METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS
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Harvey Sacks
Lectures on Conversation
Vol. I & II
(1992)
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Compiled by Gail Jefferson
{Edited by Gene Lerner}
METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS |
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Volume I |
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F ’64-S ’65 |
Lecture 1 |
pp. 10-11 |
Social objects; assembling activities; reproducible descriptions; abstract & general while not statistical |
Lecture 4 |
pp. 26-31 |
Survey of the literature |
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Lecture 8 |
p. 65 |
Macro / micro |
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Lecture 12 |
p. 97 |
Non-trivial absences |
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Lecture 13 |
p. 105 |
Needing an “excuse” to study a phenomenon |
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Lecture 14 |
p. 113 ff p. 114 pp. 125 |
“What [sociology’s] business is” ‘He doesn’t say [x]’ as “a rhetorical device” Phenomenon vs. random distribution |
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F ’65 |
Lecture 5 |
p. 159 pp. 162 |
Working on “small parts” Re. is language inconsistent |
Lecture 9 |
pp. 185-186 |
Foreigner’s task / computers that could gossip |
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Lecture 11 |
p. 195 |
Constraints on human nature |
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Lecture 12 |
pp. 201-203 |
Relationship between professional and Members’ categories |
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Appendix A
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p. 229 |
What “the apparatus” should do |
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S ’66
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Lecture 1 |
p. 236 ff pp. 237-238 |
“The apparatus” “Things that God might have overlooked” |
Lecture 1 (R) |
p. 244 ff pp. 245-246 pp. 250-251 |
“The apparatus” : “a culture” “The find power of a culture” “‘Overbuilt’ machinery” |
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Lecture 4a |
pp. 283-284 p. 287 pp. 289-290 |
‘Rule detection’ via multiple vs. single cases Sequential vs. dictionary specification Showing that an analysis is wrong (via “totally unanalyzed piece” of data) |
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Lecture 4b |
pp. 292-293 pp. 293-295 pp. 295, 299 pp. 297-299 |
Re. choosing data Re. absences Analyzing vs.. employing Members’ phenomena Single case vs. sampling |
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Lecture 5 |
p. 306 |
Need for “alternative independent materials” |
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Lecture 6 |
p. 312 pp. 315-316 |
Correctness vs. relevance; analyzing vs. counting ‘Real machinery’ vs. ‘hypothetical constructs’ |
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Lecture 12 |
pp. 358-359 p. 360 p. 362 |
A problem for comparative sociology (distribution of currencies) Proposing that “some possible fact is accepted as correct by Members” Weakness of counting [x] as “a measure” of [y] |
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Lecture 13 |
p. 364 pp. 366-367 |
Re. seeing other people’s thoughts Adequacy of criteria vs. practical efficacy |
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Lecture 17 |
pp. 389-390 |
Re. “A fuller study would show [x]” |
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Lecture 19
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p. 407 |
Re. Being “conscious” of what one is doing |
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Lecture 21 |
pp. 417-418 pp. 422 pp. 422-423 p. 425 |
In-principle inadequacy of ‘correspondence criteria’ Re. ‘possibilities’ Re. language as inconsistent Re. assembling “complex activities” |
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Lecture 23 |
pp. 428-430 p. 434 |
Linguistics: program for what’s not to be studied Re. ‘agreement’ |
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Lecture 24
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pp. 435-438 |
Re. measurement systems |
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Lecture 28 |
p. 456 p. 459 |
“If [thinking some statements are odd] get[s] us into noticing these statements, [it] need not control where we go with them.” Social science uses Members’ devices |
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Lecture 30 |
pp. 467-472 pp. 471-472 |
Problems for observational sociology / anthropology Asserting a problem vs. digging it out of the data |
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Lecture 31
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p. 476 |
What makes something an X, rather than is A an X? Is B an X?, etc. |
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Lecture 33
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pp. 483-486 pp. 486-488 |
On sampling On subjectivity |
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W ’67 |
February 16 |
pp. 515-571, 520-522 |
On formulations |
March 2
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p. 523 p. 533 |
Import of a finding “The kind of data we need” – persons doing something “knowingly” (cf. pp. 566-567) |
