experimentally a breach of these expectancies by deliberately modifying scenic events so as to disappoint these attributions. By definition, surprise is possible with respect to each of these expected features. The nastiness of surprise should vary directly with the extent to which the actor complies with the constitutive order of events of everyday life as a scheme for assigning witnessed appearances their status of events in a perceivedly normal environment.

Procedures were used to see if a breach of these presuppositions would produce anomic effects and increase disorganization. These procedures must be thought of as demonstrations rather than as experiments. "Experimenters" were upper division students in the author's courses. Their training consisted of little more than verbal instructions about how to proceed. The demonstrations were done as class assignments and were unsupervised. Students reported their results in anecdotal fashion with no controls beyond the fact that they were urged to avoid interpretation in favor of writing down what was actually said and done, staying as close as possible to a chronological account.

Because the procedures nevertheless produced massive effects, I feel they are worth reporting. Obviously, however, caution must be exercised in assessing the findings.

Demonstration 1: Breaching the Congruency of Relevances. This expectancy consists of the following. The person expects, expects that the other person does the same, and expects that as he expects it of the other the other expects the like of him that the differences in their perspectives that originate in their particular individual biographies are irrelevant for the purposes at hand of each and that both have selected and interpreted the actually and potentially common objects in an "empirically identical" manner that is sufficient for the purposes at hand. Thus, for example, in talking about "matters just known in common" persons will discuss them using a course of utterances that are governed by the expectation that the other person *will* understand. The speaker expects that the other person will assign to his remarks the sense intended by the speaker and expects that thereby the other person will permit the speaker the assumption that both know what he is talking about without any requirement of a check-out. Thus the sensible character of the matter that is being discussed is settled by a fiat assignment that each expects to make, and expects the other to make in reciprocal fashion, that as a condition of his right to decide without interference that he knows what he is talking

about and that what he is talking about is so, each will have furnished whatever unstated understandings are required. Much therefore that is being talked about is not mentioned, although each expects that the adequate sense of the matter being talked about is settled. The more so is this the case, the more is the exchange one of commonplace remarks among persons who "know" each other.

Students were instructed to engage an acquaintance or friend in an ordinary conversation and, without indicating that what the experimenter was saying was in any way out of the ordinary, to insist that the person clarify the sense of his commonplace remarks. Twenty-three students reported twenty-five instances of such encounters. The following are typical excerpts from their accounts.

Case 1. The subject was telling the experimenter, a member of the subject's car pool, about having had a flat tire while going to work the previous day.

(*S*) "I had a flat tire."
(*E*) "What do you mean, you had a flat tire?"
She appeared momentarily stunned. Then she answered in a hostile way: "What do you mean? What do you mean? A flat tire is a flat tire. That is what I meant. Nothing special. What a crazy question!"

Case 2. (*S*) "Hi, Ray. How is your girl friend feeling?"
(*E*) "What do you mean, how is she feeling? Do you mean physical or mental?"
(*S*) "I mean how is she feeling? What's the matter with you?"
(He looked peeved.)
(*E*) "Nothing. Just explain a little clearer, what do you mean?"
(*S*) "Skip it. How are your Med School applications coming?"
(*E*) "What do you mean, 'How are they?' "
(*S*) "You know what I mean."
(*E*) "I really don't."
(*S*) "What's the matter with you? Are you sick?"

Case 3. On Friday night my husband and I were watching television. My husband remarked that he was tired. I asked, "How are you tired? Physically, mentally, or just bored?"

(*S*) "I don't know, I guess physically, mainly."
(*E*) "You mean that your muscles ache, or your bones?"
(*S*) "I guess so. Don't be so technical."
(*S*) (After more watching) "All these old movies have the same kind of old iron bedstead in them."
(*E*) "What do you mean? Do you mean all old movies, or some of them, or just the ones you have seen?"
(*S*) "What's the matter with you? You know what I mean."
(*E*) "I wish you would be more specific."
(*S*) "You know what I mean! Drop dead!"

Case 4. During a conversation (with the male *E*'s fiancee) the *E* questioned the meaning of various words used by the subject. For the first minute and

a half the subject responded to the questions as if they were legitimate inquiries. Then she responded with "Why are you asking me these questions?" and repeated this two or three times after each question. She became nervous and jittery, her face and hand movements . . . uncontrolled. She appeared bewildered and complained that I was making her nervous and demanded that I "Stop it!" . . . The subject picked up a magazine and covered her face. She put down the magazine and pretended to be engrossed. When asked why she was looking at the magazine, she closed her mouth and refused any further remarks.

Case 5. My friend said to me, "Hurry or we will be late." I asked him what did he mean by late and from what point of view did it have reference. There was a look of perplexity and cynicism on his face. "Why are you asking me such silly questions? Surely I don't have to explain such a statement. What is wrong with you today? Why should I have to stop to analyze such a statement. Everyone understands my statements and you should be no exception."

Case 6. The victim waved his hand cheerily.

(*S*) "How are you?"

(*E*) "How am I in regard to what? My health, my finance, my school work, my peace of mind, my . . ."

(*S*) (Red in the face and suddenly out of control.) "Look! I was just trying to be polite. Frankly, I don't give a damn how you are."

Case 7. My friend and I were talking about a man whose overbearing attitude annoyed us. My friend expressed his feeling.

