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Aphasic Agrammatism as Interactional Artifact and Achievement

Interaction-oriented approaches to aphasic language use need no special justification and motivation. After all, talk-in-interaction is the place "where the results of brain damage become visible and consequential for people's lives" (Goodwin, 1996). Nevertheless, we will try to show that the meaningfulness—actually the necessity—of a conversation-analytic approach to aphasia can grow out of investigations originally designed and cast in terms of traditional experimental-quantitative methodology and within a cognitivist approach to aphasia. In the first part, we describe a series of investigations dealing with agrammatic speech and strongly suggesting that the concrete way in which the patients express themselves depends on how conversational partners interact with them (and on whether they interact with them at all). Hardly anybody who considers language and language use within an interaction-oriented framework in general, and within a conversation-analytic one in particular, will be surprised by such a suggestion. Actually, if this suggestion is empirically justified, aphasic language use would constitute an exciting and attractive field of observation for conversation analysis. Yet such an outcome would be highly unwelcome for the majority of present-day aphasiologists. Most aphasiologists assume—tacitly or explicitly—that performance data from brain-damaged subjects can be used "as a window into the structure and organization of normal cognitive processes" (Caramazza, 1997: 137). If, however, this performance is the joint product of the brain-damaged subject and his or her concrete interactant in concrete circumstances at concrete occasions, then the "window" is somewhat "dirty," and perhaps quite opaque.[1] Such a state of affairs would not affect Caramazza's carefully formulated methodological position: his concern is the relevance of impairment data for cognitive neuropsychol-

ogy, for theoretical accounts of and constraints on (cognitive!) theories of normal language processing (Caramazza, 1986, 1992). If data from talk-in-interaction (perhaps not only from interactions between an aphasic and an unimpaired speaker, but interactional data in general) turn out to be opaque with respect to a cognitive model of language processing, then they are simply theoretically irrelevant. This is a consequent and clear position; however, we leave it to the reader to evaluate a cognitive aphasiology for which data from the natural habitat of our language-processing capacities—unimpaired or impaired—are uninteresting.

The first part of this chapter outlines the "way from cognitive-experimental to conversation analytic approaches to aphasia" in the context of the special problem of agrammatism; the second part presents analytic explications of episodes of conversation between an agrammatic patient and unimpaired others and considers how such an analysis might provide answers to questions raised in the first part but also how it engenders new—hopefully fruitful—questions.

From Adaptation Theory to Conversation Analysis

There has been considerable controversy and disagreement about whether agrammatism is a uniform and unitary phenomenon, whether agrammatism is a distinct aphasic syndrome at all, the theoretical perspectives under which agrammatism can be meaningfully described (a linguistic theory or a processing model), and the role of language-specific factors in the manifestation of agrammatism, and so on.[2] For overviews of the state of affairs, see Kean (1995), Kolk (1998), and Jarema (1998). Despite this diversity of views and approaches, global standard characterizations of agrammatic speech output invariantly refer to the same features. For the major European languages, these are (for other languages, see Menn & Obler, 1990):

1. laborious non-fluent speech
2. impoverishment of the available syntactic structures
3. incorrectly constructed sentences and phrases
4. break-offs of sentence or phrase constructions
5. incorrect morphology
6. omission of morphological elements

Both incorrectness (substitutions) and omissions co-occur in agrammatic speech; in terms of Kleist's (1934) highly systematic terminological framework, both paragrammatisms and agrammatisms can be found. This seems to be puzzling, as the term "agrammatism" suggests a preponderance of "absences," of omissions, but agrammatic speech as characterized by a mixture of "a-" and "para-" phenomena has long been known by the old and classical neurologists (see Bleser, 1987, for a review of the old literature) and has been explicitly confirmed by more recent authors

(see, among others, Caplan, 1987: 278–279; and see the detailed descriptions in Menn & Obler, 1990).

The following example from patient W illustrates all of the mentioned features. Patient W, age 41, had suffered a trauma ten years before the first author contacted her. She was diagnosed through the Aachen Aphasia Test (AAT; Huber et al., 1983; for an English description of the test, see Huber et al., 1984) as a moderately severe case of Broca's aphasia with marked agrammatism as the central symptom. She had a hemiparesis of the right arm. All fine movements were carried out with her left arm and hand. Her formal education consisted of ten years of elementary schooling. She had never had a profession. Her native and only language is German. She speaks High German, with some usages characteristic of Berlin dialect. Mood was normal. (See appendix 1 for transcription explanations.)

Example 1
((W tells a story depicted on five cartoons. The first cartoon shows a man lying in his bed and hitting a ringing alarm clock; the time on the clock is 7:00. The second shows the man sleeping again and his wife coming in; the time is 8:00 now. The third cartoon shows the man eating his breakfast; his wife points angrily to a clock in the kitchen; the time is 8:30 now. The fourth cartoon shows the man running hastily to work. The fifth shows the man at work with his legs on the desk; the man is sleeping again. The transcript of W's telling is rough because it is the grammatical properties of her speech which are of primary interest here.))

1 W: Der Mann ((disturbances from the outside)) klingelte
        The man ((disturbances from the outside)) rang

2   der   Wecker,   ((again disturbances))
       the-MASC-SG-NOM alarm-clock, ((again disturbances))

3   zur   Arbeit! ähm (8.0) Die   Frau   schimpft
        to-the work! ähm (8.0) The-FEM woman rebukes

4   der   Mann, ähm (4.2) der   Mann
       the-MASC-SG-NOM man,   ähm (4.2) the-MASC-SG-NOM man

5   schläft, (4.2)   der   Mann ähm die
       sleeps, (4.2)   the-MASC-SG-NOM man   ähm the-FEM-SG-NOM

6   Frau   (5.1)   acht Uhr   Arbeit gehn! ähm
       woman   (5.1)   eight o'clock work to-go! ähm

7   (2.3) der   Mann (3.5) die
       (2.3) the-MASC-SG-NOM man   (3.5) the-FEM-SG-NOM

8   Frau   (6.4) weckt (4.2) ((sighs)) uh schwierig!
       (7.4)
       woman (6.4) awakes (4.2) ((sighs)) uh difficult!
       (7.4)

9   ähm (7.4) der   Mann ißt   schnell. (4.8)
       ähm (7.4) the-MASC-NOM-SG man   eats fast.   (4.8)

10   ((click, inbreath)) (5.2) der Mann   läuft
       ((click, inbreath)) (5.2) the-MASC-SG-NOM man runs

11   zur   Arbeit, (3.8) der   Mann schläft, ja!
       to-the work, (3.8) the-MASC-SG-NOM man   sleeps, ja!

The features of agrammatic speech are illustrated by the following observable characteristics of this spate of talking:

1. The speech is effortful and halting, as evidenced by the pauses.
2. The repertoire of syntactic structures is reduced to very simple main clauses in canonical word order.
3. "Der Mann klingelte der Wecker"/ the man rang the alarm-clock (lines 1–2) is a misconstruction: the verb "klingeln"/ to-ring cannot take an object; anyway, the case marking for the object "der Wecker"/ the-MASC-SG-NOM alarm-clock would be wrong; it is nominative, but it should be one of the oblique cases.
4. The expression "acht Uhr Arbeit gehn!"/ eight o'clock work to-go! (line 6) looks like reported speech of what the woman said to her husband. Under this reading then, the preceding "der Mann die Frau" (lines 5–6) would be an abandoned construction. Also the construction on lines 7–8 ("die Frau weckt"/ the woman awakes) looks like a break-off; the verb "wecken" requires an object.[3]
5. The article "der" in line 2 was already mentioned as an instance of incorrect morphology (see 3).
6. In the expression "acht Uhr Arbeit gehn" (line 6) a preposition and an article are missing before "Arbeit"; it should be "zur Arbeit"/ to-the work.

Agrammatic speech, for which these descriptions and characterizations hold, is typically obtained by means of elicitation techniques such as picture descriptions (as in Goodglass & Kaplan, 1972), retelling a fairy tale (Menn & Obler, 1990), or a semistandardized interview (as in the AAT by Huber et al., 1983). In all these techniques, the interviewer/tester/experimenter is typically very withholding and gives the patients a long time to produce their utterances.[4] In more technical terms, the interviewer/tester/experimenter aims at *maximizing* the turns of the patients. This is clearly in contrast to the organization of ordinary conversations with its structural bias for turn minimization (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974; Schegloff, 1981), although it resembles the organization of some interviews, such as broadcast news interviews, which promote expanded response turns (cf. Heritage & Greatbatch, 1991). And it prompts investigation of agrammatic speech in more ordinary interactions. Kolk, Heeschen, and their co-workers have collected and analyzed large samples of agrammatic speech in German and Dutch obtained in more natural and "ordinary" settings, such as informal conversations between patients and aphasiologists during a break in experimental sessions over a cup of coffee (or in comparable circumstances). This situation is frequently referred to in this section of the chapter, and, thus, for convenience, it is named the "baseline condition."[5] The speech of agrammatics in the baseline condition differs radically from

the speech obtained under the more formal test-like situations mentioned earlier. Kolk and Heeschen (1992) found that speech from the baseline condition is almost exclusively characterized by omissions of grammatical elements (that is, by "a-phenomena"); almost no substitutions (that is, "para-phenomena") occur. This omission style is usually referred to as *telegraphic style*. The following examples from patients K and W will give the reader an impression of this style. The episode with K (who is not discussed elsewhere in this chapter) is included because it is hard to find another episode in which all properties of telegraphic style are so beautifully exemplified; K offers a textbook case of aphasia.

   Patient K was a right-handed male, age 51; etiology was CVA; postonset was 13 years. He was diagnosed and classified by means of the AAT as a moderately severe Broca's aphasic with marked agrammatism. He had a marked paresis in his right arm and hand; all fine movements were carried out with his left arm and hand. His native and only language was German. He spoke High German with occasional Berlin-specific features. His formal education was nine years of elementary schooling. Before the CVA, he was a construction worker. At the time the first author had contact with him, he was living in a half-way house and was working in a sheltered workplace in Berlin-West. Mood was normal, given the circumstances.[6]

Example 2a From a Conversation Between K and the First Author (H)
((The conversation takes place in K's room in the half-way house. K shows H his large collection of audio equipment and of cassettes. Then H takes a sip of coffee; there is silence for 9.4 seconds, then:))

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1   H:   [inbreath] aber wozu    brauchen Sie dann so viele
                    but  for-what need     you then so many
                    So, why do you need so many radios?
2        Radios?
         radios?
3        (3.1)
4   K:   Ja,    ja   det äh [inbreath] anjesammelt also.
         Yeah, yeah that äh            collected-PP PRT
          Yeah, yeah, that uh           just piling up
5   H:   [ ( (laughs) )
6   K:   [ naja
7   H:   (x) hat   sich so angesammelt [ (xxx)
             has itself so collected
             just kept piling up
8   K:                              [Ja, teilweise ä
                                     yes, partly    ä
9        teilweise jekriegt     und teilweise gefunden.
         partly    received-PP and partly    found-PP.
10  H:   gefunden?
         found-PP?
11  K:   Ja.
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12 H: Wo   hat (.) wo   findet man denn Radios?
       Where has (.) where finds   one PRT   radios?
       Where has (.) where do you find radios?
13 K: Ja he
14   (2.0)
15 K: [inbreath] na hier (wieder) gekauft.
                 na here (again) bought-PP.
16 H: Das ham Se   sich   gekauft?
       that have you for-yourself bought-PP?
17 K: äh (1.6) vierhundert und etwas.
       äh (1.6) fourhundred and something.
18 H: hm
19 K: Ja?
20 H: Ja:
21 K: (xxx) ä zwei dreie (.) hab' ik och ä och jekriegt.
             ä two   three (.) have I also ä also received.
22 H: aha
23 K: "(x na x x Mensch /jefut/ Mensch nee, Mensch õna)"
       "(x na x x man   /found/ man   no, man   õna)"
24 H: Aber was meinen Sie denn   mit Sie   haben Radios
       But   what mean you-POL PRT by   you-POL have   radios
       But what do you mean by you found radios?
25   gefunden,   wo   findet man denn Radios? Doch nicht
       found-PP, where finds   one PRT radios? PRT   not
       Where does one find radios—not on the street?
26   auf der Straße?
       on the street?
27 K: Doch.   Papierkorb.
       Well-yes. Waste-paper-basket.
28 H: Radios   in'n   Papierkorb?
       radios into-the waste-paper-basket?
29   (6.0)
30 H: Wer schmeißt denn Radios   /ins/   Papierkorb,
       Who throws   PRT radios /into-the/ waste-paper-basket,
       Who throws radios into the waste paper basket,
31   doch nur, wenn sie kaput   sind?
       PRT only, when they broken are?
       only when they are broken?
32 K: nee nee, det nich
       no no, that not
33 H: ganze   Radios schmeißt man einfach so weg?
       working radios throws   one simply so away?
       Who throws away working radios?
34   (2.2)
35 K: ja!

