

Repair after Next Turn: The Last Structurally Provided Defense of Intersubjectivity in Conversation¹

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Organizational features of ordinary conversation and other talk-in-interaction provide for the routine display of participants' understandings of one another's conduct and of the field of action, thereby building in a routine grounding for intersubjectivity. This same organization provides interactants the resources for recognizing breakdowns of intersubjectivity and for repairing them. This article sets the concern with intersubjectivity in theoretical context, sketches the organization by which it is grounded and defended in ordinary interaction, describes the practices by which trouble in understanding is dealt with, and illustrates what happens when this organization fails to function. Some consequences for contemporary theory and inquiry are suggested.

CONTEXTS FOR INTERSUBJECTIVITY

Theoretical Context

Virtually all social theory has presupposed (and some has explicitly recognized) that underlying the very conception of a social unit—whether group, class, or society—and the very conception of orderly social process is some common grasp by the unit's members of their common situation of action and of the import of ordinary conduct within it. Although this grasp might variously be seen as a consensually shared outlook or as a

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view imposed by some set of persons and interests, some co-conception or coorientation to the world has seemed inescapable.

In focusing on the relationship between repair after next turn and “intersubjectivity,” this article underscores a connection between talk-in-interaction as a primordial site of sociality on the one hand and, on the other hand, one of the (largely presupposed) preconditions for, and achievements of, organized social life. On the whole, the problem of intersubjectivity, derivative from the individualism and atomism of Western, Judeo-Christian culture and aggravated by the privatization of mind precipitated by Cartesian and post-Cartesian philosophy, has been addressed in Western theorizing largely by philosophy. For sociology, though recognized in principle, the issues posed by the problematic character of intersubjectivity have been largely ignored in practice.

However, the problematics of intersubjectivity are anterior to most of the problems that sociological and social theory have treated as primary and fundamental, such as the so-called Hobbesian problem of order or the underlying engines of large-scale social change. Most simply put, without systematic provision for a world known and held in common by some collectivity of persons, one has not a misunderstood world, but no conjoint reality at all. That is, the problem of intersubjectivity (or cognitive order) is theoretically anterior to whatever formulations of problems of order or conflict are part of the tradition of social theory. Absent intersubjectivity, the terms of any social theory—whether they refer to interests or values, persons or roles, authority or power—by definition cannot name anything oriented to or effective with any regularity or commonality, for there could not be any common recognition of them.

A very general type of solution has typically been invoked in social theory to provide for intersubjectivity. This “solution” turns on “common culture” as the social resource by which the individual’s grasp of reality is mediated. Intersubjectivity has been understood to be undergirded first by the transmission of culture through socialization (primarily through primary socialization in childhood), together with the segregation of social units (subgroups or subcultures) whose cultural resources diverged substantially. Where these devices for ensuring intersubjectivity failed, characteristic forms of “disorganization” might surface—in mental illness and other forms of deviance, as well as in more or less overt conflict between groups with divergent “understandings of the world.”

In sociology, the main theoretical lineage that has carried this stance has been that running from Durkheim (esp. *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, 1915) to Parsons. Although rarely made explicit, the fundamental conception of such a common culture or shared understanding of the world (as was made clear by Garfinkel [1967] in the course of challenging it) was of more or less identical contents of separate minds.

Members of a culture (or subculture), upon being furnished the same fundamental conception of time, space, and causality (to recall Durkheim's concerns in coming to terms with Kant's fundamental categories of mind) as well as the remaining conceptual grid by which the surrounding real world was categorized and rendered orderly, would come to apperceive the world in roughly congruent ways. Thus was the starting point of *individual* minds encountering an *external* world (including other individuals) rendered compatible with a consensual or intersubjective grasp of reality, both physical and social (cf. Heritage, 1984a, chap. 2).

Not that this was addressed directly as a problem in sociological theory. Although Parsons (1937, chap. 11) worried somewhat about the problems of epistemic relativism that might result from Durkheim's effort to "socialize" Kant's fundamental (i.e., irreducible) categories of mind, he escaped seriously grappling with this class of problems largely by dismissing this aspect of Durkheim's work.