(*S*) "I'm sick of him."

(*E*) "Would you explain what is wrong with you that you are sick?"

(*S*) "Are you kidding me? You know what I mean."

(*E*) "Please explain your ailment."

(*S*) (He listened to me with a puzzled look.) "What came over you? We never talk this way, do we?"

Case 8. Apparently as a casual afterthought, my husband mentioned Friday night, "Did you remember to drop off my shirts today?"

Taking nothing for granted, I replied, "I remember that you said something about it this morning. What shirts did you mean, and what did you mean by having them 'dropped' off?" He looked puzzled, as though I must have answered some other question than the one asked.

Instead of making the explanation he seemed to be waiting for, I persisted, "I thought your shirts were all in pretty good shape; why not keep them a little longer?" I had the uncomfortable feeling I had overplayed the part.

He no longer looked puzzled, but indignant. He repeated, "A little longer! What do you mean, and what have you done with my shirts?"

I acted indignant too. I asked, "What shirts? You have sport shirts, plain shirts, wool shirts, regular shirts, and dirty shirts. I'm no mind reader. What exactly did you want?"

My husband again looked confused, as though he was trying to justify my behavior. He seemed simultaneously to be on the defensive and offensive. He assumed a very patient, tolerant air, and said, "Now, let's start all over again. Did you drop off my shirts today?"

I replied, "I heard you before. It's your meaning I wish was more clear.

As far as I am concerned dropping off your shirts—which ever shirts you mean —could mean giving them to the Goodwill, leaving them at the cleaners, at the laundromat, or throwing them out. I never know what you mean with those vague statements."

He reflected on what I said, then changed the entire perspective by acting as though we were playing a game, that it was all a joke. He seemed to enjoy the joke. He ruined my approach by assuming the role I thought was mine. He then said, "Well, let's take this step by step with 'yes' or 'no' answers: Did you see the dirty shirts I left on the kitchenette, yes or no?"

I could see no way to complicate his question, so felt forced to answer "Yes." In the same fashion, he asked if I picked up the shirts; if I put them in the car; if I left them at the laundry; and if I did all these things that day, Friday. My answers were "Yes."

The experiment, it seemed to me, had been cut short by his reducing all the parts of his previous question to their simplest terms, which were given to me as if I were a child unable to handle any complex questions, problems, or situations.

Demonstration 2: Breaching the Interchangeability of Standpoints. In order to breach the presupposed interchangeability of standpoints, students were asked to enter a store, to select a customer, and to treat the customer as a clerk while giving no recognition that the subject was any other person than the experimenter took him to be and without giving any indication that the experimenter's treatment was anything other than perfectly reasonable and legitimate.

Case 1. One evening, while shopping at Sears with a friend, I (male) found myself next to a woman shopping at the copper-clad pan section. The store was busy . . . and clerks were hard to find. The woman was just a couple of feet away and my friend was behind me. Pointing to a tea kettle, I asked the woman if she did not think the price was rather high. I asked in a friendly tone. . . . She looked at me and then at the kettle and said "yes." I then said I was going to take it anyway. She said, "Oh," and started to move sideways away from me. I quickly asked her if she was not going to wrap it for me and take my cash. Still moving slowly away and glancing first at me, then at the kettle, then at the other pans farther away from me, she said the clerk was "over there" pointing off somewhere. In a harsh tone, I asked if she was not going to wait on me. She said, "No, No, I'm not the saleslady. There she is." I said that I knew that the extra help was inexperienced, but that was no reason not to wait on a customer. "Just wait on me. I'll be patient." With that, she flushed with anger and walked rapidly away, looking back once as if to ask if it could really be true.

The following three protocols are the work of a forty-year-old female graduate student in clinical psychology.

Case 2. We went to V's book store, noted not so much for its fine merchandise and its wide range of stock as it is in certain circles for the fact that the clerks are male homosexuals. I approached a gentleman who was browsing at a table stacked neatly with books.

(*E*) "I'm in a hurry. Would you get a copy of *Sociopathic Behavior* by Lemert, please?"

(*S*) (Looked *E* up and down, drew himself very straight, slowly laid the book down, stepped back slightly, then leaned forward and in a low voice said) "I'm interested in sociopathic behavior, too. That's why I'm here. I study the fellows here by pretending to be . . ."

(*E*) (Interrupting) "I'm not particularly interested in whether you are or are only pretending to be. Please just get the book I asked for."

(*S*) (Looked shocked. More than surprised, believe me. Stepped around the display table, deliberately placed his hands on the books, leaned forward and shouted) "I don't have such a book. I'm not a clerk! I'm— Well!" (Stalked out of the store.)

Case 3. When we entered I. Magnin's there was one woman who was fingering a sweater, the only piece of merchandise to be seen in the shop. I surmised that the clerk must be in the stockroom.

(*E*) "That is a lovely shade, but I'm looking for one a little lighter. Do you have one in cashmere?"

(*S*) "I really don't know, you see I'm . . ."

(*E*) (*Interruping*) "Oh, you are new here? I don't mind waiting while you look for what I want."

(*S*) "Indeed I shall not!"

(*E*) "But aren't you here to *serve* customers?"

(*S*) "I'm not! I'm here to . . ."

(*E*) (Interrupts) "This is hardly the place for such an attitude. Now please show me a cashmere sweater a shade or two lighter than this one."

