

Reflections on research on telephone conversation:

Issues of cross-cultural scope and scholarly
exchange, interactional import
and consequences*

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1. Openings in the company of openings

The contemporary literature on telephone conversation openings (and, on a smaller scale, closings),¹ with its characteristic preoccupation with issues of universality vs. cultural specificity, appears to have begun with Godard's (1977) response to my initial paper on "Sequencing in conversational openings" (1968). Although the "universalist" theme has been given amplified energy in the work of Hopper and his students (Hopper 1992; Hopper and Koleilat-Doany 1989; Hopper, Doany, Johnson and Drummond 1990/91; Hopper and Chen 1996), my effort to address the issue of cross-cultural scope raised by Godard (Schegloff 1986: 145–148) appears to have imparted more centrality to this theme than one might have wished; after all, it devoted only the last three pages out of forty to the issue. Quite a lot of ink has since been dedicated to this matter, involving an expanding set of languages and institutional contexts. A bit of commentary may be in order on the preoccupying theme of much of this literature.

Although there is a certain interest in exploring the commonality or variation of some activity, and its detailed implementation in talk, across cultural contexts, it should not be imagined (as sometimes appears to be the case) that variation *disappoints* the preceding literature and commonality *confirms* it. Whatever is, is. When we find settings where openings appear to be done differently, one question is whether the differences can nonetheless be understood by reference to a same or similar underlying structure, addressed to the same or similar issues posed for the interaction and/or its participants. For example, the four sequence types which showed up in my own work in this area (Schegloff

1968, 1979, 1986, 1993) — summons-answer sequences, identifications, greetings and how-are-yous — are addressed to particular organisational and interactional issues which appear to be generic to conversational openings, although neutralised in some settings. Where the surface appearance of openings is on the face of it different, we can ask whether, on the one hand, the parties nonetheless confront and work through the same issues in the opening, and in the same order, but do so differently, and if so what the consequences of those differences are, or whether, on the other hand, the very issues posed by opening a conversation on the telephone in that cultural or institutional setting are different.

The upshot of the literature so far, as I read it, is that the first of these alternatives is the case; but in exploring such differences as are found, the focus has been not so much on the consequences of the differences for the interaction itself as on the differences as indicative or symptomatic of divergent themes and features of the larger cultural context — which is quite a separate undertaking (ten Have 2002). What has happened in this literature is that openings have been disengaged from the conversations which they were opening — and which they were designed by their parties to open, and have been juxtaposed instead with other openings, drawn from different cultural settings. Openings in the company of systematically selected other openings (i.e. from different cultural or linguistic settings) have invited examination by reference to the relevancies built into that analytic frame — comparative cultural analysis. But these relevancies are/were not those of the *participants in the conversations in question* (only rarely have the data been drawn from the openings of “inter-cultural” conversations), but those of academicians for whom cultural differences were often their professional preoccupation. That leads to a second observation, with an implied re-orientation.

2. Openings in the company of their ensuing conversations

The second point that needs to be made is, I suppose, already accessible. The account of the organisation of openings often addressed in this literature (detailed in Schegloff 1986, in particular) was *not* developed in the first instance as a universal claim, or as a point of departure for such a search. Mainly this work was pursued because it often appeared that it was not possible properly to understand *subsequent* talk in a conversation without understanding what had happened in the opening. And understanding *that* required knowing what the parties had done as “a matter of course”, but also what they had done *over and*

above what is canonical for openings, or in a fashion *different* from the default forms for openings (if there are any), and also what they had *not* done.

Now many readers will, I hope, recognise in that phrase — “what they had *not* done” — a negative observation, and will know that such observations — in order to be analytically viable — must have their underlying relevance rules or relevance grounds made explicit. That is, a virtually indefinite set of things have *not* been done in any particular opening, so to assert the absence of something as a significant, noticeable, noticed, eventful, consequential *absence* requires establishing the relevance of the *occurrence* of that “something”. Once its relevant *occurrence* has been established, then its *absence* can be argued to be a relevant absence — an event in its own right, and something can be made of it analytically. So one main point of describing the structure of the openings was not for its own sake, but to establish the relevance rules that would allow analysts to claim that something was missing from some opening, and that that missingness might help understand subsequent developments in the conversation, even ones occurring quite a bit later. Let me be concrete.

Here are three openings which display variants on a single theme — that having in hand an empirically grounded account of the organisation of openings underwrites our capacity to recognise what other, later utterances are, and are doing, in ways which would otherwise not be (as) accessible.

Episode 1

The first is a conversation between two young women who grew up in a same neighborhood and once attended college together, but have apparently not talked for a while and appear to be drifting apart.

(1) TG, 1: 1–30

1 ((telephone rings))

2 Ava: H'llo:?

3 Bee: hHi,

4 Ava: Hi:?

5 Bee: hHowuh you:?

6 Ava: Oka::y?hh=

7 Bee: =Good.=Yihs[ou:nd] hh

8 Ava: [⟨I wan⟩' dih know if yih got a-uh:m

9 wutchimicawllit. A.: pah(hh)khing place °th's mornin'.hh

10 Bee: A pa:rking place,

- 11 Ava: Mm hm,
 12 (0.4)
 13 Bee: Wh_e:re.
 14 Ava: t! Oh: just any pla(h)ce? I wz jus' kidding yuh.
 15 Bee: Nno?=
 16 Ava: =[^o(No).]
 17 Bee: =[W h y] whhat'sa mattuh with y-Yih sou[nd HA:PPY,] hh
 18 Ava: [Nothing.]
 19 Ava: u- I sound ha:p[py?]
 20 Bee: [Yee]uh.
 21 (0.3)
 22 Ava: No;
 23 Bee: Nno:?
 24 Ava: No.
 25 (0.7)
 26 Bee: ·hh You[sound sorta] cheer[ful?]
 → 27 Ava: [^o(Any way).] [·hh]How'v you bee:n.
 28 Bee: ·hh Oh:: survi:ving I guess, hh[h!
 29 Ava: [That's good, how's (Bob),
 30 Bee: He's fine,
 31 Ava: Tha::t's good,

The call opens in canonical fashion: a summons-answer sequence (Schegloff 1968, 1986); a greeting (line 3) with which caller claims recognition of answerer and solicits reciprocal recognition from a minimal voice sample, a solicitation which is satisfied by the reciprocal minimal greeting (line 4) (Schegloff 1979: 35–37). Then there is a first how-are-you (line 5), the response to which (line 6) is delivered in a peculiarly lilting and stretched out manner, whose prosody overrides the neutrality of the lexical item composing the turn (Sacks 1975; Jefferson 1980; Schegloff 1986), so that the response is first receipted with a “good,” but is apparently to be followed by a further observation about the answerer’s positive frame of mind — the “Y’sound” at line 7 which, after abandonment in the face of overlapping talk, is resumed and brought to completion at line 17. In between, however, talk by the recipient of the first how-are-you does not reciprocate that inquiry, but pursues other opening-relevant interactional themes which cannot be developed here. When, at line 17, Bee resumes the “y’sound happy” line, it has now been somewhat removed from the how-are-you sequence which engendered it. Nonetheless, once the disagreement with

“sounding happy” has been met with a backdown and allowed to pass as “sorta cheerful,” at line 27 we find a new sequence start, “How’ve you been.”

So here is the reciprocal inquiry, but in a variant form. Note first that it is where it ought to be. However delayed by the sequence concerning “parking spaces” (lines 8–16), and by the proffered and rejected characterisation as “happy” and its resolution (lines 19–26), this inquiry comes in the turn after completion of the resumed and expanded version of the first how-are-you sequence. That is part of what underlies our recognition of it as the reciprocal inquiry, even though the form and composition of the utterance are actually somewhat different.