The passage of a more serious and sustained concern with intersubjectivity from philosophy to sociology was undertaken, with variable success, for pragmatism most centrally by George Herbert Mead (1938, 1962; and see Joas 1985) and for phenomenology by Alfred Schutz (e.g., [1932] 1967; or 1962, pp. 3–47). For example, Schutz begins by insisting that commonsense thinking is situated "from the outset [in] an intersubjective world of culture" (1962, p. 10), and he goes on to focus specifically on the observation that the "world is not my private world but an intersubjective one and that, therefore, my knowledge of it is not my private affair but from the outset intersubjective and socialized" (p. 11). Explicit recognition of such a property allows explicit attention to how socialized knowledge has its intersubjectivity provided for, for example, by the feature of commonsense knowledge that Schutz speaks of as "the reciprocity of perspectives" (p. 14).

In contemporary sociology, it was Garfinkel who most forcefully brought to attention the centrality to social theorizing of a world-known-in-common and of commonsense knowledge, and it was he who showed the inadequacy of the largely tacit conceptions of it that underlie most contemporary theorizing. In a series of studies (collected in Garfinkel [1967]) prompted in the first instance by confronting the work of Talcott Parsons with the most sociologically relevant strands of phenomenology (see Heritage [1984a] for a lucid account of the theoretical lineages and interactions here), Garfinkel asked what exactly might be seriously intended by such notions as "common" or "shared" knowledge. In the days when computers were still UNIVACS, he showed as untenable that notion of "common" or "shared" that was more or less equal to the claim that separate memory drums had identical contents. When even

the sense of ordinary words and very simple sentences could be shown not to engender identical explications when presented to different persons, when those explications had themselves to be reconciled to provide them a "sense of equivalence," and when *those* reconciliations in turn required such reconciliation, and so on, the notion of "common culture" or "shared knowledge" as composed of same substantive components—whether norms or propositions—being "held" by different persons became increasingly difficult to defend.

Instead, what seemed programmatically promising was a *procedural* sense of "common" or "shared," a set of practices by which actions and stances could be composed in a fashion which displayed grounding in, and orientation to, "knowledge held in common"—knowledge that might thereby be reconfirmed, modified, expanded, and so on. Garfinkel's term "ethnomethodology"—with its explicit preoccupation with the procedures by which commonsense knowledge is acquired, confirmed, revised, and so on—can be partially understood by reference to this matrix of concerns. As Garfinkel wrote in a chapter entitled "What Is Ethnomethodology?" (1967, p. 30), "'Shared agreement' refers to various social methods for accomplishing the member's recognition that something was said-according-to-a-rule and not the demonstrable matching of substantive matters. The appropriate image of a common understanding is therefore an operation rather than a common intersection of overlapping sets."

Garfinkel drew heavily on Schutz (cf., e.g., in "Studies of the Routine Grounds of Everyday Activities" [Garfinkel 1967]) in describing the operational character of commonsense knowledge. The intersubjective character of commonsense knowledge is undergirded by a collection of features provided by a variety of interpretive procedures constituting the so-called attitude of daily life. Applicable to any particulars of social settings, the elements of the solution to the problem of intersubjectivity are principled, interpretive operations that constitute the "mundane" grasp of the world (Pollner 1987).

This general stance (by which I mean not only Garfinkel's, but that of others for whom some version of interpretive procedures is central, such as Cicourel [1972, 1974], Gumperz [1982], or Pollner [1987]) appears designed to disavow access to any determinate structure or character of a real world of input—whether from the physical world or from the conduct of other social actors—and to focus on interpretive procedures as, in effect, the sole locus and source of interpreted order.

An alternative, or supplementary, stance might take the conduct of other social actors as not, in effect, random or inaccessible to affirmative inquiry, but, rather, together with interpretive procedures, coshaping an appreciated grasp of the world. Such a view would allow for the interven-

tion by the accountable authors of conduct in what would come to be stabilized as the effective understanding of that conduct. Intersubjectivity would not, then, be merely convergence between multiple interpreters of the world (whether understood substantively or procedurally) but potentially convergence between the “doers” of an action or bit of conduct and its recipients, as coproducers of an increment of interactional and social reality.

In the context of such a stance, intersubjectivity is not a matter of a generalized intersection of beliefs or knowledge, or procedures for generating them. Nor does it arise as “a problem of intersubjectivity.” Rather, particular aspects of particular bits of conduct that compose the warp and weft of ordinary social life provide occasions and resources for understanding, which can also issue in problematic understandings. And it is this situating of intersubjectivity that will be of interest here.²

The achievement and maintenance of this sort of intersubjectivity is not treated in a theoretically satisfactory manner by invoking socialization as a mechanism, for intersubjectivity is achieved for a virtually inexhaustible range of types of events always contextually specified, for which no “distal” or “remote” socialization could provide. The solution surely is provided for by a resource that is itself built into the fabric of social conduct, into the procedural infrastructure of interaction. For the domain of conduct addressed in this article, this involves a self-righting mechanism built in as an integral part of the organization of talk-in-interaction—what has been termed the organization of repair. I try to show how the procedural basis for locating and dealing with breakdowns in intersubjectivity is woven into the very warp and weft of ordinary conversation and, by implication, possibly of any organized conduct.