36   (1.5)

37 H: puh! [die Leute ham wohl   zuviel Geld   dann, nich?
          puh! [people have PRT too-much money then, ne?

38 K: [naõja

39   (1.7)

40 H: und Sie   ham die   denn gefunden?
          and you-POL have them-DEM then found?
          and you found them?

41 K: jaja   in (x) jekuckt   äh, jedesmal äh=
          yeahyeah into (x) looked-PP äh, every-time äh=

42 H: =aha

43 K: Papierkorb   äh rausbringen wa?
          waste-paper-basket äh to-take-out eh?

44 H: Ja: :

45 K: reingekuckt   wa? (1.7) ä ä Flaschen [Flaschen
          looked-PP-into wa? (1.7) ä ä bottles   bottles

46 H: [aja jaja

47   (2.3)

48 K: leere   Flaschen,
          empty bottles,

49 H: hm hm hm:=

50 K: =Geld   gesucht=
          money looked-PP-for

51 H: naja, Flaschen versteh'   ich
          naja, bottles   understand I
               bottles I can see

Example 2b From a Conversation Between W and the First Author

1   ((H asks W what she did yesterday))

2 W: Gestern?   (10.2) " "gestern?" "   (1.3) uh
          Yesterday? (10.2) ""yesterday?"" (1.3) uh

3 H: oder [irgend-
          or   some-

4 W: [ah ja
           ah ja

5 H: Ja!
          Yes!

6 W: ä Markt   ähm (4.6) eingekauft
          ä market ähm (4.6) shopping-done

7 H: Ja::?
          Yes?

8   (2.8)

9 W: ähm Lebensmittel (4.3) und Obst gekauft
          ähm   food   (4.3) and fruit bought-PP

10 H: hmhm,

11 W: "und" (2.7) Markt   geguckt
         "and" (2.7) *market looked-PP*
12 H: Auf welchem Markt war das denn?
         At   which market was that PRT?
13 W: Karstadt- äh Hermannplatz
            ((*Karstadt is name of a department-store,*
                Hermannplatz the name of a square))
14 H: Is'   da 'n Wochenmarkt?
         Is there a   weekly-market?
15 W: Ja
16 H: Aha!
17 W: Dienstag
         Tuesday
18 H: hm
19 W: Donnerstag und Freitag
         Thursday   and Friday
20 H: aha, da   haben Sie   eingekauft?
         aha, there have   you-POL shopping-done?
21   (1.0)
22 W: Ja,   mal   gucken
         Yes, PRT to-look-around

The formal core features of telegraphic style are:

1. absence of finite verbs; that is, auxiliaries are omitted (e.g., "Geld gesucht"/ money looked-for-PP instead of the more elaborate "Ich habe Geld gesucht"/ I have looked- for money, line 50 of example 2a; other occurrences of past participles without an auxiliary can be found in lines 4, 9, 15, 41, 45 of example 2a, and lines 6, 9, 11 of example 2b), and inflected main verbs are replaced by the infinitive (e.g., "Papierkorb rausbringen"/ waste-paper-basket to-take-out-INF for the more elabo- rate "Ich bringe den Papierkorb raus"/ I take the waste-paper-basket to the outside, line 43 of example 2a. An example from W is: "mal gucken"/ PRT to look around, line 22 of example 2b.). Note that the infinitive in German is not a bare stem form, but has a suffix "-en."

2. omission of determiners and articles (e.g., "Papierkorb rausbringen" instead of the more elaborate "den Papierkorb rausbringen," line 43 of example 2a).

3. omission of prepositions (e.g., "doch. Papierkorb"/ well-yes. waste- paper-basket, line 27 in example 2a; note that H indeed understands this bare noun phrase (NP) as a prepositional phrase (PP), as evi- denced by his question for confirmation, "Radios in'n Papierkorb"/ radios into the waste-paper- basket?, line 28 of example 2a. An omission of preposition and article made by W can be found in line 6

of example 2b: "Markt eingekauft"/ market shopping-done instead of
the more elaborate "auf dem Markt eingekauft"/ on the market
shopping-done).

4. omission of grammatical subjects in constructions without a finite
verb. An exception is "det äh [inbreath] anjesammelt also"/ that
collected-PP PRT in line 4 of example 2a. Otherwise, all constructions
with a non-finite verb have a null-subject (lines 9, 15, 41, 43, 45, 50
of example 2a; lines 6, 9, 11, 22 of example 2b). Characteristically,
the one construction with a finite verb (line 21 of example 2a) does
have a subject.

It should also be noted that the speech of the patients is a bit less laborious than in
the formal test situation, though still non-fluent. But the patients sound "less vexed."

This list of features by and large fits with the formal-linguistic characterization
of agrammatic speech as resulting from the omission of (higher) "functional heads"
(Cahana-Amitay, 1997; Hagiwara, 1995; Haverkort, 1999; de Roo, 1999).

The most striking feature of telegraphic style, however, is that all the expres-
sions are correct in themselves, and that is not trivial (according to the motto "what
is omitted cannot be wrong"), given complex morphological and word order regu-
larities of German that have to be observed in these telegraphic, subsentential ex-
pressions (for details, see Kolk & Heeschen, 1992; and the introductory part of
Heeschen & Schegloff, 1999). And they are correct also with respect to subtle, more
hidden regularities: it is not only that certain elements can be omitted, but sometimes
they even *must* be omitted. Thus, in many expressions in which the finiteness is ab-
sent, the grammatical subjects must be omitted as well; otherwise, the "telegram"
would sound straightforwardly incorrect (suppose patient K had added the subject
"ich"/ I to the expression in line 50 of example 2a: "Ich Geld gesucht"/ I money
looked-PP-for—that would make the expression "impaired"). Another instance of
such a "must-be-omitted" regularity is that, absent the finiteness, the reflexive pro-
noun must also be absent. An example is K's utterance in line 4: "det äh [inbreath]
anjesammelt also"/ that uh just piling up. The German verb for "to keep piling up" is
reflexive, "sich ansammeln"/ literally: to collect oneself. The patient omits the car-
rier of finiteness—the auxiliary—and, consequently, omits the pronoun, too. The
presence of the reflexive pronoun would make the expression sound awful (??? "Det
sich anjesammelt").[7] When resuming K's utterance in line 7, H did produce the re-
flexive pronoun, but he also produced a finite verb form. Further investigations of
the agrammatics' conversational speech revealed that their "telegrams" are not only
correct but also quite normal insofar as they follow structural patterns of elliptic
expressions used by normals in casual speech designed to be compact (e.g., "Nice
weather today," "Going to miss it?"[8] etc.) (Hofstede, 1992).

It appears that agrammatic patients have an option in the way they express them-
selves: they either aim at complete sentences but have to "pay" for it with a lot of

errors, as in example 1 and in the example in appendix 2, or they resort to a simpli-
fied "register," to subsentential expressions they can produce without errors and with
less effort, but in this case they have to "pay" for it because overuse of these expres-
sions—although they are normal with respect to their formal pattern, their structure—
is certainly deviant from normal usage, as in examples 2a and 2b. The existence of
such an option is the key observation for the adaptation approach to agrammatism as
developed by Kolk, Heeschen, and others on the basis of German and Dutch data.
Here it is assumed that telegraphic style is not the direct display of the impairment of
the cognitive achitecture of language processing underlying agrammatism (which is
assumed to consist of limitations on the temporal organization of syntactic process-
ing [Kolk, 1995]), but it is rather the display of an adaptation to the deficit. The pa-
tients circumvent, so to speak, their problems in formulating elaborated expressions
(such as complete sentences) by simplifying their messages in such a way that they
can be just processed by their impaired syntactic formulator. The resulting utterances
then are short subsentential expressions, "telegrams" that formally resemble elliptic
expressions used by normals as well, although—to repeat—the almost exclusive use
of these expressions over a whole episode is certainly somewhat abnormal.[9]

Admittedly, it is fairly loose parlance to speak of "omissions," "telegrams," or
"ellipses." These terms used in traditional descriptions of agrammatic speech (and
of normal subsentential expressions) suggest that something is missing in these ex-
pressions. But this is only so from a normative linguistic perspective, with its em-
phasis on isolated complete sentences as the analytic primitive. In contrast, the
conversation-analytic term "turn constructional unit" (TCU) implies that nothing is
missing in a unit to which the participants of an interaction are oriented as a possibly
complete turn, be that unit a sentence, a phrase, or a word (Schegloff, 1996b; the
matter is discussed in some detail in Heeschen & Schegloff, 1999). The terms, then,
are used here for consistency with usage in the traditional literature and in earlier
articles. Wherever possible and feasible, in particular in the second part of this chap-
ter, "telegram" and "ellipsis" are replaced by "subsentential expression." Traditional
terms appear in scare marks.

It is equally loose and problematic talk to speak of "omitting." This suggests
that the speaker of a subsentential unit first designs his utterance as a complete sen-
tence, then decides to omit certain elements, and then reorganizes the grammatical
structure according to the rules of his language. Given current models of language
production (Levelt, 1989), this is simply nonsensical. Instead, in such a framework
one must assume that the design of an utterance as subsentential is located at a very
high level of production—in all likelihood already on the level of "intentions." Thus,
if a speaker produces "Nice weather today," he never meant to say anything more
than just this, certainly not the sentence "Today the weather is nice" or "There is
nice weather today," from which he then subtracts some elements at a lower level of
production. Again, for consistency with usage we nevertheless use the terms "omit-
ting," "omission," or "omitted elements." Properly understood, these terms mean

"absent as compared with a more elaborate expression." The terms are purely descriptive and do not refer to any processing step.

If the patients have an option, a strategic choice[10] to speak like this or like that, then we can ask what factors determine their choice. The cited examples of the differences between speech obtained under formal test conditions and in more ordinary talk-in-interaction suggest that the decisive factor is the presence or absence of ordinary interaction as the oriented-to context. Whereas in the informal conversation (examples 2a and 2b) the aphasiologist interacts with the patients in a more or less ordinary way, the cartoon story tellings (example 1 and example in appendix 2) were elicited in such a way that the patient produces a monologue without any "ordinary" communication. The cartoons were lying open between the patient and the experimenter/tester, so the telling of the stories had no meaningful communicative function. The experimenter/tester had announced that he would not interrupt but also would not help the patient in telling the stories and that the patient had all the time needed for the task. Interventions by the tester/experimenter were reduced to occasional expressions of support, such as encouragements to go on or reassurances that the patient need not feel time pressure. As mentioned, the tester/experimenter does not behave ordinarily here insofar as he or she tries to maximize the patient's turn; furthermore, the discourse the patient produces is not an achievement as in ordinary conversation (Schegloff, 1981) but rather the result of a pact between patient and experimenter signed beforehand. And, finally, the tester's/experimenter's behavior here is an extreme case of conduct described by Jefferson (1984) as "perverse passive."

However, the claim that ordinary interaction makes the difference between the two conditions is still not adequately justified; another factor is confounded with the "interaction" factor. In the "non-interactional" (or, more precisely, "attenuated-interactional") condition, the "content"—the "what has to be said"—is entirely given by the cartoons, whereas in the baseline condition the "what" is more or less up to the patient. And this may also contribute to the determination of linguistic form, that is, the choice between more elaborate expressions and telegraphic style. To assess the possible influence of this confounding factor, we asked four German-speaking and four Dutch-speaking aphasics, all diagnosed as Broca's aphasics with agrammatism by means of the German and Dutch versions of the Aachen Aphasia Test, respectively, to tell four cartoon stories in the formal ("non-interactional") test situation and again (some weeks later) with the following modifications: they had to tell the stories to a confidant (as a rule, a close relative) who did not know the stories and could not see the cartoons. Furthermore, the confidants were free to interfere with the patients' talk by questions or remarks whenever they wanted to do so. The task set for patient and confidant by the experimenter was just "to get the story across." This condition is referred to as "interactional story telling." The four cartoon stories came from the set used by Goodglass, Christiansen, and Gallagher (1993). The wake-up story in example 1 is just one of these simple stories. The two story telling conditions were then compared with the speech obtained in informal conversation (baseline condition).

The results can be found in Heeschen and Kolk (1994). Here, we present the results of only one patient. Patient W is quite representative for the agrammatic group; her talk in a naturalistic conversation with her daughter and her mother will be described and analyzed in part 2 of this chapter. W was almost indefinitely cooperative so that she participated in two additional conditions of cartoon storytelling not presented in Heeschen and Kolk (1994).

Before describing the outcome of the experimental series, we need to discuss three points:

1. The use of telegraphic style is not an all-or-none phenomenon. In a given episode or in a given task, a patient almost never uses telegraphic expressions throughout. Only a certain percentage of utterances are telegraphic. Note in this context that even patient K—who is an extreme telegraphic speaker—produces one fully elaborated expression (line 21 in example 2a). The percentage of subsentential expressions varies from one patient to the other and sometimes even within one patient across various sessions. In non-impaired speakers in casual speech, roughly 10% of all utterances are subsentential (Hofstede, 1992). There is unanimity among experienced aphasiologists if a person produces more than 30% subsentential utterances, he or she is recognizable as using telegraphic style.

2. In order to quantify the extent to which telegraphic style is used in a given situation in a given patient, one needs an operational criterion, a definition of what counts as telegraphic' utterance. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons to introduce the presence or absence of a finite verb form as the defining criterion. Many regularities of telegraphic-elliptic or subsentential expressions in German (and in all likelihood also in Dutch) center on the finite verb or its omission, respectively (Klein, 1985). And as shown by Hofstede (1992), roughly 90% of all omissions of grammatical elements by agrammatic speakers occur in expressions without a finite verb. Hence, the percentage of non-finite expressions is an empirically justified and theoretically motivated variable to characterize the trend of a given patient's telegraphic style.

3. In a quantitative assessment of the telegraphicity of a stretch of speech, it is advisable not to count subsentential expressions as telegraphic that are immediate responses to wh-questions (e.g., Where are you going?—to Berlin). Subsentential expressions in this position are too normal, too canonical (Schegloff, 1996b). Furthermore, in the experimental conditions in which the experimenter reduces his or her interventions to a minimum, no questions are asked. Subsentential utterances as responses to questions have no chance to occur here so

that not counting them makes the various conditions—the interactional and attenuated-interactional ones—more directly comparable.

In table 10.1, the percentages of telegraphic (that is, non-finite) utterances used by patient W, the percentage of finite utterances, and the percentage of "remainders" (that is, not clearly analyzable utterances and fixed formulaic expressions) are presented together with the absolute number of utterances (*n*) in each of the three conditions described (baseline, "non-interactional," and interactional storytelling).

Samples of W's speech for the baseline condition and for the attenuated-interactional storytelling were already given (Examples 1 and 2a). In example 3 W's way of constructing the wake-up story with her adult daughter (D) is presented.

