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Conversation Analysis and Communication Disorders

Ancient history

My own interest in the possible bearing of conversation-analytic work on talk vernacularly taken to be problematic or odd or compromised and professionally understood to be pathological in some respect, whether psychiatric or neurological, goes back quite a long time, to before a distinct field recognizable as conversation analysis began. So did Sacks's. Both of us worked very early—in the early 1960s—on materials with an overtly psychiatric pedigree—he on calls to a suicide prevention center and recordings of group therapy sessions with adolescents, I with psychiatric and neurologic assessments of state detainees both criminal (persons pleading insanity as a defense to criminal charges) and civil (persons held for psychiatric examination to see if they should be committed to a mental hospital because they constituted a threat to themselves or others). Both of us worked as well on the psychiatric theorizing that was brought to bear by professionals in the field on those materials, taking it as additional grist for our mill, rather than as a collegial resource.[1]

In the late 1960s, Julius Laffal's book *Pathological and Normal Language* (1965) offered material provocative to many of us trying to come to terms with talk-in-interaction as practical action, or, put another way, as action understood in part by way of the practices (or procedures or methods) for its production. For many of us, the literatures of logic and linguistics—as well as those of psychology—offered versions of such practices that seemed in fundamental ways misconceived, and Laffal (inadvertently, I suspect) provided engaging material. For example, he described a feature observed in some "schizophrenic speech"—the practice of inverting positive

and negative. Asked if he was feeling all right, the patient would answer "no" when he was and "yes" when he was not. Laffal reported an effort to see how far this would go, which involved two psychiatrists engaging the patient, one of them a pipesmoker. The other asks the patient, "Is my colleague, Dr. Jones here, smoking his pipe?" "No," says the patient. More of the exchange is reported, but it quickly becomes impossible to keep track of. Here is a two-valued logic with a simple operation—reversal of values; it should not be hard to track, to compensate for the reversal, and "decode" what is actually going on. Yet it proved to be virtually impossible. Clearly, that kind of algorithmic organization of talking in interaction seemed implausible (and, clearly, not on these grounds alone).

Later, after reading Roman Jakobson on aphasia (e.g., Jakobson, 1964, 1966, 1971 inter alia) in the mid-1970s, it seemed clear that whether or not his way of going about the problem worked, we ought to be able to contribute something. An opportunity to do so presented itself in the early 1980s.[2]

My colleague Vicki Fromkin mentioned to me a colleague on campus (Dr. Dianna Van Lancker) who had just returned from a "post-doc" in the midwest where she had worked on prosopagnosia—the vulnerability of some who have incurred trauma to the right hemisphere to experience problems in recognizing familiar faces. Now she was extending her work on such patients to explore problems in recognizing familiar voices. "Really?!" I exclaimed; I've worked on recognizing familiar voices. And so I called Dianna Van Lancker, and we agreed to have lunch and talk about mutual interests.

Well, it turned out (of course) that pretty much all that our interests had in common was the phrase "recognizing familiar voices." Dianna's voices were "familiar" in the sense of being celebrity voices, voices from the common culture: Winston Churchill, Bob Hope, John F. Kennedy, and so on. And "recognizing" them meant being exposed to extremely short taperecorded bits of them and identifying them to a tester, if possible (see inter alia, Van Lancker & Canter, 1982; Van Lancker, Cummings, Kreiman, & Dobkin, 1988). In *my* work (e.g., Schegloff, 1979, 1986), the "familiar voices" were those of persons one knew well—close family and friends, co-workers. And the "recognizing" that was at issue was that made relevant and accountable at the first bit of talk by a caller on the telephone, which might often be, and *normatively* be, not a self-identification by the caller but a brief voice sample, often only "Hi," or "Hello, Jim?" which in differing degrees permitted or demanded the giving of evidence by the answerer that she or he had recognized the caller, with consequent implications if she or he had not. These voices mattered more on the face of it in people's ordinary lives; the recognitions—or rather the failures to recognize—were potentially rather more consequential than the voices and failures to recognize with which Dianna was dealing. And yet those voices, and recognizing them under controlled and standardized conditions, did appear indicative of particular neurological impairments.

Here was a marvelous opportunity to combine naturalistic with experimental research. We planned to secure permission to tape the bedside telephones of recent victims of right hemisphere brain insults and hear how they dealt with the first moments of calls in which friends' and intimates' voices would "naturally" be presented for possible recognition. The patients for the study could be selected according to any experimental protocol that seemed desirable; my collaborator could do the formal testing using snippets of tape from famous people that supported her own research program. I had no objection to the experimental framework for this research, for it left uncompromised the naturalistic auspices of the data with which *my* analysis would have to come to terms. We could then, we thought, compare recognition of familiar/intimate voices with recognition of familiar/celebrity voices, recognition in experimental test situations with recognition as part of an ordinary, naturally occurring, interactional context of the society, and begin to explicate the ways in which our understanding of brain function could be specified and our understanding of the artifacts of experimentation in this area illumined.

It was not to be. Although most referees at the agencies to which we turned for funding thought the proposal worth support, just enough were so committed to purely experimental work that they could not appreciate the naturalistic component and its juxtaposition with the experimental and thus could not support it. So there was no funding, or, as the mythical letter from research support agencies is said to go, "We have nothing but admiration for your proposal!"

I should mention another benefit of this undertaking though, even if it did not come to fruition, and that is the reading of some of the clinical literature in the field. I thought at the time (this was early to mid-80s) that the literature might serve conversation-analytic interests in a fashion similar to the ways in which Goffman drew on the literature of physical handicap and disfigurement—both obtrusive and veiled—in work like his *Stigma* (1963). Goffman found in the exigencies of these "special populations" illumination of problems of interaction, which he went on to argue are confronted in some degree by everyone—problems of the management of appearance and of information, the contingencies of being discredited or discreditable, with the full moral weight carried by those terms.

Although these issues must surely be faced by those with compromised neurological resources as well, it is not this that struck me in the clinical literature. Rather it was the way in which certain neurological "impairments" were seen to affect interactional viability, and the ways in which interactional capacities that one would not have thought were at all related might nonetheless be regularly affected together. Let me offer one case in point of the former, from a neurologist at the University of Texas, some 20 years ago (Ross & Mesulam, 1979). It concerns the reported impairment of the capacity to detect and to display emotion,—to "do emotion," we might say—with trauma to the right hemisphere

A junior high school teacher in her thirties suffered a relatively mild cerebrovascular accident (CVA) to the right hemisphere. After a brief hospital stay and period

of recuperation, she returned to work. She lasted less than a week. Teaching boys and girls on the cusp of adolescence, she recurrently had to face incipient disruption of classroom discipline and decorum. When she tried to do so, the consequences of problems in "doing emotion" quickly became apparent. She would respond to the beginnings of some disruption with an admonition, in a prosodically flat voice,"That will be enough of that." If after a few minutes the problem was present still or again, she would say again, "That will be enough of that" (in the same flat voice). And in the face of continued breaches of decorum, she would say again, "That will be enough of that," still in the same flat voice.

The point is that each resaying would ordinarily be delivered in a prosody that displayed upgrade—increased severity, irritation, intolerance of continuation. But these all involve affective displays—doing emotion. In its absence, the kids would not, *did* not, take her seriously. Unable to maintain order in the classroom, she was unable to continue her professional career (at least as of the time of writing the case report). When I teach in my courses on ordinary talk-in-interaction about emotion and affect as being, for purposes of interactional analysis, not *states* but *actions*—outcomes that have to be done, achieved, accomplished—material of that sort allows me to make the case appear not one of academic nitpicking, not one of didactic exaggeration, not one of metaphoric license, but one of virtually literal description.

In the last half dozen years, I have in fact been able to do some limited work in this area with real, empirical materials. It has turned out that I have no materials of my own, but I have been able to work with Claus Heeschen on videotapes collected in home environments of German-speaking aphasics (Heeschen & Schegloff, 1999; chapter 10), and I have had the opportunity to examine some videotapes of commissurotomy patients with whom Eran Zaidel, a neuropsychologist at UCLA, has been working for a number of years. What follows is based on this latter work (and see also Schegloff, 1999).

What follows is divided into three parts, each somewhat truncated so as to accommodate the others. The first part is a brief excursion into the ways in which past CA work can illuminate a stretch of conduct—quite reduced conduct—of a neurologically affected interactional participant. The second part briefly examines one way in which starting with a fragment of interaction involving a neurologically affected participant can lead to exploration of a phenomenon whose interactional provenance is hardly limited to this population. Here, then, is one bit of moving from neurologically defined "stuff" to more general CA concerns. Finally, I would like to mention a few considerations that I think those committed to this intersection of CA with problematized talk need to reflect on in pursuing their work. How is one to think about the characteristics of the data—at what point, and how, does its specifically "neurological" or "problematic" character become relevant? How can one organize an individual worklife and a collective disciplinary community that can contribute both to the concerns of problematized data and to conversation-analytic work more generally? How does this work bear on the more general issue, sure to be increas-

ingly prominent in years to come, of the relationship and intersection of neuroscience and conduct in interaction?