Once we see that this is the reciprocal that had not occurred right after the initial how-are-you and its response, we can ask whether the variant implementation of this action is itself doing something. Although I cannot undertake here to document this, I submit that “How have you been” (at line 27) is the long-time-no-see version of how-are-you, that is, a version that builds into its constitution that this conversation is occurring after a longer lapse than has been customary between conversations for these parties, and therefore that what is being inquired about may be slightly different — not just what the current state of the interlocutor is, but what her state during the intervening interval has been. And the response, “Oh surviving I guess” may be seen as sensitive to that design (see also the analysis of this utterance in Jefferson 1980 and in Heritage 1998).

Episode 2

The second opening is from a conversation which has contributed data to a number of papers in the literature on conversation (Schegloff 1988, 1992, 1997 *inter alia*). Tony and Marsha are a divorced or separated couple, she living in Southern California, he in Northern California. Their teenaged son, Joey, lives with his father, but has been visiting his mother in the south over a long holiday weekend. He was to have driven home on the day in question. Tony has called Marsha, and the call begins like this.

- (2a) MDE, Stolen, 1:1–7
- 1 ((telephone rings))
 - 2 Marsha: Hello:?
 - 3 Tony: H_i: Marsha?
 - 4 Marsha: Ye:ah.
 - 5 Tony: How are you.
 - 6 Marsha: Fi::ne.
 - 7 (0.2)

So where are we? Or, rather, where were they? What is that silence (at line 7)? Who is relevantly not talking there? And what are they relevantly not saying or doing?

After the telephone's summoning ring (line 1) and Marsha's answer at line 2, Tony uses a canonical form to show his recognition of answerer and invite reciprocal recognition *by* answerer, and by including a greeting in his first turn, he provides a ready resource and a shaping constraint for answerer's preferred response — a greeting in return with some evidence of mutual recognition of caller, such as an address term. Although Marsha resists this constraint and does not respond canonically (there is no greeting term in return, for example), her “Ye:ah,” in the decisiveness of its prosody (note both the downward inflection and its ending with final intonation), conveys no uncertainty about who the caller is. That Tony hears it this way, or finds himself constrained to hear it this way, is displayed in his next turn (at line 5), where he does not go on to self-identify, as is common in such contexts when there has been no overt display of recognition. He moves to the next canonical sequence, the how-are-you sequence, and delivers it with a prosody designed for first inquiries in a reciprocal exchange — with the stress on the “are” (Schegloff 1998a: 244). Marsha responds to the inquiry, again in a decisive manner. And stops.

On the one hand, she has delivered a recognisably complete turn, constructed from a single, lexical turn-constructional unit, with turn-final prosody, in a sequential context in which it can deliver a recognisably complete action — an answer to the preceding question. In these respects, with the turn possibly complete, the silence which follows could be understood as Tony's — the product of Tony not starting a next turn. What would that next turn be? One possibility is his uptake of her reply, often done with some evaluation term. How-are-you sequences often come in three turn sequences: “how-are-you”; “OK”; “That's good” (as in (1), lines 5–7, 27–29, 29–31). So one thing Tony could be properly doing here is receipting Marsha's response. But there is another alternative.

As the caller, Tony has a default right, and responsibility, for initiating first topic, and, in particular, the reason for the call. If it is he who should be talking and he is not, one thing he may relevantly not be doing — and one thing that Marsha is arguably awaiting — is articulating the reason for the call. And what might that be? From Marsha's point of view, the announcement that Joey has reached home.

We know from the latter part of this conversation that Marsha has asked Joey to call when he reaches home; she tells Tony (see lines 67–68 in (2b) below), “I did a:sk him tuh call me when 'e go:t i:n.” Although Tony does not yet know this

at this point in the call, Marsha does know she has said it to Joey, and she can be oriented to a telephone call from this household as informing her of Joey's safe arrival. The telephone rings at a time compatible with Joey having reached home; she thinks it is him. It is not, it is Tony. Surely it is Tony calling on behalf of Joey to report his arrival.² And indeed, when Tony does not talk in this silence and it is Marsha who breaks it, she does so with the inquiry, "Did Joey get home yet?"

On the other hand, although Marsha has indeed delivered an utterance so composed as to constitute a recognisable complete turn, and one which delivers the conditionally relevant response to the preceding inquiry, there can be a good reason for Tony *not* to speak next there — not to receipt Marsha's response and not to advance to the "reason for the call" move which regularly comes after closure of the opening. For how-are-you sequences normatively are organised in reciprocal pairs: when A has initiated one to B, B reciprocates. And one common place for the reciprocal to be done is as a second turn constructional unit after the response to the first how-are-you. So what Tony could be accountably awaiting at line 7 is Marsha's reciprocal how-are-you. Indeed, as we learn *later* but the parties both know *from the outset*, Tony has just returned from a trip, and so what may be relevant here is not a generic reciprocal how-are-you, but a recipient-designed, and occasion-specific version of such an inquiry, for example, "how was the trip?"³

When Marsha's inquiry, "Did Joey get home yet?" is met by Tony's "Well I wz wondering when 'e left," and by Marsha's launching of her telling in response, the occurrence of a reciprocal how-are-you by Marsha to Tony is preempted. Here then is a substantial chunk of the conversation which ensues, including again the opening which we have been sketching.

(2b) MDE, Stolen, 1:1–70

- 1 ((telephone rings))
- 2 Marsha: Hello;?
- 3 Tony: Hi; Marsha?
- 4 Marsha: Ye:ah.
- 5 Tony: How are you.
- 6 Marsha: Fi::ne.
- 7 (0.2)
- 8 Marsha: Did Joey get home yet?
- 9 Tony: Well I wz wondering when 'e left.
- 10 (0.2)
- 11 Marsha: ·hhh Uh:(d) did Oh: .h Yer not in on what ha:ppen'.(hh)(d)
- 12 Tony: No(h)o=

- 13 Marsha: =He's flying.
 14 (0.2)
- 15 Marsha: En Ilene is going to meet im: Becuz the to:p wz ripped
 16 off'v iz car which is tih say someb'ddy helped th'mselfs.
 17 Tony: Stolen.
 18 (0.4)
- 19 Marsha: Stolen. =Right out in front of my house.
 20 Tony: Oh: f'r crying out loud, =en eez not g'nna eez not
 21 g'nna bring it ba:ck?
 22 Marsha: ·hh No so it's parked in the g'rage cz it wz so damn
 23 co:ld. An' ez a }matter fact< snowing on the Ridge Route.
 24 (0.3)
- 25 Marsha: ·hhh So I took him to the airport he couldn' buy a ticket.
 26 (·)
- 27 Marsha: ·hhhh Bee- he c'd only get on standby.
 28 (0.3)
- 29 Tony: Uh hu: [h,
 30 Marsha: [En I left him there et about: noo:n.
 31 (0.3)
- 32 Tony: Ah ha:h.
 33 (0.2)
- 34 Marsha: Ayund uh,h
 35 (0.2)
- 36 Tony: W't's 'e g'nna do go down en pick it up later? er
 37 somethin like () [well that's aw]:ful
 38 Marsha: [H i s friend]
- 39 Marsha: Yeh h[is friend Stee-]
 40 Tony: [That really makes] me ma:d,
 41 (0.2)
- 42 Marsha: ·hhh Oh it's disgusti[ng ez a matter a'f]:ct.
 43 Tony: [P o o r J o e y ,]
- 44 Marsha: I- I, I told my ki:ds. who do this: down et the Drug
 45 Coalition ah want th'to:p back.h {·hhhhhhhhh/(1.0)}
 46 SEND OUT the WO:RD.hhh hnh
 47 (0.2)
- 48 Tony: Yeah.
- 49 Marsha: ·hhh Bu:t u-hu:ghh his friend Steve en Brian er driving
 50 up. Right after:: (0.2) school is out.En then hi'll