(The clerk entered.)

(*S*) (To clerk) "My dear, this—(pointed her face toward *E*)—*person* insists on being shown a sweater. Please take care of her while I compose myself. I want to be certain this (sweater) will do, and she (pointed her face again at *E*) is so *insistent*." (*S* carried the sweater with her, walked haughtily to a large upholstered chair, sat in it, brushed her gloved hands free from imaginary dirt, jerked her shoulders, fluffed her suit jacket, and glared at *E*).

Case 4. While visiting with a friend in Pasadena, I told him about this being-taken-for-the-clerk-experiment. The friend is a Professor Emeritus of Mathematics at the California Institute of Technology and the successful author of many books, some technical, some fictional, and he is most satirical in his contemplations of his fellow man. He begged to be allowed to accompany me and to aid me in the selection of scenes . . . We went first to have luncheon at the Atheneum, which caters to the students, faculty and guests of Cal Tech. While we were still in the lobby, my host pointed out a gentleman who was standing in the large drawing room near the entrance to the dining room and said, "Go to it. There's a good subject for you." He stepped aside to watch. I walked toward the man very deliberately and proceeded as follows. (I will use *E* to designate myself; *S*, the subject.)

(*E*) "I should like a table on the west side, a quiet spot, if you please. And what is on the menu?"

(*S*) (Turned toward *E* but looked past and in the direction of the foyer) said, "Eh, ah, madam, I'm sure." (looked past *E* again, looked at a pocket watch, replaced it, and looked toward the dining room).
(*E*) "Surely luncheon hours are not over. What do you recommend I order today?"
(*S*) "I don't know. You see, I'm waiting . . ."
(*E*) (Interrupted with) "Please don't keep me standing here while you wait. Kindly show me to a table."
(*S*) "But Madam,—" (started to edge away from door, and back into the lounge in a lightly curving direction around *E*)
(*E*) "My good man—" (at this *S*'s face flushed, his eyes rounded and opened wide)
(*S*) "But—you—I—oh dear!" (He seemed to wilt)
(*E*) (Took *S*'s arm in hand and propelled him toward the dining room door, slightly ahead of herself.)
(*S*) (Walked slowly but stopped just within the room, turned around and for the first time looked directly and very appraisingly at *E*, took out the watch, looked at it, held it to his ear, replaced it, and muttered) "Oh dear."
(*E*) "It will take only a minute for you to show me to a table and take my order. Then you can return to wait for your customers. After all, I am a guest and a customer, too."
(*S*) (Stiffened slightly, walked jerkily toward the nearest empty table, held a chair for *E* to be seated, bowed slightly, muttered "My pleasure," hurried toward the door, stopped, turned, looked back at *E* with a blank facial expression.)

At this point *E*'s host walked up to *S*, greeted him, shook hands, and propelled him toward *E*'s table. *S* stopped a few steps from the table, looked directly at, then through *E*, and started to walk back toward the door. Host told him *E* was the young lady whom he had invited to join them at lunch, (then introduced me to one of the big names in the physics world, a pillar of the institution!). *S* seated himself reluctantly and perched rigidly on his chair, obviously uncomfortable. *E* smiled, made light and polite inquiries about his work, mentioned various functions attended which had honored him, then complacently remarked that it was a shame *E* had not met him personally before now, so that she should not have mistaken him for the maitre-d. The host chattered about his long-time friendship with me, while *S* fidgeted and looked again at his pocket watch, wiped his forehead with a table napkin, looked at *E* but avoided meeting her eyes. When the host mentioned that *E* is studying sociology at UCLA, *S* suddenly burst into loud laughter, realized that everyone in the room was looking in the direction of our table, abruptly became quiet, then said to *E* "You mistook me for the maitre-d, didn't you?"

(*E*) "Deliberately, sir."
(*S*) "Why deliberately?"
(*E*) "You have just been used as the unsuspecting subject in an experiment."
(*S*) "Diabolic. But clever, I must say, (To our host) I haven't been so shaken since —— denounced my theory of —— in 19—. And the wild thoughts that ran through my mind! Call the receptionist from the

> lobby, go to the men's room, turn this woman to the first person that comes along. Damn these early diners, there's nobody coming in at this time. Time is standing still, or my watch has stopped. I will talk to —— about this, make sure it doesn't happen to 'somebody.' Damn a persistent woman. I'm not her 'good man!' I'm Dr. _____, and not to be pushed around. This can't be happening. If I do take her to that damned table she wants, I can get away from her, and I'll just take it easy until I can. I remember _____ (hereditary psychopath, wife of one of the 'family' of the institution) maybe if I do what *this* one wants she will not make any more trouble than this. I wonder if she is 'off.' She certainly looks normal. Wonder how you can really tell?"

Demonstration 3: Breaching the Expectancy That a Knowledge of a Relationship of Interaction Is a Commonly Entertained Scheme of Communication. Schutz proposed that from the member's point of view, an event of conduct, like a move in a game, consists of an event-in-a-social-order. Thus, for the member, its recognizably real character is furnished by attending its occurrence with respect to a corpus of socially sanctioned knowledge of the social relationships that the member uses and assumes that others use as the same scheme of expression and interpretation.

