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*Notes on a  
Conversational  
Practice:  
Formulating  
Place\**

**M**y aim in this essay is twofold. I hope to develop two problems of conversational analysis, each drawn from a different domain of problems. I shall develop a series of considerations that bear on one of the problems, and attempt to use those considerations in the understanding of the other. I shall proceed by sketching the first problem having to do with conversational sequencing, the problem of "insertion sequences," then abruptly shifting to the other problem, selecting formulations, which I shall call

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*(Notes to this selection will be found on pp. 432-433.)*

the problem of "locational formulations". Next, a series of considerations relevant to the selection of a locational formulation will be developed, and some of those considerations will be brought to bear on a piece of data that presents an instance of an insertion sequence concerned with location, to show how this insertion sequence is ordered. I will try, in several concluding remarks, to explicate some underlying themes of the discussion.

## I INSERTION SEQUENCES

Elsewhere (Schegloff, 1968), I have described a kind of organization of utterances in conversation that allowed us to speak of them in non-trivial ways as a "sequence." Dealing there specifically with one way in which the initiation of conversational interactions is coordinated, attention was directed to a frequently occurring initial exchange, which was called a "summons-answer sequence." In order to use the term "sequence" in a strong fashion—to refer not merely to "subsequent occurrence" in the sense of the successive positions of the hands of a clock, but rather to a specifically sequential organization—a property called "conditional relevance" was proposed to hold between the parts of the sequence unit. When one utterance (A) is conditionally relevant on another (S), then the occurrence of S provides for the relevance of the occurrence of A. If A occurs, it occurs (i.e. is produced and heard) as "responsive to" S, i.e. in a serial or sequenced relation to it; and, if it does not occur, its non-occurrence is an event, i.e. it is not only non-occurring (as is each member of an indefinitely extendable list of possible occurrences), it is absent, or "officially" or "notably" absent. That it is an event can be seen not only from its "noticeability," but from its use as legitimate and recognizable grounds for a set of inferences (e.g. about the participant who failed to produce it).

A similar organization of utterances has been described more generally by Sacks (1967) for what he calls "utterance pairs." For utterances like "greetings," to say that they come in pairs, or that an exchange of them is an utterance pair, is to notice the same sort of observations as are reported in the discussion of "summons-answer sequences" under the notion of

parts of the paper was presented in a public lecture at the University of California, Berkeley, under the auspices of the Program on Language, Society and the Child in July, 1968. Both on that occasion and subsequently, I have discussed these matters with Harvey Sacks to my great profit. I have tried in various places to specify my indebtedness to him, but there are many others where I might have done so. While responsibility for the outcome is mine alone, I must thank Alan Blum for fruitful discussion in the early stages of this paper, and Erving Goffman and William Labov for critical reading and suggestions. Symbols used in the transcriptions are explained at the end of the bibliography. Each citation of transcript is followed by a code giving its source. A description of the bodies of material from which the data are drawn may also be found at the end of the bibliography.

“conditional relevance.” I shall, therefore, use these terms interchangeably, referring to certain kinds of sequences as “utterance pairs,” where one part of the sequence is conditionally relevant on the other.

Another kind of utterance sequence that has this structure is the pair “question-answer” (henceforth abbreviated to QA). The basic organization—by “basic” I intend that although other actual sequences may be found empirically, their analysis will be accomplished best by seeing them as modifications of this “basic organization”—involves the conditional relevance of an “answer” when a question has been asked. (Indeed, here—as Sacks has pointed out—this organization is even deeper, for the very recognition of an utterance as “an answer” may turn on its placement, its sequential relationship to “a question,” there being no independent linguistic or logical criteria for distinguishing the status of an utterance as an assertion from its status as an “answer.”) If this is the case, and if we seek to apply to QA sequences what we learn from other utterance pairs like SA (summons-answer) sequences, then upon the occurrence of a question an answer is relevant, and its non-occurrence is an event, upon which inferences can legitimately be based (by co-conversationalists). (Of course, the kinds of inferences drawn from the absence of an answer to a question can be expected to be different from those involved in SA sequences. The latter relate to physical absence, sulking, cold-shouldering, etc.; the former might concern ignorance, evasiveness, reticence, “covering up,” etc.) For SA sequences, it was proposed that the conditional relevance of an answer was operative under a constraint of “immediate juxtaposition” or “nextness,” i.e. in order to find the absence of an answer, a summoner did not have to wait indefinitely. If it did not occur as a “next” action (given some formulation of “units” of action), it could be found absent, and the range of possibilities that “absence” could warrant, e.g. the inferences of physical absence, etc., or a repetition of the first item, were thereby relevant. Applying these findings to QA sequences, we would expect that a Q followed either by silence or by talk not formulated as “an answer” would provide the relevance and grounds for repetition of the Q, or some inference based on the absence of an answer. Empirically this is not always so, and I shall be concerned as one part of this paper to show in the case of one kind of departure from this expectation that it should not be the occasion for rejecting the notions of “utterance pair” or “conditional relevance,” or for rejecting the membership of QA sequences in that class. Rather, for the case I shall examine, the departure from the strict format that has been outlined stands in an orderly relationship to that format, and is adapted to its organizational requirements.

There are other kinds of departures from the utterance pair organization than the one to be dealt with here. We can mention at least those that turn on an analysis of the notion “question,” and involve structurally different kinds of questions: e.g. questions that do not pass the

conversational turn to another (some so-called “rhetorical questions”), questions whose sequencing format involves that the one to whom they are addressed return them to the questioner to be answered (e.g. riddles), and questions “answered” by another question. These will not be dealt with here. In the case we shall be concerned with, the initial question is followed by another question, not as an answer to it, and yet, though the talk following the question is not an answer, an answer is not seen to be “absent.” One formulation of the problem then is as follows: given an utterance-pair structure where an answer is conditionally relevant on the occurrence of a question, how can one have, immediately following the question, an utterance (in the same conversation) that is not analyzable as “an answer” and yet does not allow the finding “no answer”? Alternatively, if we conceive a search procedure for “answers,” in light of the seeming fact that “answers” may be discriminated by their sequential placement in relation to questions, one “place to look” indicated in such a search procedure would be in conversational turns following a question. How is it that one could look to such places, where the conditional relevance property allows the non-trivial finding of “absence” given non-occurrence, and although finding the “non-occurrence” of an answer (where the question is of a type allowing for and requiring an answer) nonetheless not find its “absence”?

The kind of occurrences we are concerned with here may be called “insertion sequences” or “inserted sequences,” because between an initial question and its answer there is inserted another question-answer sequence.<sup>1</sup> For example:


- \*A: Are you coming tonight?  
 B: Can I bring a guest?  
 A: Sure.  
 B: I'll be there.  
 \*A: Have you seen Jim?  
 B: Was he in today?  
 A: Yeah.  
 B: No, I didn't see him.

Such occurrences are not infrequent in actual conversations. If we represent question and answer pairs with the form QA, then we can represent such pairs with an inserted sequence as QQAA or

A: Q<sub>b</sub>  
 B:                    Q<sub>i</sub>  
 A:                    A<sub>i</sub>  
 B: A<sub>b</sub>


where the subscript “b” stands for “base” and the subscript “i” stands for “first insertion.” A general formulation of this format might be as follows: a QA sequence can take a QA inserted sequence. If we take this general

formulation without qualification, then we may note that  $Q_1 A_1$  above, being a QA pair, can itself take an inserted sequence  $Q_{11} A_{11}$ ,



and  $Q_{11} A_{11}$  being a QA pair can take an inserted sequence  $Q_{111} A_{111}$ , and so forth indefinitely. Empirically, we do not find indefinite extensions of insertion sequences. It is possible to invent a conversational fragment with many insertion sequences; for example, one with three sequences might be as follows:

- \*A: Are you coming tonight?
- B: Can I bring a guest?
- A: Male or female?
- B: What difference does that make?
- A: An issue of balance.
- B: Female.
- A: Sure.
- B: I'll be there.



However, such multiple insertions are rarely found in naturally occurring conversations. In many cases, a  $Q_{11}$  or second insertion question will be a meta-question, requesting repetition of the  $Q_1$  (e.g. "Huh?" or "what?").

To understand how a  $Q_1$  can occur without being heard as the absence of an answer to  $Q_b$ , we shall want to look closely at it and see whether it stands in some orderly relationship to other utterances in the conversation. Perhaps such an examination will also shed light on the empirical limitation on multiplication of insertion sequences, yielding some specification of QA pairs that can or cannot take insertion sequences. To do this we shall look at a piece of actual conversation. Before doing so, however, I want to turn abruptly away from these questions to an entirely different area, consideration of which will be useful for the analysis of that datum when it is introduced, but which I shall also want to examine in its own right.

## II SELECTION OF LOCATION FORMULATIONS

It has been argued<sup>2</sup> that a central observation about "topic talk"—the argument is made initially about stories, more generally about "talk on a

\* Indicates data invented for illustrative purposes.

topic," and perhaps holds more generally still—is "co-selection of features for topic." By this it is intended that if one looks to the places in conversation where an object (including persons) or activity is identified (or as I shall call it, "formulated"), then one can notice that there is a set of alternative formulations for each such object or activity, all the formulations being, in some sense, correct (e.g. each allowing under some circumstance "retrieval" of the same referent). Furthermore, that the selections made at each spot are "fitted" to each other, or "go together." Rather than saying "they fit the topic," or are "appropriate to the topic," it may be preferable to say that in their co-selection they, at least in part, "constitute" the topic.

If this is the case, then it would clearly seem foolhardy to try to excerpt from its conversational surroundings some particular formulation, and examine how it was selected out of the set of terms that are, by a correspondence test of truth, equally "correct." The selection would seem understandable only as part of the co-selection of the variety of terms occurring in the conversational segment. Nevertheless, at the current stage of investigation, it may be advantageous to undertake just such an examination for certain kinds of collections of terms from which one is selected for use at some point in a conversation.

One such area is that of formulations of members. Because selection of identification of persons is a central resource for invoking common sense knowledge organized by reference to the collections of membership categories (Sacks, 1969, and n.d.), because it is nearly omnipresent in conversation, and because its unexamined co-optation into social science literature can be seen (for some social sciences) as a source of fundamental ambiguity, it appears useful to have considered the problem of the selection of formulations or identification terms for members in temporary isolation from topical context, where it might be analyzed best as part of a co-selection of terms for that conversational fragment. The yield is such as we find in Sacks' papers in this area (see "An Initial Investigation . . ." in this volume).

Although the warrant is considerably weaker, I propose to sketch some considerations relevant to the selection of formulations for another domain—locations. While in that domain also, and perhaps especially, the selection of a formulation or term must ultimately be analyzed in the context of co-selection of many terms, each from a collection of terms of which it is a member, I hope to derive some gains from some reflections on location-formulation selection divorced from conversational context. As I am proceeding here in explicit divorce from conversational context, I shall occasionally take a liberty not otherwise to be condoned of relying at various points on data easily enough recalled to have happened but not recorded and out of conversational context, or invented for the occasion.<sup>3</sup>

When speakers in a conversation make reference to a place, they use some term or formulation of it. This has taken work. I want to show here

that this is so; to begin to investigate the character of that work, and its implications; and to suggest one way in which what we can learn about formulating locations can be of help in understanding seemingly quite unrelated conversational practices.

### *1. The Problem*

The "problem"<sup>4</sup> of locational formulation is this: For any location to which reference is made, there is a set of terms each of which, by a correspondence test, is a correct way to refer to it. On any actual occasion of use, however, not any member of the set is "right." How is it that on particular occasions of use some term from the set is selected and other terms are rejected?