- 51 drive do:wn here with the:m.
 52 Tony: Oh I see.
 53 Marsha: So: in the long run, ·hhh (it-)/(ih-) (·) probly's gonna
 54 save a liddle time 'n: (·) energy.
 55 Tony: Okay,
 56 Marsha: But Ie:ne probably (0.8) is either at the airport er
 57 waiting tuh hear fr'm im, eess
 58 (0.7)
 59 Tony: O:kay.
 → 60 Marsha: ·hhhh So: yer ba:ck.
 61 Tony: Yah.
 62 (1.0)
 63 Marsha: I see. So you'll- you'll hear fr'm im,
 64 (0.2)
 65 Tony: Oka:y, well: if there's any prob'm w'l letche know. But
 66 I'm sure he'll be here ok[ay.
 67 Marsha: [Yeh I did a:sk him tuh call me
 68 when 'e go:t i:n [I-
 69 Tony: [O:kay
 70 Marsha: Bu:t it wasn't too crowded when we go:t there, so,
 71 (0.9)

First, then, there is a stretch of talk (lines 11–35) organised around Marsha's telling about how Joey comes to be travelling differently — and later — than planned. A sequence follows (lines 36–55) largely addressed to Tony's concern about provision for the car being returned to Northern California, ending with his acceptance of the proposed course of action (line 55), and then his acceptance (line 59) of Marsha's reassurance (lines 56–57) about provision for Joey's reaching home from the airport. Those acceptances mark closure of the extended sequence with its post-expansions which began with Marsha's inquiry at line 8, and the hearable in-breath which follows (line 60) marks a boundary between that activity and the next. What *is* the next?

“So you're back.” What is that, and why is it here? Indeed, where is “here”? One way of characterising this turn position and juncture in the conversation is “the first turn position after the sequence of sequences set in motion by Marsha's inquiry, ‘Did Joey get home yet?’” — the turn whose ensuing trajectory preempted a reciprocal inquiry to Tony's “How are you” at line 5. Alerted as we now are to that sequentially relevant but absent reciprocal, we are in a position

to register “So you’re back” as the delayed appearance of that reciprocal — indeed, the recipient-designed, and occasion-specific realisation of that inquiry which was discussed earlier. With it, Marsha displays (albeit tardily) her awareness of, and orientation to, recent events in the life of her interlocutor which in principle compose part of the domain which such inquiries may be understood to topicalise, or to proffer the opportunity to topicalise.

We may note that the form which Marsha employs for this purpose does not offer an inquiry but an observation, registers not the occasion or itinerary of the trip but its conclusion, etc. In that sense, while in form doing the job which such inquiries are designed to do — afford an opportunity for interlocutor to raise matters of priority, etc. — it does so in what is perhaps the least open way available. While allowing Tony to use the occasion to develop topic talk on that line, it does not particularly encourage his doing so. His response is in keeping with such an understanding, and the sequence is brought to closure with about as minimal a development as can be imagined, after which (at line 63) talk which begins to move toward closure of the call is developed (cf. for example, the repetition of “hear from him”).

My point here has been a simple one. To understand the placement, resonance, trajectory and aftermath of this utterance, “So, you’re back,” we need to be analytically armed to register — *with warrant* — the absence of a reciprocal how-are-you type inquiry in the opening; to recognise orderly variants of that class of inquiries, recipient designed for the circumstances of particular conversations and their participants; to recognise this utterance as such a variant, positioned aptly by reference to the sequence structure of the talk since the place where the reciprocal was missing; and to see the interactional import of the delayed realisation of the sequence. This utterance turns out to be not merely something incidentally occasioned by another’s having returned from a trip. It occupies a highly orderly position in this conversation, one displaced from its ordinary canonical locus.

Episode 3

The third sequence is from a conversation between a young woman and her somewhat older brother. Here is how it begins:

- (3) Joyce and Stan, 1:1–23
 - 1 ((telephone rings))
 - 2 ((receiver lifted))
 - 3 J: Hullo:;

- 4 S: pt Hi Joyce, it's Stan.
 5 J: Hi Stan,=
 6 S: =Hi can you hear me okay?⟨' cause the record player's on.
 7 J: O:h yea:h, I hear you fi:n[e.
 8 S: [Okay good.
 9 S: hh First of all how' (s)/(d) that thing turn out with the ticket.
 10 Dju: anything happen?
 11 (0.4)
 12 J: Oh, I just decided ta pay it.
 13 S: Decide(d) ta pay how much was it;
 14 J: Fifteen fifty.
 15 S: Fifteen fifty?
 16 J: Mm hm,
 17 (0.2)
 18 S: Bitch. Bitch.
 19 J: I(h) kn(h)owh [h
 20 S: [I guess it would ye you figured out finally
 21 found out it'd be too much ha:ssle ta take care of it.
 22 J: hh I figu:red (0.4) in order: I would just haf tig- make two
 23 trips down there;

Here again the conversation begins with the summons-answer sequence (lines 1–3), and a greeting sequence which serves as the vehicle for an identification/recognition sequence as well (lines 4–6). Where an exchange of how-are-you sequences might have gone, however, we find an uncommon inquiry, which is nonetheless fitted to its occurrence in the opening. Recall that the business of the summons-answer sequence is the establishment of a viable medium for talk and the availability of an interlocutor to be reached through it. Then note that this inquiry is directed as well to this issue — in particular the viability of the channel, and the non-canonical status of the inquiry is registered by making it accountable (“cause the record player’s on”).

And that is followed by “First of all how’d that thing turn out with the ticket.” Instead of a generalised inquiry which would provide for the recipient to select the terms by reference to which it would be answered, here Stan picks a specific matter in the biography of the other to inquire about. On the one hand this is constraining in a way in which the how-are-you inquiry is not. On the other hand, with it the inquirer can display an orientation to who-in-particular the other is and what is going on in the life of that other; it constitutes, that is,

a show of recipient design (as did the inquiry about a “parking place” in (1) and about “Joey’s arrival” in (2). As well, the “First of all” may be understood to project that the caller has called with a specific reason for the call, but that the matter prefaced with “First of all” is not that reason, and is being raised *before* that reason. In fact, the “paying the ticket” discussion leads to a number of other “preliminary” bits of topic talk before Stan introduces the reason for the call, which is a request for advice on where to shop for various items he wishes to purchase — a hat and sandals.

(4) Joyce and Stan, 3: 23–31

- 1 S: ·hhhh Well the main reason I called ya up Jess was ta
 2 as:k yer uh:: advice on two little matters:uh.
 3 (0.4)
 4 S: I might be goin’ shopping either tomorrow er Saturday an’ I’m
 5 what I’m lookin’ for is a couple a things.=)I thought maybe you
 6 might have some suggestions where I could find it.
 7 J: O:kay,
 8 S: First of all: I’m lookin’ for: a pair a sa:ndles;(0.7) and a
 9 hat.

The discussion of these items and where to seek them out, including considerable resistance on Stan’s part to Joyce’s suggestions, occupies several pages of transcript, and is brought to a close in the following exchange.