Example 3 Interactional Storytelling

1	W:	(ähder) Mann, (4.4) weckt,
		(*ähthe*) *man,* (*4.4*) *awakens*
2		(3.2)
3	D:	Was macht er?
		What does he?
4	W:	Äh klingelt äh /dem/ Wecker, "klingelt"
		Äh rings äh /the-MASC-SG-DAT/ alarm-clock "rings"
5		(2.8)
6	D:	Ja, da ist ein Mann und der Wecker klingelt(?)
		Yes, there is a man and the alarm-clock rings(*?*)
7		.3)
8	W:	äh aufstehn, acht- sieben Uhr, (3.1)
		äh to-get-up, eight- seven o'clock (*3.1*)
9		/den/ Wecker klingelt. (6.0) hm=
		/the-MASC-SG-ACC/ alarm-clock rings. 6.0) hm=
10	D:	= Was macht der Mann?
		= What does the man {do}?
11		(0.8)
12	W:	raufäh- raufhauen [((laughter))
		on- to-hit-on ((laughter))
13	D:	[auf'n Wecker?
		on-to-the alarm-clock?

TABLE 10.1 Percentages of Nonfinite (NF), Finite (F), Remaining Utterances (R) and Absolute Number of Utterances (*n*) for Patient W in Three Conditions

a1 = Baseline				*a2 = "Non-interactional" storytelling*				*a3 = Interactional storytelling*			
NF	F	R	(*n*)	NF	F	R	(*n*)	NF	F	R	(*n*)
73	7	20	(30)	24	73	3	(37)	52	30	18	(94)

14 W: Ja,   /den/   Wecker
        Yes, / the-MASC-SG-ACC/ alarm-clock
15   rauf- /ran-/ hauen. (1.3) ähm
        on- /at-/   to-hit. (1.3) ähm
16   (6.2)
17 D: Bleibt   er liegen im   Bett oder?
        Continues he to-lie in-the bed or?
18 W: Ja, ja! Acht Uhr   äh schläft- äh weiterschlafen
        Yes, yes! Eight o'clock äh sleeps- äh to-continue-to-sleep
19 D: Hm,   bleibt liegen im   Bett bis   acht [Uhr?
        Hm, continues to-lie in-the bed until eight o'clock?
20 W: [Ja,
                                                Yes,
21   die Frau   ähm (5.3) böse
        the woman ähm (5.3) angry
22 D: Die   ist böse, warum?
        She-DEM is angry, why?
23 W: Ja   ähm weiterschlafen   ((laughter))
        Yes ähm to-continue-to-sleep ((laughter))
24 D: Weil   er weiter "geschlafen"
        Because he continued-PP-to-sleep
25 W: Ja   ähm (6.7) die Frau   (5.7) guckt auf die Uhr und
        Yes ähm (6.7) the woman (5.7) looks at   the clock and
26   (3.8)
27 D: guckt wie spät es ist oder was?
        looks how late it is or what?
28 W: Ja.   äh der Mann ähm beeilt sich
        Yes, äh the man   ähm hurries-up
29 D: hm?hm?
30   (5.0)
31 W: auf der Straße, ähm
        on the street, ähm
32 D: Wie auf der Straße? Ist er rausgegangen oder was?
        How on the street? Has he gone-out   or   what?
33 W: (nein) beeilen
        (no)   to-hurry-up
34 D: Mit der Frau?
        With the woman?
35 W: Nee, der der Mann beeilt sich ähm (5.8) auweia
        No, the the man hurries-up ähm (5.8) gee!
36   ((laughter)) hm der   (1.4)
        ((laughter)) hm he-DEM (1.4)
37 D: geht irgendwohin?
        goes somewhere?

38 W: Nee, auf der Arbeit
         No, at   work
39 D: Hm
40 W: ähä (2.4) der Mann (4.4) ä:h auf'n Stuhl
         ähä (2.4) the man   (4.4) ä:h on-the chair
41   eingeschlafen.
         fallen-to-sleep.
42 D: Der   ist eingeschlafen. [((laughter))
         He-DEM has fallen-to-sleep.
43 W: [((laughter))

Without going into the details, one can easily see that W produces here quite a number of non-finite, subsentential expressions that are not direct responses to wh-questions by D so that they are to be counted as telegraphic or non-finite expressions. A very revealing occurrence is the self-correction in line 18. W starts a finite construction ("acht Uhr schläft"/ eight o'clock sleeps) but cuts it off and provides instead the verb in the infinitive ("weiterschlafen"/ to-continue-to-sleep), a clear example of redesigning her utterance from elaborate to telegraphic.

Each condition of table 10.1 was compared with the other two conditions by means of a chi-square test. As there are three conditions plus two additional ones (described below) so that there are 10 comparisons, the level of significance was fixed at .005. The difference between a1 and a2 was significant: ($\chi^2[2] = 30.61$; $p < .005$) as well as the difference between a2 and a3 ($\chi^2[2] = 21.00$; $p < .005$). There was no significant difference between a1 and a3 ($\chi^2[2] = 6.86$; $p > .005$). That is to say, patient W's strong tendency toward telegraphic style in informal conversation decreases in the "non-interactional" (or more precisely: in the attenuated-interactional) storytelling condition (as expected), but increases in the interactional storytelling, up to almost the same degree as in the baseline condition. It appears that the factor "what has to be said" cannot be responsible for the difference between speech obtained in informal conversation and speech obtained in formal test condition; otherwise, there should also have been a difference between informal conversation and interactional storytelling. As the latter is not the case, the factor "presence vs. absence of ordinary interaction" as responsible for the difference between a1 and a2 seems justifiable. However, again this is a bit premature. Another and hitherto disregarded factor is confounded with "interaction," namely, the person interacting with the patient: in a1, it is an aphasiologist, and in a3 it is a confidant. To check the possible influence of this factor, we introduced an additional non-interactional storytelling condition: some weeks after a3, patient W had to tell the cartoon stories again, this time to her daughter; but the latter was requested "to behave like a tester/experimenter," that is, in the same way as described for the aphasiologist in a2. In this non-interactional storytelling to the daughter (condi-

tion a4), patient W showed the following distribution of non-finite, finite, and remaining utterances: NF = 10%, F = 69%, R = 20%, and n = 49. Example 4 shows W's telling of the wake-up story under this condition.

Example 4 "Non-interactional" Storytelling to a Close Relative

1 W: Der Mann haut auf den Wecker.   (13.7) Der Mann
        The man   hits   on   the   alarm-clock. (13.7) The man
2   schläft weiter.   (3.4) Die Frau   (9.5) spricht
        continues-to-sleep. (3.4) The woman (9.5) speaks
3   mit dem Mann und (8.1) acht Uhr   (7.2) auf die- nee
        with the man   and (8.1) eight o'clock (7.2) on the- no
4   (16.1)
5 D: Du hast Zeit
        You have time
6   (5.4) das [Früh-
        (5.4) the   break-
7 D: [((clears throat))
8 W: das Frühstück (4.9) und (15.6) auf (14.2) hm (2.8)
        the breakfast   (4.9) and (15.6) on   (14.2) hm (2.8)
9   die   Frau sieht auf die Uhr.   (5.8) Der Mann °schn-°
        the woman looks at   the clock. (5.8) the   man   °schn-°
10   (2.8) der Mann (4.4) ißt   schnell. (11.7)
        (2.8) the man   (4.4) eats quickly. (11.7)
11   der Mann beeilt   sich auf auf auf die Arbeit nee
        the man   hurries up to to to the work   no
12   ((sighs)) (1.3) auf auf die Arbeitsstelle zu gehen.
        ((sighs)) (1.3) to to the workplace   to go.
13   Ach du Schreck, (0.6) der Mann schläft weiter.   Na!
        good gracious,   (0.6) the man   continues-to-sleep. Na!

As can be seen, the daughter is quite successful in playing the "perversely passive" professional tester. And as the latter, she elicits elaborate finite non-telegraphic expressions from her mother by acting like this. W's grammatical elaborations are quite remarkable. In line 11–12 she produces a fully correct matrix clause with a fully correct subordinate clause—a rare occurrence in Broca's patients. The elaborations and the correctness of her expressions, however, cost a dramatic amount of time.

The statistical evaluation of the data showed that this condition differed significantly from a1 ($\chi^2[2]$ = 37.78; p < .005) as well as from a3 ($\chi^2[2]$ = 26.73; p < .005), but not from a2 ($\chi^2[2]$ = 7.79; p > .005). Obviously, it does not matter whether the "tester" is a professional as in a2 or a confidant; the decisive factor appears to be the practices adopted for the conduct of interaction.

However, a factor is still confounded with "interaction": some colleagues of the first author have raised the argument that, in talk-in-interaction, the speaker does not

only have to attend to his or her own speech but also to the speech of the other so that interaction brings about a higher cognitive load. To check the possible influence of this factor we asked the patient to tell the cartoon stories once more (again, some weeks later), this time as in a2 (formal test condition with an aphasiologist), but the difficulty was enhanced by a dual task arrangement: while telling the stories, a taped voice gave the patient commands to press either a green or a red button as fast as possible. Intervals of these commands were random; the average interval was 20 s. The "wake-up" story under this condition was as follows:

Example 5
((The straight vertical lines stand for the commands to push a button))

1   W: Der Mann schläft (6.9) /morgen/   früh
         The man   sleeps (6.9) /tomorrow/ in-the-morning
2   acht nee sieben Uhr   wecken (3.4) der Mann |
         eight no seben o'clock to-awake (3.4) the man /
3   (8.5) der Mann (7.3) | (13.9) ach Mensch! (2.3) haut
         (8.5) the man   (7.3) / (13.9) oh man!   (2.3) hits
4   auf'n   Wecker   ((laughter)) | (3.2)
         on-to-the alarm-clock ((laughter)) / (3.2)
5   ach du Schreck! (3.5) der Mann schläft weiter   (2.7)
         oh Lord!   (3.5) the man   continues-to-sleep (2.7)
6   die Frau   schimpft (11.6) acht Uhr   ((sighs))
         the woman scolds   (11.6) eight o'clock ((sighs))
7 | (4.0) der Mann- äh die Frau   schimpft (6.7) oh (3.9)
         / (4.0) the man- äh the woman scolds   (6.7) oh (3.9)
8   /der/   Frau die   Frau |
         /the-MASC-SG-NOM/ woman the-FEM-SG-NOM woman /
9   die Frau   (2.8) guckt auf die Uhr.   halb neun
         the woman (2.8) looks at   the clock. half past eight
10   (3.2) die äh Fr- | äh die Frau   äh der Mann
         (3.2) the äh woman | äh the woman äh the man
11   ißt schneller. (6.5) Der Mann verschlafen. (5.6) Der
         eats faster.   (6.5) The man over-slept-PP. (5.6) The
12   Mann rennt /auf/ die Arbeit ach du Schreck! ((laughter))
         man runs /to/ the work   oh lord!   ((laughter))
13 | (6.1) der Mann schläft auf /die/   Arbeit
         / (6.1) the man   sleeps at /the-FEM-SG-ACC/ work
14   nee nee
         no no

A quick first glance suffices to show that the enhancement of the overall difficulty by the dual task arrangement did not lead to the deployment of telegraphic style. There are a few telegraphic utterances (e.g., "sieben Uhr wecken"/ seven o'clock to-awake, line 2), but the majority of the expressions are finite. The distribution of NF, F, R

and the absolute number of utterances in this dual task condition (a5)—summed over the four stories—was: NF = 16%, F = 61%, R = 23%, n = 57. The statistical evaluation confirms the first-glance impression. With respect to the distribution of finite and non-finite expressions, there was no significant difference between a5 and a2 ($\chi^2[2]$ = 7.39; p > .005) or between a5 and a4 ($\chi^2[2]$ = .95; p > .005). But there were significant differences between a5 and the two interactional conditions (a5 versus a1, $\chi^2[2]$ = 32.18; p < .005; and a5 vs. a3, $\chi^2[2]$ = 21.10; p < .005). That means that the enhancement of the task difficulty did not contribute anything with respect to the choice between telegraphic style and a more elaborate way of expressing oneself. The "attenuated-interactional" storytelling with an aphasiologist under dual task conditions showed the same picture as the same condition without dual task constraints, as well as the "attenuated-interactional" storytelling with a confidant instead of an aphasiologist. The logic of a dual task in the cognitive sciences is this: two tasks simultaneously carried out should interfere with each other (that is, the subjects should become worse than in either of the two tasks or in both) if they compete for common processing resources. If there is no interference effect, then the two tasks do not compete with each other or the dual task is not difficult enough. In any case, it is hard to make anything out of a null effect, as in our case. However, storytelling and the choice reaction time task *did* interfere with each other: patient W's speech became markedly worse in a5 as compared with a2. One fairly direct way of assessing this deterioration is the scoring of incorrect grammatical elements. In a2 patient W produced only 3 incorrect elements out of 48 (6%) and in a5 20 elements out of 66 (30%). The difference is significant ($\chi^2[1]$ = 9.96; p < .01). Thus, the interfering choice reaction time task did have an effect on W's speech; but it did not make her switch over to telegraphic style—*quod erat demonstrandum*.

In summarizing, it might be useful to combine all results in one table (table 10.2), thereby grouping the experimental conditions according to a higher or lower percentage of telegraphic utterances. For transparency's sake, the results are also simplified and only the percentages of NF ("telegrams") are presented.

The two conditions with some sort of ordinary interaction (a1 and a3) go together and the three conditions where the interaction between patient and tester is minimized (a2, a4, and a5) go together. It does not appear to matter

TABLE 10.2 Percentages of Telegraphic Utterances (NF) of Patient W in 5 Conditions

a1 = Informal conversation with aphasiologist	a3 = Interactional storytelling with confidant	a2 = Storytelling under formal test conditions with aphasiologst	a4 = Storytelling under formal test conditions with confidant	a5 = Storytelling under formal test conditions with aphasiologist, dual task
73	52	24	10	16

- what the talk-in-interaction is—either free topic or enforced cartoon stories (a1 vs. a3),
- whether the tester is a less or more familiar person (a2 vs. a4), or
- whether the task is comparatively easy or comparatively difficult (a2 vs. a5).