Were I now to formulate where my notes are, it would be correct to say that they are: right in front of me, next to the telephone, on the desk, in my office, in the office, in Room 213, in Lewisohn Hall, on campus, at school, at Columbia, in Morningside Heights, on the upper West Side, in Manhattan, in New York City, in New York State, in the Northeast, on the Eastern Seaboard, in the United States, etc. Each of these terms could in some sense be correct (if that is where my notes were), were its relevance provided for. On some occasion of use, for some co-conversationalists, under some conditions, in some conversational context, each of these terms (and undoubtedly many others) could, not only "correctly," but also "rightly," relevantly, appropriately, be used to formulate that place, while the others would not be used appropriately (or, if used, would be heard as possibly formulating some location, but in addition doing some other activity, such as "name-dropping," being arrogant, silly, etc.). I seek to direct attention to the sorts of considerations that enter into the selection of a particular formulation, considerations which are part of the work a speaker does in using a particular locational formulation, and the work a hearer does in analyzing its use.

Before turning to those considerations, however, it would be well to discriminate this problem from a related one. Aside from there being a range of place terms available to formulate a location, we should note that place terms can be used to formulate objects other than place. To choose but a few examples, terms that are place terms can be used to formulate occupation:

- A: You uh wha 'dijuh do, fer a living? (1)  
B: Ehm, I work inna driving school.  
(BC, B, 20)

They can be used to formulate "stage of life":

- A: When did this happen?  
 B: When I was in Junior High School. (2)  
 (GTS II, 23)

They can be used to formulate activities:

- \*A: What's Jim doing?  
 B: Oh, he's at the ballpark.

Where a place term is used to formulate something other than location, the first question may be not how that term was selected out of the set of terms that are correct for that place, but rather how a place term came to be used to do a non-place formulation. Such analyses cannot be undertaken here, but it can be noted that in (2) there follows an introduction into the story being told of persons formulated as "principal," "teacher," etc., and that in (1), although A understands from B's answer that he is a driving teacher (as the ensuing data makes clear), it later turns out that he is a messenger boy.<sup>5</sup> The analysis of how a place term was used to do non-locational formulation may have as its outcome the consequence that of the various terms that are correct for that place, only the one used was responsive to the problem that led to the choice of a location term in the first place (for example, street address would not have set the stage for a cast of characters formulated as school personnel, as in (2), nor would it have allowed inferences about occupation, as in (1)). Under those circumstances, the considerations relevant to using *some* place term, may without reference to other considerations select *which* place term. In such cases the central problem is not "which of alternative place terms" would be chosen, but rather "which of alternative ways of formulating X (stage of life, occupation, current activity, etc.)," one of which is a place term. Here, then, although location formulations are involved, the problem of the selection of location formulations is not the primary one. (The reverse case occurs when non-place terms are used to formulate a location, as in: "A: Is Terry there? B: No, he's teaching a class." While such cases will not be given much attention here, it is clear that they expand greatly the size of the set from which selection is made in choosing a locational formulation.)

There is a third form, in which place terms are indeed used to formulate location, but where some terms may do other work in addition. For example, "Good to be back home" may differ from "Good to be back in Chicago" in that the former is also an account, saying why "it's good," by reference to the kind of tie there is between members and "home," it being where one "belongs." Or to take another example, to report one's return from "The Catskills" (rather than Peekskill), from "The Cape"

\* Indicates invented data; here the answer could indicate either work or leisure activities, depending on "Jim's" occupation.



(rather than Buzzards Bay), Zermatt (rather than Europe) can indicate simultaneously that it is a vacation one is returning from, and the sense of expectable answers to questions such as "who else was there.?" However, here we are dealing with terms that are properly seen as selected by reference to the problem outlined above, and show attention to the selection for topic of which we spoke earlier. They, therefore, properly fall within the domain we are investigating, and we shall have more to say below about the term "home," as well as those classes of terms that are "classes-for-a-topic" (as the class of "vacation place terms" just used). We turn now to several orders of considerations I shall argue are relevant to the selection of a location formulation and its hearing.

## *2. Location Analysis*

A first sort of consideration relevant to the selection of a location formulation is a location analysis. By that I mean to suggest that the selection of a location formulation requires of a speaker (and will exhibit for a hearer) an analysis of his own location and the location of his co-conversationalist(s), and of the objects whose location is being formulated (if that object is not one of the co-conversationalists). One important dimension of such an analysis is whether, for some formulation, the objects of the analysis are co-present or not. For many conversational activities or topics, a formulation under which the co-conversationalists are co-present will be rejected. For example, the following segment is from a collection of calls to the police department of a mid-western city. Throughout this collection of conversations there is a great deal of inquiring and reporting of the location of various parties, events, directions, etc. Throughout, the name of the city, "Centurb," does not occur, never being the answer or part of the answer to questions like "Where are you?", "What is the address?", "Where is this?", "Where did this happen?" In this particular call, two police dispatchers are on the line with a lady who has reported a gas leak in her home. The conversation alternates between the precautions she should take (these points are omitted here) and finding where the help should be sent.

- D: Radio, Jones.  
C: Uh, this is Mrs. Lodge calling from one twenty one Sierra Drive/  
D: One twenty one Sierra/  
C: Yes.  
. . . .  
D<sub>2</sub>: Ma'am/where's Sierra located?  
C: It's on the corner of Sierra and uh-hh Smith Drive.  
D<sub>2</sub>: Sierra and Smith/  
C: Yes. . . .

- D<sub>2</sub>: Uh where is this Sierra and Smith located? We gotta know about this. (3)
- C: One twenty one Sierra Drive. It's right on the corner.
- D<sub>2</sub>: [Right on the corner of Si—uh of what. Sierra/and Smith. Where is Smith?
- C: [Sierra Drive. Sierra and Smith.
- D<sub>2</sub>: I wanna know where Smith is located.
- C: Well it's uh right off Flint Ridge.
- D<sub>2</sub>: Off Flint Ridge.
- C: Yeah.
- D<sub>2</sub>: Where're you at ma'am, are you in the County/
- C: Uhm uh I'm in Exurb uhm.
- D<sub>2</sub>: (Alright)
- C: Oh!!! Right near the A and P Shopping Center. Across— the creek. (3)
- D<sub>2</sub>: Alright, calm down now, you're—you're in Exurb/
- C: Yes uh.
- D<sub>2</sub>: Alright, we'll get somebody out there then tuh one twenty one Sierra.

(CPD, 22-3)

In this segment, the failure to report as part of the formulation of place the city's name is heard as being produced by a finding of co-presence for that formulation. This is indeed the case in the other calls in the corpus. The failure to formulate the city leads then to hearing that the caller is in the city (co-present in it with the police, and thus not using it in her formulation), and to a search for her street on the city map. The formulation of place is not adequate (i.e. no further asking) until this is called into question and corrected.<sup>6</sup> The usual adequate formulation names some formulation for which the object being located and the conversationalists are not co-present.

- A has offered B, both in Pacifictown, a nursing job.
- B: And where is it? (4)
- A<sup>1</sup>: Out in Edgetown, on Strawson Road.

(SBL, 1, 10, 2)

In some conversational contexts, for some conversational activities, finding a formulation for which the conversationalists are co-present may lead not to its rejection but to its selection. For example, in being "brought up to date" on the doings and whereabouts of old friends and upon learning of their wide dispersal, one might get, in New York, the exchange: "A: And where's Jim? B: Oh, *he's* in New York." Without speculating on the relevance for such an exchange of its placement in a series of locational formulations and its contrastive use in the series, or the relevance of such a

discussion as prefiguring the possibility of reunions and their feasibility, it may nonetheless be noted that a finding of co-presence or non-co-presence is relevant, and requires as a consideration in the selection of a locational formulation a locational analysis by the speaker of the respective placement of the parties. And hearers take account of the use of that procedure to see how the formulation employed was arrived at (so that while it is the case that if Jim is in New York he is in the East, a report that he was in the East would be heard by A as reporting that he was not in New York).

Much of the preceding discussion relies on a notion of a "common sense geography" which many North Americans (at least) share. It is presumed by the interactants in their conversation with one another, and by me in reporting on their interactions and in inventing others for illustrative purposes. Because the terms in which locational analyses are conducted are supplied, at least in part (I say "in part" because some such analysis will be done in much more micro-ecological terms, e.g. "this room, that room"), by this shared ("everyman's") geography, it is to the point to remark on it briefly.

A considerable number of the terms suggested above as possible formulations for "where my notes are" seem to fall into a sort of concentric organization, each earlier term of the list being included in a later term. A similar relation holds between "the city" and "county" in (4). The same kind of structure seems to be relied on in an inference such as

- A: Where did she train?  
 B: Uh I think in Oregon.  
 A: Oh. Mm mmm.  
 B: Now, I'm not sure, Fran, but I think in Oregon, 'cause she's  
 from Portland. (5)
- (SBL, 1, 12, 25.)

It is possible that the search for a term for which the conversationalist and/or referent are or are not co-present is organized for some set of terms in a fashion ordered by such a concentric or hierarchic organization of terms.

What such a common sense geography is and how it is organized (hierarchically or in some other manner) and whether there is a single layman's geography or alternative geographies from which a selection is made on particular occasion of use—these are empirical questions, and not ones to be settled by consulting geography books. Such geographies are a cultural fact to be discovered<sup>7</sup> and perhaps subjected to a sort of "componential analysis" of place terms,<sup>8</sup> but have no necessary further consequences for the analysis with which we are concerned here. That there are such geographies in use, that some of them have a hierarchical organization, and that which one will be used may turn on current and recent respective locations of the parties, can be seen in the following:

A: who has recently returned to the country, has called B.

B: How *are* you?

A: I'm fine. How're you? (6)

B: Fine. Back from the wilds of Peru.

A: Yeah.

. . . (invitation talk)

B: I—oh I can't wai'tuh see you. (6)

A: Mmmhhehh heh!

B: That's really neat (1.0 sec. pause). Didge get tuh travel in South America a lot?

(TAC, 2, 5)

For Americans, it appears, one goes "to South America" not "Peru," just as one goes "to Europe" not "France." If one says one went to France, one is asked "where else?", rather than "where in France did you visit?" Persons who went "just to France" may have to account for it (e.g. via what they had to do, better and worse ways of travelling, etc.). And the same seems to hold for South America and countries in it; not "where in Peru" but "where else in South America." For Americans, the units parallel to the United States seem to be not France or Peru, but Europe and South America. On the other hand, when people "return" from any of these places, they return to "America." In giving the context for (6) above, I quite naively and automatically wrote "returned to the country." Typically, one who is said to have "returned to California" is heard to have returned from some other state.

These materials would seem to display elements of a common sense geography. They seem to display also a kind of hierarchic or concentric organization of units, which can be further appreciated by seeing that what is asked is "Didge get tuh travel in South America?", while "Did you get to Spain?" would be strange, though clearly for some classes Spain and Peru would be co-class-members. That persons may have more than one such geography and select among them according to a locational analysis is suggested by the possibility that for Americans spending a year or two in England, the response to "I was in France" may well be "where in France?" Similarly, for speakers in New York, a response to the report "I went to Philadelphia" of "Did you get to Boston?" might be strange, but for West Coast inhabitants it might not be.

These few notes on common sense geography may be helpful tools in trying to see how the remarks that have been developed on the relevance of locational analysis to the selection of a locational formulation may shed light on somewhat unrelated problems as a by-product. There are two such "throw-offs" to be suggested here.