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March 9 |
p. 540 p. 541 |
What sort of order of fact is something? Cracking into the data via conventional ideas about what matters |
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S ’67 |
Lecture 8 |
p. 549 |
Non-exhaustibility of what looks like uninteresting material |
Lecture 9
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pp. 566-567 |
Data showing attentiveness by Members to their circumstances (cf. pp. 533) |
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Lecture 12
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pp. 582-583 |
Working seriously with notion of ‘category bound activities’ (don’t just use it, show how it’s so). |
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Lecture 13
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p. 589 |
Making trouble to test a notion (cf. pp. 690, 707) |
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F ’67
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Intro
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p. 619 pp. 621-623 |
Re. Erving Goffman Overview |
Lecture 1
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p. 629 p. 631
p. 632 |
“Wandering around applying a rule” A proposed finding should permit us to see things
On ‘theorizing’ |
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Lecture 2
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pp. 635-636 |
Re. asserting that a rule has been violated |
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Lecture 5
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p. 664 |
Problem in the world vs. problem for sociology |
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Lecture 7
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pp. 679-680 |
Locating contrast classes as naturally oriented-to phenomena |
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Lecture 8
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p. 690 |
Making trouble to test a notion (cf. pp. 589, 707) |
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Lecture 9
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pp. 695-697 |
Dispute with Avram Stroll about paradoxes |
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Lecture 10
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p. 707 |
Making trouble to test a notion (cf. pp. 589, 707) |
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Lecture 12
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p. 724 p. 729 |
Names: predictably wrongly transcribed For transcribing of any utterance, the surrounding talk is extremely important |
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Lecture 14 |
p. 742 p. 743 |
“The criteriality of such little items (as the non-equivalence of ‘Tuesday’ and ‘Nov 11, 1967’); “There is that order of redundancy in social organization.” (Re above) “[these] are matters which you’d never get at a way of focusing on if you were looking for something exceptional as a handle…[T]he sheer appropriateness of such an answer as ‘Tuesday’ beguiles you into figuring that there could be nothing interesting...” |
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S ’68 |
April 17 |
p. 753 |
Characterizations of persons...are in principle selections from alternatives…[T]he issue is to see what considerations were involved in a given selection…[T]hat leads me routinely to focus on characterizations of persons...to see if I can make points. |
Volume II |
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F ’68 |
Lecture 1
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p. 5 |
Unreliability of recollected data |
Lecture 2 |
p. 20 pp. 20-21 p. 23 p. 26 p. 27 |
Making trouble (here, shifting around story descriptors) Primacy of the way an argument is made, not the point being argued. “The only thing that’s interesting is the logic.”
Various aspects of the sequential organization of conversation “...a science of social life should, like all other sciences, be able to handle...the actual details of actual events.” Social science as “a primitive science in a very literal sense.” |
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Lecture 3 |
pp. 35-36 p. 37 p. 38 |
Re. “non-trivial statements about absences” “One criterion for the noticeable status [of an absence] is that people say about it, ‘X is absent.’.” A rejected explicational procedure: proposing that when X is not talked of it’s known in the way it is when it is talked of. A “perfectly natural” course of development of an analysis: “parts” → “formal features” |
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Lecture 4 |
pp. 54-55 |
A natural criterion for basicness of a rule |
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Lecture 5 |
p. 58 |
Proving an argument: natural vs. experimental procedures |
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p. 65 |
Is [x] a “signal”? |
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Lecture 6 |
p. 74 |
“The last thing in the world you want to find yourself saying is ‘He says [x] because it’s true.’.” (also, pp. 82) |
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W ’69 |
Lecture 1 |
pp. 91-93 |
Reconceiving X’s ‘property’ as ‘a makings of conversation’ |