The only relevant factor determining the deployment or non-deployment of tele-graphic style appears to be the presence or absence of some form of ordinary inter-action. If the use of telegraphic style is due to an adaptive strategy, then this adaptation must be "interactionally motivated" (to translate the question in the title of Heeschen & Kolk, 1994, "Adaptation bei Agrammatikern—interaktional motiviert?").

As straightforward as this result is, the numbers do not tell us anything about what actually is achieved by the adaptation and how it is achieved. To assume that a patient develops adaptive strategies just to converse with a professional aphasi-ologist (a1), or that he or she does so for the purposes of an enforced—though interactional—construction of some silly cartoon stories, (a3), does not seem rea-sonable. A detailed look at the practices deployed by patient and co-participant in naturalistic ordinary settings will be useful, because it must be in these day-to-day recurring situations that the patient can plausibly be assumed to develop adaptive strategies. Such a process of exploring and understanding adaptation in the context of mundane interaction can be informed by the corpus of description and analysis of the phenomena of talk and other conduct in interaction among language-unimpaired speakers developed over the last 35 years within the framework of Conversation Analysis.

To this end, we recorded conversations between aphasic patients and an unim-paired familiar co-participant. Patient W was recorded once in conversation with her daughter and once in conversation with her mother. As the experimental investiga-tions reported in the first part of this chapter dealt mainly with a form of storytelling, we decided to find and focus on an episode with story-like characteristics. After having learned (though definitely not understood) what happens with the patient's speech in various conditions of storytelling, and that what happens is obviously due to the global factor "interaction," we now turn to talk-in-interaction in which some telling is done, in which something gets recounted—a little story, perhaps—as it *really* oc-curred in an unmanipulated situation of talk-in-interaction to explore how telling is managed by an (aphasic) teller and a ("normal") recipient.

If, instead of using actual deployments of talk "as a window into the structure and organization of normal cognitive processes" and language, we wish to use our understanding of language, cognition and other features of the situation of practical action to understand actual conduct in this world, what is it that we have to come to terms with? And how can we use our understanding of the structures of talk and other conduct in interaction in coming to terms with it?

Analytic observations on some excerpts
from conversations with patient W

Example 6 comes from a conversation between W and her daughter (D). It took place
in the home of W in a working class area of Berlin-West. The daughter had been
living there together with her mother and her grandmother since early childhood.
She had moved to another place just shortly before the conversation took place. In
her early twenties, she is a student of education. She speaks High German with occa-
sional touches of Berlin dialect, as does her mother. The recorded conversation be-
tween D and W was not especially arranged for taping. It occurred at a time and at an
occasion when D would have visited her mother for a chat anyway.

Example 6
 ((The just-preceding talk had been about a birthday party in the home of W a few days ear-
lier. W and D exchanged comments on the quality of the salads served at the party, then there
is silence for 5 seconds, then:))

1	D:	Wie lange war Karin- *How long was Karin-* How long did Karin-	((W unpacking cookies with her left hand))
2		õiß doch! *eat PRT!* Go ahead and eat!	((D moves head toward the cookies, then back to W))
3		wie lange war Karin noch da? *how long was Karin still here?* how long did Karin stay?	
4	W:	"Zwei" Uhr. *"Two o'clock"* Two o'clock.	((head forward as if confiding))
5		(0.8)	((W withdraws gaze, then D))
6	W:	"gesch<u>la</u>fen" *"slept-PP"* Sleeping.	((W resumes gaze))
7		(0.5)	((W withdraws gaze))
8	D:	<u>Du</u> bist eingeschlafen, oder was, *You have fallen-to-sleep, or what,* <u>Yo</u>u fell asleep, or what,	((D resumes gaze, then W))
9		(1.0)	
10	W:	Ja- ä:h, Karin (.) eingeschlafen Ye- *ä:h, Karin (.) fallen-to-sleep* Ye- uh, Karin (.) fell asleep	
11		(0.7)	
12	D:	><u>Wo</u>, hier, <u>oder</u> <u>was</u>.< >*<u>Where</u>, <u>here</u>, or <u>what</u>,*< >*<u>Where</u>, <u>here</u>, or <u>what</u>,*<	

13 W: õJa̲:, lang gelegt   ((W gesturing "lying down"))
          Ye:s, lain-down
          Ye̲:s, passed out
14   (0.8)
15 D: hmpfs!

16   (0.2)
17 D: >Warum< habt ihr   sie nicht aufgeweckt,
          >why<   have you-PL her not   waked-up,
          Why didn't you wake her up,
18   (1.0)
19 W: !hh ä- ä:hm (1.8) Gernot   ((W gesturing the tickling
          hh ä- ä:hm (1.8) Gernot   motion through line 23.))
          !hh uh- uh:m, (1.8) Gernot
20   {!hhhh/(0.8)} h'm (0.8) Füße gekillert !hh und
          {!hhhh/(0.8)} h'm (0.8) feet tickled-PP !hh and
          {!hhhh/(0.8)} mm (0.8) tickled [her] feet !hh and
21 D: h_h_
22   (0.5)
23 W: P:o gekillert
          tushy tickled-PP
          tickled [her] tushy
24   (.)   ((W doing "negative" head
                                                   shakes through line 26))
25 D: õhihi
26   (0.5)
27 D: !hhh nich' wachgeworden,
          !hhh not   got-PP-awake,
          !hhh didn't wake up,
28 W: Nö
((Not directly visible in the transcript is W's non-fluency. Her rate of speech is slow, and the speech is halting and full of hesitations. The pauses in W's speech that are marked in the transcript stand out noticeably against this general non-fluency.))

On the face of it, Karin's behavior at the party appears to be "storyable," and, as noted, this was one of the reasons for selecting this episode for this chapter. However, from a conversation analytic point of view, whether something is a story (or narrative) is not a question of fulfilling defining critera for the genre established by analysts beforehand (as in Labov, 1981), but is a matter of the participants themselves, of whether they themselves are oriented to their doings as the construction of a story or a storytelling. Thus, we had better attend to what kind of talk this is and how it is co-constructed to be that.

   The talk about salads at the party having been brought to closure and having issued in a silence grown into a lapse, the character of the next spate of talk is inde-

terminate. There could be more about the party but need not be. D's next turn moves to take up a matter also related to the party and designed for its possible storyability.

1	D:	Wie lange war Karin-	((W unpacking cookies with her
		How long was Karin-	left hand))
		How long did Karin-	
2		i_§ doch!	((D moves head toward the
		eat PRT!	cookies, then back to W))
		Go ahead and eat!	
3		wie lange war Karin noch da?	
		how long was Karin still here?	
		how long did Karin stay?	

The very question "How long did Karin stay?" itself displays an orientation to there possibly being an issue here worth talking/telling about, and very likely one oriented to by both W and D. It does this in part by virtue of turn design. The question format "How long" itself takes duration to be relevant and problematic, as does the durative verb "stay" and its German implementation in the particle "noch" ("stay" serving here as the English rendering of the German "still be there"). In its presupposing Karin's presence at the party in the first place, the question may well invoke an updating of D's previous knowledge about the event (for example, that D was there until quite late and Karin was still there when she left or retired; or that Karin's presence was unexpected, and thus any duration was problematic, etc.). So Karin's question marks this matter as potentially worthy of further talk, of being made something of.[11]

3		wie lange war Karin noch da?	
		how long was Karin still here?	
		how long did Karin stay?	
4	W:	"Zwei" Uhr.	((head forward as if confiding))
		"Two o'clock"	
		Two o'clock.	
5		(0.8)	((W withdraws gaze, then D))
6	W:	"geschlafen"	((W resumes gaze))
		"slept-PP"	
		Sleeping.	
7		(0.5)	((W withdraws gaze))
8	D:	Du bist eingeschlafen, oder was,	((D resumes gaze,
		You have fallen-to-sleep, or what,	then W))
		You fell asleep, or what,	
9		(1.0)	

W's response, "two o'clock" (by any measure a late hour), confirms this inexplicitly conveyed problematicity, conveys some measure of its substantial extent, and hints

at a sense of the trouble or faux pas involved on Karin's side. Having done so, W looks away, apparently done. But it seems as if she continues resonating what she has done, and knows that it conveys something possibly misleading about what actually happened, because she implies that Karin continuously until two o'clock was sentiently "staying," that is, choosing not to leave or not registering the inappropriateness of not leaving. But that is not what was going on; she passed out, and she only "stayed" in the conscious sense until she passed out. After that, she may still have physically been there, but she was not "staying" in the same sense. So W "returns" to the talk to add "passed out." And that sets the sequel on another course, for dealing with a "passed out" late-staying guest is different from dealing with a conscious late-staying guest—different in its social interpretation, "moral" import, and strategic challenge to the host—and different as an event reported in conversation. With this reply, then, W aligns with the premise of D's question that something is of interest here, something worth talking and telling about. And in case D had not picked that up from the first component of W's response, W has provided the second.

W's answer is somewhat spare. Although a subsentential expression (just the indication of the time) is certainly canonical here, in W's expression at line 4 the preposition "um"/ at or "bis"/ until is lacking ("um 2 Uhr"/ at two o'clock, or "bis 2 Uhr"/ until two o'clock). Although this does not make her utterance ungrammatical, she produces no more than the necessary minimum. On the other hand, the telling of the time is delivered in a special way: W moves her head in the direction of D, thus coming closer to D's ears, and she lowers the volume of her voice, as if she were confiding something particularly delicate, embarrassing, or outrageous. Still, immediately after her turn in line 4 and in the ensuing pause (line 5), she withdraws her gaze from D and looks back to the cookies she is trying to unpack. Thus, a talk-unrelated activity is displayed as the focus of her attention, responded to by D with her own withdrawal of gaze so that a state of mutual disengagement is arrived at (cf. Goodwin, 1986, for the interactional impact of talk-unrelated actions). But then W redirects her gaze to D and adds "geschlafen"/ slept- PP. That the unit "geschlafen" is related to and connected with the preceding utterance is displayed by the fact that it is delivered with the same somewhat lowered voice. As noted, if Karin fell asleep, it is a possible account for the delivery of Karin's late stay at the party as a delicate or otherwise problematic matter. After this, W again looks away to the cookies. But now D's interest is aroused; she redirects gaze to her mother and offers a candidate understanding (line 8) of W's short and spare expression in line 6. Immediately after onset of D's turn, W redirects her gaze from the cookies back to her daughter, and now mutual orientation is re-achieved.

There is nothing deviant from normal, nothing "impaired" in this fugue-like tumble of gaze directions, of engagement and disengagement. Mutual orientation, as well as mutual disengagement, is not automatic but is an achievement that requires coordinated work and negotiations (Goodwin, 1981, 1984). While the character of the sequence is not yet determined, W's special conspiratorial delivery of "Zwei Uhr"

and "geschlafen" is not unlike an interest arouser typical of story prefaces (Sacks, 1995, II: 222–228), and in the aftermath of "geschlafen," the two women are sustaining a mutual orientation that prefigures continuation of the talk in progress.

```
8   D:   Du bist eingeschlafen, oder was,        ((D resumes gaze,
         You have fallen-to-sleep, or what,        then W))
         You fell asleep, or what,
9        (1.0)
10  W:   Ja-  :h, Karin (.) eingeschlafen
         Ye- :h, Karin (.) fallen-to-sleep
         Ye- uh, Karin (.) fell asleep
11       (0.7)
```

In line 8, D probes W's one-word utterance in line 6, specifically by providing a candidate agent of the sleeping, "you." As will be seen in a moment, D is mistaken here; it was Karin. Did D simply misunderstand her mother? Was W's utterance indeed too short—too "agrammatic"? A closer inspection of D's utterance suggests a more differentiated—and possibly barbed—characterization.

First, D gives the word "Du"/ you a mildly contrastive stress; furthermore, the "Du" is delivered with an unusual pronunciation: the vowel "u" is reduced to a schwa. Nevertheless, it is stressed; and a stressed schwa is a fairly recalcitrant occurrence for any phonological theory of German. Thus, the least that can be said is that the offered agent "you" is strongly marked so that it appears to be not only a proposal for the agent but a contrastive one: was it *you* who fell sleep? The deployment of the tag question "oder was"?/ or what? reinforces this putative contrast but marks it as the less likely understanding. What is at issue here may concern what exactly W's conspiratorial manner was alluding to? Whose conduct is it indelicate to refer to? Was it that Karin stayed so late that the mother fell asleep at the party she herself was hosting (an embarrassment, then, for both of them)? Or is it that Karin's sleeping is treated here as hardly believable, as something that needs special reconfirmation. The turn's construction focuses on the first of these (see endnote 18).

D's turn in line 8 contains another element: she replaces "geschlafen"/ *slept- PP* by "bist eingeschlafen"/ have *fallen asleep*. Because the stress on "Du"/*you* marks it as the thrust of D's turn, the introduction of "bist eingeschlafen" comes off as an embedded correction of W's turn (Jefferson, 1987), done en passant while some other action is the prime basis for the turn; and it is accepted in the canonical manner for embedded corrections—it is incorporated en passant in W's next turn at line 10 (a case of the unmarked correction sequence X-Y-Y). But as shown in a moment, there is more to it.