The present inquiry

The project from which I am drawing began with the juxtaposition of some empirical observations with one view about the localization of various aspects of linguistic functioning in the brain.[3]

Roughly, the view held at the time these observations were made (some 15 years ago), and very likely still widely held (but see Perkins, 1998: 307; Zaidel, 1998; Zaidel, Zaidel, & Bogen, 1998), was that, whereas much of the neurological substrate of language—for phonology, syntax, the lexicon, and semantics—is localized in the *left* hemisphere (among the naturally right-handed, etc.), the so-called discourse-organizational and pragmatic functions are situated in the *right* hemisphere. Various sorts of evidence were held to support this view, drawing almost entirely on clinical and testing observations regarding various "pragmatic deficits" attendant upon cerebro-vascular insults to the right hemisphere.

What exactly should count as "pragmatics" or "discourse" has never been thoroughly clarified,[4] let alone become a matter of consensus, and there is at present no compelling reason to think that all the preoccupations that are treated as belonging to "discourse" or "pragmatics" form some sort of unified or coherent domain. But among the deficits included in the discussion of the consequences of disruption in the right hemisphere were counted an impaired capacity to enact and recognize emotional expression; trouble in the use and recognition of non-literal uses of language, such as irony, metaphor, humor, and, most important, indirection; and the compromising of other operations understood to be associated with the use of language in organized undertakings such as interaction—including turn-taking, the doing of particular actions of the "commissive" type, such as commands and requests; and the range of conventional norms we ordinarily term "etiquette" or "politeness."[5]

My skepticism about this unilateral location of the pragmatic and discourse organizational components of language, based in large measure on "testing" of various sorts, led me to want to look at some ordinary specimens of talk-in-interaction involving those with right-hemispheric damage. Through the cooperation of the neuropsychologist Eran Zaidel and the philosopher Asa Kasher, I gained access to videotapes of several testing sessions with commisurotomy patients whom Zaidel has been studying for quite a long time.[6] Although not exactly "right-hemisphere *damaged*," persons who have had commisurotomies have undergone surgery that severed the *corpus callosum*, the pathway through which the two hemispheres of the brain "communicate." However intact the right hemisphere itself may be in these persons, the left hemisphere presumably has no access to its operations and products—at least according to the dominant version of brain function as I understand it.[7] In

such persons we should see most clearly the effects of depriving the rest of the language faculty—what is thought of in contemporary linguistics as the very *core* of the language faculty—of the robust operation of its pragmatic and discourse components.

Examining videotapes made of ongoing psycho- and neurolinguistic testing sessions with several such subjects, we observed—sometimes in the course of the testing itself, sometimes in apparent interactional time-outs occupied either with sociability or with ecological adjustments to facilitate the testing—an order of linguistic functioning at prima facie odds with the pragmatic localization view.[8]

However discrete the organization of *syntax* and the other core language components may appear from anything else in human cognitive capacity and practice (as much in the current linguistic cannon holds), *pragmatics* and *discourse organization* seem much less plausibly so. Discourse organization encompasses not only elements of grammatical structure, prosody, and the like but also units whose organization seems to fall outside even a generous drawing of the boundaries of the language faculty. For example, "narrative" is a central kind of discourse structure. It can have a seemingly direct bearing on classically linguistic aspects of language use—for example, on the selection of such grammatical features as verb tense or aspect, or forms of person reference, by reference to the relationship of the sentence under construction to story structure, such as foreground (or "story line") versus background. But the embeddedness of a "narrative" in the interactively organized structure of "a story-telling sequence" in conversation requires—as part and parcel of the discourse organization's operation—recognition of where the story is "not yet over" and "when the story is possibly complete," because different forms of response are incumbent upon hearers at those respective places and different implementations in the talk itself are required of the teller (see Goodwin, 1984; Jefferson, 1978; Lerner, 1992; Sacks, 1974; Schegloff, 1992a, inter alia). But discriminating "the crux" or "the possible completion" of a story is not among what we ordinarily think of as *linguistic* capacities.

Similarly with "pragmatics." It is common in mainline contemporary psycholinguistic work to start accounts of the so-called speech-production process with some "intention" (as it tends to be called)—whether to articulate a proposition or to perform an action. That kernel of "intention" or "action" undergoes a series of operations and transformations until it "comes out" as an utterance (e.g., Levelt, 1989). If this is so, then "pragmatics"—which includes among other things what language is used to do—is the very *fons et origo* (as they used to say), the very first step of the language faculty. But shall we imagine that the organized capacity "to do things with words" (as John Austin, 1962, put it) is entirely separate from the capacity to do things in interaction in other ways? For surely in interaction things are continuously being done in words *and* in *other*-than-words, and the two are intermixed, and, most important, what is being done in words is partially *constituted* by what is being done in *other*-than-words. If the pragmatics is separated from "the rest," can the rest issue in recognizable, coher-

ent, and effective linguistic products? If there are such products, can the pragmatics possibly *be* cut off from the rest of the speech production process?

There are common alternatives to this way of approaching data from commissurotomied patients, common ways of neutralizing such conclusions. For example, if even a few strands of the *corpus callosum* have remained intact, interhemispheric communication may still be possible. Or even though the pragmatic and discourse functions are localized in the right hemisphere, rudimentary capacities remain in the left hemisphere, capacities that are activated, developed, and exploited with the attenuation of interhemispheric communication. There are undoubtedly others (see note 7).

Nonetheless, it may be useful to present here several of the observations that we made on these subjects for two reasons. First, to the degree that the lines of argument outlined in the preceding paragraphs remain unresolved, these observations may have a bearing on claims concerning hemisperic specialization. Second, these observations offer a kind of evidence not previously brought to bear in this area, whether understood as neurolinguistics or as the neurobiology of behavior.[9] At the end, I will offer grounds for proposing that data of this sort will in the long run prove indispensable in achieving the goal of providing a neurobiological account of at least some human behavior.

If we mean to ground these inquiries empirically, we need to consider what forms of data ought to be taken into account. Until now, the key data on which claims have been based have been drawn from testing. There is much to said about the sort of data that testing produces and how it is to be interpreted, but this is not the occasion for it, nor is there the time for it.

Let me just say that *I* wish to bring to bear on the analysis of pragmatics in these split-brain individuals *naturalistic* observations of conduct in interaction, even if the interaction examined was a testing session. From that point of view, the conduct of tester and subject can be treated as constituting just another genre of interaction, whose premises an observer must respect and study but not necessarily assume or subscribe to (see, e.g., Marlaire & Maynard, 1990). Let us note, then, that the sustaining of a testing occasion is itself an interactional achievement. The patient/subject must recognize the auspices under which the tester's utterances are produced, under what auspices responses are to be given, how such responses will be treated upon receipt, and the like. All of this, of course, is a special "frame" (Bateson, 1955/1972; Goffman, 1974) sustained within an *environing* interaction, much as "a game" (such as a card game or a board game) can occupy a special frame within the interaction in which it is played (see "Fun in games," in Goffman, 1961). Some utterances are understood as "within the frame" ("moves" in games; "test items and responses" in experiments and testing situations), and others are recognized as "outside the frame," to be understood and dealt with differently (utterances such as "Are you tired?" "Would you like to take a break?"). Subjects, testers, and often even investigators ordinarily all conspire to disattend the events outside the testing frame and to treat them as "not material or relevant to what the test or experiment is about" (even, "not part of the

science"). But we need to recognize that the very capacity to sustain with a professional a testing interaction from start to finish within the larger interactional occasion itself involves quite substantial pragmatic competencies, whatever the results arrived at by assessing the responses to the test items *within* the testing frame. And our subjects appear to have at least that capacity, else they would not still be tested after all these years.

Why, then, these split-brain subjects? For one thing, if the right hemisphere is damaged, or, worse, if it cannot communicate with the left, then we should see in the affected party a massive impairment of the "pragmatic" capacity to conduct interaction in a competent fashion, not only *in* the test materials but in the testing situation that makes the administration of the test materials possible in the first place. That they are still being tested thus provides prima facie grounds for skepticism about the wholesale subversion of the pragmatic component of the language faculty.