Lecture 3 |
pp. 110-111 |
Abstract knowledge persons might have of their circumstances |
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Lecture 7 |
p. 125 |
Distribution of ‘Q on Q on Q’ sequences?; some sequencing positions ‘better than others’? |
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W ’70 |
Lecture 1 |
pp. 157-158 pp. 168-169 p. 169 pp. 171-172 |
It doesn’t pay to attempt a comprehensive analysis of a single conversation. It nevertheless pays to work elaborately at a single conversation. Re. the need for additional materials Re. machine image “A really deadly problem with contrast class arguments” |
Lecture 5 |
p. 208 |
What is some remark about something somewhere doing this interaction? |
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S ’70 |
Lecture 2 |
pp. 222-223 |
Re. “bland facts”; correctness vs. relevance |
Lecture 3
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p. 240 |
Product or byproduct? |
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Lecture 5 |
pp. 250-253 |
Re. “interactional technology”; how people listen to each other; doing provings; systematically characterizable ‘long sequences’ (cf. pp. 354-55) |
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Lecture 6 |
pp. 267-271 |
Starting with observations vs. ‘why did he do that?’ |
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Lecture 7
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pp. 269-271 |
Re. an “altogether informal…characterization of what took place” in a piece of data |
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W ’71 |
February 19 |
pp. 291-292 |
Noticing a possible phenomenon vs. laughing it off (poetics) |
March 4 |
p. 309 pp. 316-317 |
Re. posing a problem “because it looked like some answers could be found to it, by virtue of the things that were emerging…” Possible correctness of a conversational formulation (here, “He was being very rational”) |
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March 11 |
p. 325 |
Q: Couldn’t that be carried too far? HS: The whole problem is that it’s nowhere in the first instance. (Re. Poetics) |
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S ’71 |
April 2 |
p. 339 |
“The gross aim of the work I’m doing…” |
April 12 |
pp. 354-355 pp. 358-359 |
Re. ‘large sequences’ (cf. pp. 250-253) “When do you have things in such a status as to be able to think about them?” |
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April 19
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pp. 361-362 pp. 365-366 |
To what extent is some domain of social organization independently organized? Re. a ‘question’ which is a ‘request’, and a ‘command’ which is a ‘close offering’: “Neither have anything like the way in which they could be grammatically characterized, as sufficient information about how they’re dealt with.” |
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May 3
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pp. 384, 385, 389-390 |
A procedure: from some observations apparently unrelated to each other or to some problem, come to pose the problem |
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F ’71 |
Lecture 1 |
p. 419 p. 421 pp. 422-423 |
Re. the limitations of hypothetical data Less obvious data as sometimes “better” Re. the “inconsistency” of proverbial expressions |
Lecture 2 |
p. 430 |
Re. abstract models which also handle details |
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Lecture 4 |
p. 431 |
Given some “neat and delicate” occurrence, does one posit unusual personal virtuosity or “a virtuosity that maybe anyone has, or the language gives them.” |
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S ’72 |
Lecture 2 |
p. 536 p. 538 |
How to pose the question ‘why do people listen in conversation?’ The locating of alternatives is an “empirical issue” and not a matter of “obvious semantics…to be gotten by logical considerations.” |
Lecture 3 |
pp. 542-543
p. 542 p. 543 p. 551 |
Re. characterizing something as ‘an adjacency pair’ vs. learning things about particular cases of an adjacency pair Making trouble to test a notion (here, saying “Hello” before phone-answerer gets a chance) (cf. pp. 551) Re. the “unhappy” character of an “ad hoc” rule Making trouble: call your friends at dinner time (cf. pp. 542) |
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Lecture 4 |
pp. 554-555 |
Re. developing an argument on the “relating power of adjacency” |
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Lecture 5
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p. 561 pp. 561-562 p. 562 |
Re. the independence of prefaces from what they precede Re. layers of conversational organization “I want...to inhibit a consideration of actual objects in terms of single types of organization, i.e., saying of something that it’s a ‘question’, and then saying that it’s adjacency-pair orderly in a variety of ways, and that’s that, as though one is finished with it.” |
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Lecture 6 |
pp. 570, 574 p. 572 |
Distributionalizing phenomena: find a systematic “place” they occur Re. making a “cutting observation”: “There’s no point [announcing an observation] unless it cuts through the material.” |