(5) Joyce and Stan, 7:23–8:02

- 1 J: °Yeh- Well- (.) if you wanna take a little ri:de
 2 you might find it somewhere in Hollywood?
 3 (0.8)
 4 S: °Hollywood.
 5 (1.3)
 6 S: Oh well, nah I don’t really like ta go into Hollywood (it’sa)
 7 hard ta pa:rk,
 8 (1.0)
 9 J: [°Mm,
 10 S: [-hhhhh We:ll okay: at’s about all I wannid tuh (0.7) bug you
 11 with.(tod[ay].
 12 J: [uhhahhahh ·hh Okay Stan;,
 → 13 S: So are ↑you okay?
 14 J: Yeah, (0.4) um: (0.2) whatta ya doing like: s: late Saturday
 15 afternoo:n.

Here as elsewhere (as noted above), Stan is a less-than-enthusiastic receiver of Joyce's advice (lines 1–9), and then (at lines 10–11) he launches the closing section of the conversation, and Joyce aligns with his move, both by laughing at his self-deprecation (“bug you with”), thereby declining to take it seriously, and by her compliance token (“okay”). Note that the first thing done after this apparent convergence on proceeding to close the conversation is “So are you okay?” I limit myself to a few observations.

1. A move has been made to close a conversation in which there was no exchange of how-are-yous though they are relevant for this pair of interlocutors.
2. “So are you okay?” is a candidate member of the class of inquiries of which how-are-you is the default or unmarked member.
3. This then represents a move to have done such an inquiry before closing the conversation, closing having already been made the relevant activity (at lines 10–11).
4. This version of the inquiry does not ask, “how are you?” but picks a value of the answer-set, “okay,” the value whose sequential consequence is non-expansion of the sequence (Sacks 1975; Jefferson 1980; Schegloff 1986), and formulates a yes/no question about it. For this question, “yes” is the preferred response in two respects: with respect to the question form, it is the agreeing response; with respect to the action being implemented, a “yes” will allow the activity underway — closing — to be advanced.
5. Then note that Joyce's reply a) delivers the “yes” which the inquiry prefers, but b) delivers it with a non-final prosody (indicated by the comma) which precludes treating it as actionably complete. In fact, in the (0.4) second silence which follows, Stan does *not* begin a next turn, and Joyce in fact proceeds to launch a new sequence — a request sequence — an expanded version of which is developed by the parties before the activity of closing is resumed and brought to completion.

Here again, then, understanding what is transpiring later in the conversation, here within its closing section, is tied to features of its opening, including evidence that the parties have retained throughout the conversation an orientation to the absence in the opening of a how-are-you sequence, and the relevance of introducing such a sequence before closing the conversation.^{4,5}

Upshot

The point is that examining openings in Japanese or Korean (or French or Greek or Arabic, etc.) is relevant not only — not even in the first instance —

to challenge or confirm claims about the trans-cultural relevance of accounts of American openings. Rather, the primary relevance is to establish the grounds for analysts working on Japanese or Korean (or French or Greek or Arabic) telephone conversation material to understand the interactional import of what has occurred in an opening of a particular conversation in its own terms, and to understand the legacy of that opening for subsequent developments, that is, understanding events in the opening that may have consequences for understanding what happens elsewhere in that conversation because, for the parties, the subsequent course of the conversation may take its import from, or be informed by, what occurred in the opening or did not, and the subsequent course of the conversation may be the place to deal with that “legacy”.⁶

3. Back to openings across cultural contexts

There is another matter I would like to take up which is of general import, though it is perhaps of special concern in opening-specific material because of the density of interactional issues found there, and because of the characteristic sparseness of the linguistic resources deployed to deal with them. The matter concerns glossing and translation. Let me take this up with specific materials from one of the papers in this volume. (Almost certainly the issue comes up in other chapters as well, but the glossing practices employed in them do not allow me to see where and how they are posed.)

In example (8) in Yong-Yae Park’s paper (2002) she renders the caller’s first turn as “Is this Hyenceng?”, for the Korean glossed as “oh Hyenceng CP INTERR.” The issue here is this.

In American openings, there is a big difference between saying — as the caller’s first utterance to answerer — “Is this Hyenceng?” on the one hand, and “Hyenceng?” on the other. The first can be heard to display a serious problem of recognition;⁷ the second need not, but can be used to provide an opportunity for the *answerer* to recognise the *caller* (as in line 3 in (2a) and (2b) above, or (6), (9), (10) or (11) below; cf. Schegloff 1979 :47–61). This can be especially serious if — as in this case — the persons are close, and can expect to be recognised by the other, indeed are *entitled* to be so recognised; in Yong-Yae Park’s data they are sisters. So there is a special burden here on workers on materials from a non-Anglo-Saxon language and culture, writing about phenomena already described for Anglo-America nor Indo-European settings. That burden is that, if the work is to be reported in English, the text and the translation

needs to be rendered in a fashion sensitive not only to the detail and nuance of the material being studied in its language-of-occurrence, but also sensitive to the detail and nuance in comparable English language interactions as revealed in the already extant literature.⁸

In Park's paper, for example, in (8), what exactly is the import of the "INTERR" marker in this position in the opening? How should it best be rendered so as to converge with what appears to be the cognate "move" in American or British materials, or to show that what is getting done in the Korean or the Japanese is *different* from what is getting done in the English? And there can be, of course, quite new things in the Japanese or Korean (or the French or Greek or Arabic) openings. That is why pursuing work on Japanese or Korean or other language/cultural materials with an open and fresh mind is so important.

So this is a related issue. Not only must the material be rendered to catch the right "equivalencies" or "comparabilities" in English-language material without over-reaching to do so, and to avoid incorrect equivalencies; it must find ways of bringing to attention usages with no counterpart at all in English language material. Of course, these are little discoveries, or big ones, and are just what research is about in the first place. We learn from other cultural/linguistic materials about possibilities not present in prior work at all.

One example of such a new finding is provided by Park's account of the bearing of the particles *kedo* and *nuntey* as elements of self-identification in Japanese and Korean openings respectively. It is the relevance of these particles as markers of a projected next action which ordinarily follows directly — either reason for the call or switchboard request — that we can see underlying the consequences when *no* ensuing action is in fact articulated. A next action having been made relevant by the particle and then withheld, these usages make relevant the recipient's *guessing* — and especially anticipating and *acting on* — what the projected action was. In this finding, the accountable absence of the ensuing action is made apparent, together with its import for the interaction. But then it turns out that the *kedo* or *nuntey* *itself* can be accountably absent, with the import that the entire business of projecting a reason for the call is made not relevant, because that is not the basis for the call's initiation. In one sense, there is nothing quite like this in prior accounts of telephone openings that I am familiar with; in another sense, the organisational practice is familiar: something is taken to be a relevant occurrence (either canonically or occasioned by some action taken by a participant), and its subsequent non-occurrence (should that happen) thereby becomes accountable, eventful, consequential for the ensuing course of the talk. What is special here is the way in

which a particle can become the instrument by which this little structure gets triggered, and, even more reflexively, the absence of that triggering particle itself becomes of consequential import for the following course of the interaction.

We see here, then, more than evidence on the universality or variance in this or that realisation of openings. We see the interactional consequence of proceeding one way or another, in which the *absence* of components can be seen to be *as* much an action as their *presence*. Here, then, we are dealing with an amalgam of the two lines of inquiry touched on above; for the cross-cultural and cross-linguistic juxtaposition is focussed on precisely in order to get clear about the interactional import of some practice of talk in the opening in its own right and in its bearing on the subsequent trajectory of the conversation. It would be a welcome development in future work in this area if investigators who have been able to specify dimensions of variation or alternative forms of realisation in this or that cultural context (as is the case in several chapters in this volume) could go on to explore and specify the import of some form not, in the first instance, by contrast to what is done in other cultures *but as a type of move-in-interaction within the culture in which it is found*.

