

**DISCOURSE AS AN INTERACTIONAL ACHIEVEMENT:
SOME USES OF 'UH HUH' AND OTHER THINGS
THAT COME BETWEEN SENTENCES**

*Emanuel A. Schegloff
University of California, Los Angeles*

1. From the standpoint of students of 'discourse', conversation and other forms of talk in interaction are subvarieties of discourse. What comes to be minimally criterial for discourse is the presence, in some sort of coherent relationship, of a spate of language use composed of more than one sentence (or whatever other unit is treated as grammatically fundamental). It is then common to be concerned (1) with the basis for the apparent coherence between the several components of the discourse, (2) with the cognitive structure of the unit, and (3) with the mechanisms by which it is analyzed or decoded on reception. There may be an effort to discern quasi-syntactic relationships between successive parts of the discourse--between successive sentences, for example. And discourse units, such as paragraphs, may be found to be constituted by such quasi-syntactic relationships. The actual enactment of the discourse--for example, its telling--often seems to be treated as the behavioral realization of a preplanned cognitive unit. The prototype discourse for such an approach is the narrative or lecture, which readily lends itself to treatment as the product of a single speaker, whose cognitive apparatus underlies and shapes it.

For the student of talk in interaction, discourse (still minimally defined as a spate of talk composed of more than one sentence or other fundamental unit) is more usefully treated as one type of production in conversation (or other speech-exchange situation). Note that, although some sorts of objects for analysis, such as written stories, memoranda, and legal documents, may appear suitable for analysis under the former conception but not the latter, in many cases the same objects of inquiry are seen differently from the two points of view. The common discourse-analytic standpoint treats the

lecture, or sermon, or story told in an elicitation interview, campfire setting, or around the table, as the product of a single speaker and a single mind; the conversation-analytic angle of inquiry does not let go of the fact that speech-exchange systems are involved, in which more than one participant is present and relevant to the talk, even when only one does any talking.

Let me recount an old experience. Once I had trouble understanding certain monologues in Shakespeare. I was watching a series of rehearsals of *The Winter's Tale* by the Canadian Shakespeare Company on public television, and had gotten down my *Complete Shakespeare* and was following the text. In the monologue in question, I could see how line 2 followed 1, 3 followed 2, and line 4 followed 3; but I just could not figure out how line 5 followed line 4. And then I saw in a series of rehearsals that, the authoritative text in front of me to the contrary notwithstanding, line 5 did not follow line 4; some action followed line 4, and line 5 followed that action. And what was at issue in the rehearsals was what that action should be and who should do it, for the sense of line 5, and ensuing lines, would be affected in a major way by it.

Anyone who has lectured to a class knows that the (often silent) reactions of the audience--the wrinkling of brows at some point in its course, a few smiles or chuckles or nods, or their absence--can have marked consequences for the talk which follows: whether, for example, the just preceding point is reviewed, elaborated, put more simply, etc., or whether the talk moves quickly on to the next point, and perhaps to a more subtle point than was previously planned.¹ If this is the case in such a situation of talk-in-interaction as the lecture; then its relevance should be entertained as well for experiments, elicitation interviews, and ordinary conversation.

Clearly, different speech-exchange systems are involved in lectures and ordinary conversation, with different turn-taking practices providing quite differently structured opportunities to talk or participate in other ways. That is one reason why the reference to lecture situations describes wrinkled brows and smiles and nods, rather than utterances or even 'uh huh's. Clearly, as well, in several different types of speech-exchange situations, there can be occasions in which participation is constructed by a speaker in continuing response to interactional contingencies and opportunities from moment to moment, and occasions in which a participant has a preformed notion, and sometimes a prespecified text, of what is to be said, and plows ahead with it in substantial (though rarely total) disregard for what is transpiring in the course of this talking. But these two extremes are not equally likely to occur in the various types of speech-exchange situations; the prespecified text, adhered to 'no matter what', is much less

common (and for good structural reasons) in ordinary conversation than in sermons or lectures. Even the wholly prespecified talk, which most approximates the enactment of a cognitive object, must be adapted in its delivery to its occasion, and will certainly have been designed with attention to its recipients and the situation of its delivery in the first place--both aspects of interactional sensitivity. However, it should be clear at the outset that in what follows I am most centrally concerned with what I take to be both the primordial and the most common setting and organization for the use of language--ordinary conversation. Although much of what I have to say is relevant to other settings, the way in which orientation to co-participants and interactional structure matter to discourse and its formation, will vary in different speech exchange systems with different turn-taking systems.

Important analytic leverage can be gained if the examination of any discourse is conducted in a manner guided by the following.² (1) The discourse should be treated as an achievement; that involves treating the discourse as something 'produced' over time, incrementally accomplished, rather than born naturally whole out of the speaker's forehead, the delivery of a cognitive plan. (2) The accomplishment or achievement is an interactional one. Quite aside from whatever individual cognitive or processing achievements might be involved (which are not to be treated only as anterior to the interactional), the production of a spate of talk by one speaker is something which involves collaboration with the other parties present, and that collaboration is interactive in character, and interlaced throughout the discourse, that is, it is an ongoing accomplishment, rather than a pact signed at the beginning, after which the discourse is produced entirely as a matter of individual effort. (3) The character of this interactional accomplishment is at least in part shaped by the sociosequential organization of participation in conversation, for example by its turn-taking organization, which is not organized to be indifferent to the size of the turns parties take, but whose underlying (though supercessable) organization is designed to minimize turn size. It is this feature which requires us to see 'discourse' and 'discourse units' which have overcome this bias as achievements and accomplishments. (4) Because the actual outcome will have been achieved by the parties in real time and as, at each point, a contingent accomplishment, the mechanisms of the achievement and its effort are displayed, or are analyzably hidden in or absent from, various bits of behavior composing and accompanying that discourse, and analyzable with it.