The first has to do with one kind of circumstance in which a member

makes what another might call an "overgeneralization." The datum involved is the following. An American, returned from a stay of several years in another country, writes a letter to a friend, a native of the country from which the writer has returned. At the beginning of the third paragraph he writes in connection with race relations: "Things here in the States are much worse than the press would have you believe." Having spent all his time since his return in New York City, persons might say that is an overgeneralization; he does not know what is going on in the rest of the country, he knows about New York. And there are lay theories to account for such overgeneralization: people do not think precisely; they are careless with language. Such views treat the utterance as if the speaker is, in the first part of the utterance, bounding the domain for which his assertion is true. One can then find that there is insufficient evidence to warrant the assertion for that domain. But we can take another view and ask: how is such an utterance assembled? It has parts; are all its parts produced in the same way? Instead of seeing the utterance as the defective or inadequate product of one procedure (e.g. a quasi-scientific one), can we see it as the proper outcome of some other? We can, perhaps, propose that different sets of considerations are relevant to producing the various parts of the utterance, and that the part "here in ——" may be produced, in part, by reference to such considerations of locational analysis that have been sketched above. In filling in some place formulation in such a phrase, the selection of a term will be guided by the respective locations of the parties (and not necessarily by a specification of the domain for which the assertion is proposed to hold). We noted above that with respect to other countries, persons return to "the United States." The "here" on which a recent returnee reports to his friend still abroad may then get as its formulation "the States." If persons use some such considerations to select a location formulation, while other parts of their utterance are produced by reference to other considerations, we can see one way in which statements which may come to be seen as "overgeneralizations" are generated.

The second "throw-off" has to do with the use and understandability of what could be called "locational pro-terms," most prominently, terms such as "here" or "there." These terms are prototypical members of a class logicians have called "indexical expressions,"<sup>9</sup> terms whose referent varies with the context of its use. For terms like these it would appear that for the retrieval of their referent to be possible, they should be used only after some referent is named. On the occasion of their appearance, one could then search to find the term to which they refer. However, in some instances these pro-terms are used as first references, without prior place names and without causing difficulty. Utterances such as "How are things there?" or "Things here are going well" do not elicit responses such as "How are things where?" or "What do you mean 'here'?" One way in which a

"solution" of these pro-terms would be possible would be to look to the locational formulation that some location analysis by the speaker would yield as relevant, and hear that as the intended use of the pro-term.

Similarly, relational terms such as "downstairs," "in front," "across the street," etc., although they can be combined with place terms, are also used alone. When so used, they are purely formal and may be applied (for terms like "in front") to any structure, or (for terms like "downstairs" or "across the street") to any structure with certain properties (e.g., multi-leveled, or on a street). Agreements to "meet downstairs" or to "wait in front," insofar as they yield successful meetings, would seem to have involved the parties in finding the objects, never explicitly formulated, to which these relational terms were to be applied. And a locational analysis would seem to be involved in the adequacy of such usages, both in the making of arrangements (e.g. to meet) and in the recounting of tales, as in:

A: En' I couldn' remember what I did with it so I said to Joan,  
 "Go ahead uh an' I'll run *back*." An' I ran back and when (7)  
 I came down, uh, I uh—they said "you've missed all the  
*excitement*" . . .

(Trio, 7)

or (for terms like "back," as in "going back") to any circumstances in which a "history of recent movement" is available.

Similarly, the term "home" has a shifting referent; it is not used only for the house one normally occupies, but stands as an alternative term to a range of others. One can be "glad to be home" when one gets back to the United States, to New York State, New York City, the neighborhood, the house, etc. (With flights to the moon, a Soviet astronaut may soon announce the Russian equivalent of "it's good to be home" upon splashing down in the Pacific Ocean.) A locational analysis allows one to see how "home" is being used, i.e. in contrast to what kind of location formulation, and not necessarily to assume that all who express pleasure at being "home" when landing at Kennedy Airport live in the International Arrivals Building.

### 3. *Membership Analysis*

A second order of considerations in the selection of a locational formulation, which may be called "membership analysis," has to do with the categories of members of the society of which the hearer(s), in the first instance, but also the speaker, are members; that is, there are relationships between the identifications made (by the parties) of the parties to the conversation, on the one hand ("membership categorizations," as in Sacks, this volume), and the selection and hearing of locational formulation, on the other. Consider, for example, that members who are asked for directions or information may see that the inquiry was directed to them because the inquirer identified them in a particular way and saw their membership in some category as ground for seeking the information from them. In such circumstances, if the membership identification the

inquirer used as the warrant for the inquiry is incorrect, the request for information may be met not by an answer or plea of ignorance, but a denial or correction of the identification on which the inquiry was based. Something such as this is going on, it appears, when persons answer inquiries on the street with "I'm a stranger here myself"; or when shoppers, mistaken as sales personnel in department stores, answer inquiries about the whereabouts of "better dresses" not with "I don't know," but with "I don't work here." That the kind of place formulation involved in the inquiry is related to the membership categories is suggested by the likelihood that the question "what floor is this?", asked of the same persons, may be answered.

Seen from the point of view of an inquirer in such situations, the kind of formulation they have of the location about which they seek information may be used to decide on a search procedure for finding to which member of a population of possible answerers the inquiry should be directed. One New Yorker, for example, trying to find "Fillmore East" (a center for rock music) and knowing only its name, reports "looking for the hippiest looking person on the street" to ask for directions. Perhaps, armed with the alternative formulation "105 Second Avenue," the possibly helpful population would have not been so restricted. Similarly, someone looking for "Kent Hall" at Columbia University, a place which does not have a street address as an alternative formulation, may feel that he might need a person "from Columbia" to recognize his goal and help in finding it. I was, for example, stopped by such a person after getting off the bus at the University and asked "Are you going to Columbia?" "Yes." "Can you tell me where Kent Hall is?" (Of course, the initial question not only establishes my membership in a class whose members can be expected to be able to deal with "Kent Hall," it prepares me to recognize the name "Kent Hall" for the kind of thing it will be the name of, i.e. a Columbia thing.)

Furthermore, the use of certain formulations of a location will allow an interlocutor to hear that the speaker is for some membership class "a stranger," and that that identification is relevant in formulating a response. Examples here are difficult, because that some formulation marks its user as a stranger will (and this is what is at issue) be recognizable to non-strangers, and for any example chosen some readers will not be non-strangers. Nonetheless, one who asks in New York City how to get to the "Long Island Train Terminal" (instead of "Penn Station" or "Pennsylvania Station") will thereby be recognizable to New Yorkers (a class of members) as a non-New Yorker, a stranger (a non-class member). And although this is merely one membership identification of many that is correct for such a person (he being perhaps also a male, white, a father, a soldier, etc.), it is one that has relevance to the response, providing a sense of the sorts of locational formulations that can be used. (Where directions are asked for a place whose formulation does not allow a determination of the asker's

status in this respect, it may be inquired into as a preliminary to answering. For example, if one is asked for the "Brooklyn Museum," the return may be "Do you know Brooklyn?" On the answer turns (1) which of alternative sets of directions will be given and/or (2) how the places the directions make reference to will be formulated. Will they, for example, refer to "where Ebbetts Field used to be"?)

Similarly, persons are marked as strangers when they call to check on the safety of relatives in Burbank upon hearing there are riots "in Los Angeles' Watts' section." The often-noted deluge of phone calls into areas of natural disaster and civil disturbances in contrast to the relatively little calling out to give reassurance (Fritz and Mathewson, 1957) appears to be related to the need of mass media to formulate the location of the events in terms recognizable to strangers, while their location is formulated locally in native terms. For Bostonians, both their relatives and the riots are in Los Angeles; for the relatives, the riots are in Watts, whereas they live in Burbank.

These remarks are intended to illustrate a variety of ways in which the relationship between members' categorizations of one another and selection or hearing of locational formulation manifests itself. To begin to spell out the features on which the linkage is based we must touch at least briefly on several more general issues.

It appears to be the case that persons (in this society, at least) in using names and in asking for them, claim their recognizability (an important variant omitted here is asking for a name to provide for its future recognizability). Persons introducing themselves use different "frames" in their introductions when claiming the recognizability of their name and when no such claim is made. On the telephone, for example, the frame "my name is \_\_\_\_\_" makes no claim to recognizability, while the frame "this is \_\_\_\_\_" does.<sup>10</sup> Where the claim to recognizability is warranted, but failure of recognition is anticipated, the "claim" form is used with assistance supplied for the recognition (e.g. "Professor Van Druten, this is Sally Bowes. I was in your course on German History."). When asking a name where the grounds for expecting its recognizability may not be apparent, grounds are given. Thus, in the classic ploy, "What did you say your name was again?", recognizability is based on a claim that the name has been already given. To cite actual data:

B has been talking about people she is having to lunch. (8)  
 A: Who didju say it was? I think you *told* me.  
 (SBL, 2, 1, 8, 5)

This is far from the only grounds that may be offered. For example:

A, who is visiting the city, has spoken of visiting a friend in Van Nuys.



B: Wh-what is yer friend's name, cuz my *son* lives in Van Nuys.

A: Glazer.

(9)

B: Mmhmm no. And uh, if she uh . . .

A: She lives on Mariposa.  
(1.6 second pause)

B: No, I don' even know that street.

A: Mm no.

(DA, 3)

Similarly, when a name has been asked for, the request can be rejected on the grounds of no expectable recognizability.

B: Who is that?

A: Uh she's uh not known here. She lives out in South town.

(10)

B: Mm.

A: She's uhm-hum, just moved here about a year ago.

(SBL, 1, 10, 8)

For our concerns here, place names and personal names may be considered as of a piece, the issue of recognizability holding for both. "Name-dropping," for example, can be done with place names as well as with personal names, and depends for its operation on the recognizability of the name.

To speak of the "recognizability of the name" is insufficiently precise here. What is central is more than hearing once again a sequence of morphemes that have been heard before. What we mean by "recognizability" is that the hearer can perform operations on the name—categorize it, find as a member of which class it is being used, bring knowledge to bear on it, detect which of its attributes are relevant in context, etc. It is the ability to do such operations on a name that allow such responses as:

\*A: Who did you go with?

B: Mary.

A: Oh, it was a family affair.

\*A: I had lunch with Jones.

B: When's his book coming out?

\*A: I saw Bundy.

B: Any chance of getting money?

Names themselves are on the whole neutral with respect to the categories of which their bearers are members. Whereas in English, personal names may indicate sex, ethnicity, and sometimes social class, they are otherwise mute. Recognition involves, then, the ability to bring knowledge to bear

on them, to categorize, see the relevant significance, to see "in what capacity" the name is used.

In this respect, too, place names are like personal names.

- A: And he said that some teacher, who's coming uhm from  
I believe he might have said Brooklyn, some place  
in the east. (11)

(SBL 1, 1, 12, 21)

Here, the particular place that had been mentioned is not clearly remembered, but the outcome of some operation (some analysis of the place that was mentioned) is. This sort of finding has wider import; however, our interest here is only in showing that on hearing, such operations, classifications (in short) "analyses" are done, and their outcome may be retained while the particular is not, and that what is meant here by "recognizability" is "analyzability" in this sense. Thus, names are to be used only when expectably recognizable, where that means "analyzable." When prospective users are not sure that some name will be recognizable in this sense, they may ask that about the name before using it:

- A: Well tell me, do you—does the name Charles Weidman  
mean anything to you? (12)

B: Well, I should say so.

(SBL, 2, 2, 4, 11)

\*A: D'ya know where the Triboro Bridge is?

B: Yeah.

A: Well make a right there . . .

And, if it is not recognizable, they may supply the relevant attributes:

\*A: Do you know George Smith?

B: No.

A: Well, he's an artist, and he says . . .

Members treat the recognizability of particular names as variably distributed. For some names, recognition can be expected of the members of some membership categories. And not only recognition, but adequate recognition, i.e. not only can it be expected that they can perform some operations or analyses, but the ones that yield the adequate-for-the occasion outcome, the relevant recognition. Which categories of member can be expected to recognize a name turns on the kind of name. For place names, one relevant category is territorially based. Persons in a place, or in proximity to it, may be expected to be able to recognize place names in it or near it, and they may offer current or former proximity, or territorially

based category membership, as evidence, warrant, or account for their recognitions.