4. Describing previously undescribed components of openings

Several distinct steps might compose such contributions. First, formulating the practice of talking which constitutes the distinctive form of conduct found in openings of telephone conversations in country/culture X;⁹ and second, the action or alternative actions which this practice of talking can implement, however specified by situational particulars. In some instances such findings would link particular lexical choices with the stances or actions which they index or implement (as in the proposal that the form of how-are-you-type inquiry realised as “How have you been” is a practice for registering a notably long time since these parties have talked). In others, utterance-types not commonly found in openings, or not canonical components of them, are not just noted, but are analysed for what action they implement in the opening, and with what potential sequential and interactional consequences for the conversation.

Specimen 1

To offer just a reduced sample, consider the proposal (Schegloff 1986 :143–144) that “Did I wake you?” and its variants can serve as a “pre-apology.” Note first that,

from the outset, more is involved than simply registering the occurrence of utterances of this form in the opening, with a candidate interpretation. Its sequential relationship to apologising is an empirical matter, being grounded both in contingent apologies packed into a single turn in a single exchange, as at lines 5–6 in (6):

- (6) Charlie (Openings, #173)
 1 ((telephone rings))
 2 Charlie: Hello?
 3 Caller: Charlie?
 4 Charlie: Yeah?
 → 5 Caller: Hey, listen, I'm sorry if I woke ya.
 → 6 Charlie: ['s all right.
 7 Caller: [Hey-
 8 Caller: Hey, listen, uh eh, what's ...

and in the sequentialisation of the association into a pre-apology and a contingent apology in its aftermath, as in (7) at lines 3 and 5.

- (7) CDHQ (Openings, #328)
 1 ((telephone rings))
 2 Mrs W.: Hello-o? ((sleepy voice))
 → 3 Mr W.: Yeh did I wake yih up?
 → 4 Mrs W.: Yea:h.
 → 5 Mr W: Sorry gal.
 6 Mrs W.: That's- (O.K. Doll),

Here, when the pre-apology inquiry gets an affirmative answer, an apology follows.¹⁰

But implicated as well are what such an utterance reveals about its sources and what it projects as its contingent consequences. For example, such utterances can register and display (and on occasion make explicit) the caller's hearing of some anomalous quality in answerer's voice in the answerer's first turn(s), as in (8) and (9), or, under other contextual circumstances, it can register the caller's awareness of the unusual social time of day at which the call has been initiated (as in (6) above), etc.

- (8) MTRAC, 90–2
 1 ((telephone rings))
 2 Marcia: Hullo?
 → 3 Reah: (Hi.) Did I wake you up?
 4 Marcia: No.

- 5 (0.8)
 6 Reah: Are you sure,
 7 (1.5)
 8 Marcia: (Well,)_ hhuh huh huh .hh
 9 (0.5)
 10 Reah: 's this Marcia?
 11 Marcia: Yeah
 12 Reah: (Howayou,)
 13 Marcia: Yeah. You did not wake me up Reah.
 → 14 Reah: Oh your voice sounds different.

or

- (9) Wong: NNS, 3
 1 ((telephone rings))
 2 Recipient: Hello,
 3 Caller: Tch! Hi Mei Fang?
 4 Recipient: (Hmm?)
 5 Caller: This is Joan Wright.
 6 Recipient: Hi. [How are you.
 → 7 Caller: [Did I wake you up?
 8 (0.4)
 9 Recipient: No.
 10 (0.2)
 → 11 Caller: Oh: you soun:ded as if [you might have been (0.2) resting.
 12 Recipient: [(no really)
 13 (0.2)
 → 14 Recipient: I have a cold.
 15 Caller: Oh:::
 16 (0.4)

(8) and (9) make clear that the initiation of the “Did I wake you?” sequence is grounded in heard features of the answerer’s voice, and whereas affirmation of the waking is readily believed and acted on, denial of the waking is doubted, the asking of the question is grounded in the answerer’s “sound”, and the matter is not let go until the sound is otherwise accounted for.

Such displays of “possible occasioning” implicate future trajectories of interaction, and those can have their own more or less complicated structures of relevancy. For example, “Did I wake you up?” *as a question* makes an answer relevant next. *As a pre-apology* it makes relevant next responses which will

either promote development of the sequence to an apology or will block such a development. In the aftermath of such an utterance, then, delivery of a response is complicated by the “cross-cutting preferences” introduced by the inquiry — a preference for agreement with respect to the question, and a preference for disagreement with respect to the pre-apology (as agreement would promote the relevance of proceeding to an apology, which is otherwise a dispreferred action). In fact, the reluctance of answerers to confirm having been awakened by reference to this dispreference for promoting the apology can be seen not only in the suspicion with which it is received (as in (8) and (9)), but in responses which say “no” but follow with a (presumably superfluous) reassurance that “it’s all right”, as in (10):

- (10) Charlie (Openings, #171)
- 1 ((telephone rings))
 - 2 Charlie: Hello.
 - 3 Judy: Hello, Charlie?
 - 4 Charlie: Yeah?
 - 5 Judy: Did- I wake you up?
 - 6 Charlie: No. It’s all right.
 - 7 Judy: Oh, okay. No I did you call earlier today?

Or ones in which the response is made contingent on the time of day, which, of course, is irrelevant to the facts of the matter (11).

- (11) Charlie (Openings, #157)
- 1 ((telephone rings))
 - 2 Charlie: Hello?
 - 3 Naomi: Charlie?
 - 4 Charlie: Yeah.
 - 5 Naomi: Di- I wake ya- up?
 - 6 Charlie: I don’ know. [What time is it.
 - 7 Naomi: [Huh
 - 8 Naomi: It’s noon.

What the preceding paragraphs have offered is a sketchy outline of the sequential and interactional import of this utterance, “Did I wake you up?”, and the line of action it introduces into an opening. Having such accounts of the assertedly distinctive components of openings in previously undescribed settings (whether culturally or otherwise formulated), however sketchy as long as they were empirically grounded in detailed transcripts of recorded data, would

substantially advance our understanding of the trajectories of interaction in openings of different sorts, and would dramatically deepen our understanding of what such differences tell us about cultural differences. For they would replace the analyst's often impressionistic and interpretive account of the cultural import of some element of an opening with *the import it demonstrably has for the participants in the interaction in which it occurred*. Even for the purposes of cultural analysis, this is a deeper, more consequential, increment to our understanding, and it is one grounded in the actual experience of members of the culture *enacting* and *embodying* the culture, rather than reflecting on it. (For a related argument concerned with critical discourse analysis and critical theorising more generally, cf. Schegloff, 1997 and the ensuing exchanges, Wetherell 1998; Schegloff 1998b; Billig 1999a, 1999b; Schegloff 1999a, 1999b.)

Specimen 2

There is another set of practices in the opening which was treated in the dissertation in which many of these themes were first taken up (Schegloff 1967), but which has not (as far as I know) come to more general attention. The following exchanges exemplify this practice (no ring is shown because none can be heard):

- (12) IND:PD (Schegloff 1967: 192)
- 1 Dispatch: Police Desk
 - 2 Caller: Uh Joe
 - 3 Dispatch: Yeah
 - 4 Caller: This uh this is ...
- (13) IND:PD (Schegloff 1967: 222)
- 1 Dispatch: Police Desk
 - 2 Caller: Johnny?
 - 3 Dispatch: No, this is Jerry.
- (14) IND:PD (Schegloff 1967: 232)
- 1 Dispatch: Police Desk
 - 2 Caller: Hey Art? (0.?) Is this Schrenken?
 - 3 Dispatch: Yes
 - 4 Caller: Uh Jerry?
 - 5 Dispatch: Yeah
 - 6 Caller: This is Dick uh Tanner
 - 7 Dispatch: Yeah Dick

Openings of this sort were treated in a chapter entitled “Transformations”,¹¹ and they resisted subsequent efforts to prepare them for publication. In retrospect, this was because, at the time, no account had yet been developed of the identification/recognition practices in ordinary (i.e., non-institutionally specific) telephone openings (of the sort eventually developed in Schegloff 1979), an account which would have provided resources for — or at least context for — the analysis of sequences like those exemplified in (12) to (14) above. Still, a rudimentary account may be worth sketching here, for its surprising relevance to other recent work.