One class of such behavior which is implicated in the achievement of discourses in conversation is the concern of this paper. Instances of the class take the form of vocalizations such as 'uh huh', 'mm hmm', 'yeah', and others as well

as head-gestures such as nods.³ These, as well as other, bits of talk and behavior produced by other than the 'main speaker' are regularly discarded when discourses--the stories, the arguments, etc.--are extracted from the tangle of detail which composed their actual occurrence. 'The story' is purified of them in the course of its extraction, both by lay recounters and by professional analysts. It is this separation of bits of talk, otherwise intercalated with each other and contingent on one another, into two distinct classes, of which one is the 'real talk' (the story, the 'what-was-being-said') and the other conversational 'detritus' (apparently lacking semantic content, and seemingly not contributing to the substance of what the discourse ends up having said), which makes possible the notion of 'discourse' as a single speaker's, and a single mind's, product. It is a consequence as well that the interactional animus and dynamic of the spate of talk can disappear into the cognitive structure and quasi-syntactic composition of the discourse. What has been discarded may itself be picked up by investigators--typically other investigators, even other sorts of investigators--for separate treatment under such rubrics as 'accompaniment signals' (Kendon 1967) or 'back-channel' actions (Yngve 1970; cf. Duncan and Fiske 1977).

But, as I urge later, the fact that both parts of the occasion--the teller's telling and the behavior of the recipients--may be subjected to study does not restore the interactivity lost when the former is extracted from the latter. For the parts of the telling appear to follow one another, rather than each following some responsive behavior by a recipient (or the lack thereof); and what recipients produced after this or that part of the telling has been removed from the environment of that to which it was responsive. From 'discourse' and 'listener behavior' so conceived and studied, it is unlikely that one will be able to reassemble the actual structure of 'talking at length in conversation'.

In what follows, I first elaborate a bit on the meaning of, and the reasons for, treating the occurrence of discourse in conversation as 'an achievement'. One mechanism for that achievement has its focus at points at which recipients or hearers could begin talking but content themselves with 'uh huh' and the like instead, after which prior speakers continue. I briefly discuss recent treatments of vocalizations such as 'uh huh' and 'yeah', and then offer some alternatives.

2. Why should the existence of a 'discourse' (a multi-sentence unit) in ordinary conversation be treated as an achievement? Elsewhere (Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 1974) it has been argued that speakers construct utterances in turns at talk out of describable structured units, with recognizable possible completions. In English, some lexical items (e.g. 'hello', 'yes', 'who'), some phrasal units, some clausal units, and sentences constitute such 'turn-constructural

units'. The end of any such unit is a possible completion of a turn, and possible completions of turns are places at which potential next speakers appropriately start next turns. If this is the case, then an underlying structure of turn distribution is in operation which organizes interactive enforcement, or potential enforcement, of a minimization of turn size.

If such a system is in operation, then a constraint for single-unit turns has at least two sources. First, there is an organizational basis for current nonspeakers to monitor for the possible completion of first units in a current turn as a place to start next turns. And second, there is an orientation by speakers starting a turn to the organizationally motivated orientation of others to so start up, which can engender a designing of the talk in a turn to be so organized as to get what needs to be said said before the end of the first unit's completion. The second of these can contribute to making the smooth operation of the first viable and routine. A great many turns at talk in conversation thus end up being one unit long.

With all of this, it is obvious that some turns at talk end up having more than one unit in them. Nor is this an anomaly, or counterevidence. It does invite exploration of the possible existence (and features) of methodical ways in which such multi-unit turns are achieved. If there are such ways, then their use may serve as additional evidence of the underlying organization which these methods are used to supersede, at the same time as they explicate the work of achieving the supersession--the discourse. Although this is not the place to undertake an extensive, let alone exhaustive, account of such methodical devices, several may be mentioned to supply a sense of the sorts of phenomena that are involved.

One class of methods by which multi-unit turns may be achieved is that composed of devices initiated by the potential speaker of the multi-unit turn.

(a) The potential discourse-speaker may indicate from the beginning of the turn an interest in producing a more-than-one-unit turn. For example, the speaker may begin with a list-initiating marker, such as 'first of all',⁴ projecting thereby that after the turn-unit in which the 'first' is done, more will follow. Note that there may otherwise be no particular need to pre-mark an item as first in a list (i.e. besides leaving it to be so discovered over the course of extended talk, by virtue of eventual subsequent items) other than the problem of getting to produce subsequent items. Beginning a turn this way recognizes the turn-taking contingency, and, by projecting a multi-unit turn, invites recipients to hold off talking where they might otherwise start, so that the 'post-first-units' may have room to be produced.

(b) Indeed, the turn-position, or turn-opportunity, in which the beginning of a projected multi-unit turn could be produced, may instead be entirely devoted to a whole turn which is focused on doing the projecting (as the list-initiating marker

does within a turn). Some years ago, Sacks (1974) described one such operation under the rubric 'story prefaces', and more recently, I have described under the term 'pre-pre' a similar logic of use underlying one class of occurrences of utterances of the form 'Can I ask you a question' (Schegloff 1980). In both cases, a course of talk is projected which involves more than one turn-constructional unit, and the talk begins with a display of that projection. Note that it remains for recipients to honor this projection, and to withhold talk at the points at which it would otherwise be appropriate. Although initiated by the intending extended-turn speaker, if an extended turn results, it will have involved interactive accomplishment by both speaker and recipients, the latter being recipients only by abjuring their possible status as speakers. The list-initiating marker, or story preface, or 'pre-pre' (i.e. 'Can I ask you a question') are the overt markers of orientation to the constraints making achievement of discourse problematic, and of the effort directed to superseding them.