One last matter before turning to a few fragments of these interactions, and that concerns what is meant here by "pragmatics." Among the tropes that figure most prominently in the literature on "pragmatic deficit" (as noted earlier) are various forms of "non-literal" speech—including forms such as metaphor, irony, indirection, ellipsis, and humor or laughter. (Although these last do not always involve the non-literal, their involvement in the present inquiry is doubly motivated, the other motivation being the claimed pragmatic deficit in recognizing and expressing emotion.) A variant often given special attention is the doing and recognition of "indirect speech acts," which are taken to reflect a disparity between what their implementing utterances *literally* implicate as actions and what they "*actually*" (and, in this view, "*non*-literally") are taken to implicate.

Aside from these features, other components included in claims about compromised "pragmatics" include implicature, deixis, gesture, rules and practices of politeness and etiquette, and, as pragmatics blends imperceptibly into discourse structure and discourse analysis, those forms of organization that underlie the orderly conduct of talk itself, such as turn-taking, sequence organization, topic organization, and the like. Although there may be other proper components of pragmatics and discourse structure that I have not included, these are surely common, in many instances central, and are more than enough aspects to examine in the talk in interaction of our target population.

Analysis I: From Conversation Analysis to "neurologically compromised" data

First of all, I would like to engage in a brief exercise in what might be called "applied conversation analysis," or at least one form of it. Here resources developed in past CA work—work addressed to quite different and diverse interests and problems—is brought to bear on data involving participants with putative communication disorders. One object of such an exercise is to render data that may be opaque or

recalcitrant to vernacular understanding by virtue of the disorder (or by virtue of its ordinariness and consequent transparent invisibility) more accessible to informed observation and to bring the results of such examination to bear on claims about the disorder or the behavioral mechanisms involved in it.

The fragment, which lasts no more than a few seconds, occurs in the middle of a testing session with a man whom I will call Alvin.[10] Although Alvin does not talk in this exchange (he has been asked by the research assistant to talk as little as possible),[11] the episode displays his capacity to parse and to grasp the talk of an interlocutor and to respond effectively in interaction. For us here, the point is to see the access we get to this brief exchange with the analytic resources of "formal" conversation-analytic treatments of turn-taking and sequence organization.

The research assistant, Dan, has been administering the tests, while the principal investigator, Ezra, is operating the camera in an adjacent room, shooting through the doorway. As the sequence on which we will focus begins (at #1 in the transcript that follows), Alvin is sitting almost motionless, watching the assistant take out and examine the next set of stimulus cards (fig. 2.1).

My examination of this exchange will be organized around the numbers above the lines of transcript. Each marks the locus of some observations about the sequence to that point and the import of those observations, the first of which is the gloss of the state of the interaction at the onset of this sequence just provided.



FIGURE 2.1

Example 1 Ezra and Alvin

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          #1              #2                          #3
EZ:  Alvin, can yo[u come a bit closer to the [ta:ble=
                   [AA turning                 [AA leans
                      to EZ                       forward,
                                                  head down
             #4            #5
     =may [be even the [re?=
          [AA eyes     [AA grasps chair,
             up             eyes down
                                                        #6
AA: =((slides chair forward one substantial measure, then looks up to EZ))
               #7
EZ:  That's [good.=
            [((AA slides forward another small increment))
AA: = ((lips part, head turns back to table, puts left hand to
            #8            #9
     mouth and coughs, [left hand adjusts glasses))
                       [
DG:                    [Oh:  :  :kay, ((puts first new stimulus card
                                        on table in front of AA))
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Let us note first, at #2, Alvin's prompt coordinated response to Ezra's use of his name as an address term; he looks to Ezra directly after Ezra has spoken his name, aligning himself as a recipient for the turn-in-progress (Goodwin, 1981). That he has analyzed his name—"Alvin"—*as* an addressing is itself, of course, an achievement. Taken as an object for "on-line" parsing and analysis in real time, "Alvin" can be understood in either of two ways. One is as an address term or vocative; the other is as the subject of a clause/sentence. On the former analysis, Alvin would be the addressee and, potentially,[12] the selected next speaker (the prior request that he minimize speaking to the contrary notwithstanding). On the latter analysis, the utterance would be understood as *about* Alvin, but addressed to the testing assistant, Dan.

Not until the word "you" is there grammatical evidence an utterance along the first of these lines is in progress. But by the time "you" is articulated, Alvin is already turning his head toward Ezra, so that by the time "come a bit" is being said, Alvin is already fully oriented toward him as an aligned recipient (see fig. 2.2).

Since Alvin and Dan are sitting side by side, the loudness of the utterance does not differentiate them as intended recipients. Alvin has analyzed the talk for its displayed target, has recognized its first element as indicative of that, and has produced an appropriate response when he finds himself to be that target—an initial indication of discourse/pragmatic capacity, with respect both to turn-taking and sequence organizational features of the talk; for the design of this bit of talk serves to (potentially) select Alvin to occupy the next turn position and involves constraints on what



FIGURE 2.2

should be done there as well—a response to the summons, which he here realizes by gaze redirection, in compliance with the earlier instruction to minimize talking.[13]

By #3, Alvin has begun withdrawing his gaze and initiating a compliant response at the word "table," which is projectable as the incipient possible completion of Ezra's turn (see fig. 2.3). Note then that there are at least two orders of discourse/pragmatic competence involved here. The first of these is Alvin's analysis of the turn-in-progress for its imminent possible completion, displayed by his incipient gaze withdrawal—a turn-taking matter.

A second competence displayed here regards the turn's sequence-organizational status; Alvin displays an analysis of Ezra's utterance as making relevant some sort of responsive turn or action next, and "next" means "now." In particular, Alvin begins to display an analysis of Ezra's turn as a *request*, and a request for an *action*, by initiating an action seeable and analyzable (by Ezra) as *compliance* with the request.

Furthermore, the request is in the form that many varieties of conventional speech-act theory would term "indirect." The form "*can you* come a bit closer" in this view literally asks a question about ability or capacity. The "request for action" has to be analyzed out of this utterance as the indirect speech act being enacted. This is just the sort of speech act, just the sort of non-literal usage, which—in the com-



FIGURE 2.3

mon view—persons with a discourse/pragmatic deficit would be expected to have trouble with.[14]

Directly following "table," with the hearable continuation of talk (the "may" of "maybe"), at #4, Alvin apparently registers that the turn may be extended *past* its projectable point of possible completion, and his eyes begin to return to the speaker Ezra (see fig. 2.4)—again turn-taking competence of a detailed sort.

At #5, Alvin hears in the talk that the extension of the turn past its initial possible completion is not "generative," that is, not a whole new unit of talk but additional elements to the prior turn-constructional unit. The previous analysis of upcoming possible completion appears then to be reinstituted; Alvin again withdraws his gaze and continues the previously initiated action, which, with the grasping of the chair, now shows itself transparently to be a compliance with the request (see fig. 2.5); Alvin now slides his chair closer to the table by a substantial increment. Again, then, both turn-taking and sequence-organizational constraints are being grasped and met.

At #6, at the possible completion of the action designed as compliance with Ezra's request, Alvin looks to Ezra (see fig. 2.6). Sequence-structurally this is a third position, a position in which the initiator of a sequence (especially a sequence like a request sequence) regularly makes some assessment of, or other reaction to, whatever



FIGURE 2.4



FIGURE 2.5



FIGURE 2.6

was done as a response to the sequence initiation (i.e., in second position). Here, then, is a place at which orientation to sequence structure can warrant "anticipation" of a sequence-structural third position (Schegloff, 1995, in press) uptake—a place for Alvin to look to Ezra for an assessment of the adequacy of his "move"; has he moved "close enough."

Note that here, unlike the first observation earlier, it can *not* be by virtue of Ezra being a speaker or a source of sound that Alvin looks to him. Although Ezra does indeed deliver the type of utterance that "belongs" in third position ("That's good"), Alvin glances toward him *before* this utterance is begun. Note again that the posture in figure 2.6 is captured just before Ezra's assessment, "That's good." This is a gaze direction warranted by *sequence structure* (in particular, request/compliance sequence structure), a relevance structure[15] to which Alvin, by his glance, shows himself to be oriented and attentive. Indeed, his turn to Ezra, aligning himself as recipient, may serve to prompt the assessment utterance that is then forthcoming.

Although we lack the data here, we can venture a guess that as Alvin looks to him, Ezra is neither smiling nor nodding and that his evaluation of the adequacy of Alvin's compliance move is not clear until his utterance. In the absence of "approval," Alvin may read the possible *in*adequacy of his response, and, *as* Ezra is saying "That's good," at #7, Alvin is already executing a move to add another increment of compliance to what he had done before. In the video of this episode, one can see an additional small increment of sliding the chair forward during "That's good," as if in

response to the absence of validation of the previously designed compliant action. We have here not merely discourse/pragmatic competence but a kind of sensitive micro-tuning and adjustment of conduct to interactional contingencies in a request/compliance sequence.