D: . . . They're setting up emergency at uh uh the cattle barn.  
Y'know where that is? (13)

C: Yeah. I live on 38th about 10 blocks east.  
(IPD, #371)

And a show of knowledge about a place may prompt an inquiry "Oh, have you been there?" Knowledge of places is, in that sense, locally organized.<sup>11</sup> Although the structure of knowledge about a "sort of place" may be general and formal, everyone organizing knowledge in the same categories and on the same dimensions, the particulars that are so organized are assumed to vary with territorially-based memberships. Thus, most persons live similarly, in a place in an environment of places, in a house, in a neighborhood, in a "part of town"—which can be similarly talked of (and it is an important fact that some do not). Their place, and its environment of places, have characteristics, character, a population composition, etc. These categories are filled by persons with their particular situations, *their* house, *their* street, *their* neighborhood, *their* part of town, *their* city, *their* state, etc., on which they are knowledgeable and can speak, while others can respond accordingly. The sharing of particulars at one or another of these levels is perhaps one sense of membership in a "same community." It is by reference to the adequate recognizability of detail, including place names, that one is in this sense a member, and those who do not share such recognition are "strangers."

In this way, "right" selection and adequate recognition of place formulations can be seen to be one basis for demonstrations of, claims to, failings in, decisions about, etc. the competent membership of either speaker or hearer. Where "trouble" occurs, it can be seen either that the speaker's analysis was incorrect, or that the analysis was correct but the hearer is not a fully competent instance of the class of which he is (relevantly for the place term employed) a member. The occurrence of "trouble" can be most clearly recognized when the use of a place formulation produces a question or second question about the location of the initial place formulation as in (4) above or in

\*A: I just came back from Irzuapa.

B: Where's that?

\*A: Where are you?

B: Sloan Street.

A: Where's that?

In the first case, perhaps B can see the incorrect analysis A made of him to come up with that term as a claimedly adequate one, and can perhaps use

that incorrect analysis himself to see what sort of person A must be to have produced it. Alternatively, A can see B as a deficient version of some class in which B claims membership, for members of which "Irzuapa" ought to be an adequately recognizable place formulation. Insofar as friendships, reputations, marriages, collaborations, etc. may turn on someone's competent membership in some class of members (e.g. "swinger," "anthropologist," "good Jewish girl," "Africanist," etc.), each occasion of the use of a place formulation selected because of its presumed recognizability to a member of such a class is part of a never-ending potential test in which persons can be shown to be inadequate members of the class, and thereby inadequate candidates for the activity. Alternatively, each place term a person uses can be inspected to see if it is the term such a person, a member of a certain class of members, should use. The stream of conversation is thus full of places getting mentioned off-hand in some formulation, and requiring recognition. And much can turn on their being recognized and on their being "rightly" selected (where "right," as compared to "correct" may mean "not subject to further question, and not giving cause for a re-analysis of the membership of the user"). Aside from inferences about the membership and competence of the parties, trouble over a place formulation can lead to reparative work in the conversation to show that although the place formulation used was not recognized, the speaker's membership analysis used to choose that term was correct, and the hearer is not a defective member, but rather some particular account is available to explain the "momentary non-recognition."

Thus:

B: I played bridge today, and I—I was in the home—an awfully nice party down on El Ravina—El Ravina.

A: Yeah.

. . . (Talk regarding bad cards) . . .

A: This was a— This was a party, where *is* El Ravina.

B: Well, I'll tell you sum'n, the way I went, I went onto Pacific Boulevard, and I went up past El S— uh Prairie.  
*You know,*

A: Oh.

B: Rest Home. And then I turned to the left, and it's the very first street.

A: Oh! Of course. I know where it is,

B: Uh huh.

A: *I know.*

B: Uh huh.

A: (Clears throat)

B: And it's a very nice little street,

A: Uh.

B: Close to the ocean.

(14)

- A: I was getting it—mixed up with uh there's something like that out in uh Little Falls.  
 B: Well, that could be,  
 A: A—and uh like Ravina.  
 B: Mm hmm.  
 A: Maybe it's just Ravina, not *El Ravina*.  
 B: Mm hmm.  
 A: Out in Little Falls.  
 B: Mm hmm.  
 A: That's awfully—  
 B: Well this is E-l, R-a,v-i-n-a.  
 A: Yeah, I know where it is.  
 B: Uh huh. Yah—yeah, it's very easy to find. I was—I just got to the—got to the // first ( ).  
 A: It's the main one, to go down to,  
 B: Yeah.  
 A: Mm // hm.  
 B: Uh huh. And then when I was going to—you know, out, there I was facing the wrong way, so I thought etc.

(SBL 1, 12, 15-16)

A, having failed initially to recognize the name, eventually comes to say the speaker was not wrong to have used it; the membership analysis that might have produced this formulation was correct; it ought to have been recognized, and there is a reason why it was not.

Two further remarks on this point are relevant. First, the account given for the non-recognition is curious, i.e. "I was getting it—mixed up with uh there's something like that out in uh Little Falls." For why would the location of *El Ravina* have been a thing to ask for if she recognized it as being in *Little Falls*. The two can turn out to be "mixed up" only *after* she gets a formulation of *El Ravina* from B. Before that, she heard it as "in *Little Falls*," i.e. that *is* where it is. Why then ask where it is? And how can a "mix-up" that is possible only after the clarification that there are two different places involved account for the failure to recognize the name when it is first used. Perhaps it would have been strange to A that B would go to a party at "Little Falls," given some analysis of the "kind of place" that is and the "kind of person" B is. This lack of fit produced the failure of recognition. (On fit between places and persons, see below, section 4.) Second, throughout this segment A asserts several times her recognition of the place. But the discussion of where it is does not end until she demonstrates the recognition. We can note that transformations from one formulation to another can not only show a preferred formulation (as will be suggested below), but can demonstrate that the transformer has recognized and understood, by showing he can analyze the first formulation and find a correct transformation. Thus, for time formulations:

- B: How long y'gonna be here?  
 A: *Uh* / not too long. Uh, just till uh Monday. (15)  
 B: Till—oh (yeh mean) like a week f'm t'morrow.  
 A: Yeah. (DA, p. 1)

So when A begins a transformation of El Ravina, exhibiting the product of an analysis, "It's the main one, to go down to," she demonstrates the recognition that B had a "right" to expect and relied on in employing the place name initially.

Of the variety and range of locational formulations from which a speaker selects, a significant number are place names (e.g. of parts of town, city, neighborhood, street, business, building, etc.). If the use of a locational formulation that is a place name requires, as a condition of use, its expectable recognizability; if recognizability involves the hearer's ability to categorize, bring knowledge to bear, analyze; if the hearer's ability to do so is seen to turn on his membership in some category of member, then selection of such a term will require a membership analysis of the hearer by the speaker. The analysis is to determine the availability to the hearer of that competence on which the speaker must rely if he is to use some locational formulation adequately, i.e. understandably, without further elaboration, with no further question. It is in the light of such considerations that the illustrative materials at the beginning of this section are to be understood, and the relevance of a membership analysis, in addition to the locational analysis discussed earlier, to the selection of place formulations is to be appreciated.

#### 4. *Topic or Activity Analysis*

A third order of consideration that seems to be involved is an orientation to "topic" or to the activity being accomplished in an utterance; in short, a "topic analysis" or "activity analysis" is also relevant to the selection and hearing of a place formulation. This is suggested by the discussion above of the requirements of a hearer that he perform operations on names—categorize, analyze, etc.—to find the relevant respects in which it is used. Perhaps the central focus of relevance in this connection is the topic that is being built up or talked to, the activities being enacted in the utterance. In order to begin to get at this orientation to topic in the selection of place formulations, it will be useful first to consider whether the collection of formulations from which a selection is made is homogeneous and undifferentiated, or whether it is structured, and has sub-sets, or "sorts of formulations." I shall propose several "sorts of formulations" and propose that such sub-collection structures of terms are a resource in the sensitivity to topic of the selection of place formulations.

One sort of formulation I shall call G for geographical, and note it without discussion. Such formulations as street address (2903 Main Street) and latitude-longitude specifications are of this sort.

Another sort of term can be abbreviated as  $R_m$ , for "relation to members." Such forms as "John's place," "Al's house," "Dr. Brown's office" are among those intended. Terms such as "home," "the office," "the supermarket," "the store" are also of this sort, the first two (and ones like them) being formulated by their relationship to the speaker or hearer, the latter two, on some occasions of use, being heard as "the X to which we both know we go" (though in other conversational contexts they may be used as members of a class of places, a sort of place).

Of the  $R_m$  terms, ones of the form "the X" where it is used as "my X" or "your X," where the member by relation to whom the place is formulated is said "to have an X" (e.g. home, house, office, etc.) have special uses and properties. First, for most persons, there are relatively few terms that can be used in this way. "Home" and "office" (or some such work place equivalent) may exhaust the list for most persons. For those who have others, the character of the activity they are seen to do in using them may depend on whether their interlocutors knew they had such additional places.

K: Oh I—I never saw it before, cause I was on the *ranch*  
when it first came *out*. And it was so funny. (16)

R: Oh, do you own a ranch too?

(GTS, 1, 13)

Note that the usage "the ranch" is recognized as K's ranch, K's "having" a ranch. And that can be seen, by those who did not know it before, as boasting, showing off, etc. Here, then, we have one way in which doing a correct membership analysis in picking a locational formulation can have consequences. "The ranch" can be used with persons who know you have one, while the talk continues to be focused on the movie that is under discussion. Alternatively, with those who do not know it, "away" would allow the same outcome. But here, "the ranch" becomes the focus of the conversation, and the "movie" topic is deflected.

These special  $R_m$  terms, "the X" type  $R_m$  terms, and especially the term "home," have the special character not only of "belonging to" the member in relation to whom they are formulated, but, as we noted earlier, such a place is for a member "where he belongs." One way of showing how this expresses itself in member's practices is to consider the use of terms like "out" or "not here."

Were someone to inquire at my home, by phone or in person, for "John Smith," there is a sense in which it would be true to say he was "out" or "not here." A search of the premises would reveal no one with that name. But that is not what would be said. What persons say in such

circumstances is something like "You have the wrong number (address)." Being "out," or "not here," or "not here right now," is what people are with respect to a limited class of places, formulated typically as  $R_m$  places (where the  $m$  or member can be their name), especially of "the X" type, which might be called "base places" for them, places in which it is warranted to search for them without an account for looking for them *there*. It is for such places that when they are not there, they are "not here" or "out." And if a place stops having that relation to a member, others will normally be told upon inquiry "He doesn't work (live) here any more." In one case I know, someone was trying to reach an editor at "his office" for three weeks. Told each time he called that "Mr. Smith is out," he called back again. Only after some time did he learn that Smith had left his position, whereupon, of course, the caller discontinued his efforts.

The status of such places under  $R_m$  formulations as places where one belongs, whose presence there is not accountable, can be seen in another way. When a place is formulated by an  $R_m$  term, and especially as "X's home," persons calling on the telephone who fail to recognize the voice that answers as belonging to one by relation to whom the place can be formulated often ask "Who's this?" There are two kinds of answers to this challenge. One is "Who's *this*?" or "Whom do you want" (which children are often taught to ask, before answering); the other is some kind of self-identification by the answerer. It appears that in choosing between these kinds of answers, an analysis by the answerer of his relation to the place he is in is relevant. If he is a person by relation to whom the place can be formulated, if he "belongs" there, if his presence is not accountable, he will counter-challenge "Who's *this*?" If not, some self-identification will be returned and in many cases such a self-identification will be chosen as will also provide an account of the answerer's presence, e.g. "This is Mr. X's nephew" or "The babysitter," the latter showing not only why the answerer is there, but why she is answering the phone.

One further point before returning to  $R_m$  formulations in general. It was noted above that for most persons there is a restricted number of places of "the X" type. There are, however, resources for greatly expanding the set of terms that can be used to formulate such places. There is a set of terms mentioned earlier and discussed further below that are relationship terms such as "near," "with," "in front of," etc. When combined with some object, these terms generate a large set of terms that can stand as transformed formulations of an  $R_m$  term.