W begins to answer D's question "*you* fell to sleep, or what?" in the affirmative, but cuts off the "ja"/ *yes*, attaches an "editing term," and then intitiates a self-repair to replace her agreement with a correction of D's displayed supposition. W's intial "ja-" reflects an orientation to the normal preference for agreement (Pomerantz, 1984;

Sacks, 1987), one that surfaces in "normal" speakers as well, even when one's knowledge is at variance with it. As is common in such instances, she repairs it and provides a correction in its place—the real agent of the falling asleep, Karin. She incorporates the repaired verb en passant while correcting the person reference (but only the nonfinite verb part, the past participle), thereby ratifying the embedded correction of grammar by D.[12]

```
10  W:   Ja- ä:h, Karin (.) eingeschlafen
         Ye- ä:h, Karin (.) fallen-to-sleep
         Ye- uh, Karin (.) fell asleep
11       (0.7)
12  D:   >Wo,     hier, oder was.<
         >Where, here, or  what,<
           >Where, here, or  what,<
13  W:    Ja:,  lang gelegt                    ((W gesturing "lying down"))
         Ye:s, lain-down
         Ye:s, passed out
14       (0.8)
15  D:   hmpfs!
```

In line 12, D continues to "unpack" W's one-word utterance in line 6. She asks for the location of Karin's falling-to-sleep ("Wo?") and then adds a candidate ("hier") which, by the tag question "or what," is marked as just one of several alternatives. Given the global context (the birthday party) as well as the specific context (Karin stayed until 2 o'clock and fell asleep), it is plain enough that Karin fell asleep "here" in the sense of "this residence." Unless discriminating between the kitchen in which this conversation is being conducted and elsewhere in the apartment, the question as a locational inquiry is gratuitous. However, D's turn conveys something else. It is delivered in a (slightly) louder voice and with (slight) acceleration. These features together embody ("do") being taken aback—conveying a disapproving stance. The reproach could be directed toward Karin (for her improper behavior) or toward W (for letting Karin behave improperly, for not preventing Karin from falling to sleep here), or to both.

W's response addresses these several possible reproaches. In line 13, W confirms that it was "here" by a "ja" delivered with heightened and louder voice and with an overlong vowel. This "ja" is quite a different object from the one in line 10; it is an almost lexicalized item in German for reconfirming information marked as unusual or unlikely before. It can be glossed as "yes indeed, imagine!" Clearly, W appears not to take D's questions in line 12 as gratuitous but displays understanding for D's taken-aback stance. The second turn component "langgelegt" gives an account of how all this could happen and why she, the host, could not prevent this *malheur*: Karin has "lain down." The German verb "sich langlegen" does not correspond exactly to the English "to lie down" (which would be "sich hinlegen"). It adds

a component of urgency, even uncontrollability, for the action of lying down. This, together with W's gesture (moving left hand from left to right at the height of her breast), which is carried out with some verve, suggests that it was not the simple action of just lying down but rather a falling down—in American English (given the party context) "passing out."

Excursus on agrammatism and conversational
practice: argument structure

It might be useful here to stop the turn-by-turn analytic gloss and to take up issues addressed in the first part of this chapter. W clearly produces talk referred to as "telegraphic style" in traditional terminology. All her utterances are subsentential, and not only in response to wh-questions. Indeed, all her utterances are truncated versions of whatever grammatical unit they are designed to instantiate (e.g., lacking the preposition in a prepositional phrase, etc.). D's response to her mother's spare utterances have already been described as "probing" and "unpacking." She formulates and elaborates points that have been "undertold" or compacted by W herself; she talks, so to speak, on behalf of W (although not in the manner described by Sacks [1995] as "collaboratives" and by Lerner [1991, 1996] as "anticipatory completion"). She deploys a practice also found in a conversation between another agrammatic and another healthy co-participant (Heeschen & Schegloff, 1999), and the characterizations in that article are confirmed by the material under examination here, but only at a global level. The particulars and details of these two conversations are quite different. The most conspicuous difference is that W uses *verb forms* as the kernel of her utterances, whereas the patient described in Heeschen and Schegoff (1999) uses *noun phrases*. From an interactional and linguistic point of view, verb forms have two useful properties: (1) associated with a main verb, there is the verb's argument structure so that the participant who undertakes to elaborate the subsentential unit is guided or "navigated" in doing so;[13] (2) in German, non-finite verb forms such as the past participles used by W have to appear at the end of clauses (see appendix 1), thus marking a possible (syntactical) completion—a grammatical property of German that can be a resource for the management of turn taking (Schegloff, Ochs, & Thompson, 1996, p. 29). Let us briefly check whether W and D make these properties relevant in their interaction.

```
6   W:   "geschlafen"                        ((W resumes gaze))
          "slept-PP"
           Sleeping.
7         (0.5) ((W withdraws gaze))
8   D:   Du bist eingeschlafen,    oder was,   ((D resumes gaze,
          You have fallen-to-sleep, or  what,    then W))
          You fell asleep, or what,
9         (1.0)
```

```
10  W:   Ja- :h,  Karin (.) eingeschlafen
         Ye- :h, Karin (.) fallen-to-sleep
         Ye- uh, Karin (.) fell asleep
11       (0.7)
12  D:   >Wo,    hier,  oder was.<
         >Where, here, or  what,<
           >Where,                    here, or what,<
13  W:   Ja:,    lang gelegt          ((W gesturing "lying down"))
         Ye:s, lain-down
         Ye:s, passed out
```

For the first of these properties, argument structure, D's elaborations of W's utterance "geschlafen" indeed follow, step by step, the frame of the verb's common understood argument structure: who (line 8) and where (line 12). In some psycholinguistic models of sentence production, the verbal lemma (meaning and argument structure) is considered the starting point and cornerstone of the sentence formulation process (Bock & Levelt, 1994), so that W's utterances would reflect an early basic step in the production process, the elaboration of which is then left to the conversational partner. It is tempting—in a virtual reversal of Vygotsky's proposals—to conceive of D's and W's division of labor as an externalization of cognitive processes otherwise located "within" the individual speaker so that we would have here an ideal case of "shared cognition." However, this would fail to account for some of what is going on in W's and D's interaction. D not only achieves the articulation of information not present in the laconic expression of her mother; she simultaneously marks her stances toward the facts she is informed about in co-construction with her mother. And W, in turn, does not only confirm the mere informational components D's elaborations offer her; she also responds to the stances D marked. Thus, the reproach conveyed in D's turn at line 12 is responded to not only by a confirmation but also by a justification (I could not prevent Karin from behaving like this; she simply passed out). And to D's disapproving surprise and disbelief that Karin fell asleep "hier," W responds with a special delivery of "ja," in line 13. Thus, although it is true that D exploits the fact that verbs have an argument structure, she does considerably more at the same time. The need to elaborate and to "unpack" W's key word "geschlafen" becomes an occasion and a resource for other activities on D's part.

Excursus on agrammatism and conversational practice:
Possible turn completion and the treatment of silence

Now we turn to the second of these properties (clause final position of non-finite verb forms). Although grammatical rules—such as the clause-final position of nonfinite verbs in German—are not sufficient for the description of units in conversation (Ford & Thompson, 1996), and although conversational units in German can be expanded beyond the non-finite verb, the latter clearly marks a possible (though not

necessarily an actual) completion point for a turn. The question then is whether D
displays orientation to non-finite verbs in her mother's speech as possibly indicat-
ing the turn's end. And this is clearly *not* the case, or at least D does not exploit
such positions as places at which to start a next turn of her own. After W's turn in
line 10, as well as after her turn in 13 (both ending with a non-finite verb), D be-
gins a next turn only after gaps of silence of considerable length.[14] It seems as if D
gives her mother time to add more material, and only if W fails to indicate that she
is going to continue does D launch her own utterances. D displays this attitude also
in line 05: she withdraws her gaze only after W herself has withdrawn gaze and
not directly after the time indication ("Zwei Uhr"), although this is—in this posi-
tion (an answer to a temporal wh-question)—certainly a potentially complete turn.
This "considerateness" of D, this concern about being sure that W has indeed com-
pleted what she wants to say, is a common feature of D's conduct in interaction
with W, observable in many other episodes and many other occasions not presented
here.[15] Although this practice is, in one respect, somewhat problematic as it ex-
poses W as a patient with a dysfluency problem, it can also be characterized as a
benign behavior: it at least contributes to avoiding one sort of trouble otherwise
endemic to an interactional environment with recurrent inter-turn gaps of silence.
This sort of trouble can be seen in an episode of a conversation between W and her
own mother (G).

    Both mother and daughter of W have been living together with her for many
years, since the onset of her aphasia. W's mother is referred to here as "grandmother"
(G). G at first declined to participate in the taping, saying that she did not know what
to talk about. The first author suggested that W and G could discuss the TV program
or whatever they had on their minds, but before finishing this suggestion, G began
talking about TV.

Example 7

```
1  G:   Ja, ik wollte sagen,   was * guckst'n            ((* G points
        Yes, I would-liketo-say what watch-you-PRT        to TV-room))
        Yes, I wanted to say, what are you gonna watch
2       heute abend      im Fernsehen,  = haste      da
        today in-the-evening on TV,      = have-you there
        tonight on TV,                   = have you
3       schon   was       je- (1.0)* guckt    ((* W withdraws
        already something l-  (1.0)  looked-P          gaze))
        already watched something?
4         (0.5)
5  W:   Ach ja? ä:h,  Grusel (.) [film
        Oh yes? ä:h,   horror- (.) movie
        Oh yeah? Uh:, a horror    [movie
6  G:                            [ (nein,) Gruselfilm,
                                   (no)    horror-movie,
                                   (no,) a horror movie,
```

7   ach [nein, ich meine jetzt,*   ((* G points to TV-room,
      oh   no,   I   mean now,   W redirects gaze to G))
      oh [no,   I   mean now,

8   <u>na</u>ch dem da
      after this   there
      after what you're watching

9 W: [""h_h_""]

10   (0.8)

11 G: Ke:vin kennste   ja,   *Ke:vin allein zu Hause*
       Kevin   you-know PRT, Kevin alone at home
       Kevin   you know,   *Kevin Home Alone*

12   (0.4)

13 G: "ham wer auch schon   jesehn."
       have we also already seen.
       we've already seen that.

14   (1.0)

15 G: "(ne) nich so   doll, wa?"
       (no) not   that good, what?
       (Not) very good, huh?

16   (1.0)

17 G: >Dann bringen se<   noch *Der Al:te*
       then bring   they still   <u>The Old</u>
       >They are still showing<   *The Old Man*

18   (0.8)

19 W: >ach nee<   ((W withdraws gaze))
       oh   no
       >Oh no <

20 G: Nee(-) ach nee
       no(-) oh no
       No(-) Oh no

21 W: hihhi

22 G: *Du mit   deinen [<u>Gru</u>:sel-,   ((*W redirects gaze to G))
       You with your   horror-,
       You and   your   [horror-,

22 W: [Kevin

23 G: du   du m- möcht (est immer) also du willst
       you you m- like   always PRT you want
       You you l-   like   (it all the time) you always

24   lieber   was   zum   Gruseln
      more-gladly something for-the getting-the-creeps
      prefer something that gives you the creeps.

25   haben [immer
      have   always

26 W: *[ja   schön hahaha   *((W nodding head
       yes, lovely hahaha   and looking away))
       [Yes, it's lovely hahaha

G begins by asking what W is going to watch on TV that evening and whether she has already selected something. W answers G's question with "Gruselfilm"/ *horror movie* (line 5). Immediately before the completion of G's turn, W withdraws her gaze to her lap. It appears that she anticipates (very likely from past history) that her selection will be problematic for G. And her forebodings prove to be justified. Immediately after "Grusel"/ *horror* and overlapping with "film," G launches a strong rejection of W's choice: "No, horror-movie, oh no" (lines 6–7). It is delivered in a somewhat accusatory and angry tone, so that it conveys a component of complaint and reproach beyond the mere rejection of a proposal. W registers it (at line 9) with a bit of laughter overlapping G's second "no," a laugh that may register not only an understanding of G's rejection but also an "admission of guilt" that the proposal was made with an anticipation of its rejection. G now proposes (line 11) an alternative to the horror movie, *Kevin Home Alone*.[16] When there is no uptake of this proposal (at line 12), G speaks again, articulating a possible reason for reservations about this suggestion—that the women have already seen the film (line 13). After this, there is again silence, now for 1.0 sec. As W again fails to provide any response, either to G's suggestion or to the possible grounds for rejecting it, G continues, again with possible grounds for rejecting the proposal, this time a negative assessment of the film (line 15), and this time marking the completion of her turn with an upgraded indication of the relevance of a response by W—the turn-exit device of a tag question ("wa?"/ *what*? in line 15). Again, however, a 1.0-second silence passes (line 16) in which W gives no indication of moving to take next turn. Once again G retakes the floor (line 17), now completing the series of backdowns from her earlier proposal by offering an alternative proposal for the evening's TV watching (*Der Alte*/ the old one—a very innocent, unspectacular, "worthy" detective series.

The silences at lines 12, 14, and 16 deserve an explicit analytic interactional gloss. Preceding line 12, G had offered a proposal for the evening's TV watching, and such an action (a "first pair part" of an adjacency pair) makes relevant next a responsive action (a "second pair part") by its addressee, W. The prime alternative types of response are acceptance and rejection, or, more generally, alignment or disalignment. Instead, G encounters silence. Silence after a first pair part—whatever its particular action—prefigures a non-aligning response, in this case a rejection, a dispreferred option that participants regularly undertake (jointly) to avoid. One way of avoiding it is to anticipate the obstacle and offer it as an account in search of agreement—that is, alignment at least on *that*. Another way to avoid the misalignment is withdrawal of the object of the prospective rejection and its replacement. In the present exchange, then, an account is one type of next move that can be relevant. However, after each increment of silence that follows, it is not W but G who formulates the account or otherwise backs away from the proposal: they already saw the movie, the movie was not so good, here is another proposal instead. G can be taken here as speaking, in a sense, on behalf of W as the party resisting the proposal, showing an alignment of understanding even where there is disagreement on what to do. The silence is taken

not as an "aphasiological" silence reflecting some language problem, but as an inter-actionally meaningful gap of silence, that is, a delay prefiguring a dispreferred action—a common practice in ordinary conversation. And G's recurrent responses to the silences display adjustments and reactions not to language impairment but to misalignment in a project being worked through in interaction. The same effect can also be seen at lines 16–17, where W's non-response in the aftermath of an overt question (the tag-question "wa?" at line 15) prompts the final backdown from the previous proposal and the offering of another. And this time G gets a response, again after a delay (the 0.8 sec at line 1), which here again prefigures rejection. And, in fact, W's response *is* a rejection, indeed is more than a simple rejection; the "ach" marks the rejected proposal as, in effect, having not been apt or appropriate (Heri-tage, 1998). It is an inapt alternative to a horror movie.[17] In a sense then, the answer "ach nee" is a rejection and at the same time an account of it. G registers the rejec-tion by "nee," but replaces it immediately by what W had actually said, thus display-ing an understanding that W did more than just reject the suggestion.