Upon completion of the added increment of moving closer and Ezra's assessment, it appears that Alvin has analyzed Ezra's "That's good" as *both* the end of a turn *and* the end of a sequence. He shows this in several ways. First, he turns his head back to the table and away from Ezra; second, he adjusts his glasses (at #9; see fig. 2.7 top right)—which is for him a "work-related" gesture, regularly used with new or difficult stimulus tasks; third, these movements are well coordinated with the testing assistant, Dan, such that the adjustment of the glasses coincides with Dan's "Okay" and placement of the new stimulus on the table (see fig. 2.7 bottom).

This amounts, then, to Alvin's recognition, and *collaborative constitution* with Ezra and Dan, of this little sequence as a "side sequence" (Jefferson, 1972) interpolated into a larger, ongoing activity, *from* which it created a temporary departure and *to* which there should be a return on its completion. There is then the recognition and joint construction of a *hierarchical* structuring of activities and sequences of activities.

Finally, at just the juncture between the end of the side sequence and the resumption of the "work" activity, Alvin puts his hand to his mouth and coughs (at #8), or to put it in terms of the etiquette with which he shows himself to be in compliance,

FIGURE 2.7

he "covers his mouth while coughing" (see fig. 2.7 top left). And by placing the cough in the no-man's land between sequences (note, it comes *after* the gaze withdrawal and *before* the adjustment of glasses marking task resumption), he puts it at a relatively non-sensitive moment, when no one is an active interactional co-participant, into whose interactional space this ritually marked body adjustment is thrust. And etiquette is, of course, arguably *another* of the components of pragmatics.

About this whole episode, with its robust and exquisitely detailed attention to compliance with an indirect request, it remains only to remark that, later on, it turned out that (according to the results of formal testing procedures) Alvin "did not perform well on tests related to commands and indirect requests." What is to be made of this sharp contrast in the results of different modes of inquiry requires more careful and sustained treatment than can be given it here, but perhaps the issue can be given an initial, tentative, formulation.[16]

If it is the case that the organizations of practice for doing talk-in-interaction are designed in the first instance for talk *among* recurrent others *about* recurrent others—that is, among a limited circle of interlocutors who, for the most part, know each other and know, for the most part, the world they share in common with each other—then talk among those who do not know each other and do not share a social world and mutually frequented environment represents an extension of the organization of interaction to a second order tier of social and physical reality. If those at neurological risk have the robustness or impairment of their neurological capacity assessed on materials and in settings largely disengaged from their familiar, taken-for-granted, idiosyncratically relevant *lebenswelt*, if their deployment of linguistic resources is assessed in settings shorn of the right to invoke what they know their interlocutor to know, to be routinely able to not have to tell interlocutors everything but to exploit their already knowing it, then what is being assessed is not the first order set of resources for talk-in-interaction. And that is what happens when assessments are based on exchanges only with testers and therapists and not on exchanges with family members, friends, and work associates; when it explores invented and imagined worlds in constructed vignettes and experimental stimuli, in the retelling of test material pictures and cartoons, and the like (Heeschen and Schegloff, chap. 10). Whatever the ostensible objects of measurement are taken to be, it is responses to test stimuli that are being measured, not naturally occurring actions in interaction, engendered by the indigenous exigencies of courses of action pursued in interaction—except for the course of action called "testing." This is not to deny that real things are being assessed by such testing—things that may be indicative of structural and functional properties of the brain and their associated cognitive capacities. It is, however, to call into question the specific features being assessed by instruments not targeted at the likely constitution of the resources for talk-in-interaction and to invite exploration of alternatives—such as assessments conducted on specimens of language use drawn from prima facie first order sites of language use—talk with familiars, about familiars' matters, in familiar contexts.

The little episode examined here is thoroughly unremarkable. How do we find its texture, its structure, what is going on in it? How does one go to work on it? I submit that in order to understand the physical movements that constitute the whole of Alvin's participation in this episode—indeed to come to "see" them at all, in an analytic sense—we need to appreciate (we *have* appreciated) their status as social actions. Compliance, responsive attention deployment, approval solicitation, and the like—that is what they are. By them, Alvin displays his orientation to the relevant organizational dimensions within which this interaction is being realized and on which it is being scaffolded. The timing of his moves displays Alvin's grasp—*in its detailed course*—of the developmental structure of Ezra's talk, as composing a turn constructional unit, which is progressing toward possible completion, at which point it may be for *him* to respond, and as constituting an action that will shape the *terms* of his response within a jointly oriented-to sequence structure. These movements embody and display, in this setting's situated details, Alvin's and Ezra's collaborative orientation to the resources, constraints, and practices of turn-taking and sequence organization as formal organizational frameworks for their concerted participation, through whose deployment the import of what is going on here is materialized, is fabricated, jointly, *by* the parties, *for* the parties.

But how is all that made available to *us*, external observers? We do not encounter it in the same fashion as the participants do—micro-moment by micro-moment forward in real time, subject to the contingencies and exigencies of responding and the interactional import of *non*-response. Here is where the resources of formal accounts of such structures of practice come into play. For that is what conversation-analytic work such as the turn-taking article (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974) and accounts of adjacency pairs and their expansions (Schegloff, 1995, in press) are designed in part to do.

Surely they are designed to elucidate the elegant formal structure and efficacious design of the organizations of interactional practice as objects of interest in their own right. But their payoff finally rests in their capacity to illuminate actual episodes of interaction, to serve as tools in the understanding of what is going on there for the parties and how it is getting done—tools such as "possible turn completion," "transition-relevance of possible completion," "the conditional relevance brought into play by a first pair part," and so on. Formal analysis is, then, not an *alternative* to "substantive," or "content-ful," or "meaningful" or "setting-specific" treatment of ordinary talk-in-interaction; it is an *instrument* for its *implementation*. It serves us well as professional analysts to the degree that it has accurately depicted the formal character of how ordinary participants in talk-in-interaction co-construct those episodes and understand them in their course, and for that very reason. And its efficacy, it turns out, is not limited to that sense of "ordinary participants" that excludes those with compromised neurological resources; they too participate in ordinary conversation and by reference to the same organizations of practice, even if, of necessity, implemented in somewhat different ways.

Analysis II: From the "neurologically impaired" to Conversation Analysis

The second segment I would like to examine briefly involves the research assistant Dan and another commisurotomy patient/subject, Larry. In this episode I will focus not so much on the general robustness of Larry's pragmatic capacities with turn-taking and sequence organization, but rather on something more specific. I want to focus on an utterance of Larry's in the course of some interactional manipulation by the tester/researcher and ask: what is this utterance being used to do, what action or actions is it accomplishing? And what practices of talk-in-interaction underlie the production of that action?

These are questions we put to bits of conduct in *anyone's* interaction. So here, although I am not drawing on already accomplished work in the field, I am going about the work in a not uncharacteristic fashion. But in asking "what is going on here? and how?" I am seeking not (or not only) to bring evidence from actual conduct in interaction to bear on an assessment of the robustness of Larry's pragmatic and discursive capacities. I am seeking as well to advance our understanding of talk-in-interaction by going to work on a piece of data from a person diagnosed as having a communication disorder as a possible exemplar of an as-yet undescribed action in interaction.

After about twenty minutes of testing, Dan proposes to Larry that they play cards, specifically the game of "War."[17] After several cards have been played, Dan begins purposely "fooling around."[18] First, he takes a trick in which he had had the *lower* value card; Larry spots the maneuver and reclaims the trick, saying "eh *eh*:::," displaying the card values, and maybe (his talk is obscured at this point) ending with "nice try."[19] A few moments later Dan "fools around" in a different fashion, simply delaying the play of his card after Larry has played his. After a few seconds, Larry calls Dan's attention to the state of play by saying, "I played my nine; whenever you're ready." Shortly thereafter, Dan "cheats" again, again by taking a trick in which his card had the lower value.

Example 2 Dan and Larry

```
     |. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ((L plays his card of next trick))
L:   How long d'you wanna do this for.
                  |. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ((D plays his card of next trick))
     ((D reaches for and takes trick, tamping it on the table and depositing it in his pile.
     At start of D's "taking"action, L starts and aborts a "taking" move of his own.
     As D deposits trick on his pile, L speaks)):
L:   Nice try.                                                                  <<— #1
     (0.2)       ((D looks at L.))
     |. . . . . . . . . . . ((3–4 lateral head shakes by L))
L:   Nice try.=                                                                 <<— #2
D:   =What.=
L:   =My six,=your two=                                                         <<— #3
```

D: =So?
(0.5)
L: En:: so you took it. <<— #4
(·)
D: So?
L: You shouldn've. <<— #5
(0.2)
D: So?
| . . . . ((L points to his pile, then D's))
L: 't should be on this deck, not that.= <<— #6
D: =So?
(0.8)
| . . . . . ((L tilts head, like shrug))
L: Okay. I pass. I c'n afford to lose those cards. <<— #7
(0.8)
L: I'm winning anyhow.