It was decided to breach this expectancy by having students treat a situation as something that it "obviously" and "really" was not. Students were instructed to spend from fifteen minutes to an hour in their own homes acting as if they were boarders. They were instructed to conduct themselves in a circumspect and polite fashion: to avoid getting personal; to use formal address; to speak only when they were spoken to.

In nine of forty-nine cases students either refused to do the assignment (five cases) or the try was "unsuccessful" (four cases). Four of the "no try" students said they were afraid to do it; a fifth said she preferred to avoid the risk of exciting her mother who had a heart condition. In two of the "unsuccessful" cases the family treated it as a joke from the beginning and refused, despite the continuing actions of the student experimenter, to change. A third family took the view that something of an undisclosed sort was the matter, but what it might be was of no concern to them. In the fourth family the father and mother remarked that the daughter was being "extra nice" and undoubtedly wanted something that she would shortly reveal.

In the remaining four-fifths of the cases family members were stupefied, vigorously sought to make the strange actions intelligible, and to restore the situation to normal appearances. Reports were filled with accounts of astonishment, bewilderment, shock, anxiety, embarrassment, and anger as well as with charges by various family members that the student was mean, inconsiderate, selfish, nasty, and impolite. Family members de-

manded explanations: "What's the matter?" "What's gotten into you?" "Did you get fired?" "Are you sick?" "What are you being so superior about?" "Why are you mad?" "Are you out of your mind or are you just stupid?" One student acutely embarrassed his mother in front of her friends by asking if she minded if he had a snack from the refrigerator. "Mind if you have a little snack? You've been eating little snacks around here for years without asking me. What's gotten into you?!" One mother, infuriated when her daughter spoke to her only when she was spoken to, began to shriek in angry denunciation of the daughter for her disrespect and insubordination and refused to be calmed by the student's sister. A father berated his daughter for being insufficiently concerned for the welfare of others and of acting like a spoiled child.

Occasionally family members would first treat the student's action as a cue for a joint comedy routine which was soon replaced by irritation and exasperated anger at the student for not knowing "when enough was enough." Family members mocked the "politeness" of the students—"Certainly Mr. Dinerberg!"—or charged the student with acting like a wise guy and generally reproved the "politeness" with sarcasm.

Explanations were sought in terms of understandable and previous motives of the student: the accusation that the student was covering up something important that the family should know; that the student was working too hard in school; that the student was ill; that there had been "another fight" with a fiancee.

Unacknowledged explanations were followed by withdrawal of the offended member, attempted isolation of the culprit, retaliation, and denunciation. "Don't bother with him, he's in one of his moods again." "Pay no attention but just wait until he asks me for something." "You're cutting me, okay. I'll cut you and then some." "Why must you always create friction in our family harmony?" A father followed his son into the bedroom. "Your mother is right. You don't look well and you're not talking sense. You had better get another job that doesn't require such late hours." To this the student replied that he appreciated his consideration, but that he felt fine and only wanted a little privacy. The father responded in high rage, "I don't want any more of *that* out of *you*. And if you can't treat your mother decently, you'd better move out!"

There were no cases in which the situation was not restorable upon the student's explanation. Nevertheless, for the most part, family members were not amused and only rarely did they find the experience instructive, as the student argued that it was supposed to have been. After hearing the explanation, a sister replied coldly on behalf of a family of four, "Please, no more of these experiments. We're not rats you know." Occasionally an explanation was accepted and still it added offense. In

several cases students reported that the explanation left them, their families, or both wondering how much of what the student had said was "in character" and how much the student "really meant."

Students found the assignment difficult to complete because of not being treated as if they were in the role that they are attempting to play and of being confronted with situations to which they did not know how a boarder would respond.

There were several entirely unexpected results. (1) Although many students reported extensive rehearsals in imagination, very few of those that did it mentioned anticipatory fears or embarrassment. (2) Although unanticipated and nasty developments frequently occurred, in only one case did a student report serious regrets. (3) Very few students reported heartfelt relief when the hour was over. They were much more likely to report a partial relief. They frequently reported that in response to the anger of others they became angry in return and slipped easily into subjectively recognizable feelings and actions.

Demonstration 4: Breaching the Grasp of "What Anyone Knows" To Be Correct Grounds of Action of a Real Social World. Among the possibilities that a premedical student could treat as correct grounds for his further inferences and actions about such matters as how a medical school intake interview is conducted or how an applicant's conduct is related to his chances of admission, certain ones (e.g., that deferring to the interviewer's interests is a condition for making a favorable impression) he treats as matters that he is required to know and act upon as a condition of his competence as a premedical candidate. He expects others like him to know and act upon the same things; and he expects that as he expects others to know and act upon them, the others in turn expect the like of him.

A procedure was designed to breach the constitutive expectancies attached to "what-any-competent-premedical-candidate-knows" while satisfying the three conditions under which their breach would presumably produce confusion.

Twenty-eight premedical students, of the University of California in Los Angeles, were run individually through a three-hour experimental interview. As part of the solicitation of subjects, as well as the beginning of the interview, *E* identified himself as a representative of an Eastern medical school who was attempting to learn why the medical school intake interview was such a stressful situation. It was hoped that identifying *E* as a person with medical school ties would minimize the chance that students would "leave the field" once the accent breaching procedure began. How the other two conditions of (a) managing a redefinition in insufficient time and (b) not being able to count on consensual support

for an alternative definition of social reality were met will be apparent in the following description.