(c) Speakers may also employ methodical devices for achieving a multi-unit turn at positions other than the beginning of the turn in question. There is, for example, what can be called the 'rush through'--a practice in which a speaker, approaching a possible completion of a turn-constructional unit, speeds up the pace of the talk, withholds a dropping pitch or the intake of breath, and phrases the talk to bridge what would otherwise be the juncture at the end of a unit. Instead, the speaker 'rushes through' the juncture without inbreath, reaches a point well into a next unit (e.g. next sentence), and there stops for a bit, for an inbreath, etc. (Schegloff 1973). Here the turn-extension device is initiated near the otherwise-possible-end of the turn, rather than at its beginning. Once again, interaction and collaboration are involved, for recipients could start up despite the displayed intention of current speaker to continue, and produce thereby at least a 'floor fight'. Once again, the turn-extension device exhibits, on the speaker's part, an orientation to the imminent possibility of another starting up as s/he approaches the end of the turn-unit. Once again, if successful at getting to produce a multi-unit turn or discourse, the talk displays the special effort involved in achieving it.

Of course, not all multi-unit turns are the result of speaker-initiated methods designed to achieve them. Some multi-unit turns are the outcome of a different methodical production. A speaker produces a one-unit turn, at whose possible completion no co-participant starts a next turn. Then one way the talk may continue is by the prior speaker talking again, sometimes by starting a new turn unit.⁵ On possible completion of the now added second unit, a multi-unit turn has been produced; of course, the same cycle may occur on the next possible completion as well.⁶ In cases of this sort, the course of action which issues in a multi-unit turn is 'initiated' by a

recipient, and not by an (intending) speaker of (what ends up as) the multi-unit turn, or discourse unit. Once again, interactional achievement is involved, each participant orienting to the other(s), and all oriented to the underlying turn-taking organization, which is itself an interactionally driven and constrained organization. Once again, signs of the collaborative work are marbled through the talk--in this case, in the form of a frequent slight gap of silence at the possible turn completion which can issue in prior speaker resuming and extending the turn into a multi-unit one.

In the preceding, I have tried to point to several methodical routes by which multi-unit turns or discourses can come to be. Each concerns how a second turn-constructural unit can come to be produced at the point at which the underlying turn-taking organization otherwise provides for turn-transition. But sometimes quite extended spates of talk are involved--stories, chains of argument, long descriptions, etc. The point about the joint, interactive achievement of discourse is not limited to the beginning of spates of discourse--the initial possible transition point at which the turn stays with the same speaker. Recurrently through an extended spate of talk, places where others could start up appear, and when others do not start up full utterances, there are commonly small behavioral tokens by which interactive management of the possible transition occasion is effected--bits of assessment or the absence of them where they are relevant, tokens of interest, nods, smiles, 'uh huh's, and withholding of these, gaze direction with or without mutual gaze, and the like. It is on one class of these that I concentrate in what follows.

3. The modern literature in which bits of talk, vocalization or related behavior are extracted from what becomes ongoing talk by another, and are subjected to treatment in the aggregate, begins with the linguist Fries (1952). Fries treated together the following sorts of forms (1952:49): 'yes', 'uh huh', 'yeah', 'I see', 'good', 'oh', and others of lesser frequency. Others have dealt with body-behavioral versions of this behavior, and have discussed the vocalized forms in the course of doing so (Kendon 1967; Dittman and Llewellyn 1967, 1968). The most common term now in use for such items, 'back-channel communication', was introduced by Yngve (1970), and includes a much broader range of utterance types, including much longer stretches of talk. The term 'back-channel' has been adopted by Duncan and his associates (for example, Duncan and Fiske 1977), together with the broadened definition of the class. Duncan and Fiske (201-202) include not only expressions such as 'uh huh', 'yeah', and the like, but also completions by a recipient of sentences begun by another, requests for clarification, 'brief restatement' of something just said by another, and 'head nods and shakes'.⁷

Throughout this literature, two related characterizations have been offered to deal with these bits of behavior. According to one, these bits of behavior are evidence of attention, interest, and/or understanding on the listener's part. (Thus Fries 1952:49, '...signals of this continued attention...', or Kendon 1967:44, '...appears to do no more than signal... that he is attending and following what is being said...').⁸ A second use of such behavior proposed in this literature is that it '...keeps the conversation going smoothly' (Dittman and Llewellyn 1967:342), or '...appears to provide the auditor with a means for participating actively in the conversation, thus facilitating the general coordination of action by both participants...' (Duncan and Fiske 1977:202-203).

I do not intend to comment extensively on this second characterization beyond noting that once an organization of conversation is established in which nonspeaker interpositions are a recurrent part, their presence will be part of 'going smoothly' or of active participation; but this does not tell us why active participation is taken to involve this sort of behavior, or why the absence of such interpolations undercuts the 'smoothness' of the conversation, if indeed it does (cf. Schegloff 1968:1092-1093). However, it is the capacity of 'uh huh' and cognate bits of behavior to betoken attention and understanding which is the most common proposal about these events taken in the aggregate, with each removed from its context of occurrence; and it is to this sort of characterization that the following points are addressed.

(1) The term often used in the literature to describe 'uh huh' and similar productions is 'signal', and it is unclear what the implications of this term are for the strength of what is believed to be done by these bits of behavior. It is worth noting, however, that 'uh huh', 'mm hmm', 'yeah', head nods, and the like at best *claim* attention and/or understanding, rather than *showing* it or *evidencing* it. The references to 'signals of continued attention' or 'signal...that he is attending and following' treat these as more than claims, but as correct claims, and this need not be the case; it is, at any rate, a contingent outcome, and not an intrinsic characteristic of the behavior being described.

(2) It is unclear why any particular behavior--such as 'uh huh' or a head nod--should be needed to address the issue of attention, whether to claim it or to show it. Regularly, these bits of behavior are produced when there are otherwise present on a continuous basis sorts of behavior which are understood as manifestations or exhibits of attention, such as continuing gaze direction at speaker.⁹ Aside, then, from the issue of whether 'uh huh' etc. evidence attention or claim it, there is the issue of why attention is taken to be problematic in the first place, in need of showing or claiming.