In brief, the argument offered in Schegloff 1967 was along the following lines. The organisational self-identification in answerer’s first turn (in my data at the time, “Police Desk, Can I help you?”), some version of which is characteristic in business and other institutional contexts (in the United States and in many other cultural contexts) introduces a default formulation and virtual account not only of who *has been* reached, but of whom the caller *was trying* to reach. More specifically and accurately, it embodies a virtual account of the auspices under which the caller engaged in those actions — e.g., dialling a particular number — which caused this telephone to ring etc.¹² What this form of answer in effect established as the terms under which the talk was to proceed was that the speaker at that end of the interaction was — from the indefinitely large set of possible ways of characterising him — one who was manning the “police desk,” to “help” citizen callers. Several points played off this observation.

First, although one issue hovering over the first moments of such a conversation concerned whether the caller had reached “the intended party” in the sense of the mechanically right telephone number, attached to a telephone in the right place, etc., it turns out that another issue was involved which sounds closely related but is in fact importantly distinct. And that is whether the caller has reached the right party *in the right and relevant sense* — a party grasped under the right auspices. The “Police Desk” answer of the telephone confirmed not only that the right telephone had rung, but that a member of the right category of answerer had answered, one oriented to that category membership as the one relevant for undertaking interaction of the sort which was presumed to have engendered the event in the first place.

Second, as implied at the end of the prior paragraph, with this self-identification, and its introduction and confirmation of an “identity” for the answerer, went a correlative “identity” for the caller. By reference to Sacks’s account of membership categorisation devices (Sacks 1972a, 1972b), this could be understood by reference to the so-called “consistency rule” (Sacks 1972a: 33–34; 1972b: 333).

A first person to be categorised having been categorised with a term from the categorisation device “police/citizen”, the central category made relevant for the other person to be categorised was some category from the same categorisation device, and the default in this respect was “citizen (complainant)”.

All of this was generally “invisible” (in the sense of not occupying distinct elements of the talk) because, overwhelmingly, callers had indeed come to call in the presupposed way, had found the police self-identification confirmatory of their orientation to the occasion, and accepted the implied (or “altercasted”, Weinstein and Deutschberger 1963) identity for themselves as relevant and in point. However, in instances in which the callers were *not* calling qua complainants, and were *not* calling the answerers qua helpers, but rather were, to cite one example, also police personnel calling a colleague or a friend, and in *that* capacity, these default understandings turned out to be problematic. The sequences exemplified in (12) to (14) above appear to be designed to transform the categorical relevancies introduced into these incipient conversations as early as possible, because different categorical identities made relevant different recipient design constraints and different appropriate turn designs and sequential and interactional trajectories.

We now recognise a caller’s use of an address term for answerer in caller’s first turn as a common practice in so-called “personal” telephone conversations (a) for displaying caller’s recognition of answerer at first possible opportunity, i.e. after first voice sample, and (b) for displaying by choice of address term as putatively recipient-designed, elements of the relationship between caller and answerer, and (c) for providing a voice sample from which answerer might recognise caller and display that recognition in the next turn (Schegloff 1979, 1986). It is worth mentioning that these observations remain in point after answerer first turns which are composed of individual or household self-identification, where that is the default cultural practice. But when placed after an *organisational* self-identification, as in the case of the police, this line of continuation *diverges* from the default stance embodied in the answerer’s first turn, and embodies the launching of an alternative tack. The alternative embodied when the address term is a first — or “given” — name is one formulated by reference to “personal relationship” as the relevant categorisation device, rather than professional/client or organisation/public.

Note as well that the use of address term as a candidate identification of answerer operates at more than one level. Its proximate or “surface” sequential import is as a candidate identification, a sequence initiation (or “first pair part”) making relevant in next turn a confirmation (the “preferred” response) or rejection + correction of the proffered candidate identification. But in vali-

dating as correct the identification proffered by the address term, the answerer validates as well the shift in categorisation device under whose auspices the ensuing conversation is to be realised, and thereby collaborates in the transformation of the categorical infrastructure of the interaction.

What has prompted my “exhuming” of this aspect of my work on openings of telephone conversations from its almost thirty five year long obscurity? It is the surprisingly similar issue of the *language* in which the interaction is to be conducted which is the focus of Rasmussen and Wagner (2002). The language of the interaction is, in general, even more deeply presupposed than the categorical identifications of the participants. Indeed, in the vast majority of conversations, this tacit relevancy is unlikely ever to surface at all. It is the development of both technology and international trade which underlies the potential for this otherwise tacit matter to become contingent in the materials examined by Rasmussen and Wagner, and this contingency’s relevance surfaces — as does the relevance of having reached the right party, and under the right categorical auspices — in the first turns of the conversation. I wish only to note that although these early turns appear to differ from the ones in the police calls which I studied (for example, in the Rasmussen and Wagner materials, each party offers a full or partial *self*-identification and not, as in my materials, a candidate identification of the other), in both settings a) the answerer’s initial turn sets the default for the conversation,¹³ b) the caller may align with that default in the ensuing turns, or c) the caller may undertake to change the language, though when it is language which is being changed rather than categorial relevance, the move seems to be realised in an otherwise-relevant next turn being produced in the proposed alternative language (as in Rasmussen and Wagner 2002, example (7), line 6), rather than by the launching of a sequence aimed to stabilise alternative terms of reference for the parties, as in the police data.

Or so it appears. In retrospect, however, it may be remarked that the accounts developed in my 1979 paper on “identification and recognition” are consequential precisely in permitting a revision of this view. In 1965–67, these little sequences following the organisational self-identification by the police looked like sequences specially devoted to transforming the categorical infrastructure of the incipient conversation. The 1979 paper showed that callers’ first turns composed of an address term for the “heard answerer” constituted one canonical practice for caller’s co-constructing the identification-and/ or-recognition work in the openings of “personal” telephone conversations. Although this practice of talking *is* transforming (if subsequent talk is aligned with it), it is not a “transformation sequence”.¹⁴ It is an “identification/recognition sequence”

which, when placed after an organisational self-identification in which personal identity has no place, has the effect of transforming the participant-identification terms of the interaction.

If this is the case, then both changes in language (of the sort described by Rasmussen and Wagner) and changes in categorical infrastructure may be understood as being introduced by simply starting to use “the-thereby-proposed-alternative”, rather than by the launching of a special sequence designed to do “transformation”. There, then, is just the kind of gain to be realised by undertaking detailed, empirically grounded accounts of practices of talk-in-interaction — in telephone conversation opening as elsewhere in talk-in-interaction. What had appeared in 1967 a cogent account of “transformation” in the opening via a special sequence to do it, can be recast by reference to work done in 1979 and in 1999 to require a rather different account.

5. Conclusion

Whether American, British, Dutch, French, Greek, German, Korean, Japanese, Swedish or other nationality or language/dialect is involved, inquiry into openings of conversations on the telephone have often turned what was initially designed to grasp the interactional structure of one critical phase in the overall structural organisation of the unit “a single conversation” into symptoms of cultural values and commitments, or even into what used to be termed “national character”. What may have been intended to be conversation analysis is turned into cultural analysis of a quite different stripe.