We need not press the analytic gloss of this exchange further. We presented the exchange between W and her mother in juxtaposition with the exchange between W and her daughter to exemplify and discuss two quite different ways in which conver-sational co-participants can understand the temporal delays that can characterize conversations with Broca's aphasics, can react to them, and thereby incorporate them into quite different interactional trajectories as a result. Although these are just two singular exchanges, we offer them here to instantiate a contrast with potentially much greater provenance. Here is a series of points explicating the juxtaposition:

1. The two episodes are characterized by silences of comparable duration, located in a position conversation analysts call "gaps," that is, after possible completion of a turn constructional unit and, therefore, of a turn.
2. In these exchanges, because of the aphasia of one of the participants, "gap" position may be equivocal by virtue of both grammar (problem-atic capacity to recognize grammatical possible completion and to mobilize grammatical structure of a next turn) and prosody (often indeterminate contours that do not clearly project or realize possible completion).
3. In the interaction between W and G, many more of these gaps following talk by G are resolved by further talk by G (rather than by W) than in the conversation between W and D, where (following a turn by D) more are resolved by eventual talk by W.
4. In the W/G conversation, the post-gap resumption of talk by G displays treatment of the gap as "disagree-able" rather than dis-fluent by embodying backdown, account, abandonment of position, and so on, that is, responses to perceived misalignment; by contrast, D's post-gap talk does not have this character.

5. So there appear to be two different turn-taking and sequence organizational *gestalten* managing the sequential import of temporal delay at possible turn boundaries:

   a. One is interactional and conventional (in the sense of commonplace), treating gaps as indicative of *interactional* trouble, whether trouble of understanding, alignment, or something else.

   b. The other is medical, custodial, adaptive—treating gaps as the product of *individual* trouble—whether productional or receptive, and specifically *not* to be treated as indicative of interactional trouble. The consequence can be a kind of "kid gloves" display and a continuous orientation to the aphasic interlocutor as "patient," as "troubled," and so on.

6. This contrast is spread over, and manifested in, *stretches of talk*, the joint product of the several parties' participation, and liable to become a diffuse "ethos" (Bateson, 1936) of interaction, a transient or persistent moral climate that can be troubling or comforting, but in any case not specifiable, and hence treatable as unreal, as suspect, as "imagined" by the affected party. And the affected party is vulnerable to facing it, no matter what form it takes: as apparent "testiness" or conflict sensitivity in the conventional interactional stance, or as apparently being "humored" in the other. The alternatives may come to characterize different episodes or phases in a single occasion of interaction, different interactional occasions in a series of occasions, stable characteristics of relationships with different interactional partners, and so forth.

It remains to be seen how robust this contrast turns out to be. But it is one line of consequences whose roots may be traced back to the impact of agrammatism on the organization of turns, thereby on the management of ordinary turn-taking in conversation, and thereby on the interpretation of turn-taking events such as inter-turn silence through the organization of sequences.

Return to the telling

After these comments on W's agrammatism and its possible bearing on ensuing talk, let us resume the explication of example 6.

```
10  W:   Ja- :h,  Karin (.) eingeschlafen
         Ye- :h, Karin (.) fallen-to-sleep
         Ye- uh, Karin (.) fell asleep
11       (0.7)
```

```
12  D:   >Wo,     hier, oder was.<
         >Where, here, or  what,<
         >Where, here, or  what,<
13  W:    Ja:,  lang gelegt              ((W gesturing "lying down"))
         Ye:s,  lain-down
         Ye:s, passed out
14       (0.8)
15  D:   hmpfs!
16       (0.2)
17  D:   >Warum< habt ihr    sie  nicht aufgeweckt,
         >why<  have you-PL her not    waked-up,
         Why didn't you wake her up,
18       (1.0)
19  W:   !hh - ä:hm (1.8) Gernot          ((W gesturing the tickling
         !hh - ä:hm (1.8) Gernot            motion through line 23.))
           !hh uh- uh:m, (1.8) Gernot
20       {!hhhh/(0.8)} h'm (0.8) Füße gekillert  !hh und
         {!hhhh/(0.8)}  h'm (0.8) feet tickled-PP !hh and
         {!hhhh/(0.8)} mm (0.8) tickled [her] feet !hh and
21  D:   h_h_
```

In line 15, D responds (with a delay of 0.8!) to W's accounts in line 13 with a labial sound (like a puff), which is fairly conventional in German for the expression of disapproval and surprise. With this, D overtly confirms her strongly critical stance toward Karin's improper conduct at the party. But that her critique is not restricted to Karin but extends toward her mother is now shown in the continuation of her turn at line 17. In its formulation of a negative observation (what someone did *not* do; cf. Schegloff, 1988) and in its demand for an account for this "failure," this turn is built as a complaint, addressed *to* her mother, and complaining *about* her mother and other responsible persons at the party ("ihr"/ *you-PL*) and asks why they—once they could not prevent Karin from falling to sleep—did not awake her in order to rescue the situation.[18]

The question/complaint is followed by a pause of 1.0 second in which nothing visible or audible happens except that the two parties remain oriented to each other.[19] The sequence of body-behavioral actions after the silence deserves a more detailed description than could be given in the transcript. W "points" her head to the left, in the direction of a neighboring room, where obviously the whole event took place and where the protagonists were located. There follows a trouble-indicating editing term—a same-turn repair initiation characteristic of a search ("ä- ä:hm"), and then the deployment of a hand gesture expressing a sort of "resignation" (open palm turned upward). Simultaneously with the gesture, W turns her gaze away from D and begins to look downward to her lap. After the gesture, the hand is turned down again and

re-positioned to its place on the table near the cookies (its "home position"; Sacks & Schegloff, 1975). These activities occupy the additional gap of 1.8 seconds between question/complaint and its response.

W then delivers a (male) name "Gernot" and, with the onset of this name, she redirects her gaze to D but withdraws it again immediately thereafter—again down to her lap. W's hand is then lifted a bit, moved in the direction of D's visual field, and then launches a pointing gesture down to W's feet. (Both the observer and the co-participant can only guess that the gesture is to the feet because, in carrying out the gesture, W makes her hand and lower arm disappear under table.) With the onset of "Füße gekillert"/*feet tickled-PP* ("killern" is the normal Berlinish verb for High German "kitzeln"), W's hand reappears above the table and again becomes visible. W's fingers are now being rapidly moved in a fashion depicting the activity of tickling and—to anticipate—these tickling movements continue until the end of W's turn in line 23. The interval between uttering "Gernot" (the agent of the tickling) and the onset of "Füße gekillert" (the verb phrase) is two times 0.8 seconds, with a soft "h'm" in between. (Whether the first 0.8 seconds are filled with silence or with breathing activities cannot be determined.)

It appears that W encounters two word-finding problems here—first for the name of the agent and then for the body part (and perhaps also for the activity).[20] W's head nodding/pointing to the place where Gernot apparently acted is certainly insufficient as a clue for D to guess the new referent. But it appears that W did not design the head gesture as an invitation for D to co-participate in the search for the name: after the nod, the head and gaze remain to the right, that is, away from D. This gaze aversion is fairly canonical in the initial phase of a word search (Goodwin & Goodwin, 1986) and seems to display the general preference for self-repair (Schegloff, Jefferson, & Sacks, 1977). And W is indeed able to repair the trouble with the name by herself; she finds and utters it and then reorients herself back to D. But immediately thereafter, W appears to run into a second word-finding problem. What she "has in mind" is indicated by the pointing gesture, but it has already been noted that D cannot see what W is pointing to. It seems, however, that W is carrying out the gesture "for herself," and, as with the search for "Gernot," is not soliciting assistance from her interlocutor in finding the searched-for item.[21] However, this purely cognitive account of what W is doing with the gesture(s) is not fully satisfactory. Although what W's hand does under the table is indeed hidden, the act of deploying the hand to a place where it cannot be seen is itself public and visible. Actually, W makes some effort to make it public; before the hand disappears, it is raised and thus explicitly brought to D's attention. The "hiding act" appears to reinforce what is already displayed by W's gaze aversion, namely, the preference for solving the word-finding problem by herself; it serves to discourage or "disinvite" D from participating in the search.[22] At the same time, it makes manifest that there **is** a problem, and it thereby provides an account for the silence-in-progress—one that may displace alternative possible accounts and interpretations, preeminent among them that the response which

is "on the way," but delayed, is a dispreferred or non-aligning one.

After "Füße gekillert," W prepares herself (and displays this preparation) to continue with an inbreath and an "und."

```
19  W:  !hh ä-  :hm (1.8) Gernot          ((W gesturing the tickling
        !hh ä-  :hm (1.8) Gernot          motion through line 23.))
        !hh uh- uh:m, (1.8) Gernot
20      {!hhhh/(0.8)} h'm (0.8) Füße gekillert !hh und
        {!hhhh/(0.8)} h'm (0.8) feet tickled-PP !hh and
        {!hhhh/(0.8)} mm (0.8) tickled [her] feet !hh and
21  D:  h_h_
22      (0.5)
23  W:  P:o   gekillert
        tushy tickled-PP
        tickled [her] tushy
24      (.)                               ((W doing "negative" head
                                            shakes through line 26))
25  D:  hihi
26      (0.5)
27  D:  !hhh nich' wachgeworden,
        !hhh not   got-PP-awake,
          !hhh didn't wake up,
28  W:  Nö
```

The hand—continuing to display the tickling—goes to the neck, a perfectly reasonable body part to tickle in order to awake someone from sleep. At just this point—in midturn—D interpolates laughter into W's talk.[23] What is accomplished through this positioning of the laughter? Its place suggests that it is not reactive to something that has already occurred or been said, but is rather anticipatory laughter, displaying the projection that what will follow in the talk projected to come by W's gesture is a laugh-source.[24] D's anticipatory laughter can be taken as showing W that their minds are together; D can project that W was going to produce a "laughable," and agrees in treating it as something deserving laughter. A display of such convergence might be particularly relevant at this moment, as D's implicit or explicit reproaches in lines 8, 12, and 17 might have created a certain tension. D accepts her mother's justifications that they could not do anything to prevent Karin from falling to sleep ("she sort of fell down," line 13) and that they tried to awake her with tickling, and she shows this acceptance to her mother at a very sensitive point, namely, *before* her mother has actually finished her justification. Almost perfectly simultaneous with D's laughter, W changes the direction of her pointing gesture from the neck to her "tushy" and reinforces the action of bringing this body part into focus by lifting it from her seat. Exposing this delicate body part is certainly an impropriety that can occur only in intimate interaction and serves to confer a sense of intimacy if it were lacking. It is a laughable by which intimacy is offered and confirmed (Jefferson, Sacks, & Schegloff, 1987).

After the interrupting laughter and a short pause (line 22), W brings the unit launched with the "und" before the laughter to completion: "Po gekillert"/ *tushy tickled- PP*. The word "Po" is not an extreme impropriety, but its deployment again marks this as an intimate interaction. Thus, W underlines the amusing and intimate aspect of her showing the tushy by referring to it with a "naughty" word. The utterance of this word comes after the laughter of D and it thus confirms the acceptance of intimacy offered with the laughter. In a sense, not only does D's projection of a laughable comes true, but W makes it come true.

As the starting point of this chapter was agrammatism and telegraphic style, a brief comment on the linguistic form of W's turn in lines 19 through 23 might be apt. The auxiliary for the past participles is lacking, and thus the whole expression technically falls under the rubric "telegram," which is any expression without a finite verb. But, otherwise, W's utterance is quite elaborate compared with her previous ones. In particular, a grammatical subject is present ("Gernot," the agent of the tickling). And the appearance of a subject in an expression in which the finite verb is lacking was already discussed as linguistically somewhat problematic (and rare).[25] How should we understand it at just this juncture of the conversation?

The preceding turn by D to which W is responding is different in various respects from her questions at line 8 and 12. The latter were designed in such a way that a brief answer was, in principle, all that was required. In fact, these questions were formulated as candidate understandings, so that only a "yes" or a "no" (with a correction) would have been sufficient. The question in line 17, however, is not an understanding check or an unpacking of something her mother had alluded to before. As a question, it makes relevant a fuller telling of the events at the birthday party. Furthermore, its formal design does not offer a preformulated format on which W could scaffold her answer. Finally, this is not only a question but also a vehicle for a complaint and a request for accountability—that is, an action requiring not only answering but defense or compliance. All of these features of D's turn constrain W not only to construct her expression by herself. In particular, they make relevant the explication of the agent and the action that constitute the account that responds to the demands of the preceding turn. Thus, the degree of elaborateness of W's expression appears to fit the local interactional contingencies of just this sequential and interactional juncture and is not responsive to, or understandable by reference to, grammatical rules or statistical regularities (for a more general argument along these lines, see Schegloff, 1993).