My examination of this very rich sequence will focus only on a single object—"Nice try" at arrows 1 and 2. To get at what is getting done in this twice-deployed turn, we will need some analytic resources concerning one of its components, the use of the term "try," in "nice try."

The term "try" is regularly used when an "effort" has *failed*. This is especially clear when the verb is used in the first-person past tense. In utterances such as "I tried to call you" (or "ring you") or "I tried to open the window," one hears that (in the first case) the call did not get through or wasn't answered, and, in the second, that the window is still closed. Of course, when one *has* reached someone by phone or succeeded in opening the window, one has also "tried"; but we don't say we "tried" when we succeeded; we say the name of what we succeeded at doing—or we don't say anything at all, because that success will have carried its own information.

"Nice try" is a form related to this usage of "try." It is, in the first instance, an assessment, which, when its target is the recipient, can embody a compliment, a compliment that can serve as a consolation to one who has "failed," as, for example, the utterance "That was a good try " at the end of an exchange taken from an episode of girls playing the game of hopscotch:

Example 3 Hopscotch (from M. Goodwin, 1998, 12:10:42–12:10:55)
Linsey: ((throws stone and hits line))
Liz: Oh! Good job Linsey!
You got it all the way [on the seven.
Kendrick: [((shaking head)) That's-
I think that's sort of on the line though.
Liz: Uh- your foot's in the wr(hhh)ong- [sp(hh)ot.
Kendrick: [Sorry.
That was a good try. <<—1

Used this way, through its use to do this action, "Nice try," then, marks what has preceded as "*over*," or *completed*, and as a failed attempt to do whatever "target action" was being done (for example, "trying to win," or "trying to cheat"). I say that it is a form for "consolation," but for certain speaker/hearer combinations, and in the aftermath of certain kinds of events, it can be done and heard as "ironic."

In particular, after a suspected effort to cheat, "nice try," said by the targeted victim, *may* be seen as ironic—as the "cool" or "self- possessed" or "superior" alternative to doing an overt challenge, "outrage," or quitting. And, in complimenting the perpetrator, it can be heard as an *accusation* of sorts—albeit a veiled one, treating the "violation" as *designed* (hence, potentially, "cheating"), rather than as an error or slip, or pretending to do so—a mock or teasing accusation.

In the *first* round of "fooling around" that precedes this (see note 19), Dan takes a trick in which he had the *lower* value card; Larry spots the sleight of hand and *reclaims* the trick, does "disapproving/warning" by saying "eh *eh*:::," displaying the card values, and possibly then remarking, after about a two-second pause following Dan's acknowledgment "Oh," "Nice try." *This* "Nice try"—if that is what is said—comes after Larry has moved to interdict Dan's play, has detailed the components of the "error," has rectified the situation, and has gotten in return from Dan the acknowledgment (or "change-of-state token," as Heritage, 1984, calls it), "Oh." This "Oh" acknowledges the facticity of Larry's demonstration and registers it as "news" (hence, presumably *not* designed by its agent), but offers no account, no apology, or other acknowledgment of having erred. There is a gap of silence following the "Oh," in which Larry appears to await such an acknowledgment. In this episode, then, "Nice try" comes 1) after an otherwise-possibly-complete-but-for-one-slot sequence, 2) after a position for apology, or error-acknowledgment has passed unfilled, and 3) as a potential alternative account for the already acknowledged misplay, namely, "attempted cheating."

In example 2, directly after Dan wrongly takes the trick, Larry says "Nice try." Here, unlike the response to the earlier bit of "teasing" by Dan with an "in-progress" interpolation of "eh eh:::", "Nice try" is the *initial* response by Larry, one which, first, claims that some event or designed course of action is *over*, and, second, that it has *failed*. Now *what* is just over and failed? Not the game of War; not the round of play in the game. Larry's utterance *presupposes*, and invokes an orientation to, the "*move*" or the "action" as the unit that it describes as a failure, and ironically "compliments." That is, here "Nice try" plays on and invokes *its recipient's guilty knowledge* for its very understanding; that is the sense in which it is—or *does*—a *veiled* accusation. For Dan to "understand" Larry's utterance—that is, to *display understanding* of it as an *interactional* event—is to allow that he "recognizes" what event has just ended and ended in failure, and that is, in effect, to *confess*, for Larry's utterance is predicated on recognizing the "ruse" or the "*cheat*" as what is being referred to. The main tactic for avoiding this outcome is to invoke or claim *non*-comprehension.[20] (Note just in passing how indirection and irony centrally figure in the account I

have just offered, and, if the account is correct, in the sophisticated line of action Larry is executing here, and recall the claims about impairments to non-literal and indirect uses of language in the standard account of compromised right-hemispheric functioning.)

Dan does indeed take the tack of non-comprehension—*first* after arrow #1 by looking blankly ("uncomprehendingly" as we say) at Larry; *second* after arrow #2 by the repair initiator or so-called clarification request "what" (Drew, 1997; Schegloff, Jefferson, & Sacks, 1977); and *third*, after Larry's response explicating the card combination that made *him* rather than Dan the winner of the trick, by reiterations of "So?" that claim *non-understanding of relevance* (which here take the place of the "Oh" in the prior go-round).

The relevance, of course, is (within the context understood as "the card game") that the trick should be returned. In the previous episode, Larry reached out and took back the trick in question himself. Here he makes relevant its return *by Dan* with what is, in effect, a pre-request or complaint, or a series of them. If Dan took the trick wrongly or in error, then he should right the wrong and return it. And this is exactly what the researchers say they were trying to elicit from Larry—a request for return of the trick—to *exemplify his pragmatic competence*. Dan's recurrently offered "So?" is meant (within the context understood as "the testing situation") as a prompt to *elicit* the articulation of this request, but it seems to be heard by Larry, with ample grounds (in the context understood as the interaction surrounding the card game), as a willful refusal to understand and respond to the upshot that had been analyzably provided for at arrows 2 and 3. Such a withholding of understanding would ordinarily be understood—*outside* the frame of a testing experiment, that is—as adumbrating, projecting, or even embodying a rejection, a dis-aligning stance toward the action that has been made relevant (Sacks, 1987; Schegloff, 1988a, 1995, in press). Dan's claims not to see the relevance are understood by Larry as unwillingness to return the trick, indeed, as a way of doing/showing "rejection," "refusal," or even "defiance," and hence as an indication of the probable fate of an overt request, were it to be tendered.

Now the practices of ordinary talk-in-interaction are designed to *avoid dis*preferred responses such as rejection. Specifically, "preliminary" moves are used to "test the waters," with no "plunge" if they are unfavorable. So what Larry does here shows quite a robust "pragmatic" capacity, well attuned to ordinary interaction. If the prospect is that a request will be rejected, regularly the request is withheld,[21] as it is here.

Surely here we find pragmatic competence of a level requisite to ordinary conduct, strikingly embodied in Larry's persistent resistance to the efforts of the experimenter to elicit a request as evidence of that pragmatic competence. Indeed, the very "So" that *discourages* Larry's production of a request could easily be taken as evidence for a hypothesis concerning an incapacity to formulate requests, and even as a metric for the extent of his *pragmatic deficit* in this regard. The more that prodding

failed to produce a request, the greater the evidence of pragmatic deficit. Framed in the world of testing and experimentation, under the interpretive framework of a theory of pragmatic deficit, this may appear plausible, even compelling. Framed in the world of ordinary interaction, it invites a quite different understanding—one not of compromised pragmatic capacity but of interactional sensitivity. This vignette can therefore serve as an instructive resource explaining contrasting results of naturalistically observed conduct, on the one hand, and the outcomes of testing and other investigator-induced conduct, on the other.

The analysis to this point speaks to the robustness, even sophistication, of Larry's pragmatic competence,[22] but not yet as fully as it might to a payoff for CA. We have begun to pick apart Larry's particular move and how it works, but to derive a more general payoff for a grasp of the interactional phenomenon here, we need more. Do we have in "Nice try" one exemplar of a *type* of action accomplishable through a describable practice of talking in interaction? If so, are our observations about "Nice try" *generic to that action type and that practice*? Or do they instead bear on the *realization* of that action type in a manner fitted to the particulars of this *moment-in-context*? Or are they more obliquely related to the type of action being accomplished and more directly related to what that action is responding to?