During the first hour of the interview, the student furnished the facts-of-life about interviews for admission to medical school by answering for the "representative" such questions as "What sources of information about a candidate are available to medical schools?" "What can a medical school learn about a candidate from these sources?" "What kind of a man are the medical schools looking for?" "What should a good candidate do in the interview?" "What should he avoid?" With this much completed, the student was told that the "representative's" research interests had been satisfied. The student was asked if he would care to hear a recording of an actual interview. All students wanted very much to hear the recording.

The recording was a faked one between a "medical school interviewer" and an "applicant." The applicant was depicted as being a boor; his language was ungrammatical and filled with colloquialisms; he was evasive; he contradicted the interviewer; he bragged; he ran down other schools and professions; he insisted on knowing how he had done in the interview and so on.[9]

Detailed assessments by the student of the recorded applicant were obtained immediately after the recording was finished. The following edited assessment is representative:

> I didn't like it. I didn't like his attitude. I didn't like anything about him. Everything he said grated the wrong way. I didn't like his smoking. The way he kept saying "Yeah-h!" He didn't show that he realized that the interviewer had his future in his hands. I didn't like the vague way he answered questions. I didn't like the way he pressed at the end of the interview. He was disrespectful. His motives were too obvious. He made a mess of it. He finished with a bang to say the least . . . His answers to questions were stupid. I felt that the interviewer was telling him that he wasn't going to get in. I didn't like the interview. I felt it was too informal. To a degree it's good if it's natural but . . . the interview is not something to breeze through. It's just not the place for chit-chat. He had fairly good grades but . . . he's not interested in things outside of school and didn't say what he did *in* school. Then he didn't *do* very much—outside of this lab. I didn't like the man at all. I never met an applicant like that! "My pal"—Just one of these little chats. I never met anybody *like* that. Wrong-way Corrigan.

The student was then given information from the applicant's "official record." This information was deliberately contrived to contradict the principal points in the student's assessment. For example, if the student said that the applicant must have come from a lower class family, he was told that the applicant's father was vice president of a firm that manufactured pneumatic doors for trains and buses. If the applicant had

[9] The actual script of the interview is available from the author upon request.

been thought to be ignorant, he was described as having excelled in courses like The Poetry of Milton and Dramas of Shakespeare. If the student said the applicant did not know how to get along with people, then the applicant was pictured as having worked as a voluntary solicitor for Sydenham Hospital in New York City and had raised $32,000 from thirty "big givers." The belief that the applicant was stupid and would not do well in a scientific field was met by citing A grades in organic and physical chemistry and graduate level performance in an undergraduate research course.

The Ss wanted very much to know what "the others" thought of the applicant, and had he been admitted? The "others" had been previously and casually identified by the "representative" as "Dr. Gardner, the medical school interviewer," "six psychiatrically trained members of the admissions committee who heard only the recorded interview," and "other students I talked to."

The S was told that the applicant had been admitted and was living up to the promise that the medical school interviewer and the "six psychiatrists" had found and expressed in the following recommendation of the applicant's characterological fitness.

> Dr. Gardner, the medical school interviewer, wrote, "A well-bred, polite young man, poised, affable, and self-confident. Capable of independent thinking. Interests of a rather specialized character. Marked intellectual curiosity. Alert and free of emotional disturbances. Marked maturity of manner and outlook. Meets others easily. Strongly motivated toward a medical career. Definite ideas of what he wants to achieve which are held in good perspective. Unquestioned sincerity and integrity. Expressed himself easily and well. Recommend favorable consideration." The six psychiatric members of the admissions committee agreed in all essentials.

Concerning the views of "other students," S was told that he was, for example, the thirtieth student I had seen; that twenty-eight before him were in entire agreement with the medical school interviewer's assessment; and that the remaining two had been slightly uncertain but at the first bit of information had seen him just as the others had.

Following this, Ss were invited to listen to the record a second time, after which they were asked to assess the applicant again.

Results. Twenty-five of the twenty-eight subjects were taken in. The following does not apply to the three who were convinced there was a deception. Two of these are discussed at the conclusion of this section.

Incongruous materials, presented to S in the order indicated, were performance information, and characterological information. Performance information dealt with the applicant's activities, grades, family background, courses, charity work, and the like. Characterological information consisted of character assessments of him by the "medical school

interviewers," the "six psychiatrically trained members of the admissions committee," and the "other students."

Subjects managed incongruities of performance data with vigorous attempts to make it factually compatible with their original assessments. For example, when they said that the applicant sounded like a lower class person, they were told that his father was vice-president of a national corporation that manufactured pneumatic doors for trains and buses. Here are some typical replies:

"He should have made the point that he *could* count on money."

"That explains why he said he had to work. Probably his father made him work. That would make a lot of his moans unjustified in the sense that things were really not so bad."

"What does that have to do with values?!"

"You could tell from his answers. You could tell that he was used to having his own way."

"That's something the interviewer knew that *I* didn't know."

"Then he's an out and out liar!"

When Ss said that the applicant was selfish and could not get along with people, they were told that he had worked as a volunteer for Sydenham Hospital and had raised $32,000 from thirty "big givers."

"He seems to be a good salesman. So possibly he's missing his profession. I'd say *definitely* he's missing his profession!"