(3) If, for the moment, we treat the issue of attention as having its relevance established, then it may be noted that any instance of an indefinitely extendable set of utterances

would either claim or show attention to, or understanding of, an immediately preceding utterance by another. That is, a vast array of types of talk following an utterance by another exhibit an orientation to it; accordingly, the claim that 'uh huh' exhibits an orientation to, or attention to, preceding talk does not help discriminate 'uh huh' from any other talk, or tell us what 'uh huh' in particular does or can do, and therefore why a participant might choose to produce it rather than something else.

(d) If, however, we aim to understand how bits of behavior such as 'uh huh' and the like may be taken as bearing on the attention, interest, or understanding of their producers with respect to the talk being produced by another, then we should also note that 'uh huh', 'yeah', and the like are regularly taken as betokening agreement as well. A search for the mechanism by which interest, attention, or understanding are exhibited by this behavior, should also deal with the apparent exhibiting of agreement.

When 'uh huh's etc. are considered in the aggregate, then, the characterization of the class as signaling attention, interest, or understanding appears equivocal. Although it can be argued that attention and understanding are generically relevant in conversation, no ready account is at hand (when the aggregate of cases is considered) for why these issues need specially to be addressed, why they are addressed with these tokens, why addressed at these particular points (if, indeed, it is at particular points, on this account, that these tokens are placed).

However, examination of particular occurrences of the sort of behavior under discussion--of particular 'uh huh's, 'yeah's, etc.--might yield answers to some of these questions. In particular instances, for example, analysis may show that attention was indeed problematic for the parties, and that an 'uh huh' or a nod was produced 'in response to' an extended gaze by the speaker which appeared to solicit a sign of attention/interest/understanding. Or, analysis may show that certain usages by speakers regularly involve addressing the issue of understanding in their immediate aftermath. Thus, as described elsewhere (Sacks and Schegloff 1979), speakers may use 'recognitional reference forms' (such as proper names) to refer to persons they think recipients know; but if speakers are not certain that recipients know the intended referent, they may mark the reference form with an upward intonation, soliciting some signal of recognition (a special kind of understanding); if no such display is forthcoming, further tries, involving further clues to the identification of the referent, are provided, with display of recognition again solicited. Recipients may betoken such a recognition with 'uh huh' or may add to this token (especially if recognition was delayed) some demonstration of recognition, as in (1) and (2).

- (1) A: Ya still in the real estate business, Lawrence
 B: → Wah e' uh no my dear heart uh, ya know Max
 Rickler h
 → (0.5)
 B: with whom I've been 'ssociated since I've been out
 here in Brentwood has had a series of um (0.?)=
 A: → [yeah
 B: =bad experiences uhh hhh I guess he calls it a
 nervous breakdown.
 A: Yeah
 (Sacks and Schegloff 1979:19)
- (2) L: ...well I was the only one other than than the uhm
 → tch Fords? Uh Missiz Holmes Ford? You know uh
 the the cellist?
 [
 W: → Oh yes. She's she's the cellist.
 L: Yes
 (Sacks and Schegloff 1979:19)

With this background, one can note that even in the absence of overt solicitation by upward intonation of some display of recognition, after recognitional reference one commonly finds 'uh huh' and the like,¹⁰ as in (3).

- (3) Bee: hh This feller I have- (iv-) "felluh"; this ma:n.
 (0.2) t! hhh He ha::(s)- uff-eh-who-who I have
 fer Linguistics is real ly too much, 'hh h=
 Ava: → [Mm hm?] [Mm hm,
 (TG, 198-201)

It is not that some substantial proportion of 'uh huh's etc. are thus accounted for, but that an analytically coherent set of cases can be assembled in this way from a series of analyses of individual cases, the basis for the coherence of the class being derived from the sequential environment in which those particular tokens are produced. Although appeals to signalling attention, interest, and/or understanding appear equivocal when invoked on behalf of the aggregated occurrence of tokens such as 'uh huh', 'yeah', and the like removed from their particular environments, such accounts may be viable and strong when introduced for delimited and described cases in which the relevance of these issues *for the parties to the conversation at that point in the talk* can be shown. Appropriate sets of such analyzed single cases may then be assembled to display recurrent practices, themes, structures, etc.

4. Is there nothing more general, then, that can be said about such utterances as 'uh huh' and the like, when they compose all of their producer's vocalization on that occasion

of talking? Two observations seem to me to have sufficiently general relevance to bear mention in this connection.

Perhaps the most common usage of 'uh huh', etc. (in environments other than after yes/no questions) is to exhibit on the part of its producer an understanding that an extended unit of talk is underway by another, and that it is not yet, or may not yet be (even ought not yet be), complete. It takes the stance that the speaker of that extended unit should continue talking, and in that continued talking should continue that extended unit. 'Uh huh', etc. exhibit this understanding, and take this stance, precisely by passing an opportunity to produce a full turn at talk. When so used, utterances such as 'uh huh' may properly be termed 'continuers'.

Note that the sorts of issues mentioned earlier as arising with respect to the 'signalling attention and understanding' accounts bear differently here.

(a) For talk-in-interaction whose turn-taking organization makes possible-completion-of-one-speaker's-talk a place where another can start up a next turn, it is structurally relevant at such places for parties to display their understanding of the current state of the talk. For example, as Sacks pointed out years ago, participants sometimes begin a turn by producing an 'uhm' just after the possible completion of a prior turn, then pausing, and then producing a turn, rather than just delaying the start of their turn until they are 'ready'. They may be understood to proceed in this fashion precisely in order first to show their understanding of the current state of the talk and their stance toward it (i.e. 'a prior turn is over, it is an appropriate occasion for a next turn, I will produce one'), in some independence of the actual production of the turn they eventually produce. So also is it relevant for parties to display their understanding, when appropriate, that an extended turn is underway, and to show their intention to pass the opportunity to take a turn at talk that they might otherwise initiate at that point.