So let us look briefly at another instance to join "Nice try" as two instances of a kind of practice for a type of action. In example 4 Carney had sat down on her husband Gary's lap at this backyard picnic recorded in early 1970s Ohio and had fallen off onto the ground. Example 4 comes from the flurry of sequences produced in response to this "accident."

Example 4 Auto Discussion, 3 (simplified)

```
Carney:        [Thank heaven the camera was ['n o(h)o(h)o(h)n
  Curt:                                        [Ehh hu:h huh! ·hhh
  Curt:  [(I don'know I think it's-)]
  Gary:  [ Y o u   r e a l   i z e ] I c'd'v broke my ba:ck,
Carney:  (°eh-k-heh)/(0.3)
  Curt:  W-well that's a'least a'her worries, sh-[she's always got me tuh=
  Gary:                                          [Uh-hu:h,
  Curt:  = (     [          [          ) eh-huh
  Gary:          [u h! u h! [uh! uh!  [uh!=
Carney:                     [A  (h)  [  (      )=
  Curt:                              [=eh hu [::h
   ???:                                      = [°(is yer leg all right?)
  Gary:  Yer her cousi[n.
  Curt:               [eh hheh!
Carney:  No:,[just my a:rm,
  Curt:       [That's ruh- It's all in the fam'ly,
         (0.2)
Carney:  Thanks hon,                                                <<— #1
         (0.1)
```

Carney: W'make a good couple.
Gary: ME::, <<— #2
(0.2)
Gary: Yer the one thet did it! <<— #3
(0.7)
Gary: hhOh my G o:d.hhhh I've got my, sacroiliac twisted all the way arou:n

Carney's "Thanks hon" addressed to her husband (at arrow #1) is the target here, the utterance I propose to consider together with "Nice try." Let me simply mention a few observations about the *two* of them:

1. Both are self-positioning seconds, or reactions—though not "second pair parts." In this respect they are like laughter—irremediably responsive, and as a default, locating the just-preceding (on some granularity scale) as what they are reactive to.
2. Both are "indirect" comments on what another has done, "carried by" an action directed to that other on its completion. "Nice try" is an assessment that carries a compliment as well as a consolation; "Thanks hon" is an appreciation, or rather an "appreciator"—something that expresses or "does" appreciation; and the following, "W'make a good couple" adds the self-congratulatory version of a compliment. That said, we can note that "Nice try" is also an appreciator and that one thing some assessments can be used to do is appreciation. So both combine appreciation and compliment.
3. Both are ironic, in that they convey or articulate an assessment of what they are reacting to, and one with a positive valence ("nice" in "nice try," and "thanks" [i.e., a response to something appreciated] + "hon" (i.e., term of endearment)], though that event in both cases otherwise is being given, or arguably makes relevant, a *negative* assessment.
4. Both are indexical and trade on guilty knowledge. They require their recipients to "solve" what is being complimented or thanked for (or "*blamed* for," once irony is admitted as part of the analysis). Any response other than repair initiation betrays understanding of the indexical reference.
5. Both imply agency, intentionality, and responsibility. (Note: these are vernacular terms here, not analytic ones.) And indeed Gary's response to "Thanks hon"—"*ME*:: Yer the one that *did* it!"—addresses (and disputes) precisely the issue of agency and responsibility.
6. There are also some apparent *turn*-constructional features of these two utterances—for example, that they are both lexical or phrasal—"designedly terse," one might almost say. Compare "Nice try" with the version offered in the hopscotch game: "That was a good try."

Note, by the way, that none of the earlier observations about "try" (pp. 39–41) has any direct application here, once we are trying to explicate the *type* of practice and *type* of action of which these *two* utterances might be *co*-instances—once, that is, we try to develop a more *formal* analysis of the *type* of action being implemented and the practices for implementing it. Different "layers" of practice are involved in describing the type of action and in describing a particular realization of one.

Of course, this is all quite tentative. We have not yet established or grounded the claim that we do indeed have a *type of action* or a *type of practice* here. I have introduced "Thanks hon" to try to exemplify a bit of the analytic procedure of *entertaining or nominating a phenomenon*, a kind of formal analysis of which much CA work is composed, here launched from an episode featuring a participant with putatively compromised pragmatic capacities.[23] By doing so, we can quickly enter a line of inquiry about a type of action in interaction—not communication disorder or specific impairments. Here then we are travelling in the opposite direction from episode #1—from the domain of problematic talk to a more general contribution to conversation analysis.

Reflections on the interface

But isn't something wrong here? Larry does not really seem compromised at all. Indeed, he looks to be quite intact, even sophisticated. So haven't I cheated? Well, yes and no. "Yes" in the sense that I have not in this latter exercise taken a characteristic exemplar of *what is disordered* in those with a communication disorder and shown how to use *it* in building more general CA contributions. I do not really have the data with which to do that, having access only to this commissurotomy material (at least in my native tongue). But I mean to make virtue of necessity. For there is an important point to be derived from what I have actually done, and with this I move into the last part of my remarks. I offer a few reflections on doing CA work with "communication disorders."

In work on "speech disorders," professionals commonly write and talk about "aphasics," about "Brocas" and "Wernickes," meaning by those terms not bearers of those names but bearers of brains "insulted" (as the term goes) in those areas, about "autistics," "Downs," and so on. These then become categories of membership in the society (Sacks, 1972a, 1972b) by reference to which we formulate these parties to interaction, and by reference to which we understand what they could be up to. One of the most invisible and devastating consequences of basing our understanding of these folks on testing situations is that, in them, these folks get to be little else *but* aphasics, Downs, or Brocas. They become mere "language users," as the phrase goes, and ones with problems in that regard, rather than actors with things to do, lives to live, things to give and to request and to tell and to promise, memories to share and call upon in getting their interactional business done, with language among the resources with which to do those things.

When we can address ourselves to the conduct of these folks in their common life settings, we get to see what and who else they are—or if I can put it this way, "who and what they do the being of," and how they do it. It surely must be a policy of inquiry that it remains an open question *what* about a person with Brocas aphasia is aphasic, and what not. I re-invoke a point I wrote about several years ago (Schegloff, 1991), because it seems directly relevant here.

It is only slightly less problematic nowadays than it has been for most of human history to give close disciplined attention to the details of ordinary daily life. What was the point in studying what everyone already knew? One needed a license for close looking, and the two most common licenses (poetic license aside) were the faultedness of what was to be looked at, with the promise of finding ways of ameliorating the fault, and the promise of making intendedly profitable or consequential undertakings *more* profitable or happier in their outcome—undertakings such as negotiation, salesmanship, and the like.

The auspices of this volume are supplied by the former banner. One of its past vulnerabilities has been to attribute to the auspices of the inquiry whatever was found out as a *result* of the inquiry, indeed to formulate the problems of the inquiry by reference to its auspices. But, to cite an older example, not everything that schizophrenics say or think is "schizzy," and some of the things that *are* are not schizzy in principle, only in mode or degree of realization.

So my first reflection here is that we would do well at least some of the time to start by treating the producers of what appears to be disordered talk or other conduct in interaction like other co-participants about whose conduct we ask: what was it doing? How was it doing it? How was it understood (by co-participants)? How did it come to be understood that way? What is the evidence for any of this? We should introduce into the analyses that try to answer these questions the materials and categories of aphasiology, speech pathology and therapy, neuropsychology and neurolinguistics, for example, only as the materials we are examining mandate and require it of us.

There is a consequence of this stance for the professional lives of investigators and for the communities of practice and inquiry that they seek to construct and sustain, and that is the second reflection I would like to share with you. One is more likely to make progress in this specialty only if one is also a generalist. That is, in order to understand well the ostensibly *dis*ordered talk of the affected populations, investigators need to address also the study of ordinary talk by ordinary folks in ordinary (for them) settings.

There is a direct parallel here to colleagues who study talk in "institutional settings," that is, work settings with distinctive practices of talking-in-interaction such as courtrooms in session, broadcast news interviews, classrooms in session, medical consultations, and the like. I hope that it is increasingly understood that these "contexts" cannot be taken as unproblematically relevant. Not everything that occurs in the surgery is medical and needing to be understood by reference to such categories of participant as "doctor" and "patient," nor is everything that occurs in a room in

which instruction is intermittently taking place "classroom interaction." Because there are, or can always imminently be, episodes of quite *un*professional conduct in these professional settings, because even the professional talk there is informed by quite vernacular practices of talk in interaction, it is hard to imagine analysis of depth and cogency not being facilitated, and even enabled, by routine participation in analysis of non-specialized materials. Both for the commonalities it allows to be recognized and for the contrasts it allows to be specified, the most penetrating of our colleagues who work on institutional talk also work on "ordinary conversation." And the most effective work often plays back and forth between some type of action or practice in a specialized setting and its occasional or occasioned deployment in ordinary interaction.