"They probably contributed because of the charity and not because they were solicited."

"Pretty good. Swell. Did he know them personally?"

"It's very fashionable to work, for example, during the war for Bundles for Britain. So that doesn't—definitely!—show altruistic motives at all. He is a person who is subject to fashion and I'm very critical of that sort of thing.

"He's so forceful he might have shamed them into giving."

"People who are wealthy—his father would naturally see those people—big contributions—they could give a lot of money and not know what they're giving it for."

That he had a straight A average in physical science courses began to draw bewilderment.

"He took quite a variety of courses . . . I'm baffled.—Probably the interview wasn't a very good mirror of his character."

"He did seem to take some odd courses. They seem to be fairly normal. Not normal—but—It doesn't strike me one way or the other."

"Well! I think you can analyze it this way. In psychological terms.

See—one possible way—now I may be all *wet* but this is the way I look at *that*. He probably suffered from an inferiority complex and that's an overcompensation for his inferiority complex. His *great* marks—his *good* marks are a compensation for his failure—in social dealings perhaps, I don't know."

"Woops! And only third alternate at Georgia. (Deep sigh) I can see why he'd feel resentment about not being admitted to Phi Bet."

(Long silence) "Well! From what—that leads me to think he's a grind or something like that."

Attempts to resolve the incongruities produced by the character assessment of "Gardner" and "the other six judges" were much less frequent than normalizing attempts with performance information. Open expressions of bewilderment and anxiety interspersed with silent ruminations were characteristic.

(Laugh) "Golly!" (Silence) "I'd think it would be the other way around."—(Very subdued) "Maybe I'm all wro—My orientation is all off. I'm completely baffled."

"Not polite. Self confident he certainly was. But not polite.—I don't know. Either the interviewer was a little crazy or else I am." (Long pause) "That's rather shocking. It makes me have doubts about my own thinking. Perhaps my values in life are wrong, I don't know."

(Whistles) "I—I didn't think he sounded well bred at all. That whole tone of voice!!—I—Perhaps you noticed though, when he said 'You should have said in the first place' before he took it with a smile.—But even so! No, no I can't see that. 'You should have said that before.' Maybe he was being funny though. Exercising a—No! To me it sounded impertinent!"

"Ugh—Well, that certainly puts a different slant on my conception of interviews. Gee—that—confuses me all the more."

"Well—(laugh)—Hhh!—Ugh! Well, maybe he looked like a nice boy. He did—he did get his point across.—Perhaps—seeing the person would make a big difference.—Or perhaps I would never make a good interviewer." (Reflectively and almost inaudibly) "They didn't mention any of the things I mentioned." (HG: Eh?) (Louder) "They didn't mention any of the things I mentioned and so I feel like a complete failure."

Soon after the performance data produced its consternation, an occasional request would be made: "What did the other students make of him?" Only after Gardner's assessment, and the responses to it had been made were the opinions of the "other students" given. In some cases the subject was told "34 out of 35 before you," in others 43 out of 45, 19 out

of 20, 51 out of 52. All the numbers were large. For 18 of the 25 students the delivery hardly varied from the following verbatim protocols:

[34 out of 35] I don't know. —I still stick to my original convictions. I—I—Can you tell *me* what—I saw wrong. Maybe—I—I had the wrong idea—the wrong attitude all along. (Can you tell me? I'm interested that there should be such a disparity.) Definitely. —I—think—it would be definitely the other way—I can't make sense of it. I'm completely baffled, believe me. —I—I don't understand how I could have been so wrong. Maybe my ideas—my evaluations of people are—just twisted. I mean maybe I had the wrong—maybe my sense of values—is—off—or—different—from the other 33. But I don't think that's the case—because usually—and in all modesty I say this—I—I can judge people. I mean in class, in organizations I belong to—I usually judge them right. So therefore I don't understand at *all* how I could have been so wrong. I don't think I was under any stress or strain—here—tonight but—I don't understand it.

[43 out of 45] [Laugh] I don't know what to say now. —I'm troubled by my inability to judge the guy better than that. [Subdued] I shall sleep tonight, certainly—[Very subdued] but it certainly bothers me. —Sorry that I didn't—*Well!* One question that arises—I may be wrong—(Can you see how they might have seen him?) No. No, I can't see it, no. —Sure with all that background material, yes, but I don't see how Gardner did it without it. Well, I guess that makes Gardner, Gardner, and me, me. (The other 45 students didn't have the background material) Yeah, yeah, yeah. I mean I'm not denying it at all. I mean for myself, there's no sense saying—Of course! With their background they would be accepted, especially the second man, good God! —Okay, what else?

[23 out of 25] [Softly] Maybe I'm tired. (HG, "Eh?") [Burst of laughter.] Maybe I didn't get enough sleep last night. —Uhh! —Well—I might not have been looking for the things that the other men were looking for. —I wasn't—Huh! —It puts me at a loss, really.

[10 out of 10] So I'm alone in my judgment. I don't know sir! I don't know, sir!! —I can't explain it. It's senseless. —I tried to be impartial at the beginning. I admit I was prejudiced immediately.

[51 out of 52] You mean that 51 others stuck to their guns, too? (Stuck to their guns in the sense that they saw him just as the judges saw him.) Uh huh. [Deep sigh] I still don't—Yeah! I see. But just listening I don't think he was a—very good chance. But in light of his other things I feel that the interview was not—showing—the real—him. —Hhh!