- B: Uh if you'd care to come over and visit a little while this morning, I'll give you a cup of coffee. (17)
- A: Hehh! Well that's awfully sweet of you, I don't think I can make it this morning, hh uhm I'm running an ad in the paper and—and uh I have to stay near the phone.

(SBL, 1, 10, 14)



"Near the phone" seems here to be a place formulation chosen "for topic" to go with "running an ad." Clearly, selecting a term "for topic," given the resources of the collection of relational terms, can generate an extended collection of formulations that are transformations of "home" (e.g. "with the children," "in front of the stove," "working out back," "at my desk," "at the typewriter," etc.). I call them "transformations" for two reasons, neither to be supported by data here. First, if someone were to call B in (17) and ask where A was, the answer would probably not be "near the phone" (and might not be understandable if it were), but "at home." The basic formulation is "home"; "near the phone" is a topically-sensitive transformation. When removed from topical context, it is not a relevant transformation. Second, A, in selecting a place formulation, does not select from among "120 Main Street" (or whatever her address may be), "home," and "near the phone" to refer only to the sorts of formulations so far introduced into this discussion. It appears more likely, though there is no evidence, that she selects first between a G and  $R_m$  term, and having selected the latter, then modifies it for topic, or transforms it.

Why should she, however, have chosen an  $R_m$  term over a G term? Is there a preference rule for this choice? In general, it appears the rule is: use an  $R_m$  term if you can. The qualifier "if you can" refers largely to the earlier finding that names should be used only where expectably recognizable. The consequence here is that one should use an  $R_m$  term if one can formulate the place by relationship to a member the hearer(s) can be expected to recognize. So we find  $R_m$  forms used because the other knows the  $m$ , where that involves introducing a second or third formulation:

- B: Euhhmm uh they live uh right at— They live on Oleander Street, and that's a street beyond Terrace Lane.  
 A: Yeah. (18)  
 B: Where Sarah lives.  
 A: Yeah.

(SBL, 1, 12, 9)

And where an  $R_m$  formulation is not used, it may be understood that it is because the other does not know the member involved, as in

- B: I played bridge today, and I—I was in the home—and awfully nice party down on El Ravina—(1.0) (19)  
 El Ravina. (SBL 1, 12, 15)

And where a G term has been used to a hearer who knows the place by an  $R_m$  formulation, he may transform it.

- \*A: Meet you in front of one fifty three seventeenth avenue.  
 B: Oh, at Bill White's house?  
 A: Yeah. I didn't know you knew Bill.

On the whole, then, the preference rule appears to be: use an  $R_m$  formulation if you can. Clearly, this makes the choice of an  $R_m$  formulation turn on the outcome of a membership analysis, requiring an analysis of who knows whom, who are strangers, whether persons are members of such pair-relationships as would allow use of an  $R_m$  term. And since  $R_m$  terms are preferred, such a membership analysis may be required as a first procedure, if only to reject an  $R_m$  formulation and select another. The character of  $R_m$  terms and the preference rule thus suggests that a membership analysis has been done not only when an  $R_m$  term has been used, but when one has not but was possible.

Another expansion of the collection from which selection of a locational formulation is made can be seen to occur when we recognize that members may formulate members as being not "in" or "at" a place, but "between" places. Persons "on their way home," for example, may select that formulation in place of "in the station," "at 125th Street," "in the train," "in the third car," etc. A person dressed in a swimsuit in his car, may have a gas station attendant ask him "going to the beach?" Someone who will "return your call" wants to know if "you're in your office" and the answer may be "I'm on my way home." So another set of formulations is provided by the possibility of being "on the way to ———," "on way from ———," etc.

Similarly, there are places formulated so that their main character is not only, or not so much, where they are as where they are "on the way to," "between," i.e. where they are in relation to something else. Such formulations we will call  $R_1$ , or relation to landmark, where by "landmark" is not intended public buildings or monuments, but any object recognizable from description (here using "recognizable" not in the earlier sense of "analyzable," but as "capable of being seen as the place mentioned or described"). "Three doors from the corner," "three blocks after the traffic signal," "the last street before the shopping center," "behind Macy's," "to the left of the billboard," "next to the school building," "two houses down from Jack's place" are examples. Such terms are compounds of certain relationship terms and recognizable objects or place formulations of other sorts (being in this way like the transformation formulations for  $R_m$  places discussed earlier, e.g. "near the phone"). In such cases, whether or not the second part of the compound can be formulated as a place in its own right, it may also be formulated for what we may call its "relational" or "transitional" properties, as a point of reference. Conversely, a place that could be formulated in its own right may be formulated by using some other place as a point of reference. And if there are many such places that can be used for their transition value and be used as points of reference, then the size of the set of possible formulations from which selection is to be made is enormously increased. (For example, a place that can be formulated in its own right as Penn Station can then become "under Madison Square

Garden," "n blocks south of Macy's," "across the street from Hotel Q," etc.).

Landmarks, in the sense being used here, have as probably their most prominent use their inclusion in directions,<sup>12</sup> where they are used specifically as in-between places. Directions formulate getting from point A to point F by moving from A to B, B to C, C to D . . . to F, where B, C, D, E are used for their transition value. Any place can be so formulated for some places as "between them" for some class of members (for whom they would be recognizable; hence, again, the relevance of membership analysis).

Some places in the society may have almost solely transition value, and others will, for certain categories of members, have largely transition value. The phenomenon of seeing people "waiting" seems to rest on seeing them located in a transitional place, being thereby not in a place, but on the way to some other place. Places with high transitional value may thereby accrue great economic value, certain business seeking to be located precisely at places treated by members as transition places for many points of origin and many destinations. They are places, then, where people can meet, in some independence of where they may later be going. That members of this society could produce Schelling's results (1963, pp. 55-56), in which an absolute majority of persons told to meet someone in New York could agree on where to do it with no further information (e.g. where they were going to go after meeting, where the other was coming from, etc.), suggests their familiarity with the notion of a place in-between places, even where these are unknown, i.e. a place with absolute transition value, or maximum transition value (and further that they saw such a place as relevant to their task, and that an absolute majority could independently arrive at the same one). It is this feature that is central to the kind of formulation of location we are calling  $R_1$ .

Another sort of formulation might be called "course of action places," i.e. places that are identifiable places only by virtue of what goes on there and are so formulated (e.g. "where they leave the garbage"). In the history of the Western world, of course, that is how many places were made. (For example, where battle X was fought, etc., the latest being the spot, otherwise unidentifiable, where Kennedy was killed. The "otherwise unidentifiable" routinely leads to some mark of identification being put there, whether monument or city.)

Finally, a prominent sort of location formulation is place name,  $R_n$ , be it street, city, section, store or whatever. Names, we argued before, are used when analyzable, and so we should note that the indefinitely large collection of place names is organized into a variety of sub-collections, whose recovery is the work of analysis. The very terms just used to suggest kind of place names are themselves names of sub-collections or categories. Each place name may be a member of many sub-collections (for example, "Bloomingdale's" as a store, a department store, a "better" department

store, an East Side store, a store on 59th Street, etc.) for each of which it is grouped with different co-class members. But even groups of names as a group may together be members of alternative collections ("Bloomingdale's," "Macy's," "Gimbel's" all being department stores, Manhattan stores, etc.). As a limiting case we should note those classes whose co-members are grouped together for a single attribute, and hence may be a class for a single (or limited range of) topic, as in the case used earlier of vacation places or, even more specifically, skiing places—perhaps for no other topic would Aspen, Zermatt, and Stowe be used and heard as co-class members.

Having suggested that locational formulations fall into types and collections, we can return to the concern with "orientation to topic" or "topic analysis" that occasioned this discussion.

The relevance of the organization of place formulations into collections is that where one has collections one has the possibility of attending, in the selection of formulations, to the collections of which they are members. One can, for example, use a consistency rule in selecting a set of formulations to be used (see Sacks, this volume), selecting formulations that are members of a same collection (or, otherwise put, using the collection membership of the first formulation used to locate the collection from which subsequent terms are chosen). For place formulations one can select terms that will allow selection of other terms by use of a consistency rule, and which will allow a hearer to observe that a consistent (i.e. from some same collection) set of formulations has been employed.

For example, the relationship terms discussed earlier have a collection usage, independent of the place terms with which they are combined. So "in front of \_\_\_\_\_," "in back of \_\_\_\_\_," "to the right of \_\_\_\_\_," etc. can be seen, when used serially, to be drawn from a collection of such terms. And the place formulations to which this collection can be applied can have collection usages. We have already noted that place names can be analyzed as members of alternative collections. Here we can note that  $R_m$  terms are also capable of such organization, either by reference to the collection of places for some member (e.g. "He could be at home, at the office, or on the ranch"), or by reference to the places formulated by reference to members who are members of a single collection (e.g. "Should we play at Bob's place, or Arthur's, or Bill's?" for a "bridge circle"). Finally, the members of the collection of relational terms can be combined with a single place term ("in front of X," "across the street from X," etc.), thus formulating a set of places, each of which could be formulated in a variety of ways (even within the constraints of a location and membership analysis) by their respective relations to a single point of reference. In such a circumstance (but not only in such a circumstance) it would appear not only that the terms were being chosen for consistency, but that they had consistency for a focus. Thus, in the following data, all the place terms

(which I have bracketed) appear to be formulated by reference to "Shepherd's."

- JEANNETTE: Hello.  
 ESTELLE: Jeannette.  
 JEANNETTE: Yeah.  
 ESTELLE: Well, I just thought I'd—re—better report to you what's happen' at [Shepherd's] today /  
 JEANNETTE: What'n the world's happened // ed. (20)  
 ESTELLE: D'you have the day off /  
 JEANNETTE: Yeah /  
 ESTELLE: Well I—v—got outta my car at five thirty I drove aroun' an' at first I had t'go by [the front a' the store,]  
 JEANNETTE: Eyeah /  
 ESTELLE: An' there was two / p'leece cars [across the street], andeh-colored lady wan'tuh go in [the main entrance] [There where the silver is] an' all the // [(gifts an' things),]  
 JEANNETTE: Yeah,  
 ESTELLE: And they, wouldn' let'er go [in], and' he hadda gun / He was holding a gun / in 'is hand, a great big long gun /  
 JEANNETTE: Yeh.  
 ESTELLE: An'nen [over on the other side], I mean [to the right of there], [where the—employees come out], There was a whole—oh musta been tenuh eight'r ten employees stanning there, because there musta been a—It seem like they had every entrance barred. I don' know what was go // ing on.  
 JEANNETTE: Oh, my God. (Trio, 1-2)

And in another conversation a few minutes later:

- JEANNETTE: Maybe it was uh somebody from maybe—They wuh—was it [from the bank] / maybe there was a bank / holdup an' they were just you know—p— (21)  
 prepared the—maybe there were—yiknow sometimes the—hh they—rob the bank, an' then they go [through Shepherd's 'r something like that].  
 ESTELLE: Where's the bank?  
 JEANNETTE: [Right on the corner.] (Trio 14-15)

That the terms are selected by reference to Shepherd's is the outcome of work. The police cars "across the street" from Shepherd's were also "in

front of" some other store, but the former formulation is selected; the "bank" is on the corner of some two intersecting streets (e.g. "on the corner of Main and Spring"), but is here formulated as "right on the corner," i.e. of Shepherd's block. Formulation selection *can* be done to focus *off* some object. For example,

B: Now for instance wu—she use to borrow from me. She borrowed twice, from me once.

A: Uh huh.