At the micro-pause in line 24, W begins to produce lateral ("negative") head shakes that persist during D's laughter (line 25) and the pause of 0.5 second at line 26. D's laughter here is an upgrade of her preceding laughter; there is an increase in sonority (the vocalic part of the first laughter resembled a schwa, that of the second one a full vowel), and it is delivered at a higher pitch than the first one, amplifying the display of affiliation with W. In line 27, D responds to W's lateral headshakes and once again anticipates the import conveyed in them: the efforts to wake Karin

up were in vain. D's utterance here is striking; it is subsentential and is of the same linguistic format as W's earlier spare and telegraphic utterances. Although this format may well be unmarked in this position and merit no special notice, it may be worth noting its possibly interactionally meaningful import, a sort of linguistic affiliation with W. Although the expression is not delivered with question intonation, it is nonetheless an understanding check of W's account of the outcome of these efforts to "revive" Karin. W reconfirms D's guess with a "nö" delivered with a somewhat amused tone. The special form of the negation—the vowel [ö] instead of the more familiar [e]—again betokens intimacy. Thus, from line 21 through line 28, the interactants do more than just the co-formulation of information concerning the events at the party. Simultaneously, they produce an activity sequence, covering a whole range of stances, from complaint to account to acceptance and alignment.

Summary and discussion

Throughout this example (and, it may be added, throughout the whole conversation) W uses exclusively short subsentential expressions. But this is not because she cannot do otherwise. In the cartoon story tellings, in particular in condition a4, she used grammatically quite elaborate expressions, including a subordinate construction, although the latter cost effort and an enormous amount of time. So what is achieved by the "telegraphic" style in the interaction with her daughter is very active coconstruction. W's contributions are generally laconic, abbreviated, undertold, and designedly compact; they prompt in D moves to unpack her mother's spare expressions, including articulating verbally W's non-verbal behavior (e.g., the negative headshakes starting in line 24). This "speaking on behalf of the patient" has also been observed in Heeschen and Schegloff (1999) and, even more dramatically, in Goodwin's (1995, chapter 4 in this volume) various accounts of a more severely affected aphasic. This characterization of the interactional impact of telegraphic style and even more radically reduced linguistic production appears to be corroborated by this case, but only at a very general level. The particulars of the interactions described in Heeschen and Schegloff (1999) and here are quite different. W uses verbs that enable D to reconstruct the missing information by "navigating" along the argument structure associated with the verb. Trajectories composed of verbs followed by reconstruction of the arguments implemented in understanding checks is the most conspicuous linguistic feature of the interaction between W and D and can be observed throughout the whole conversation. But this division of labor in co-formulating information is not the only feature of the verb-argument sequences. D elaborates W's expressions by providing a candidate for a given argument. Her co-formulations become the vehicle for marking her stance toward the co-formulated information.

     All this works in a remarkably smooth way due to D's supportive practices, in particular her concern about non-conflictual turn transition. She explicitly marks the

completion of her turns wherever possible, and she gives her mother time to initiate or finish her turns. This kind of support is exactly tailored to W's specific language problems, namely, the agrammatics' problems of syntactically parsing the co-participant's turn and of syntactically and prosodically organizing their own turns. In other instances, such as word finding, D appears to respect W's strong preference for self-repair. Although W might not have welcomed her correction in line 8, it was at least designed as an embedded, and thus unobtrusive, correction. Thus, it is not only W who adapts to her language problem (by delivering only very short expressions), but D, too, adapts to her mother's agrammaticism (by elaborating W's expressions, by careful management of turn transition, etc.).

But adaptation seems to be more than just some practices on the part of each of the co-participants. Adaptation is a mutual phenomenon. W adapts by a drastic reduction of the structure of her expressions, but at the same time her short expressions are designed to facilitate D's support (most notably by the use of verbs). We have noted that W's turns are laconic, curt, abbreviated, undertold, designedly compact, and that they prompt moves to unpack them. What forms of compacting are deployed on the one hand to provide the terms for subsequent collaborative unpacking on the other? We can focus on what the aphasic party has left out or on what the aphasic party has put in, and how, and where. The key observation here has concerned the use of verb forms to package the designedly compacted talk, for the resource it provides via argument structure to guide the interlocutor's complementary work of unpacking.

W's frequent use of verbs as the kernel of her subsentential expressions substantially counters one of the most cherished views in aphasiology: Broca's patients have a selective and specific naming problem for activities requiring verbs (see Gainotti, 1998). Is W an exception in her diagnostic group? W participated in a picture-naming test designed by the first author for an entirely different purpose than the one underlying this chapter. In this test, Broca's patients were selectively worse in verb retrieval than in noun retrieval when compared with Wernicke's patients, whose performance for verbs was equally good (or bad) as for nouns: on average, Broca's patients retrieved 82% correct nouns and 37% verbs; Wernicke's averages were 74% and 78%, respectively. W followed fairly exactly the statistical trends of her group: she had 43% correct verbs and 83% correct nouns. On the basis of these results, one would expect anything but the extensive use of verbs for W's linguistic behavior in talk-in-interaction. For the time being, it is hard to see what underlies this divergence between test performance and naturalistic behavior. But W's use of verbs is not an isolated case of such divergence (cf. Schegloff [1999, chapter 2 in this volume] for similar findings regarding pragmatics). In general, it remains an open problem in psycholinguistics (including aphasiology) to what extent experimental results can be attributed to the "natural world, and not to the procedures of inquiry which produced them" (Schegloff et al., 1996, p. 25).[26]

Conclusion

What, then, would we have the reader take away from this chapter?

1. There are now good grounds for systematically entertaining the possibility that results of testing with aphasic and other neurologically affected subjects are at least in part a function of interactional contingencies of the testing situation, and for openness regarding inferences to other, non-specialized "speech exchange systems," including those which massively characterize everyday life. Why this is so is as yet unknown, but it bears on features central to neuro-scientific (including aphasiological) inquiry, diagnosis, and treatment. That testing supplies a window into the brain and ordinary cognitive processes can no longer be taken as given. It should be clear that inquiry into naturally occurring conduct—including (perhaps preeminently) conduct in interaction—is now critical.

2. One strategic site affected by agrammatism is the "transition space"— the boundary area between the possible end of one turn at talk and the possible start of a next. The normal temporal value of the transition space is a beat, but in the conversations examined here and ones like them, this temporality is upset and eventful silences are created by the parties—*all* the parties, for any one of them can end a silence. We have described two different ways in which these temporal variances can be absorbed and woven into the sequential structures of conversation—ways that can have quite different experiential effects on the participants and on the quality of the interaction. These deserve more elaboration than they could be given here, and more grounding in data as well. Indeed, there is reason to believe (if there is any merit to this line of analysis) that these alternative ways of managing temporal "anomalies" in talk-in-interaction are relevant whatever the sources of the anomalies—whether grounded in compromised brain functioning or in compromised mastery of the spoken language. In any case, the anomalies of talk-in-interaction are not to be understood only by their origins; their import is set by what is made of them, and what is made of them can vary systematically.

3. Although one cannot ignore what it is that aphasics can *not* do, it is clear that what they *can* do is important and varies, and that the particulars of telegraphic speech are consequential in shaping its accommodation in conversation. This chapter has barely begun to explore the possibility that reduction to verbal expressions tilts the forms of accomodation toward exploiting argument structure. How do

interlocutors proceed with aphasics whose telegrams take the form of noun phrases? And what other forms remain to be explored?

Wherever these questions, and others we do not yet know enough to ask, may lead, it seems clear that, for a long time into the future, that work will prosper which most incisively explicates what happens when those with compromised neurological functioning encounter the ordinary world of life in its primordial site—talk and other conduct in interaction.

Appendix 1

Remarks on transcription, translation, and German grammar

The transcriptions follow the conventions of Ochs et al. (1996) with four minor modifications:

1. The exclamation mark is used to indicate a specially confirmative delivery of the preceding word. The word is spoken somewhat louder and somewhat shorter than usually, and sometimes either with a particularly high voice or with a particularly low voice. An example can be found in line 35 of example 2a.
2. Words between slashes are incorrectly delivered words referred to as "paraphasias" in aphasiological contexts. The source of the incorrectness can be phonetic, grammatical, or semantic.
3. The distribution of capital letters is determined by the rules of German orthography. They do not indicate enhanced loudness. For the latter, only underlinings are used.
4. Incomprehensible speech is indicated by sequences of x's in round brackets. The number of x's indicates the approximate number of syllables given the rhythm of the speaker.

For the German texts, the conventional rules of German orthography are followed, but without the innovations introduced by the Orthographic Reform from August 1998. Colloquially pronounced words and Berlinisms are also written in normal orthography; that is to say, they are written in such a way that application of the orthographic rules would lead to the actual pronounciation. Punctuation signs do not follow German orthography. They indicate features of intonation as described by Ochs et al. (1996).

Under the German text, an English word-by-word translation is given, written in Italics. If the morphological properties and categories of a word cannot be inferred from the English equivalents, explanatory abbreviations are attached to the English

word (see list of abbreviations). However, in order not to inflate the English transla-
tion, this is not always done and not always in an exhaustive way. For example, the
German article is inflected for gender, number, and case. But these categories are
indicated with attachments only in transcriptions in the first part because only in that
part are the grammatical-morphological features of agrammatic speech of particular
interest. But even there, specifications are not always complete. As a general rule, if
nothing is indicated by attached abbreviations, the German word is grammatically
and morphologically correct.

If English requires more than one word for a single German word, these words
are connected with a hyphen. A frequently occurring example is the infinitive. In
German, the infinitive is built by verbal stem plus the suffix -en; thus, in the English
translation, the "to" and the verbal stem are connected. Sometimes a German expres-
sion consisting of only one or two words requires an English expression structured
in a totally different way. The words of the English expression are then connected
with hyphens, and the alignment with the German text indicates to which German
word(s) the expressions correspond. An example is "weiterschlafen"/ to-continue-
to-sleep.

On a third line, an idiomatic English translation is given. However, this is not
always done, but only when the word-by-word translation would be very hard to
understand. The reader should not forget that the German original, in particular the
speech of the agrammatic patients, is often also unidiomatic and sometimes hard to
understand. In such a case, no effort was made to make the English idiomatic. This
holds in particular for the experimental storytellings reported in the first part.

Five features of German grammar need special explanations because they might
be fairly puzzling for the English-speaking reader:

1. Spoken German is very rich in particles. Their contribution to mean-
   ing is very subtle and cannot be captured by any direct English
   translation. In the word-by-word translation, they are left untranslated
   and indicated by "PRT." Where possible, an effort is made to reflect
   the particles' meaning in the idiomatic translation.

2. In spoken German, the personal pronouns "er, sie, es, sie-PLURAL" /
   he, she, it, they are often replaced by forms of the demonstrative
   pronoun "d-" that, in many contexts, have only a mild demonstrative
   touch. In the English word-by-word translation, they are represented
   by the personal pronoun plus an attached -DEM.

3. The use of the perfect tense in spoken German is quite different from
   that in English. The German perfect tense does not necessarily involve
   aspect and is used in contexts where in English a preterite would be
   used. For example, German "Ich bin vier Wochen in Amerika gewesen"
   has the meaning "I was in America four weeks" and not "I have
   been." In this context also the form of the perfect participle in German

is always distinct from the preterite forms; hence, English forms such as "tickled" have always the attachment "-PP" (for "participle") to avoid misunderstandings.

4. Word order in German is relatively free except for the forms of the verb. In main clauses, finite verb forms have to appear in second position, the non-finite forms (infinitive and participle) in clause-final position. As a consequence, sentences with perfect tense do not only deviate from English with respect to meaning, but also in the word order: "Ich bin vier Wochen in Amerika gewesen" would appear in a word-by-word translation as "I have four weeks in America been."

5. Points 3 and 4 are of particular relevance for understanding agrammatic "telegraphic" speech in German. When a patient tells about an event in the past, he or she would use the past participle without the auxiliary (and mostly without a grammatical subject) and the participle is preceded by its arguments. Thus, in "telegraphese" the elaborate "Ich bin vier Wochen in Amerika gewesen" would correspond to the shorter expression "vier Wochen in Amerika gewesen"/ four weeks in America been. In telling about the present (or the future), the finite forms of the present tense are replaced by an infinitive, which—of course—has to appear at the end of the clause. Thus, the more elaborate "Der Wecker klingelt um sieben Uhr"/ the alarm-clock rings at seven o'clock would correspond in telegraphese to "(der Wecker) um sieben Uhr klingeln"/ (the alarm-clock) at seven o'clock to-ring. Constructions with either an infinitive or a past participle possibly preceded by arguments figure centrally in the speech of the two patients presented in this chapter. The reader would be well advised not to rely only on the idiomatic English translation.

List of Abbreviations

ACC	accusative
DAT	dative
DEM	demonstrative
FEM	feminine
INF	infinitive
MASC	masculine
NOM	nominative
PL	plural
POL	polite address form
PP	participle
PRT	particle
SG	singular

Appendix 2

K describes a cartoon story consisting of four pictures. The first cartoon shows a farmer sowing corn; the second how the corn is growing; the third shows the farmer examining the corn (and he is obviously content); the fourth shows the farmer transporting the corn with a truck. In the corn field, there stands a scarecrow.

01 So, denn, da   /die/   Mais also (1.5) die   der
    So, then, there /the-FEM/ corn PRT (1.5) the-FEM the-MSC
02 der   äh streut die   Körner (2.5) und der   der
    the-MSC äh scatters the-PL corns   (2.5) and the-MSC the-MSC
03 guckt ach der   (2.0) ((sighs)) der die äh der die die äh
    looks ach the-MSC (2.0) ((sighs)) (series of articles)
04 schreckt Dings also die   äh die   (xx) /schreck/
    scares   thing PRT the-FEM äh the-FEM (xx) /scare/
05 die   Vögel, /Vöchel/, die   (3.8) die Vögel schrecken
    the-PL birds /Vöchel/, the-PL (3.8) the birds scare
06 /drauf/.   (2.0) die   der   der   guckt (4.8)
    /there-on/ (2.0) the-FEM the-MSC the-MSC looks (4.8)
07 und der   dann weiter
    and the-MSC then further
08 Dann guckt er, dann probiert er, /der/
    Then looks he, then examines he, /the-MSC/
09 probiert er, da   mal dann da   ist   Flaute gewesen
    examines he, there PRT then there has dead-calm been
    (("da ist Flaute gewesen" is idiomatic for *then things were finished*))
10   also fertig,   (2.0) /fertig macht/.
    PRT finished, (2.0)   /finished/.