I think this is the way workers on communication disorders should organize *their* work life as well. In order to bring past CA work to bear on problematized talk, analysts need to control the CA resources not just from reading them but from deploying them on the materials they inhabit by default. That means practicing them in materials where no systematic contingencies of disability are present as tempting accounts. And those who aspire to derive from their work with problematized materials and from affected participants contributions to the core corpus of CA's understanding of talk-in-interaction will themselves best know how to bring the observations from one domain into the other. But that means being up to speed in the other as well, and that means having an ongoing work life with the materials of ordinary *non*-suspect talk-in-interaction.

Let us not forget where this road leads, and this is the third and last reflection I would like to share.

In the burgeoning preoccupation with the so-called neurobiology of behavior, two tasks will need to be addressed to enable the linkage named by the rubric. One task is the discovery and description of the structure and functioning of the neurological apparatus, and that is the mandate of the neurosciences. The other is the discovery and description of the behavior whose neurobiological grounds are to be elucidated.

Central here will be conduct in interaction, because this species has evolved as a *social* species, and the central site of a social species in the conduct of conspecifics is interaction with one another. It seems fair to say that no one is better positioned to provide the requisite accounts of the organization of conduct in interaction than are those working along conversation-analytic lines. The organizations, the resources, the practices which are of interest here are those which are demonstrably oriented to by the participants. How else could their neurological equipment be implicated in their production?

This is an undertaking to which all good conversation-analytic work will surely contribute. What special contribution may be made by work on those with neurologically implicated communication disorders remains to be determined and discovered. But almost certainly it will be of a piece with the larger corpus of conversation-analytic work.

So the cultivation of work lives and working communities that sustain a mutual enrichment between CA research generically and CA research with problematized talk will serve not only the viability and gratification of the work lives being affected. It promises results—who knows when—at one of the more exciting growth points of human self-knowledge.

Appendix

As Dan is still putting away the cards he won on the prior trick, Larry plays his card for the next trick. Dan hesitates momentarily while playing his card, sees that he has the lower one, then plays the card, withdraws his hand, and then both he and Larry reach for the trick simultaneously. Dan's hand reaches the trick first, and he gathers up the cards as if to take the trick. As Dan taps them on the table to align them before adding them to his pile of won cards, Larry speaks.

A Dan and Larry, Fooling around #1

| . . . . ((L starts lateral head shake))

L: Eh eh. EH eh. Eh eh. <<— #1

| . . . ((D looks to L after "depositing" cards))

L: ((Reaches to D's card pile; as he picks up prior trick, he speaks))

L: My ten. <<— #2

(0.8) ((L turns over cards of prior trick to reveal their face))

L: Your three. <<— #3

D: So, <<— #4

(0.5)

L: (°So.)

(2.0)

D: ((tamps down his card pile three times))

L: Nice try.<I'll give you an E for effort, ((while playing next card)) <<— #5

Dan undertakes to administer a questionnaire to Larry.

B Dan and Larry, Fooling around #3

1 D: Where d'you live.
2 (0.5)
3 L: In a house, ((smile voice))
4 (0.5)
5 D: Where.
6 L: On a stree:t, ((smile voice))
7 D: Where,
8 L: In a city, ((smile voice))
9 (0.8)
10 D: Okay=(which part of it.)

(0.8)
L: 't's on the north side of the city,
D: On the north side of the city,
(0.8)
D: ('cause) this is a real big city=
=[I guess there's only one house on the north,=
L: =[(yeah)
D: =one house in the south [(heh heh)
L: [(house.)
D: .hh D'you like it there?
L: It's okay:,
(1.0)
L: EHH! hah [hah hah hah hah hah
D: [((4–5 lateral head shakes))
D: D'you miss being tested.
(0.8)
L: Occasionally,
(2.0)
D: A:nd d'you miss working.
L: No: ((one lateral head shake))
D: Not at all.
D: No.
(1.0)
D: ·hh How many people live in your home usually.=
L: =Too many.
D: ⌊heh heh
L: ⌈ heh
L: Three.
(0.5)
L: My dad, my wife and I.
(2.5)
D: uh How many hours d'you usually spend (0.2) here.
(0.2)
L: Not very many.
(0.5)
D: How many.
(0.8)
L: 't depends on (how many tests you have).
(1.2)
D: 'kay:: who- whom do you:: spend most of your time with
at home.
L: Myself.
(0.2)
D: ((raises first one eyebrow, then the other; smiles))
(2.2) ((DG looking at "interview schedule"))

56 L: Bu' * boy do I have fun!= ((* = begins conventional
57 [((laughter)) gesture for masturbation))
58 D: [((laughter))
59 (5.0)

C Automobile Discussion, 26

Gary: He don'work weekends'r nothin, (he'd never sign up fer nothin).
(2.5)
Gary: You just ha::d some. <—#1
(4.0)
Gary: (Loogih dat.)Now I don't have nothin tuh drink.= <—#2
Carney: =hm-hm heh-heh ·hhh
Curt: Hm-hm=
Mike: [Hm-hm
Carney: [Awwwww. <—#3
Ryan: ·hh heh heh!
Ryan: Poor li'l baby, <<—#4
(0.4)
Ryan: [hn-heh-heh! ·hhh
Curt: [nn-hn hnehhe [h
Mike: [hn-[-hn-hn-hn- [-hn-hn-hn-hn-=
Ryan: [heh! [
Curt: [ha-ha-ha-ha-ha-ha-
[-ha-ha
Mike: =[-hn-hn
Ryan: [heh-heh- [-heh
Gary: [([[=
???: [·hhhh! [
Ryan: [·hhh!
Gary: = [ ) .
Curt: = [Aa: : [: : =
Gary: [hehhe [heh
Curt: [=hha ha hah=
Ryan: =heh heh=
Curt: =hheh
(2.0)

Notes

Parts of this chapter, or earlier versions of those parts, have previously been presented at The First Rector's Colloquium, Tel Aviv University, May 1991; at The Program for the Assessment and Renewal of the Social Sciences, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, March 1994; at the 80th Annual Meeting of the Speech Communication Association, New Orleans, LA, November 1994; in a plenary address at the Meetings of the American Association for Applied Linguistics, Chicago, IL, March 1996; in a plenary address to the 6th International

Congress, International Association for Dialogue Analysis, Prague, The Czech Republic, April 1996; at a Colloquium of the Language, Interaction and Social Organization Program, University of California, Santa Barbara, Colloquium, May 1996; in the keynote plenary address at the 5th International Conference of the International Pragmatics Association, Mexico City, July 1996; and as a keynote plenary address at the Conference on "Disorder and Order in Talk: Conversation Analysis and Communication Disorders," University College, University of London, June 1997, the last of which is the basis for the present text. A revised version of the International Pragmatics Association presentation has been published in Schegloff, 1999, and as drawn upon in the section entitled "Analysis I." The present texts was written while I was the grateful beneficiary of a Guggenheim Fellowship and a Fellowship in Residence at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, CA, under support provided to the Center by The National Science Foundation through Grant #SBR-9022192.

1. See, for example, Sacks's discussion (in Sacks, 1992: I: 302–305 et passim) of the opening analysis in Pittenger, Hockett, and Danehy, 1960, or of observations by Frieda Fromm-Reichmann (at ibid., 768–771), and my treatment of psychodynamic theorizing in Schegloff, 1963.

2. Elements of the following paragraphs have been discussed in Schegloff, 1996: 28–29.

3. Parts of the following discussion, including stretches of its text, especially at pp. 28–37, are taken from Schegloff, 1999.

4. A useful discussion of the boundaries of "pragmatics" may be found in chapter 1 of Levinson, 1983.

5. For a review of much of the relevant literature, see Zaidel, 1998; Zaidel, Zaidel, and Bogen, 1998.

6. I would like to thank Asa Kasher and Eran Zaidel for providing access to data from their study of split-brain patients, a study supported by the USA-Israel Binational Science Foundation (grant no. 88-00116/3) and by the Israel Science Foundation (grants nos. 891/96-7 773//92-3 to Asa Kasher, Tel-Aviv University, and Eran Zaidel, UCLA), and by the USPHS NIH (grant no. NS 20187 to Eran Zaidel).

7. Zaidel et al., 1998: 281 suggest four accounts of "normally unified everyday behavior of the patients" in spite of this disconnection.

8. The work of Zaidel and Kasher from which the data being examined are drawn, as I understand it, has been largely focused on issues concerning the modularity of language structure, issues distinct from those of hemispheric localization, however thematically similar. Whatever inferences may be drawn from the analysis sketched in what follows for issues of hemispheric localization are of equivocal import for issues of modularity (though it may be noted that Zaidel [1998: 83] concludes his review of the relevant literature with the assessment that it "argues against a strictly modular view of natural language competence").