(b) 'Uh huh's, etc. as continuers do not merely claim an understanding without displaying anything of the understanding they claim. The production of talk in a possible turn position which is nothing other than 'uh huh' claims not only 'I understand the state of the talk'; but embodies the understanding that extended talk by another is going on by declining to produce a fuller turn in that position. It does not claim understanding in general, but displays a particular understanding through production of an action fitted to that understanding.¹¹

(c) Except for the limited set of behavioral productions that are used to do 'continuers', it is not the case that any instance of an indefinitely extendable set of utterances would achieve this outcome or do this job. Most other forms of talk would be full turns in their own right, rather than ways of passing the opportunity to produce such a turn, and would

fail precisely thereby to display understanding of, or respect for, an extended unit still in progress.

The 'continuer' usage is most readily illustrated by data in which clear marking of the end of the extended unit, or discourse, is provided, and until the occurrence of which the 'in-progress' character of the talk is clearly visible. Among the ways in which such marking may be done are the several ways of announcing, at the beginning of the unit, the sort of thing that will be its possible end. For example, there are story prefaces (cf. Sacks 1974) which may characterize the sort of event the forthcoming story is about (for example, 'a funny thing happened...'), such that the unit will not be possibly complete until such an event has been mentioned, and may be over at the end of its mention. Or there are 'preliminaries to preliminaries' (Schegloff 1980) in which an 'action-type' is projected (like 'question' in 'Can I ask you a question?') as that to which preliminaries are leading; the preliminaries may then be developed as an extended discourse (e.g. a description, a story, etc.) until such an action is done (e.g. such a question is asked) as these preliminaries could be leading up to. Several instances are given in (4) and (5).

- (4) 1 B°: I've listen' to all the things that chu've said,
 an' I agree with
 2 you so much.
 3 B°: Now,
 4 B°: → I wanna ask you something,
 5 B°: I wrote a letter.
 6 (pause)
 7 A: Mh hm,
 8 B°: T'the governor.
 9 A: Mh hm::,
 10 B°: -telling 'im what I thought about i(hh)m!
 11 (A): (Sh:::!)
 12 B°: → Will I get an answer d'you think,
 13 A: Ye:s,
 (BC, Red:190)
- (5) 1 B: → Now listen, Mister Crandall, Let me ask you
 this.
 2 A cab. You're standing onna corner. I
 heardjuh
 3 talking to a cab driver.
 4 A: Uh:::uh
 5 B: Uh was it- uh was a cab driver, wasn' i'?
 6 A: Yup,
 7 B: Now, yer standing onna corner,
 8 A: Mm hm,
 9 B: I live up here in Queens.
 10 A: Mm hm,
 11 B: Near Queens Boulevard,

- 12 A: Mm hm,
 13 B: I'm standing on the corner of Queens
 Boulevard a:nd
 14 uh::m () Street.
 15 A: Right?
 16 B: Uh, I- a cab comes along. An' I wave my
 arm, "Okay,
 17 I wancha I wancha." You know,
 18 A: Mm hm,
 19 B: Uh::m, I'm waving my arm now. Here in
 my living room.
 20 hhhh!
 [
- 21 A: heh heh!
 22 B: A:nd uh, he just goes right on by me.
 23 A: Mm hm,
 24 B: A:nd uh-two::, three:, (.) about three
 blocks,
 25 beyond me, where- in the direction I'm going,
 there
 26 is a cab stand.
 27 A: Mm hm,
 28 B: Uh-there is a hospital, (0.?) uh, a block
 (0.?) up,
 29 and there is a subway station, right there.
 30 A: Mm hm.
 31 B: Uh now I could 've walked, the three or
 four blocks,
 32 to that cab stand,
 33 A: Mm hm,
 [
- 34 B: Bud I, had come out-of where I was,
 right there
 35 on the corner.
 36 A: Right?
 37 B: → Now is he not suppose' tuh stop fuh me?
 38 A: If he is on duty,
 (BC, Red:191-193)

Note that after the projection of a question upcoming, the recipient of the extended talk confines himself almost entirely (the alternatives are touched on below) to continuers--'uh huh', 'mm hhm', 'right', and the like, until a question is asked (of the sort analyzably projected; not just any subsequent question; not, therefore, the one at line 5 in (5)). The extended unit then being completed, and a determinate action being called for by the question, the recipient of the discourse addresses himself to the question. The same form of utterance may be produced (for example, the 'yes' at line 13 in (4)), but in this sequential environment it is a full turn, rather than passing one.

What will constitute the end of an extended spate of talk is not always named or characterized as it is in the aforementioned forms; still it is regularly readily recognized by the participants. Sometimes, however, misunderstandings occur, and a continuer produced to display an understanding that an extended unit is in progress and is not yet completed thereby displays a misunderstanding, as in (6) (taken from the same corpus of telephone calls to a radio talk show, as was the source of (4) and (5).