B: An', oh I was setting in 'er house, 'n Cal Major came 'n delivered something, and she w— said she didn't have the change. Would I loan 'er the money to pay 'im. . . . (22)

(SBL, 1, 1, 11, 1)

Here, "what was delivered" is focussed away from by being formulated as "something." So "focussing off" can be done conversationally. In the data of (20) and (21), "Shepherd's" can thus be focussed *off* or focussed *on*. The choice of formulations has done some work in focussing *on* it. And that focus is a focus on topic or oriented to topic, or partly constitutive of what the topic is. This, then, is an elaboration of one element of what we spoke of at the beginning of Part II (p. 79 above) as "co-selection of features (or descriptors) for topic"—namely selection of place formulations for topic.

As place formulations can have a collection membership and a consistency usage, so can membership identifications (see Sacks, this volume), i.e. one can use a membership term that allows a subsequent one to be selected for its consistency with the first. Is there any relationship between consistent selections of membership identifications on the one hand, and consistent selections of location formulations on the other? In other words, can there be not only "within type" consistency, but "cross-type consistency"? We cannot pursue such an inquiry here. It is part of the much larger question: what types of descriptors can be massed for consistency considerations (as between types and not only within them) so as to show that each term was not picked randomly, without reference to topic, but was picked for (or to constitute) that topic for which the cross-type consistency is relevant? And how is such co-selection done, i.e. is the selection for topic done within each type separately, or for one type initially, with subsequent types coordinated to the first, etc.? The data already introduced can offer at least a suggestion in this respect.

There are a number of collections of membership identification terms available for formulating the persons referred to in the story under discussion in the conversations from which (20) and (21) are taken. Consistent identifications would have been made, for example, by the terms "men" and "women." But although consistent among themselves, these member identifications would have stood in no relevant relation to the selection of place terms focussed on "Shepherd's." On the other hand, the collection

whose terms include "employees," "customers," etc. would be relevant to that focus, to the type of place "Shepherd's" is. It seems that this is the collection of membership terms used. At the end of (20), "employees" is used to formulate the persons "stanning there" (persons who "could have been" formulate by sex, age, race, etc.). As for the term near the beginning of (20) "andeh-colored lady," it can be shown that it is used here as a description of a "kind of customer," where "customer" is not said.

That such "unspoken" primary categorizations are done can be seen in the use made of the identification "a blond." Although it appears that this term identifies as its primary category "color hair" or "type of member with blond hair," the term is used to specify a sub-class of female. "Female" is then the primary categorization, though unstated. Unstated primary categorizations, then, are possible. That "colored lady" is used here as a secondary sub-classification within a primary "customer" (or "non-employee") is suggested by the following data from "Jeannette's" call to a fellow employee at Shepherd's to find out "what happened" that occurred between the conversations from which (20) and (21) are respectively excerpted. Passing on what was reported to her, she says:

- JEANNETTE: Well, she said that there was some woman thet—  
the—they they were whh— had held up in the  
front there, thet they were pointing the *gun* (23)  
at, 'n everything. A c-negro woman.
- PENELOPE: NO : : : ! No.
- JEANNETTE: What.
- PENELOPE: Dat was one of the empLOYEes.
- JEANNETTE: Oh.
- PENELOPE: He ran up to 'er an' she jus' ran up to 'im an' sez  
"What's happ'n what's 'app'n'" W'l the kids  
were laffing abou//t it,
- JEANNETTE: Oh/ heh heh heh heh//heh heh.
- PENELOPE: An' she wuh—That was somebody thet worked in  
the *sto//re*.

(Trio, 10)

It appears, then, that there can be links of consistency or relevance between types of descriptions, e.g. for personnel and for place; that one gets an adaptation to "Shepherd's," that given the type of place "Shepherd's" is there are constraints on the kind of identification that will be made of personnel, and that selection of each kind of term can be produced with an orientation to topic. Aside from location and membership analysis, then, "topic analysis" seems to be relevant to the selection of a locational formulation. It is relevant to a speaker in building or assembling "a topic," and relevant to a hearer in analyzing what is being talked to, what the focus is. Indeed, as a hearer must analyze place formulations that are used to find

their relevance, place formulations can be used to focus his analysis; their co-selection with other descriptors creates the relevance that he finds in his analysis. It may be in the light of this co-selection that we should appreciate that the use of "Junior High School" to answer "When did this happen" in (2) above is followed by the introduction into the story of characters formulated as "principal" and "teacher," and the answer "I work in a driving school" to the question "Wha' dijuh do for a living?" in (1) occurs in the middle of a conversation that began

B: I like tuh ask you something.

A: Shoot.

B: Y'know I 'ad my lisen'suspendid fuh six munts. (24)

A: Uh huh.

B: Y'know for a reaz'n which, I rathuh not mensh'n tuh you, in othuh words,—a serious reaz'n, en I like tuh know if I w'd talk to my senator, or—somebuddy, could *they* help me get it back.

(BC, B, 20)

It may be that co-selection for topic is relevant not only for selection of a place term given the relevance of *some* place term; it may also be relevant to the selection of a place term to formulate a non-place descriptor.

I have urged that in the selection and adequate hearing of a locational formulation, at least three orders of consideration are relevant—a location analysis, a membership analysis, and a topic analysis—and I have tried to sketch the dimensions of the selection problem, and the kinds of work subsumed under the analyses that are involved. I now return to the problem of insertion sequences introduced in Part I to see if, as a "throw-off" from the notes on locational formulation, we can make any progress in elucidating what is involved there.

### III

## AN INSERTION SEQUENCE TYPE

Insertion sequences, it will be recalled, are sequences occurring between the two parts of an utterance pair, i.e. between two utterances the second of which is conditionally relevant given the occurrence of the first. Most broadly posed, the problem of insertion sequences would be concerned with what kinds of insertions various kinds of utterance pairs could take. A more limited inquiry would be directed to the various kinds of insertions (if there are various kinds) the utterance pair QA (question, answer) could take. Here, we are more specifically concerned with one kind of sequence we find inserted into QA pairs, i.e. a QA insertion. We have asked: what are the constraints on QA insertions, such that one does not find indefinite



expansions? What must the second question (i.e., the inserted question) have to show that it is attentive to the first, that while after the first question an answer is relevant, and that the following utterance is not an answer, nonetheless the finding "no answer" is not warranted and is not made?


We shall proceed by examining some data with an insertion sequence. It will be useful to reproduce a large segment of the data. The utterances are broken up and numbered for convenience of reference.

- B<sub>1</sub>: You know, I have // a house, a big garden—  
 A<sub>1</sub>: Yes.  
 B<sub>1</sub>: Why don't you *come* and see me some//times.  
 A<sub>2</sub>: I would like to.  
 B<sub>3a</sub>: I would like you to.  
 B<sub>3b</sub>: Let me // just—  
 A<sub>3</sub>: I don't know just where the—uh—this address // *is*.  
 B<sub>4a</sub>: Well where do—  
 B<sub>4b</sub>: Which part of town do *you* live.  
 A<sub>4</sub>: I live at four ten east Lowden. (25)  
 (2.0)  
 B<sub>5a</sub>: Well, you don't live very far from me.  
 B<sub>5b</sub>: If you go on the State (1.0) High—no if you go out past the court house // to Elmhurst.  
 A<sub>5</sub>: Yeah.  
 B<sub>6</sub>: [[Okay?  
 A<sub>6a</sub>: [[Yes—  
 A<sub>6b</sub>: Yes.  
 B<sub>7</sub>: Go to Elmhurst, pass the court house and go to Elmhurst. And then go Elmhurst, uh north.  
 A<sub>7</sub>: Mm hm.  
 B<sub>8</sub>: Towards Riverton, til you come to that Avilla Hall.  
 A<sub>8a</sub>: Oh, yes.  
 A<sub>8b</sub>: [[Uh huh,  
 B<sub>9</sub>: [[Dju know where that // is?  
 A<sub>9</sub>: Oh, surely.  
 B<sub>10</sub>: Avilla Hall on the corner of Bor//don.  
 A<sub>10</sub>: Uh huh.  
 B<sub>11</sub>: Well there, on Bordon you turn back to town, left,  
 A<sub>11</sub>: Uh huh,  
 B<sub>12</sub>: A very short block.  
 A<sub>12</sub>: Uh huh,  
 B<sub>13</sub>: And the very first street from Elmhurst there, crossing Bordon is called Avenida del Mar.  
 A<sub>13a</sub>: Yes.  
 A<sub>13b</sub>: I know where that is.  
 B<sub>14</sub>: And uh there's a mailbox on the corner of (      ). You turn right, (after that).  
 A<sub>14</sub>: Mm hm,

- B<sub>15</sub>: And the very first house after that corner is—the corner house, is the corner of Junipero Serra,  
 A<sub>15</sub>: Mm hm,  
 B<sub>16a</sub>: —and Avenida del Mar.  
 B<sub>16b</sub>: And that's my house.  
 A<sub>16</sub>: Oh!  
 B<sub>17</sub>: Mm hm.  
 A<sub>17</sub>: Mm yes I know exactly where it is.  
 B<sub>18</sub>: Now the house has some uh fruit trees, on the corner, (25)  
 orange trees,  
 A<sub>18</sub>: Mm hm.  
 B<sub>19a</sub>: It's the corner house.  
 B<sub>19b</sub>: First there's the corner house of Bordon and Avenida del Mar, it has uhm geraniums and roses.  
 A<sub>19</sub>: [[Mm, hm,  
 B<sub>20</sub>: [[And then the next house, there's a driveway and then there's the—you go onto Avenida del Mar, uh right.  
 A<sub>20</sub>: [[Mm hm,  
 B<sub>21</sub>: [[And it goes straight—uh there's a corner right away, and that corner house is mine.  
 A<sub>21</sub>: I see, uh huh,  
 B<sub>22</sub>: The front faces on Junipero Serra.  
 A<sub>22a</sub>: Uh huh,  
 A<sub>22b</sub>: That isn't far at *all*.  
 B<sub>23</sub>: It's uh within uh a one minute's walking distance from Avilla Hall.  
 A<sub>23</sub>: Mm hm,

(SBL, 1, 10, 12-14)

I shall argue for the following mapping of the data onto the insertion sequence format, QQAA.



Although A<sub>3</sub> is not constructed syntactically as a question, it appears to be used here (a) as a question and (b) as a request for directions. As for (a), note that B<sub>4a-b</sub>, "Well where do— which part of town do *you* live," is produced as a "second" or "return" question by its placement of accent (a procedure whose most commonplace occurrence is \*A: How *are* you. B: Fine, and how are *you*. That "seconds" are done with special accent or intonation can also be seen when the second is not a "return" but a "repeat." Thus, if A summons B by calling his name and gets no answer,

he may repeat the summons.<sup>13</sup> Thereupon, B may respond "I didn't hear you," which appears puzzling, since if he did not hear him, how can he know *that*, and if he did, he is lying. It is the distinctive accent and intonation of "seconds" that allow such a finding (Sacks, lectures). If B produces her utterance as a second or return question, then  $A_3$  is being treated as a "first question."<sup>14</sup> As for (b), it is being claimed that the "where" question here requires for its answer not some formulation of, e.g. the part of town (a formulation whose possible relevance can be seen by its use in  $B_{4b}$ ), but rather a procedural account, i.e. directions. That  $A_3$  is a "possible request for directions," that it would be relevant for a hearer to inspect it to see if that is what it is, rather than to inspect it to see what it is, may be claimed because of its placement after the sequence  $B_2-A_2$ . For sequences of actions whose first actions are an invitation and an acceptance, direction-asking-giving (and generally, "making arrangements") is a sequentially relevant next action. (So, for example, where the invited one does not make an inquiry, the inviter may nonetheless ask "Do you know how to get here?" We cannot know, but  $B_{3b}$  may have been the beginnings of direction-giving.) Therefore, although  $A_3$  may be doing other things as well (as will be discussed below), it is at least a request for directions. We have, then, a segment, including in it an insertion sequence, which begins with a request for directions. How does the insertion sequence fit?