9. Zaidel et al., 1998, explicitly register divergences between conduct in ordinary interaction and performance in testing situations ("Long-term personal interaction with the patients reveals a few persisting cognitive lacunae" (280); "In contrast to everyday interactions, lateralized testing . . . reveals" (280); "In general, . . . split-brain patients behave in a coordinated, purposeful, and consistent manner, belying the independent, parallel, usually different and occasionally conflicting processing of the same information from the environment by the two disconnected hemispheres" (283). But detailed analysis focuses on data drawn from testing, not data drawn from repeatably inspectable conduct in ordinary interaction, on which the analysis

to follow is based, on the premise that it too is amenable to rigorous and telling analysis, which can make distinctive contributions in this area, however different in tenor.

For a discussion of a setting that raises related issues, see Schegloff, 1991: 54–57. For a more general discussion of the relationship between naturalistic and experimental research on talk-in-interaction that bears on testing as a mode of inquiry as well, see Schegloff, 1996: 22–30. And see Heeschen and Schegloff, this volume, chapter 10.

10. I had intended to make available digitized video clips of this interactional episode, so that readers could get direct access to the data while reading its analysis. It has proved impossible to secure informed consent for the use of frame grabs from the videotape of this interaction with which to give the reader some direct visual access to the material addressed in the ensuing account. Accordingly, using the videotape and frame grabs displayed in conference presentations of this material as the target, we used Adobe Photoshop and the Poser program to model the key aspects of the key moments of Alvin's conduct in this strip of interaction. I wish to acknowledge the contributions of Geoff Raymond of the Department of Sociology and Val Poliuto of the Visualization Center, then both at UCLA, in producing these depictions of a virtual character, which nonetheless capture with remarkable fidelity the key elements of the conduct of a very real, embodied person, while retaining his complete anonymity.

11. This itself is indicative of a special speech exchange system being in operation for the "testing" interaction, one apparently sustained by the "subject" even in this momentary intermission from it.

12. "Potentially" because addressing an utterance to someone does not, by itself, select him or her as next speaker. Only certain turn types, if addressed to another, select that other as next speaker. The most common such turn types are those that constitute "first pair parts" of adjacency pairs (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974: 716–717). The turn which ends up being addressed to Alvin here, being a request, *is* such a first pair part and does select him as next, but that has not yet happened at the moment we are examining.

13. There is, of course, the possibility that Alvin is merely looking in the direction of the current speaker as a sound source, without discriminating that he is the targeted recipient. We will see later that he looks to Ezra when there is no such basis for his doing so.

14. I am not, of course, endorsing mainline speech act theory here. Au contraire, the utility and relevance of its way of discriminating direct and indirect speech acts in actual talk-in-interaction is called into question here, as it is elsewhere; see Schegloff, 1988a, 1992b: I: xxiv–xxvii. Shoshana Blum-Kulka has pointed out to me (personal communication) that many lines of speech act theory would now consider the form of this utterance as virtually formulaic and as not implicating the sort of analysis to which the text is addressed.

15. Not, of course, in the sense of Sperber and Wilson, 1986.

16. After reading a draft of Schegloff, 1999, from which this section of the present chapter is taken, Asa Kasher (one of the principal investigators in the larger study from whose material this episode was drawn) wrote (personal communication) that, in the testing mentioned in my text, "the S did not use a command, under . . . circumstances where normal Ss do use it regularly, and that he did not react properly to non-regular indirect requests, not of the form of 'could you . . .' and the like, which are usual, but rather of unusual forms ('would it be possible for you' and the like)." The upshot of this colleague's comment was to qualify my invocation of the consequentiality of differences in context between performance in tests and in "real life" exchanges, in accord with the difference

between what "Alvin" does in this example (respond to a "usual form" of indirect request) and what he did poorly at in the tests.

Perhaps so, perhaps not. My text does not question the adequacy of the tests in assessing whatever they will turn out to have assessed, only their relevance to what those who have been tested can do—demonstrably *do* do—in real-life circumstances. What the tests are assessing is, of course, precisely what is at issue here—the organization of a "language faculty?" its mapping to, and implication with, the architecture of the brain? the context-sensitivity of practices of talking-in-interaction?

I am reminded of a number of stories I was told by Claus Heeschen, trained as a formal linguist and aphasiologist (and my collaborator in Heeschen and Schegloff, 1999; chapter 10), in describing his own scientific trajectory from testing as the instrument of inquiry into the speech and other conduct of aphasics to detailed examination of naturalistic records of ordinary interaction in mundane settings with friends and relatives. For example, while engaged in testing aphasic patients, he would ordinarily use rest periods, during which patients had coffee, to go and check his mail. One day, he happened to join the patients in the coffee room during the coffee break and was astonished to hear the patients doing things while talking among themselves or with relatives that they had just shown themselves "unable" to do in the preceding testing session. After that experience, he undertook to try out other methods of inquiry in addition to testing, and, eventually, in preference to it (see the first section of Heeschen and Schegloff, chap. 10).

That there may be important differences in capacity and performance between talking in the special frame of "testing interaction" and in ordinary conversation is, then, no idiosyncratic or casual suggestion on my part; indeed, the contrast is reported by one of the principal investigators of this very project (as cited earlier from Zaidel, 1998, and Zaidel et al., 1998). One payoff we may hope for from the intersection of naturalistic with other modes of inquiry is just such a specification as is at issue here of what tests (or other measurement instruments) are tapping, that is, a specification of validity.

17. For those unfamiliar with the game, a brief description should be sufficient. The game is quite simple. Each player begins with half of a common deck of playing cards; each round of play consists of the two players revealing the top card in his or her half of the deck by turning it over; the one with the higher value card takes the trick and places the winning and losing cards into his or her pile of winnings, which is used to replenish that player's playing deck when it is exhausted. If the cards are of equal value when turned over, "war" is declared; the players each play three cards face down and a fourth card face up, with the one having the higher value winning the lot; if they are of equal value again, the same procedure is used recursively until someone wins the contested pile. In principle, the game continues until one player has won all the cards, but if adults play at all, they rarely continue to that point.

18. On the researchers' subsequent account, Dan was attempting through this "fooling around" to elicit "requests" from Larry, these being a speech act from a class—"commissives"—of special interest for pragmatics concerns.

19. The transcript of that segment appears in the appendix as A.

20. Another episode in which guilty knowledge and non-comprehension are intimately and strategically related, this one involving a child, is examined in Schegloff, 1989.

21. What Larry may have lost sight of is that Dan is still operating within the "testing" frame rather than in a "naive" game-playing frame, like a teacher asking the time not to know the time, but to know that the pupil can read the clock.

22. This sophisticated competence is well displayed in an episode that follows almost immediately afterward. See B in the appendix. That Larry understands utterances that are designed to be pragmatically disappointing is shown in the mode of his participation in the activity that directly follows cessation of the card game. Here Dan asks Larry a series of questions, to which Larry gives answers constructed to be *acceptable*, and even *correct* syntactically and semantically, but not pragmatically—"pragmatically unsatisfying," we might call them. In this respect, they are constructed specifically as "teases"—like the teasing response to "Do you know what time it is," "Yes, shall I tell you?" or simply "yes." Thus, he answers "Where do you live?" with "In a house," with a cunning smile on his face. Throughout this episode he hovers on the verge of laughter and tries to draw Dan into laughing with him (for example at lines 23–24), including, in the end, by co-implicating him in a *lewd gestural allusion* to masturbation (talk about non-literal usage as evidence of pragmatic competence!). It is as if he had formulated Dan's conduct in the game of "War" as "teasing"—as an intentional claimed failure of understanding designed to draw the other into a form of responsive conduct that in some fashion is disallowed or disapproved to that other. And he shows here that he can give as good as he got.

23. See C in the appendix for another candidate instance, taken from the same backyard picnic in Ohio. A discussion of a mutual acquaintance is being ended in Gary's first turn in this example, and in the 2.5-second silence that follows, Gary's young son, Ryan, picks up and drains his father's drink.

The candidate exemplar of the practice we have been tracking is at arrow #4. Note then that at arrows #1 and #2, Gary complains about his son's action; at arrow #3 Carney (his wife and Ryan's mother) interpolates a mock expression of sympathy, which the boy Ryan then complements with "Poor li'l baby." Although different from the previous specimens in various ways (in them, the target utterance embodied the complaint; here it is in response to a complaint), this instance seems, like the others, designedly terse and ironic (in its role reversal), but I leave further exploration of this possibility to the reader.

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