[36 out of 37] I would go back on my former opinion but I wouldn't go back too far. I just don't see it. —Why should I have these different standards? Were my opinions more or less in agreement on the first man? (No.) That leads me to think. —That's funny. Unless you got 36 unusual people. I can't understand it. Maybe it's my personality. (Does it make any difference?) It *does* make a difference if I assume they're correct. What I consider is proper, they don't. —It's my attitude—Still in all a man of that sort would alienate me, A wise guy type to be avoided. Of course you can talk like that with other fellows—but in an interview? . . . Now I'm more con-

fused than I was at the beginning of the entire interview. I think I ought to go home and look in the mirror and talk to myself. Do you have any ideas? (Why? Does it disturb you?) Yes it *does* disturb me! It makes me think my abilities to judge people and values are way off from normal. It's not a healthy situation. (What difference does it make?) If I act the way I act it seems to me that I'm just putting my head in the lion's mouth. I did have preconceptions but they're shattered all to hell. It makes me wonder about myself. Why should I have these different standards? It all points to me.

Of the twenty-five Ss who were taken in, seven were unable to resolve the incongruity of having been wrong about such an obvious matter and were unable to "see" the alternative. Their suffering was dramatic and unrelieved. Five more resolved it with the view that the medical school had accepted a good man; five others with the view that it had accepted a boor. Although they changed, they nevertheless did not abandon their former views. For them Gardner's view could be seen "in general," but the grasp lacked convincingness. When attention was drawn to particulars, the general picture would evaporate. These Ss were willing to entertain and use the "general" picture, but they suffered whenever indigestible particulars of the same portrait came into view. Subscription to the "general" picture was accompanied by a recitation of characteristics that were not only the opposite of those in the original view but were intensified by superlative adjectives like "supremely" poised, "very" natural, "most" confident, "very" calm. Further, they saw the new features through a new appreciation of the way the medical examiner had been listening. They saw, for example, that the examiner was smiling when the applicant had forgotten to offer him a cigarette.

Three more Ss were convinced that there was deception and acted on the conviction through the interview. They showed no disturbance. Two of these showed acute suffering as soon as it appeared that the interview was finished, and they were being dismissed with no acknowledgement of a deception. Three others inadvertently suffered in silence and confounded *E*. Without any indication to *E*, they regarded the interview as an experimental one in which they were being asked to solve some problems and therefore were being asked to do as well as possible and to make no changes in their opinions, for only then would they be contributing to the study. They were difficult for me to understand during the interview because they displayed marked anxiety, yet their remarks were bland and were not addressed to the matters that were provoking it. Finally three more Ss contrasted with the others. One of these insisted that the character assessments were semantically ambiguous and because there was insufficient information a "high correlation opinion" was not possible. A second, and the only one in the entire series, found, according to his account, the second portrait as convincing as the

original one. When the deception was revealed, he was disturbed that he could have been as convinced as he was. The third one, in the face of everything, showed only slight disturbance of very short duration. However, he alone among the subjects had already been interviewed for medical school, had excellent contacts, despite a grade point average of less than C he estimated his chances of admission as fair, and finally he expressed his preference for a career in the diplomatic service over a career in medicine.

As a final observation, twenty-two of the twenty-eight Ss expressed marked relief—ten of them with explosive expressions—when I disclosed the deception. Unanimously they said that the news of the deception permitted them to return to their former views. Seven Ss had to be convinced that there had been a deception. When the deception was revealed, they asked what they were to believe. Was I telling them that there had been a deception in order to make them feel better? No pains were spared, and whatever truth or lies that had to be told were told in order to establish the truth that there had been a deception.

Remarks on Some Modifications of the Attitude of Daily Life

The attitude of daily life furnishes a person's perceived environment its definition as an environment of social realities known in common. The sociologists gloss this environment with the term "common culture." The attitude of daily life is constitutive of the institutionalized common understandings of the practical everyday organization and workings of the society as seen "from within." Modifications of its presuppositions thereby modify the real environments of the society's members. Such modifications transform one socially defined environment of real objects into another environment of real objects.

One such modification includes its being learned. This involves for the neonate the growth of a world in Olds' (1958) and Parsons' (1955) sense of the growth of object systems, and the progressively enforced and enforceable compliance of the "developing member" to the attitude of daily life as a competent societal member's "way of looking at things."

A second modification consists of the ceremonial transformation of one environment of real objects into another. We mentioned before that such modifications occur in the cases of play, theatre going, religious conversion, "conventionalization," and scientific inquiry. If, for each of these cases, one asks where does the person "go" or where is he "called back to" when he "stops playing" or is admonished to "stop playing," or "leaves the theatre" or is admonished to "stop acting and be yourself," or "backslides" from his religious promises or is criticized for exaggerated virtue, or "puts aside his party disguise" or is warned that "the party is over,"

or "forgets his scientific problem for awhile" or is chided for his "absent mindedness," that in each case he returns to "life as usual" or is expected to give evidence of his grasp of the institutionalized common understandings of the organization and workings of the everyday society, i.e., of his "practical circumstances."