- (6) 1 B: This is in reference to a call, that was made
 2 about a
 3 month ago.
 3 A: Yessir?
 4 B: A woman called, uh sayin she uh signed a
 5 contract for
 6 huh son who is- who was a minuh.
 6 A: Mm hm,
 7 B: And she claims inna contract, there were
 8 things given,
 9 and then taken away, in small writing.
 9 ((pause))
 10 A: Mm hm
 11 B: Uh, now meanwhile, about a month ehh no
 12 about two weeks
 13 before she made the call I read in, I read or
 14 either
 15 heard-uh I either read or hoid onna television,
 16 where
 17 the judge, hadda case like this.
 18 A: Mhhm,
 19 B: And he got disgusted an' he says 'I'- he's
 20 sick of these
 21 cases where they give things in big writing,
 22 an' take
 23 'em, an' take 'em away in small writing.
 19 A: Mhhm,
 20 B: An' 'e claimed the contract void.
 21 A: Mhhm,
 22 B: Uh what I mean is it c'd help this woman
 23 that called.
 23 You know uh, that's the reason I called.
 (BC, Gray, 74-75)

At line 21, A produces another in the series of continuers that have helped propel B's telling; this one, it turns out, is 'mistaken', for the caller had apparently intended 'An' 'e claimed the contract void' to be the end--perhaps hearable as 'a solution' for the woman to whose earlier call he refers.¹² It is worth noting that 'trouble' around the end boundary of discourse units need not be understood as 'cognitive' or

processing error; it can be the vehicle for thoroughly designed interactional effects (cf. the discussion of reengagement of turn-by-turn talk at emergence from a story in Jefferson 1978).

These instances allow me to remark on several additional points which may provide some sense of the interactional texture involved here.

1. Note that after a continuer, the speaker of the extended unit may 'do the continuing' in various ways (and it should be underscored that this locus of talk should be investigated precisely for the work of 'doing continuing'). In (4), the first continuers are followed by increments to the turn-unit (sentence) already in progress; in (5), some continuers are followed by increments to the prior sentence (for example, lines 10-11); others are followed by starts of new sentences, (for example, lines 12-13); still others are followed by what could be counted as new sentences by virtue of their grammatical independence, or as increments to the prior by virtue of their linkage by conjunction--by just such a token as marks 'continuation' (for example, lines 22-26). In this respect, then, there is no major differentiation between sentences and multi-sentence units or discourses; the same mechanism can engender an elaborated version of the former or the latter.

2. Note that the bits of behavior produced by the recipient of the extended talk vary. Two points may be advanced here. First, even when little other than continuer usage is involved, the tokens employed for it vary. I have referred to 'uh huh', 'yeah', etc. throughout this paper, and have not addressed myself to the differences between these tokens. I note here only that the availability of a range of tokens may matter less for the difference of meaning or usage between them (if any) than for the possibility thereby allowed of varying the composition of a series of them. Use in four or five consecutive slots of the same token may then be used to hint incipient disinterest, while varying the tokens across the series, whatever tokens are employed, may mark a baseline of interest.

Second, in some of the positions at which some sort of continuer is relevant (as may be shown, for example, by the speaker withholding further talk until one is produced, as in (4), lines 5-7, or (6), lines 8-11), the immediately preceding talk may be such as to invite some sort of 'reaction' aside from, instead of, or in addition to the continuer. And one does find throughout extended units--especially stories--markers of surprise ('Really?'), assessments ('oh my', 'wow', 'you're kidding', 'isn't that weird', 'wonderful', etc.), and the like. In the fragments I have cited, we may note the laugh in (5) at line 21, and in (4) the laugh/assessment/expletive at line 11. Note in the case of the latter that it follows a selection of idiomatic phrasing that indicates 'scolding' (and this has already been reported as directed to a high political official), and its last word is delivered with a laugh

token as well.¹³ In the case of (5), note that at lines 16-17, the teller 'packages' the telling in a very dramatic format with exaggerated self-quotation, which could have been designed to engender a more forthcoming appreciation than this 'mm hmm' provides.¹⁴ Note, then, that although B does continue talking after the continuer, here she does not continue with the extended unit that was 'in progress', but shifts from a description of the events being told about to a description of the current scene of the telling, using the recurrence of 'waving the arm' as the bridge. The description appears designed to underscore 'incongruity' and to elicit a response to it, but even the first effort at this fails to get a response ('I'm waving my arm now. '); she then adds another (she could have resumed the story) to underscore the incongruity even further ('Here in my living room'), to which she appends a laugh token as well. This time she does get a response of the sort she has apparently been after. (Note: one is tempted to write 'of a sort fitted to the character of her talk', but, of course, it is precisely the assessment of the character of her talk which is at issue in the sort of response A makes or withholds. It may be suggested that the mechanism by which a series of same continuer tokens displays incipient disinterest involves the availability of tokens of surprise, special interest, assessment etc., the nonproduction of which shows the recipient not to be finding in the talk anything newsworthy, interesting, or assessable. Varying the continuer tokens may mask the absence of other types of response token; using the same one continuously may underscore it.)

The general point I want to make here is that the operation of continuers and of the other bits of behavior produced by recipients in the course of, or rather in the enabling of, extended talk or discourse by another, is designed in a detailed way to fit to the ongoing talk by the teller, and 'to fit' may involve either 'cooperating' with what that talk seems designed to get, or withholding; both of these are fitted to the details of the locally preceding talk, and cannot be properly understood or appreciated when disengaged from it. When disengaged, there is no way of telling that the 'mm hmm' at line 18 in (5) is not only a continuer, but is possibly withholding a laugh; and without that, one may not be in a position to understand why the teller next abandons the story for a description of her telling posture. In brief, disengaging the listener behavior from its local sequential context not only undercuts the possibility of understanding what it is doing; it can remove an important basis for understanding what is going on *in the discourse itself*.

The preceding discussion having ended with an account of some of the interactional texture in particular data fragments, it is in point to recall that the concern of this section is to see what more general assertions can defensibly be put forth

to characterize what tokens like 'uh huh' may be doing. One I have suggested is the usage as 'continuer'.