There are two senses of cultural analysis worth discriminating in this context (indeed, there are many more). Working on French openings or Greek ones can straightforwardly be a way of analysing talk-in-interaction in one’s own native language and one’s own indigenous culture. In my view, this is the ideal matchup of analyst and material. And where the results can be properly characterised by reference to categories of national language and culture, this is a *form* of cultural analysis. Indeed, it is in this sense that many have insisted for years — in the face of complaints that CA does not take culture sufficiently into account — that conversation analysis *is* cultural analysis, or a form of it. The practices and organisations of practice which are its end product surely appear to be part of what one speaks of as (a) culture.

But comparative cultural analysis is something else. It is something else because it focuses on those things on which cultures contrast. It thereby treats

as of special relevance alternatives (alternative practices, modes of conduct, etc.) which are not alternatives to one another for members of *either culture*. For whom *are* they relevant alternatives and on what grounds? More often than not they get their relevance as alternatives for academic analysts, by virtue of the theoretical or other commitments of the academic analysts, quite apart from the relevancies informing the participants in the interactions in either linguistic/cultural context. Here is where things can go astray, and where special care needs to be taken to avoid replacing the relevant orientations of the parties producing the interactions with the orientations of the researchers studying them.¹⁵ At the very least, the practices and forms being described need to be grounded in their within-culture sets of alternatives. Then we know we have got something culturally real. How then to compare them? Let us get there first; then we will know the actual shape of the problem.

For now, much remains to be done in providing compelling accounts of the practices of opening and closing telephone conversations in the range of linguistic/cultural contexts awaiting careful inquiry. I have tried to sketch some paths of inquiry which would serve us well in furthering this goal. For the most part they have in common a commitment to going beyond simply assigning terminological labels or cultural interpretations (or psychological or interactional ones, for that matter), without going on to ground those in the details of the interactional data. In particular, workers in this area need a) to show the orientation of the interactional participants to the proposed interpretive account via b) its display in the immediately ensuing talk, which is generally the consequence of what has just preceded and displays participants' understanding of what just preceded, and/or via c) its sources in preceding talk, the understanding of which it displays, while d) remaining alert to the fact that openings and closings are not autonomous stretches of talk, but were, and were designed to be, openings and closings of particular prospective and accomplished episodes of interaction, and need to be examined as such. These are familiar analytic resources in conversation analysis, but too often they are not mobilised by writers to ground their interpretive claims in the details of the data and show their convergence with the understandings of the parties, thereby converting interpretation into grounded analysis.

For colleagues who are inclined to take this line of thinking to heart and have it inform their work, there are consequences. One can try to specialise in openings or closings, but not by ignoring what lies outside those domains. Just as one cannot do adequate cardiology or neurology without understanding how the body as a whole works, so can one not adequately grasp particular

domains of phenomena in interaction without being attentive to how the organisation of interaction more generally works. One can specialise *in addition to* practising competently at the whole, but *not instead of it*.

This conception of a work life necessarily keeps the analysis internal — both to the episode of interaction and to the linguistic/cultural setting in which it occurred. And in doing so it can contribute to building up the resources which may some day permit a more robust comparative analysis than has hitherto been possible — if, that is, the interests of disciplined inquiry make it attractive to pursue such analysis.

Notes

* These reflections draw in part on my discussion of several papers bringing conversation-analytic work to bear on data featuring Asian languages presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for Applied Linguistics, Seattle, WA in March, 1998. They have been adapted to focus on work concerned with telephone conversation in diverse cultural and institutional settings, and with conversational openings in particular. This draft was prepared while I was the grateful beneficiary of a John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Fellowship and a Fellowship in Residence at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, CA, under support provided to the Center by The National Science Foundation through Grant # SBR-9022192.

1 The literature on telephone conversation has been preoccupied most centrally with openings and closings — in part because these are loci of specially visible — if not obtrusive — contrast with co-present interaction, most likely related to the consequences of the loss of visual access as they are embodied in components of the opening and closing sections of the interaction. And of these two loci, openings have been studied more commonly than closings, in part because they have a physically determined determinate beginning, and start from a same starting point (acoustic mutual availability), whereas closings can pose immediate issues of where to start (where *they* start) and how to provide for the immensely diverse preceding preoccupations and realisations out of which they are precipitated. Whatever the reasons for the predominant attention to openings, my text will overtly address itself to them, but much of what I have to say applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to closings as well, and interested readers should stay on the alert for where the appropriate extensions are to be made, and how.

2 And, indeed, a bit later she gets another phone call in which Tony begins by saying, “Joe got here I just wan’duh letchu kno:w”.

3 Puzzled about Joey’s non-appearance, Tony may also be oriented to the possibility that Marsha has something to tell him about a delayed departure on the drive to the north. He does not yet know that things have happened to have Joey fly rather than drive.

4 A Greek version of the same form of inquiry, in much the same structural location appears as (20) in Pavlidou (2002), and readers may wish to examine it for its relation to the present discussion. The author remarks that this inquiry occurs although “in the opening part of the

call there have been reciprocal phatic utterances” So a) the resonance between opening and closing is registered; b) it becomes relevant to know exactly what those “phatic utterances” in the opening were (were they a Greek version of how-are-you?); and c) depending on the outcome of b), one can explore the consequences for the proper understanding of this form of inquiry in the closing of there having been an exchange of how-are-yous in the opening. The key point, however, is this: first comes the exploration of how an item (whether word, particle, turn-type, action, sequence, etc.) is understood and dealt with by the parties in the interaction, and how that is to be understood in terms internal to the structure of the interaction. Only then can the comparative cultural questions be usefully posed and refer to real worldly occurrences, if, indeed, they invite being posed at all by that point.

5 It should go without saying, of course, that an account of canonical opening structure is a key analytic resource in understanding what is going on within the opening itself (exemplified by the discussion of (2) in the text above in particular) or in talk which just follows it or serves to terminate it. Analyses which exemplify this relevance may be found, *inter alia*, in Schegloff (1995; 1996; and 2002, Appendix 2).

6 The same is true for closings, except that closings need to be understood by reference to what has happened, or has not happened, in the preceding talk — that is, they can serve as the place which inherits the legacy of the conversation, whether the occurrence of a “thank you” to register the occurrence of a request or offer in the conversation (even if rejected), or some aspect of conduct to register the occurrence of previous efforts to close the conversation, or whatever feature of the preceding talk is treated as relevant to the conduct of the closing.

7 Two different problems in recognition may be implicated. In one, the caller is not oriented to the possible recognisability of the answerer (e.g., when advised to “call a certain number and ask for X”) and is seeking to establish an identification of the answerer. In the other, the caller *is* oriented to the potential recognisability of the answerer but has encountered trouble in recognising the answerer from the answerer’s first utterance (e.g., see (8) below, at lines 10 and 14).

8 It is critical to make clear that I am concerned here with problems of *presentation*, not investigation itself. In the research itself, inquiry must attend in the first instance solely to the features and orientations indigenous to the materials — the linguistic and cultural resources and the participants’ demonstrable orientations. If the results of inquiry should happen to converge with findings for materials in other linguistic/cultural settings, that is a separate matter and a separate finding. But inquiry should not start with findings in one linguistic/cultural setting and seek to reproduce them in another, or to avoid reproducing them in another. What is addressed in the text here is not this, but problems of *presentation*, when the language of presentation (i.e. the text of the paper or report) is different from the language of the materials being presented, and the latter must somehow be rendered for readers without independent knowledge of it. The problem is, in principle, general; in practice, it is currently most likely to confront researchers writing in English about non-English materials, and being thereby confronted with a readership using its English language interpretive resources to parse the gloss or translation used to render the non-English materials. Then the writer will do well to take into account how the English language gloss or rendering will “compute” in the English language idiom readers will bring to bear on its interpretation.