A third modification consists of the instrumental transformations of real environments of objects that occur in experimentally induced psychosis, extreme fatigue, acute sensory deprivation, the use of hallucinogenic drugs, brain injuries, and the like. To each of these there corresponds the modification of the presuppositions on the one hand and the social structures that are produced by actions oriented to these modified environments on the other. For example, subjects who were given Lysergic Acid at the U.C.L.A. Alcoholism Clinic frequently met the experimenter's inquiries about what they saw in the room with the rebuff that his questions were banal and indicated a stupid fellow who could never appreciate what they saw even if they were to trouble themselves to try to make it plain to him. An analysis of interaction using Bales' scoring procedures would have varied accordingly.

A fourth modification consists of the "discovery of culture" by anthropologists and sociologists. This discovery consists of the discovery from within the society of commonsense knowledge of social structures, and the attempt to treat commonsense action and commonsense knowledge as objects of mere theoretical social scientific interest. The modification of the attitude and objects of commonsense actions is detected in the attempts by sociologists to furnish in attitude and methods the procedures whereby commonsense attitude, actions, and knowledge of social structures are to be brought under the jurisdiction of sociological theory as a definition of their essential features. In their ideas, if not or perhaps not yet, in their actual practices, sociologists have thereby set for themselves the task of discovering an historically new and unprecedented definition of "real social structures." In that commonsense activities and environments are simultaneously the topic as well as the feature of sociological inquiries, a concern for describing the actual features of sociology's attitude and methods as possible modifications of the attitude and methods of commonsense, the "discovery of culture," reconstructs the problems of the sociology of knowledge and locates them at the heart of the sociological enterprise and with full seriousness.

In his essay, "The Stranger" (1944), Schutz spoke of a fifth modification which he described as the attitude's presuppositions "ceasing to stand the test." The stranger for Schutz was the person whose attempts to assign the attributions of the attitude of daily life to the intended sense of actual appearances produced situations of chronic "error." He becomes, says Schutz, the person who has to place in question nearly

everything that seems to be unquestionable to the members of the group in which he seeks membership. His hitherto unquestioned schemes of interpretation become invalidated and cannot be used as a scheme of orientation with the new social surroundings. He uses with difficulty the in-group culture as a scheme of orientation for he is unable to trust it. The apparent unity of the cultural pattern for the in-group members does not exist for him. He has continually to realize his interests while having to reckon with fundamental discrepancies between his own and other's ways of seeing situations and handling them. Situations that in-group members see through in a glance, and who see too an appropriate recipe for its management, are specifically problematic and lacking in obviousness of sense or consequences. From the in-group member's view the stranger is a man without a history. Most importantly, too, his crisis is a personal crisis.

In the language of this paper, the perceivedly normal appearances of the stranger's scenes of interaction are for him specifically problematical. The stranger is the person whose rights to manage decisions of sensibility, objectivity, and warrant without interference from others, i.e., whose competence, neither he nor others are able to take for granted.

Since each of the presuppositions assigns a feature to the actor's environment, the user may suffer a nasty surprise with respect to each of them. Thus there is a sixth modification. It is possible to induce experimentally the breach of these suppositions by deliberately modifying scenic events so as to systematically disappoint these attributions. The attributer's environment should thereby be made strange to him and accordingly he should believe himself and act in the presence of others like a stranger.

A radical version of this modification consists of rendering the attitude's presuppositions inoperative. The procedure with premedical students was intended to produce such a modification. Despite the shortcomings of the demonstration, it nevertheless suggests a model for formulating the problematic phenomena of "alienation," "anomie," "deviance," and "disorganization" using the commonsensically ordered and ordering routines of everyday actions and their objects as the point of departure.

By way of brief explication, we may call to mind how considerable are the risks for persons whose appearances breach the attitude's attributions—whether they do it experimentally, or whether like the psychopath they manage it with habitual conduct. From the status of a perceived competent person in his own eyes and in the eyes of others, i.e., from the status of bona fide membership, he may prove or be moved by persons for whom these attributions continue to operate to any of those statuses that every society reserves for those who "lack commonsense."

Every mother tongue provides for a range of social types who do not appreciate these attributions or for whom it is believed that these attributions do not operate: characteristically, children, pre-adults, aged persons, outsiders, boors, fools, ignoramuses, and barbarians. The major institutionalized statuses for those who lack commonsense would seem to be the alternative ones of criminality, illness, immorality, or incompetence. Organizationally speaking, those who lack commonsense are not only not trusted, but themselves do not trust. Indeed, one might preliminarily think of the trustworthy and trusting person as someone who managed the discrepancies with respect to these attributions in such a fashion as to maintain a public show of respect for them.

The fact that its modifications include such possibilities as its being learned, of its ceremonial and instrumental transformations, of its being discovered, and of its being breached or made inoperative gives the attitude of daily life a critical place in any attempt to account for stable, persistent, continuing, uniform social interactions.

In reviewing the modifications of the attitude of daily life and its world one begins to sense why it is that the theme of commonsense thinking has been a major one in all major philosophies. One may begin to sense, too, why the phenomenon of commonsense thinking, activities, and knowledge is such an obstinate feature and is so strongly idealized and defended in all stable groups. Obviously, however, such a sense does no more than point to the attitude and environments of commonsense as problematic phenomena. It does not formulate the problem. Part of Schutz's great stature as a sociologist consists in having performed the fundamental work that makes it possible for sociologists to do so. This paper has attempted to get on with the task.