The continuer usage rests on the observation that 'uh huh', etc. passes the opportunity to do any sort of fuller turn at all, on the grounds that an extended unit is already in progress. Note, however, that, were a fuller turn done, it would be some particular type--it would be of some particular form, and would be doing some particular action or actions. In passing the opportunity to do a fuller turn, a participant therefore is also passing the opportunity to *do something in particular*--the opportunity to do whatever might have relevantly been done at that point. We just discussed a case in which an 'mmhm' was alternative to a laugh; but we clearly cannot say that 'uh huh', etc. is generally a way of withholding laughter, because there is no way of showing that doing laughter is generally relevant, and if something cannot be shown to be relevantly present, then it cannot be relevantly absent, or withheld. Of course, laughter is not generally relevant; it was relevant in the case I have discussed because the other party did something to make it relevant, and that is why one needs the local sequential environment--to see what the other parties have done that makes some sorts of next actions relevant, which 'uh huh' may be displaying the withholding of. The question is: are there any kinds of actions which have some kind of 'general relevance' in conversation, by which is meant that they are not made relevant by the particulars of someone's immediately preceding talk or behavior? There is at least one candidate.

One kind of talk that appears to have quite a general potential provenance is what has elsewhere (Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks 1977) been termed 'other-initiated repair' or 'next-turn repair initiation'. A variety of constructional formats are used to do the job of initiating the remedying of some problem of hearing or understanding the just prior talk of another--several of the WH-question terms, such as 'who', 'what', etc., as well as 'huh', partial (and sometimes full) repeats of prior turn, partial repeats plus one of the question words, and others (pp. 367-369). It appears that there are no systematic exclusion rules on the possible relevance of next-turn repair initiation in any possible turn position. Although next-turn repair initiation is generally withheld until after completion of the turn in which the trouble-source occurred, it appears correct to say that such repair initiation is regularly potentially relevant after completion of any unit of talk by another.¹⁵ Its use exploits its positioning--next after the unit in which the trouble-source occurred. If it is the case (Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks 1977:363) that any talk can be a trouble-source, then 'after any talk' can be a place for repair to be initiated on it. Speakers can look to the moments after some unit of talk to find whether repair on that talk is being initiated; indeed, speakers who will be continuing can leave a

moment of nontalk for such repair to be initiated if the talk just produced is to be treated by others as a trouble-source. Then 'uh huh', nods, and the like, in passing the opportunity to do a full turn at talk, can be seen to be passing an opportunity to initiate repair on the immediately preceding talk.¹⁶

Note that, if tokens such as 'uh huh' operate to pass an opportunity to initiate repair, the basis seems clear for the ordinary inference that the talk into which they are interpolated is being understood, and for the treatment in the literature that they signal understanding. It is not that there is a direct semantic convention in which 'uh huh' equals a claim or signal of understanding. It is rather that devices are available for the repair of problems of understanding the prior talk, and the passing up of those opportunities, which 'uh huh' can do, is taken as betokening the absence of such problems.

Further, the use of other-initiated repair as one way of pre-indicating the imminent occurrence of disagreement (Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks 1977:380) suggests why 'uh huh's and the like can be taken as indications of agreement with the speaker of an ongoing extended unit. For if disagreement were brewing, then opportunities to initiate repair would supply a ready vehicle for the display and potential deflection of that disagreement. Passing the opportunity to raise problems of understanding may be taken as indicating the absence of such problems. It may also be taken as indicating the absence of that which such problems might have portended--disagreement--and thus be taken as indications of agreement.

It must be noted, however, that there is a difference between this usage and the continuer usage. It was noted earlier that with regard to the 'current state of the talk', 'uh huh' does more than claim an understanding, but embodies it in particulars and acts on it. With respect to the understanding of, and agreement with, what a prior speaker has said and done, 'uh huh' is merely a claim of understanding. Such a claim may turn out to be incorrect; and passing one opportunity to initiate repair is incompatible with initiating repair later. The status of 'uh huh' as an indication of understanding or agreement is equivocal in a way in which its status as a continuer is not, as participants who have relied on it will have discovered and regretted.

In this section, I have tried to formulate what appear to me to be the only two general characterizations that can be sustained when applied to singular, particular, situated instances of vocalizations such as 'uh huh': a usage as continuer and a usage to pass an opportunity to initiate repair. For the rest, the treatment of them in the aggregate, separated from the talk immediately preceding them, loses what they are doing. Perhaps more germane to the official topic of this Georgetown University Round Table, along with that is lost the character

of the ongoing talk during which they have been produced. Thereby our understanding of discourse is weakened. I close with several observations on this theme.

5. Among the themes I have stressed most strongly is that, at least in conversation, discourse must be treated as an achievement. There is a real, recurrent contingency concerning 'who should talk now'; the fact that someone continues is an outcome coordinately achieved out of that contingency. There is a real, recurrent contingency concerning what *whoever-gets-to-talk* should talk on; the fact that the same speaker who talked before talks again *and talks more of the same thing* is an outcome achieved out of this contingency (they could have gone on to repair what preceded; they could have parenthesized into a comment about their talking; they could have 'touched-off' into something entirely different, etc.).

Once it has happened that 'a speaker continues' (for example, 'a teller continues his story'), that appears entirely 'natural'; we lose sight of what were contingent alternatives; they do not become 'ex-alternatives' or 'alternatives-not-taken'; they simply disappear, and leave the achieved outcome in the splendid isolation of seeming inescapability. For analysts, this is a great loss. Good analysis retains a sense of the actual as an achievement from among possibilities; it retains a lively sense of the contingency of real things. It is worth an alert, therefore, that too easy a notion of 'discourse' can lose us that.

If certain stable forms appear to emerge or recur in talk, they should be understood as an orderliness wrested by the participants from interactional contingency, rather than as automatic products of standardized plans. Form, one might say, is also the distillate of action and/in interaction, not only its blueprint. If that is so, then the description of forms of behavior, forms of discourse (such as stories) included, has to include interaction among their constitutive domains, and not just as the stage on which scripts written in the mind are played out.

NOTES

My appreciation to the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences and Humanities (NIAS) for time to reflect on some of the matters discussed here, while I was a Fellow during 1978-1979, and to Anita Pomerantz and Michael Lynch for useful discussion.