9 If, indeed, “country/culture” can be shown to supply the relevant terms of description, which is by no means a foregone conclusion. This issue was addressed in an abbreviated fashion in Schegloff and Sacks (1973: 291), and in note 4 of that paper, in particular:

For example, that all the conversations are in ‘American English’ is no warrant for so characterizing them. For there are many other characterizations which are equally ‘true’, e.g., that they are ‘adult’, ‘spoken’ (not yelled or ‘whispered’), etc. That the materials are all ‘American English’ does not entail that they are RELEVANTLY ‘American English’, or relevantly in any larger or smaller domain that might be invoked to characterize them. All such characterizations must be warranted, and ... we cannot warrant them now. Ethnic, national or language identifications differ from many others only in their *prima facie* plausibility, especially to those in the tradition of anthropological linguistics. The basis for this position may be found in Sacks (1972a); a discussion of unwarranted ethnic characterizations of materials and findings may be found in Moerman (1967).

I know of no compelling rebuttal of this position, which appears as relevant now as it did then (with the exception of the special focus on anthropological linguistics, which has unhappily broadened to a larger disciplinary matrix).

10 It does happen that an affirmative response promotes sequelae other than an apology, such as the “pre-topic closing offering” and “pre-first-topic closing offering” discussed in Schegloff and Sacks (1973: 314–317), exemplified below:

Openings, #235

- 1 ((telephone rings))
- 2 I: Hello;
- 3 A: Did I waken you dear,
- 4 (0.5)
- 5 I: nn yeah. Hn.
- 6 A: D’you want to call me back when you’re awake?

But overwhelmingly in the data I have examined “Did I wake you up?” is taken as a pre-apology and is played out as such.

11 Another practice examined in that chapter and under that rubric was embodied in a caller’s first turn which took such forms as “Who’s this?” or “Who’s talking?” (Schegloff 1967: 194–213). Sequences set off by such utterances are not discussed here.

12 An earlier chapter had introduced the notion “the method of the call”, and concerned the auspices under which the action-trajectory was initiated which had produced as its outcome the exchange of talk being studied. It was in dialogue with that chapter that Sacks’s discussion of “the *reason* for the call” (Sacks 1992, I: 773–779) was developed as a variant of “the *method* of the call.”

13 Though when this is simply the individual’s name, it may not reveal what the language default is, except (as Rasmussen and Wagner suggest) insofar as it invokes a past history of interaction between these individuals and its customary language resource.

14 On the other hand, the caller's practice in first turn which takes the form "Who's this?" or "Who's talking?" (see note 11 above) does appear to be specifically launching a transformation. Always answered with last name in the corpus of police calls which I was examining, it is often answered in the context of "personal calls" by a rejection of the inquiry (but cf. Schegloff 1986: 146–147).

15 As one anonymous referee notes, "Of course, cross-cultural differences *are* relevant to participants when they, themselves, come from different cultures." And this could be so in several senses — when one or both participants have multiple cultural memberships and competencies, or when each comes from a culture not shared by the other. Although the referee complains that this is a point not contemplated (and, by implication, possibly not contemplatable) in CA studies, this is too pessimistic a view. If such interactions occur and are somehow managed by the participants, and if the empirical record of such interactions is made available for analysis, there is every reason to figure that they are analysable with the analytic resources available within CA. If approached empirically in this spirit, such materials may well yield new sorts of findings; only a serious attempt to do the work will tell.

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Appendix: Transcription conventions

(Adapted from Ochs, Schegloff and Thompson 1996: 461–465)

1. Temporal and sequential relationships

- A. Overlapping or simultaneous talk is indicated in a variety of ways.
- [Separate left square brackets, one above the other on two successive lines with
 - [utterances by different speakers, indicates a point of overlap onset, whether at the start or later.
 -] Separate right square brackets, one above the other on two successive lines with

-] utterances by different speakers, indicates a point at which two overlapping utterances both end, where one ends while the other continues, or simultaneous moments in overlaps which continue.

So, in the following, Bee's "Uh really?" overlaps Ava's talk starting at "a" and ending at the "t" of "tough."

Ava: I 'av [a lotta t]ough cou:rses.

Bee: [Uh really?]

- (0.5) B. Numbers in parentheses indicate silence, represented in tenths of a second; what is given here in the left margin indicates 5/10 seconds of silence. Silences may be marked either within an utterance or between utterances, as in the two excerpts below:
- (.) C. A dot in parentheses indicates a "micropause", hearable but not readily measurable without instrumentation; ordinarily less than 2/10 of a second.

2. Aspects of speech delivery, including aspects of intonation

- A. The punctuation marks are *not* used grammatically, but to indicate intonation.
- . The period indicates a falling, or final, intonation contour, not necessarily the end of a sentence. Similarly, a question mark indicates a rising intonation, not necessarily a question, and a comma indicates a "continuing" intonation, not necessarily a clause boundary. The inverted question mark (¿) is used to indicate a rise stronger than a comma but weaker than a question mark.
- :: B. Colons are used to indicate the prolongation or stretching of the sound just preceding them. The more colons, the longer the stretching. On the other hand, graphically stretching a word on the page by inserting blank spaces between the letters or words does *not* necessarily indicate how it was pronounced; it is used to allow alignment with overlapping talk. Thus,

Bee: Tch! (M'n)/(En) they can't delay much lo:nguh thy
[jus' wannid] uh- 'hhh=

Ava: [Oh :]

Bee: =yihknow have anohtuh consulta:tion,

Ava: Ri::ght.

Bee: En then deci::de.

The word "ri:ght" in Ava's second turn, or "deci::de" in Bee's third are more stretched than "oh:" in Ava's first turn, even though "oh:" appears to occupy more space. But "oh" has only one colon, and the others have two; "oh:" has been spaced out so that its brackets will align with the talk in Bee's ("jus' wannid") turn with which it is in overlap.

·hh C. in-breath

hh out-breath

- D. A hyphen after a word or part of a word indicates a cut-off or self-interruption, often done with a glottal or dental stop.

word E. Underlining is used to indicate some form of stress or emphasis, either by increased loudness or higher pitch. The more underlining, the greater the emphasis.

word Therefore, underlining sometimes is placed under the first letter or two of a word, rather than under the letters which are actually raised in pitch or volume. Espe-

WOrd cially loud talk may be indicated by upper case; again, the louder, the more letters in upper case. And in extreme cases, upper case may be underlined.

- >< F. The combination of “more than” and “less than” symbols indicates that the talk between them is compressed or rushed. Used in the reverse order, they
<> can indicate that a stretch of talk is markedly slowed or drawn out.

3. Other markings

- (()) A. Double parentheses are used to mark transcriber’s descriptions of events, rather than representations of them. Thus ((cough)), ((sniff)), ((telephone rings)), ((footsteps)), ((whispered)), ((pause)) and the like.
- (word) B. When all or part of an utterance is in parentheses, or the speaker identification is, this indicates uncertainty on the transcriber’s part, but represents a likely possibility. Empty parentheses indicate that something is being said, but no hearing (or, in some cases, speaker identification) can be achieved.
- ()
- (try 1)/ C. In some transcript excerpts, two parentheses may be printed, separated
(try 2) by a single oblique or slash; these represent *alternative* hearings of the same strip of talk.