Notes

1. Compare Schegloff, 1989: 140–144, and in particular:

What occurs in interaction is not merely the serial externalization into some joint arena of batches of talk, hatched in private . . . intentions, and filled out with the docile artifacts of "language." . . . This treats the mind/brain as the scene of all the action, and the space of interaction as a structureless medium, or at least a medium whose structure is beside the point with respect to what is transmitted through it, as the composition of telephone cable is beside the point for the conversations transmitted through it. But interaction is that for which the talk is conceived; its character is shaped by the structure of opportunities to deliver a message in the first place, and so forth." (140)

2. The first section of the chapter reports on collaborative work conducted over a considerable time period by the first author, Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen, and H. Kolk, Catholic University of Nijmegen.

3. In this description and characterization of W's utterance, it is assumed that the preceding expression "der Mann"/ the-MASC-SG-NOM man is self-repaired and substituted by "die Frau"/ the-FEM-SG-NOM woman. Alternatively, one can assume that "der Mann"/ the-MASC-SG-NOM is meant to be the object of "weckt"/ awakes; under this assumption, however, W would produce an incorrect case marking (it should be "den Mann"/ the-MASC-SG-ACC). In addition, the word order in W's utterance would be incorrect (the verb form "weckt" must occur directly after "den Mann"). And as word order errors are very rare in Broca's aphasia, the first description of W's utterance is more plausible. However, all these reconstructions of aphasic utterances and their grammatical scoring are rarely entirely unequivocal. Additional principles must frequently be invoked for deciding between one or the other reconstruction as, for example, the "minimum principle" (Kolk & Heeschen, 1992, pp. 99–100).

4. This sounds as if the tester/experimenter acts in a friendly and considerate way, but one can see it as well as a fairly cruel action from the perspective of ordinary conduct in ordinary conversations: the tester/experimenter systematically lets pass many occasions for possible turn transition and remains systematically silent when the patient has reached a completion point. And as "silence is a terrible thing" (Sacks, 1995/1970, p. 225), the patient frequently finds himself or herself in a situation when he or she must continue to talk, although he or she neither planned nor wanted to do so.

5. It is called "baseline" because in almost all patient files in almost all neurological and neuropsychological institutions with which the first author has had contact at least a bit of speech obtained under this condition is documented.

6. For reasons of comparison, a sample of K's speech obtained under the more formal testing conditions appears in appendix 2.

It is certainly evident—even without further discussion—that K speaks here in a drastically different way than in the conversation with H. His speech in the cartoon story shows all the features described already for W's telling the wake-up story. In particular, K makes not only omissions here but also a lot of errors.

7. Cases like these make quantitative assessments of aphasic speech such as suggested by Saffran, Berndt, and Schwartz (1989) fairly problematic. What, for example, does a score for "sentences" mean if a sentence is defined as any occurrence of a subject and a verb, but if the absence of a subject is sometimes required by the grammatical rules of the language and thus cannot be taken as a sign of the patient's impairment?

8. The first author was asked this question by a friend during a stay in Boston after he had told him that he would leave Boston the next day.

9. The general idea of adaptation is not new in neuropsychology. Jackson's (1884) idea of positive and negative symptoms needs to be mentioned here (for a discussion, see Kolk, 1987), as well as Baillarger's and Jackson's awareness of the influence of the concrete task situation on the speech outcome of aphasics (see Alajouanine, 1960, for a review). Isserlin's (1922) account of telegraphic speech as the result of an economy strategy belongs to this tradition, as does Goldstein's (1948) general neuropsychological approach, according to which symptoms have functions and reflect the organism's efforts to cope with a deficit rather than the deficit itself. But these distinguished authors have never represented the mainstream in aphasiology and neuropsychology. And in more recent times when, for methodological reasons, transparent relations between symptomatic performance and deficit are required (given

a particular goal of impairment studies, see introductory paragraph), the tradition of Jackson, Goldstein, and others has been almost completely forgotten.

10. This choice is not necessarily consciously controlled. Thus, if the adaptivists speak of "choice" or "strategic adaptation" or "adaptive strategy," then it is rather—to use the terms of Heritage, 1990/1991—a strategy$_{cog}$ than a strategy$_{cs}$, although the borderline between them can be a bit blurred.

11. D interrupts her question concerning Karin before it has come to completion and encourages her mother to have one of the cookies from the package W is hesitantly opening, as if she does not dare to help herself to a snack. A somewhat testy stance is conveyed not only by doing this self-interruptively, but also by the virtually untranslatable particle "doch," which here might contribute to having the turn rendered as "Eat it already!" Although not present in the excerpt, it might be useful to know that the problem of overweight and overeating is a recurrent topic in exchanges between W and D. It informs the preceding exchange about the salads at the party. After the inserted injunction, D returns to her original question, repeats it verbatim to show she is saying again what she was in the course of saying before (Schegloff, 1996a), and brings it to completion.

12. Between the agent "Karin" and the verb, there is a noticeable micro-pause for which there are several possible characterizations: First, the aphasiological characterization assumes that the pause is just something that can happen in non-fluent patients. Second, the linguistic characterization notes that if the finite part of the verb is missing, then the grammatical subject as specifier of the verb phrase is not licensed any longer (Cahana-Amitay, 1997; Haverkort, 1999; de Roo; 1999). It is not part of the construction; between subject and non-finite verb there is a break and this is expressed by the pause. Third, one interactional characterization supposes that the hesitant and coda-like delivery of "eingeschlafen" reflects a perturbation in the aftermath of the other-correction in line 8—perhaps prompted by the equivocal need for a repeat of the framing item to complete the correction. Another interactional characterization might be that the separation of the two units in W's turn responds to the fact that two different components or layers in D's preceding turn—the openly asked question for the identity of the agent and the embedded-correction work—are addressed by them, and this interactionally different nature of the two units is reflected by their separated delivery. The aphasiological characterization is certainly the least attractive. Even if, on the basis of quantitative studies, the pause can be associated with a certain probability, this would not explain why it occurred here. The linguistic characterization is not incompatible with the two interaction-oriented ones, which, in turn, are not incompatible with each other. Perhaps, there is something to each of these possibilities.

13. In a forthcoming work, Thompson and Hopper reassess the viability of familiar conceptions of argument structure when juxtaposed with data drawn from ordinary conversation. In its use of the talk of the participants to invoke the relevance of the notion of argument structure in this context, our discussion appears to be compatible with the Thompson/ Hopper critique.

14. D's "play it safe" strategy (delay turn transition until she is absolutely sure that W has finished) might be partly due to the fact that W's intonation contours are a bit flat. The risings and fallings are not very sharp, so that they cannot be reliably exploited as cues with respect to turn continuation or turn completion. This "dysprosody" is frequently part of the general non-fluency of Broca patients (Huber, Poeck, & Wenhger, 1989, pp. 111, 113).

15. Note that D's silence after a turn by W is quite different from the "perversely passive" conduct of an aphasiologist described in the first section. First, D does not wait endlessly before taking a next turn, and second, she does not produce continuers after the end of W's turn, providing for W to continue some putative larger discourse unit. That is to say, her conduct is not organized in a manner designed to elicit maximal turns by W; she simply waits a bit to make sure that the minimal turns of W are indeed over.

In D's conduct, there is another indication of her concern to ensure conflict-free and unproblematic turn transition. The two tag questions "oder was?" in lines 8 and 12 were characterized as displaying D's awareness of alternatives; but tag questions are also a common and effective turn-exit device (Sacks et al., 1974), marking very clearly and unambiguously a place relevant for transition and, ordinarily, a selected next speaker. In the whole conversation between W and D, D uses "oder was?" excessively so that one could easily take it to be simply D's stylistic idiosyncrasy. But even if it were, it has interactional impact and is consequential for the organization of the conversation. It spares W a more sophisticated—and in particular a continuing—syntactic analysis of D's turns with respect to completion, or reinforces it.

16. This is the German title (retranslated into English) of the movie *Kevin Home Alone I* (known in the United States simply as *Home Alone*). It was broadcast on German TV some weeks before this conversation took place. The follow-up movie *Kevin Home Alone II* was announced for one of the days following the conversation. From what G is saying, it appears that (she thought) it was to be broadcast the same evening, but she was wrong.

17. Indeed, *Der Alte* is a perfect contrast program to a horror movie, and people with a predilection for the latter can hardly be expected to like *Der Alte*.

18. This complaint against the mother suggests the possibility—not pressed previously—that line 8 ("you fell asleep, or what") was not simply a misunderstanding of the conspiratorial tenor of the mother's previous utterance. It may display a propensity on the daughter's part to level accusations and complaints (of which line 8 is another analyzable instance) against the mother.

19. This is another indicator of D's concern about turn transition. We earlier noted that she marks her own turn completions with tag questions; here we note that she not only gives W time to finish but also to intitiate her turns. This is quite sensitive, given that one of the major problems of Broca's aphasics is the initiation of speech (Goodglass, 1973/1968). It seems the two parties grant each other moments of silence up to 1.0 sec. It is possible that this one second reflects an underlying metric (or metrical adjustment) as described by Jefferson (1989), a conjecture reinforced by noting that, after the 1.0 second of silence, W produces only an aspiration and an "editing term," followed by an additional 1.8 seconds of silence!

20. An alternative line of analysis would focus on the known difficulty previously cited for Broca's aphasics to initiate speech, reinforced here by W's mobilization of an effort to produce a more elaborate expression, an almost full sentence complete with subject noun phrase, and so forth, which may enhance the problems of starting. The line adopted in the text carries its own justification.

21. Such a characterization would square neatly with the theory that gestures serve not (or not only, cf. Kendon, 1994) a communicative function, but the facilitation of word retrieval—in unimpaired speakers (Krauss, Chen, & Chawla, 1996; Krauss, Morrel-Samuels, & Colasante, 1991) as well as in aphasics (Hadar & Yadlin-Gedassy, 1994; Hadar, Burstein,

Krauss, & Soroker, 1998). W could then be understood to be trying to access the word "Füße" by pointing to her feet, whatever else she might also be undertaking to do.

22. The fact that even aphasics are not oriented toward co-participation in the initial phase of a word search has been frequently observed (Klippi, 1996; Laakso & Klippi, 1999).

23. Given what was said about D's careful endeavors to avoid overlap, this is surprising. It would not help to consider the laughter as mere unvoluntary physiological reaction to something funny. Laughter is a socially organized activity, and its form, as well as its positioning, is meaningful in interaction (Jefferson et al., 1987). On the other hand, laughter is not ordinarily treated as interruptive, or as competitive with simultaneously produced talk (Schegloff, 2000).

24. This is reminiscent of a practice described and analyzed by Goodwin and Goodwin (1992): a recipient interrupts an ongoing turn at a point where it is projectable that the speaker is going to produce an assessment, but where it is still unclear what kind of an assessment he or she is going to produce, with an assessment of his or her own. Goodwin and Goodwin characterize this practice as a strong display of agreement or of claimed agreement: the recipient shows his or her confidence that he or she knows in advance what the speaker is going to say and that he or she and the speaker will agree. Similar as well are the anticipatory completions described by Lerner (1991, 1996).

25. Non-finite expressions with a subject do not fit the minimalist linguistic theory of agrammatism (see Cahana-Amitay, 1997; Haverkort, 1999; de Roo, 1999), as the subject belongs—as specifier—to the same phrase as the finiteness features of the verb, which, however, are not present so that the subject is not licensed any longer. As a matter of fact, telegraphic utterances with a subject occur very infrequently in agrammatic as well as in unimpaired speech. According to Hofstede (1992), only 4% of all non-finite expressions have the format "subject + non-finite verb," as compared with 23% for the format without the subject. Thus, statistically, they play a marginal role, and the linguistic theory can be rescued. However, no statistics can help us to understand why such a linguistically recalcitrant utterance appears precisely where it occurs here. To understand this, an inspection of the sequential context of the occurrence is necessary. And, indeed, such an inspection yields immediately an answer, pursued in the text that follows.

26. There is perhaps no more ironic exemplar of this problem than one that returns us to the beginnings of this chapter, and the use of stories and storytelling in testing practices for aphasics. Suppose that we ask whether the talk about Karin's misbehavior at the party should be understood as a story? Surely in the beginning of this episode the two parties do not appear oriented to the construction of a story preface (Sacks, 1974) or other of the described forms for launching a storytelling in conversation. Nor is the further trajectory of the exchange compatible with the proposal that a storytelling is being achieved here. There is, for example, no extended turn of the sort characteristic of stories, with an occasional interpolation of continuers or assessments or news-marks. Although W is the participant who is knowledgeable about the party events, both participants determine the trajectory of the reconstruction of the events, and both contribute, to an equal extent, to the promotion of the telling—D by specific questions and W by the form of her answering. W triggered the whole sequence by "geschlafen"/ *slept* (line 6), but D has thereafter taken the initiative in "steering" the telling itself. Perhaps, this is an interactive format for collaborative storytelling W and D employ. If so, they are not alone, nor are other such collaborators with aphasics alone. Similar or related practices have

been described for storytelling unaffected by brain trauma (cf. Lerner, 1992; Mandelbaum, 1987, 1989, 1993). If this is so, then, retrospectively, the practice of experimentally eliciting whole series of storytellings in the testing practices described in the first part of this chapter becomes even more questionable than previously registered.

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