1. The behavioral vehicles for interaction between 'performer' and 'audience' may vary among various 'single speaker' settings, but the fact of interaction is certainly not limited to the academic lecture. Max Atkinson (private communication) has been exploring it in political speeches in Great Britain.

2. See, for example, the paper by Marjorie Goodwin (1980). These themes are relevant not only for discourse units, but for 'sentences' as well. Cf. Charles Goodwin (1979).

3. Of course, not every occurrence of one of these vocalizations is an instance of the usage I am concerned with; not, for example, occurrences which follow so-called 'yes/no questions'.

4. Once again, not all utterances of 'first' or 'first of all' are list-initiating, although they do commonly project some form of extended talk, if only by indicating that before an already relevant action, something else is to be done, as in the following segment:

Vic: I know who didit.

James: You know who didit,

{

Vic: Yeeah,

Vic: Ye:s.

James: Who wuzzit.

(0.7)

Vic: → First of a::ll, un Michael came by:,...

(US, 33)

5. The alternative is adding to the turn unit already produced, which can then be recompleted, as in the following:

Anne: Apparently Marcia went shopping fer all these things.
(1.0)

Anne: Becuz uh: (0.5) Leah didn't seem t'kno:w, which
kid//d-
(Post-Party, I, 5)

6. On the possibilities discussed in this paragraph, cf. Sacks et al. (1974:704, 709, 715).

7. Cf. note 16.

8. Kendon does describe another use of such interpolations --a 'point granting' use.

9. In Fries' materials from telephone conversation, and in Dittman and Llewellyn's experimental format (1967:348), the parties are not visually mutually accessible, and this remark is not in point.

10. As it happens, a number of Yngve's instances are of this sort; cf. Yngve 1970:574.

11. Cf. Fragment 6, lines 20-23, and the discussion in note 12.

12. Note that B's 'what I mean...' shows an orientation to 'having been misunderstood'. He does not go on to say he means to help the woman and this was the reason for his call; he uses a repair format to indicate that this is what he meant before, which was not understood by A, as displayed by the 'mh hm' which indicates waiting for more to come. This bears

on the remark earlier in the text that continuer tokens display an understanding of the current state of the talk, and do not merely claim an understanding. It is the displaying of what understanding their producer has which makes it possible for recipient of the continuer to find that understanding flawed.

13. On the ways in which a laugh token can solicit a response from a coparticipant, cf. Jefferson (1979).

14. If so, then the 'mm hm' may be used in lieu of, or to display the withholding of, such a more forthcoming response, a possibility further examined later. Note too that 'uh huh', etc. can be delivered in an indefinitely extendable range of ways; some 'uh huh's can mark surprise, appreciation, assessment, etc.

15. Indeed, it can be relevant after a suspected talk unit by another, as exchanges such as the following show:

(Silence)

A: Huh?

B: I didn't say anything.

(EAS: FN)

16. In this respect, 'uh huh', 'mm hmm', nods, and the like are specifically alternatives to utterances such as 'huh?', 'what?', 'who?', and the like, rather than being comembers of a category such as 'back-channel communications', as in Yngve (1970) and Duncan and Fiske (1977). On the other hand, 'uh huh', etc., in being alternatives to repair initiation, are in a sense part of the organizational domain of repair.

In writing in the text of 'passing the opportunity to do a full turn at talk', I appear to be joining the consensus reported on, and joined by, Duncan and Fiske (1977:203) that 'back-channel actions, in themselves, do not constitute speaking turns'. However, I do not believe that (a) this question should be settled on conceptual or definitional grounds; (b) the various components included in the term 'back-channel' fare identically on this question; or (c) positions on the turn-status of 'uh huh' are invariant to the occasion for the issue being posed. I can here only suggest the basis for this stance. Consider the fragments in (i) through (iii).

(i) D: But listen tuh how long-

R: → [In other words, you gotta string up the-
you gotta string up the colors, is that it?
(KC-4, 37)]

(ii) R: Hey::, the place looks different.
F: Yea::hh.

- K: Ya have to see all ou r new-
 []
 D: → It does?
 R: Oh yeah.
 (KC-4,2; cf. Sacks et al.; p. 720)
- (iii) 1 B: hhh And he's going to make his own paint-
 ings,
 2 A: mm hmm.
 3 B: And- or I mean his own frames.
 4 A: yeah.
 (SBL: 1, 1, 12-11)

Note first that in both (i) and (ii), talk which requests clarification (in (ii)) or repeats and solicits confirmation (in (i)), which are two types of back-channel for Duncan and Fiske, win out in floor fights, though, according to Duncan and Fiske, it is a consequence of back-channels not being turns that instances like these are not even counted by them as simultaneous turns. In my view, the issue of the turn-status of some utterance should be approached empirically, i.e. do the parties treat it as a turn; in (i) and (ii), clarification talk is so treated. I believe much talk of this sort is treated by participants as having full turn status. However, other sorts of vocalization, such as 'uh huh', are not so treated, as Duncan and Fiske note, at least with respect to simultaneous talk and its resolution.

When the issue is a different one, however, a different position may be warranted. In (iii), for example, 'paintings' in line 1 is an error, which is corrected at line 3 by its speaker. This correction is undertaken after the recipient has had an opportunity to do so, and has passed. With respect to the organization of repair and its interactional import, it can matter that B's self-correction follows a passed opportunity for A to initiate repair. A silence by A in that position may well have called attention to the presence of a repairable; the 'mm hm', in specifically not doing so, is doing something. 'Mm hm' is more than 'not a turn'; with respect to the repair issue, it is very much like one.

Accordingly, it seems appropriate to me that the turn-status of 'uh huh' etc. be assessed on a case-by-case basis, by reference to the local sequential environment, and by reference to the sequential and interactional issues which animate that environment.

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