One way to examine this matter would be to look for some orderliness in the relation of the  $Q_i$  to the  $Q_b$ . In other work, it has regularly appeared that one crucial aspect of what an utterance does in a conversation turns on its sequential placement and, most importantly, what it follows. We have already seen that the  $Q_i$  is produced with attention to the preceding utterance, i.e. in being produced as a second question. We shall, however, focus on the relation between the  $Q_i$  and  $A_b$ , and argue that the insertion sequence  $Q_iA_i$  is a "pre-sequence" for the activity done in  $A_b$ .

"Pre-sequences" [discussed in Sacks, (1967), #8 and #9, and Schegloff (1968)] are utterances produced as specifically prefatory to some activity. The term "pre-sequence" is an aggregating term to collect various specific cases, such as pre-invitations, pre-offers, pre-warnings, etc. In data such as

A: Hello?

B: Judy?

A: Yeah.

B: Jack Green.

A: Hi Jack.

B: How ya doin. Say, what're ya doin.

(Sacks, 1967, lecture 8)

(26)

\*A: Hello.

B: Hi. Are you doing anything?

“What’re ya doing” and “are you doing anything” are heard as pre-invitations, i.e. are heard by reference to what they have been inserted before. Pre-sequences, then, are produced and heard via their sequential placement, but as placed not after some utterance, but before one. (For further discussion, see the cited references.)

In the present case, it is being urged that the  $Q_1A_1$  insertion sequence is a pre-sequence for the activity of  $A_b$ . Such a proposal seems to fit nicely to the very notion of an insertion sequence. For it could be asked: how is it an insertion? When it is produced, the  $A_b$  has not yet been produced. In what sense can something be inserted between one item and another that has not occurred? Does that not treat the conversation as an accomplished product, rather than as a developing process for the conversationalists who produce it? No. The  $Q_b$  utterance makes an  $A_b$  utterance conditionally relevant. The action the  $Q_b$  does (here, direction-asking) makes some other action sequentially relevant (here, giving directions by answering the  $Q_b$ ). Which is to say, after the  $Q_b$ , the next speaker has that action specifically chosen for him to do, and can show attention to, and grasp of, the preceding utterance by doing the chosen action then and there. If he does not, that will be a notable omission, an event, on which inferences of their lack of attention or grasp may be based.

We are asking: is there some talk that the next speaker after  $Q_b$  could produce that would not be the action chosen by the  $Q_b$ , but would nonetheless exhibit an orientation to that action, and thereby to the  $Q_b$  that requires it? One way would be to do an action that, although not the one chosen, was a pre-sequence to the one chosen. This would exhibit an orientation to, and understanding of, what action was conditionally and sequentially relevant at that point. Here we want to show that  $B_{4a-b}$  is a pre-sequence for “giving directions,” where “giving directions” is a sequentially relevant next action to the  $Q_b A_3$  “asking directions” (and that is at least one thing that  $A_3$  is).

How  $B_{4a-b}-A_4$  is a pre-sequence to direction-giving may be shown by seeing what sorts of resources “direction-giving” may require, and how the  $B_{4a-b}-A_4$  sequence is addressed to those requirements. The materials that have been developed on locational formulations may be useful here, for they have suggested that where selection of location formulations is done, various analyses are relevant. Giving directions requires (at least for the sort of directions involved in getting some place) location formulations. Where the one who is to give directions does not have the materials for the required analyses, or seems not to have them, the possibility of asking for them becomes relevant, and a pre-sequence can be a way of doing that and can be seen to be doing that.

In the data we are concerned with here, two requirements for direction-giving that seem relevant are (a) regarding locational analysis, what would be a relevant first segment of directions and a right formulation of it, e.g. a

first landmark or transition place, and (b) regarding membership analysis, what sorts of places and formulations would the other know, recognize, be able to analyze, as the base on which directions can be built.

The first issue involves that where A is starting from is relevant to (though not necessarily identical with) where B starts the directions. This issue is related to the point made earlier that not every place is "in-between" any two places, or has transition value for them, and, hence, can be used as a landmark. To choose a set of transition places for use in the directions, as places the other is to be "brought to" serially in reaching the goal, one may need the points of origin and destination. If a direction-giver knows them for the hearer, he can proceed. In face-to-face interaction, the direction-giver may derive it from a locational analysis; when asked "how do I get to X?" it is heard as "from here" and "now." (And if the directions involve walking east and the asker wants to make a phone call first and the phone booth is in the opposite direction, an explanation will frequently be offered, or the direction-giver will try to make a "correction.") Or, as is often the case in telephone inquiries, the asker will build that information into the question. (Thus, I have heard persons ask a travel information service, "How do I get to X from the Upper West Side?") Where the information is not available, a crucial resource for formulating the directions is lacking.

The second consideration should be familiar from the previous discussion. We have already suggested that recognizability of locational formulations is related to membership, and particularly to the locally organized knowledge attributable to territorially based membership classes. Where someone lives can be informative about what they know, what formulations of what places will be right for them. Independently of what places will have transition value, there is the issue of what formulations of those places will be right and recognizable, and this turns on membership analysis (as does the issue of what transition places can be omitted, i.e. for what do directions not need to be given, as here in B<sub>5b</sub>, getting to the "State Highway," or to the "Court House." The direction-giver must know the asker's "base knowledge," i.e. for what formulations of places that might be used in the directions there would not be the re-asking "where's that." This kind of knowledge is seen to be organized via territorially organized membership.

A direction-giver must, then, have the materials for a locational analysis and a membership analysis. Frequently, he will have such materials; if not, he can use a pre-sequence to get them. B<sub>4a-b</sub> is the sort of question that seeks those materials. The "part of town" can be a locus of knowledge; it can be grounds for choosing a set of transition points, and a right formulation for them. (For that work, it may be superior to "where do [you live]?", if we can for a moment presume that that is what B<sub>4a</sub> started to be. The latter question asks an address, and B may be as unknowing about the location of A's address as A is about B's. An "address" answer might then

occasion a re-asking by B, "where's that?" And no basis for formulating directions would have been elicited. Whereas "address" may be known only to people in "that part of town," "parts of town" are presumed known to people in the town, and would be adequate for doing the required analyses. It happens that A answers with an address, and B can use it, but that does not change the contingencies.) The selection of transition places and formulations of them based on B's analyses—"Elmhurst" (B<sub>7</sub>), "Avilla Hall" (B<sub>8</sub>), "Avenida del Mar" with its "mailbox" (B<sub>13</sub>, B<sub>14</sub>)—turn out to be "right," a matter to which both parties orient themselves throughout the direction-giving, B with inquiries ("O.K.?" B<sub>6</sub>, "D'ja know where that is?" B<sub>9</sub>), A with reassurances both in response to inquiries and unsolicited ("Uh huh's" throughout, "Oh yes," A<sub>8a</sub>, "Oh surely," A<sub>9</sub>, "I know where that is," 13b, "Yes I know exactly where it is," A<sub>17</sub>).

I have argued, then, that A<sub>3</sub> is a (base) question, asking for directions; that B<sub>4a-b</sub>, the beginning of an insertion sequence, is a pre-sequence for direction-giving, gathering materials for analyses required for the selection of location formulations to be used in the directions; that A<sub>4</sub> adequately supplies those materials; and that B<sub>5b</sub>-B<sub>23</sub> give the directions requested by A<sub>3</sub>, and are thus the (base) answer (omitting here the checking of the adequacy of the directions and rightness of the formulations woven into the direction-giving). For completeness, a few remarks should be made about B<sub>5a</sub>, "Well, you don't live very far from me," which has so far been left out.

It could be proposed that A<sub>3</sub>, rather than or in addition to, being a request for directions, begins a decline of the invitation. Although I can see no argument for this as the activity A<sub>3</sub> is doing (especially in view of the acceptance in A<sub>2</sub>), such a suggestion seems responsive to the possible relevance of A<sub>3</sub> to such an action. And B<sub>5a</sub> can be interpreted as responsive to that possible relevance as well.

The relevance is this. For offers and invitations, distance may be grounds for accepting or declining. Thus, in the middle of a major disaster, distance can be one of the grounds cited by the police (D in the data below) for declining the offer of a doctor's services.

- D: Is this Dr. ——?  
 C: No, I wanted to know if you got a hold of him.  
 D: No, we didn't, uh since he's that far away we don't uh since (27)  
 we have uh since I talked to you the Army has volunteered  
 to send some out.  
 C: Uh huh.  
 D: So, doctors uh . . . well we don't need 'em bad enough to  
 call 'em in from out of town.

(IPD, # 59)

And earlier in the conversation we have been examining, A declines B's offer of a nursing job, using distance as a relevant ground.

A: Yeah, but this—this is a nice case // an I just—

B: Is it? Are *you* on it now?

A: I relieve. It's the one I've been relieving on ever since March. (28)

B: Ah uh what kind of a case is it.

A: Uhm it's the uh post-brain surgery.

B: Mm hm.

A: And uh it isn't hard work.

B: I see. And *where* is it.

A: Out in Edgerton, on Strawson Road.

B: Oh and it's *quite* a drive from here too. Well you know, uh seven days a week is just too much for me . . . (etc.)

(SBL, 1, 10, 2)

A finding of "far" can, therefore, be relevant to declining an offer or invitation, though it should be noted that "far" and "near" are formulations of place chosen with an orientation to topic. So "far" for a job may be "near" or "not far" for a friend. Because directions can serve as an indication of distance, a finding of "far" or "near" may be relevant to whether or not they will ever be followed. The "assessment in advance" ("you don't live very far from me") may then provide some way of hearing the directions.

As the directions are produced "piece by piece" and are analyzed by hearer "piece by piece," and at each point the hearer may not know how many more steps there may be, an assessment may be assembled over the course of the directions as to how far/how complicated they are, and the relevance of that to the invitation considered. An assessment in advance can be useful in trying to cut that off. It may lead, perhaps, to hearing at each step of the directions that there is not likely to be too much more to come. It may control the assembly of the assessment over the course of the development of the directions. Finally, it makes an assessment by the hearer at the end of the directions not a "free assessment." For the hearer to find at the end of the directions that "it's far," given the "assessment in advance," would not be just an assessment, but a disagreement, and one might not want to respond to an invitation with that. In the data here, A's assessment at the end (A<sub>22b</sub>) echoes B's, "That isn't far at all." (Sacks has pointed out that speakers beginning an extended utterance may supply their hearers with the remark appropriately made at its end. Speaking in the first instance of stories, he notes that they frequently are begun "The funniest thing happened" or "I heard the strangest story" or "I have wonderful news," and hearers chime in at the end with "how funny," "how odd," "how wonderful," thereby letting the speaker see they have correctly noted the end of his extended utterance. The data under consideration here suggests that directions are another sort of extended utterance on which these bounds can be used.) If we recall that location formulations are

selected with an orientation to topic or activity, then we can appreciate that the use of "not very far" rather than "near" may be chosen for its fit to such "preventive measures" as are being taken here.

We started by asking how insertion sequences in QA pairs were possible without a violation thereby being committed, without the absence of an answer being found—that is, how do people see when a question follows a question that it is not *any* other question, not an evasion? (We speak of those cases where it is not seen as an evasion by the speaker of the first Q. Of course, some second questions are so seen, and *their* features should be investigated.) We have suggested one way, where the inserted question is a pre-sequence for the activity that the initial or base question makes relevant. Since the insertion sequence is specifically done and heard as prefatory to the activity made conditionally relevant by the question, attention both to that activity and to the question is thereby exhibited.

More generally, conversationalists are on the whole required to exhibit attention to last prior utterances [Sacks, (1967)]. Questions are specially "demanding" in that respect, because they make an answer conditionally relevant. However, if a question requires an answer that will include parts that themselves require exhibiting attention to some set of considerations (as place formulations require attention to respective location, respective membership, and topic or activity), then what follows the question can exhibit attention to the question by exhibiting attention to those considerations required by the activity the question makes relevant. In the materials at hand, our exploration of the considerations relevant to selecting a locational formulation have allowed seeing that the insertion sequence under examination did that. For other materials, we can now look to see to what degree insertion sequences are pre-sequences to the second part of the base utterance pair, and what sorts of work relevant to the activity of that second part the insertion sequences are doing.

#### IV CONCLUDING REMARKS

I have argued that for any "place" there is a set of terms or formulations that are "correct." On any occasion of employing a term for that "place," much less than the full set is "right" or adequate (i.e. not producing questions, or further questions, requiring reformulations).<sup>15</sup> It happens, on the whole, that speakers select "right" or adequate formulations, and do preliminary work if it is required in order to do so. The selection of a "right" term and the hearing of a term as adequate, appear to involve sensitivity to the respective locations of the participants and referent (which can change over the course of the interaction); to the membership composition of the interaction, and the knowledge of the world seen by



members to be organized by membership categories (where the composition can change over the course of the interaction); and to the topic or activity being done in the conversation at that point in its course, and which is, at least in part, constituted as "that topic" or "that activity" by the formulations selected to realize it.

If this is so, then it seems to follow that on each occasion in conversation on which a formulation of location is used, attention is exhibited to the particulars of the occasion. In selecting a "right" formulation, attention is exhibited to "where-we-know-we-are," to "who-we-know-we-are," to "what-we-are-doing-at-this-point-in-the-conversation." A "right" formulation exhibits, in the very fact of its production, that it is some "*this* conversation, at *this* place, with *these* members, at *this* point in its course" that has been analyzed to select *that* term; it exhibits, in the very fact of its production, that it is some particular "*this* situation" that is producing it.<sup>16</sup>

\* \* \*

It is one lesson of these materials that formulation of locations accomplish and exhibit the particularities of an interaction, and they do this through general, formal structures. (By the last phrase I mean that the problem of selecting a term from a collection of terms, or of selecting a collection from a set of collections, is a general, formal procedure, although its outcomes can be particular to the circumstances in which the operation is done. The contrast might be where particularities of situation would be exhibited by unique markers for a situation or class of situations.) We can now look to see for what other domains this lesson is relevant. Are there kinds of conversational practices that cannot do this? Are there many others designed for that kind of use, which permit conversation to operate within very tight constraints, while each one can be at each point a matter for analysis as the outcome of a general practice and part of a general structure?

As for the former question, it appears that the most general sequencing structures of conversation for which we have descriptions hold across such variations as place formulations reflect.<sup>17</sup> As for the second question, it seems to invite a detailed, empirical examination of the gloss "context."

These notes may be read as pertinent to some ways in which "contextual variation" affects interaction. It is being proposed that the much invoked "dependence on context" must be investigated by showing that, and how, *participants* analyze context and use the product of their analysis in producing their interaction. To say that *interaction* is context-sensitive is to say that *interactants* are context-sensitive, and for what and how that is so is an empirical matter that can be researched in detail. One dimension has to do with the ways in which interactants particularize their contributions so as to exhibit attention to the "this-one-here-and-now-for-us-at-this-point-in-it" character of the interaction. I have tried to suggest that

place formulations particularize at least for location, composition (at least with respect to those membership categories relevant to the selection of place formulation) and place in conversation (topic, activity). It is now in order to see what range of conversational practices are subject to similar usage, what kinds of organization they have, whether or not they are fitted to one another, etc.

That others await description seems clear. One need only note that selection of age terms for members (see Sacks, this volume), and the selection of collections of age terms from which to select a term seems to exhibit attention to particularities, especially of membership (although other categories of member seem to be involved than in the case of place-formulation selection). Thus, terms like "older man" or "young woman" cannot be divorced from the age composition of participants in the conversation in which they occur, as "he's 45" may on occasion be. So the alternative collection of age terms—the one being the set of terms of the form "n years old," the other the set of terms including "young, old, younger, older, middle-aged, not so old, . . ."—may have different potential for exhibiting attention to particularities of membership composition, and may be selected accordingly. If a term is chosen from the latter collection, it may then be used to exhibit attention to the specific membership composition of an interaction.

More directly parallel to discussion of place formulation are temporal formulations. Although this is certainly not the place to develop an analysis, a few observations may suggest that temporal formulations may particularize in their domain in a manner congruent with location formulation. Note that an event may be formulated as occurring at "2:06; about 2; in the afternoon; Monday afternoon; Monday; the third week in January; January; January 23; January 23, 1964; January 23, 1964 A.D.," providing a seeming calendrical parallel to what were called G terms above. Or an event can be formulated as "before we met," "after the baby was born," "a month after your grandfather died," etc., forms that appear to be for temporal formulations similar to  $R_m$  terms in place formulations. Formulations such as "the day after the Kennedy assassination," "a week before the election," "the day of the storm," etc., are for various membership groups located by "reference to landmark," in this case "landmark" dates. There seem to be preferred temporal formulations and transformations to them (as is the case with place formulations), as in the following data:

- A: You know when the next meeting of the curriculum committee is? (29)  
 B: Friday morning at 10:00.  
 A: Tomorrow.  
 B: Right.

in which B's choice of formulation is found not "right" in not exhibiting a grasp of the "when" of the conversation in relation to the object being talked of.

In short, there is reason to believe that a search for other conversational practices that exhibit attention to the particularities of the interaction in which they occur will find others; some perhaps with a structure similar to that discussed here in connection with place formulations, others perhaps quite different. As more such practices are subjected to analysis, we may be able more fully to document empirically an argument that can be suggested only tentatively from this discussion, concerning the "efficiency" of language as a resource in interaction. Various investigators have claimed that language is overbuilt for the kind of use it ordinarily gets (see, e.g. Sapir (1921), p. 13; Weinreich (1966), p. 147); that it would be more efficient to have a single term for each referent, and each term refer to but a single referent, and not have synonyms; that there is much redundancy built into human communication because of the defectiveness of language or of humans as senders and receivers of messages, and redundancy allows messages to get through anyhow [Colin Cherry (1957), p. 117]. If one takes conversational interaction among a society's members as one's domain (rather than characteristics of communication channels or linguistic structures exempted from daily use), then the major interest may be in the way alternative available formulations of objects allow the exploitation of members' analytic skills to accomplish a fundamental feature of everyday, organized social life. For it is through such resources that the production of a world of particular specific scenes through a set of general formal practices is accomplished and exhibited.

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## DATA SOURCES

- BC Telephone conversations on a radio "talk show."
- GTS Group psychotherapy sessions with teenagers.
- CPD Phone calls to the emergency desk of the police department of a midwestern city.
- SBL Phone conversations in a western city.
- Trio A series of three phone conversations, A to B, B to C, B to A.
- DA Phone conversation.
- IPD Phone calls to midwestern police department in immediate aftermath of a disaster.
- TAC Phone conversations among young adults in a western city.

## SYMBOLS USED IN TRANSCRIPTS

- / indicates upward intonation
- // indicates point at which following line interrupts
- (n.o.) indicates pause of n.o. seconds
- [ indicates simultaneous utterances when bridging two lines
- ( ) indicates something said but not transcribable
- (word) indicates probably what said, but not clear
- but* indicates accent
- emPLOYee* indicates heavy accent
- : : : indicates stretching of sound immediately preceding, in proportion to number of colons inserted

<sup>1</sup> I am indebted to Harvey Sacks for calling the phenomenon to my attention.

<sup>2</sup> Sacks (1967 and forthcoming).

<sup>3</sup> A central reason for frowning on invented data is that while it can be easily invented, it is invented only from the point at which it is relevant to the point being made, thereby eliminating a central resource members use in hearing it, i.e. its placement at some "here" in a conversation, after X; in short, by eliminating its conversational context.

<sup>4</sup> By "problem" I intend not that speakers will have pondered the matter, but that what they say is to be seen by analysts, both professional and lay (i.e. hearers), as a solution, as the outcome of work.

<sup>5</sup> On choosing that way of identifying oneself that maximizes status, see Moerman (1967). Suttles (1968) reports for the slum he studied that with the exception of five occupations, persons answer inquiries about their occupations by reporting the place where they work or the industry, rather than their job title, 46 & 100.

<sup>6</sup> A curious appearance of this: if your tobacconist "remaindered" matches you may find yourself with one which advertises "Al's Liquor Shop, 122 Main St.," and wonder where it is.

<sup>7</sup> See, for one attempt in this direction, Lynch (1960).

<sup>8</sup> On componential analysis, see e.g. Conklin (1955), Frake (1961), Goodenough (1956), and Lounsbury (1956).

<sup>9</sup> Garfinkel and Sacks (1969) review the terms and discussions by philosophers, logicians, and linguists. Their paper is relevant to several themes in the present discussion.

<sup>10</sup> Schegloff (1967), Ch. 2.

<sup>11</sup> Although the unit to which "local organization" applies may be quite large. Thus, for example, the "common sense geography" to which we referred earlier involves some knowledge about places never visited, but expectably known by competent members. Whereas asking of one returned from Peru whether he travelled to Colombia does not necessarily exhibit the asker's intimate familiarity with those places, remarking to someone who reports living on West Fourth Street, "Oh, you're in the Village," can be seen to exhibit a knowledge based on personal experience. Which sorts of places are known generally, in the manner of a common sense geography, and which are known "locally" in the sense intended in the text, is a matter for empirical investigation. I am indebted here to Diana Cook.

For one ethnographic report on the variation of naming and knowledge of an area by proximity to it, cf. Suttles (1968), 24-5.

<sup>12</sup> On direction giving, see Psathas and Kozloff (1968).

<sup>13</sup> Schegloff, 1968.

<sup>14</sup> William Labov argues that it would be a good strategy to reserve the term "question" for such utterances as have been traditionally so described by linguists employing syntactic and intonational criteria. In that case, knowledge that linguists have about "questions" would not be diluted by including in that class utterances for which that knowledge does not hold. A<sub>3</sub> would simply be called "a request for information." On the other hand, neither syntactic considerations (such as inverted verb forms) nor distinctive intonations seems to mark adequately the class involved. Perhaps eventually we will understand by "question" utterances that provide the relevance of distinctive sequencing rules for the ensuing utterances. It is with an eye to such a possibility that I use the term "question" here.

<sup>15</sup> Although we have omitted consideration of the following point earlier, it is important to note it here. "Right" formulations need *not* be drawn from the set of "correct" formulations; it is not a set-sub-set relationship. When one office worker says to another at the end of a coffee break, "Well, back to the salt mines," the rightness of the formulation is not precluded by the "incorrectness" of the term as a description of his work place. This is a direct parallel for place formulations to what Sacks calls "intentional mis-identification" for membership identification.

<sup>16</sup> This point is reminiscent of a classic concern of the sociology of knowledge. It has been part of the program of one approach in the sociology of knowledge that accounts, descriptions, theories, etc. are to be examined most importantly not with respect to the objects with which

they seek to come to terms, but with respect to the circumstances of the producers of the account, or its audience. To understand how some account comes to be offered, an investigator should look not to the objects being addressed; they will not explain the production of the account. It is to the circumstances of its production (its environing class structure, Zeitgeist, psychic states, cultural values, professional ambience, etc. in traditional studies) that one must look to understand its occurrence. I have argued here that formulations of location are used by reference to, and hence exhibit or "reflect," the situational or contextual features of their production. That a formulation is "correct" is, in this context, the least interesting of its features, for it would be equally true of a range of other formulations. Not any "correct" formulation will do. "Right" formulations are "right" in part by exhibiting the particulars of the situation of their use. These notes may then be read as bearing not only on issues in the study of conversational interaction, but also (if the two are separable) as an essay in the sociology of common sense knowledge. See Garfinkel, 1967, and, especially, Garfinkel and Sacks, 1969.

<sup>17</sup> Sacks, 1967, and forthcoming.

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