Grounding in the Sequential Organization of Conversation

The sequential basis for the (largely unnoticed) confirmation of intersubjectivity, and for its occasional repair in “third position,” can be very briefly sketched. In turns at talk in ordinary conversation, speakers ordinarily address themselves to prior talk, and, most commonly, to immediately preceding talk. In doing so, speakers reveal aspects of their under-

² See also Goffman (1983) for an examination of common understandings through the treatment of “presupposition,” “deixis,” and “background expectations” by linguists, sociolinguists, and sociologists. Goffman does remark in passing (p. 46) on the possibilities of *mis*understanding, but relates these more to the vulnerabilities of cryptic utterances between intimates than to the systematic contingencies of the repair of misunderstanding in general (my thanks to Candace West for reminding me of the related theme of Goffman’s paper.)

standing of the prior talk to which their own speech is addressed (Sacks 1989, in press; Moerman and Sacks as presented in Moerman [1988]).

For example, in responding to an interlocutor's "How are you?" with "Fine," a speaker can manifest a variety of simple, but fundamental, understandings. In starting to talk, he or she can show an understanding that the prior speaker's turn was possibly finished. In producing an answer, this same speaker can display an understanding of the prior utterance as a question. By forming up the answer through a description of personal state (or "adjective of manner"), the speaker can show an understanding of the grammatical type of the question as a so-called WH—question (i.e., of the type beginning with WH as in *who*, *where*, etc.) as compared to a yes/no question. By selecting this particular "value" of response (as compared, e.g., to "terrible," "wonderful," or an actual launching of a story) the speaker can reveal an understanding of the force or standing of such a question in the interaction in progress, in view of the type of interaction, the state of the relationship of the participants, and so on (see Sacks 1975; Jefferson 1980; Schegloff 1986).

Similarly, with the rejoinder, "That's good," the initial speaker can in turn display understandings that the "responder's" turn is possibly complete, that it was indeed a response to the question that had preceded it (and was not directed to some third party, e.g., or delivered as part of a mumbled internal dialogue), that it was designed to report a favorable "state" (hence the positive assessment in return), and to pass an opportunity to undertake some extended report (Sacks 1975; Jefferson 1980; Schegloff 1986).

And so on. Each next turn provides a locus for the display of many understandings by its speaker—understandings of what has immediately preceded (and of far less readily apparent features than those used here as illustrations; see Schegloff [1984, 1988*b*, pp. 118–25, 1990] for illustrative, more elaborate, discussions) or of what has occurred earlier or elsewhere that nonetheless figures in the turn's talk. The understandings are displayed en passant for the most part (although there is also a distinct type of utterance overtly designed to check its speaker's understanding of preceding talk), as by-products of bits of talk designed in the first instance to do some action such as agreeing, answering, assessing, responding, requesting, and so on.

Having registered the observation that, through their talk, speakers can display aspects of their understanding of prior talk, it remains to be noted that, in doing so, they can reveal understandings that the speakers of that prior talk find problematic—in other words, what they take to be *mis*understandings. There can be misunderstandings of what is being referred to—sometimes because a word or phrase or usage is accessible to alternative interpretation (as in the case of pronouns and other deictic

or indexical expressions), sometimes in the face of quite explicit and “readily hearable” references (see excerpt 18 below). There can be misunderstandings of the upshot of what a speaker is doing with a turn’s talk—for example, misunderstandings on the serious/nonserious dimension, such as taking a joke seriously or vice versa, or taking as a complaint something claimed as otherwise intended (for these and other types of misunderstanding, see Schegloff [1987*a*]).

When such “problematic understandings” occur, and whatever their apparent “source,” speakers of the “misunderstood” talk can undertake to “repair” the misunderstanding, and this can thus constitute “third position repair”—repair after an interlocutor’s response (second position) has revealed trouble in understanding an earlier turn (the “repairable” in first position). The ordinary sequential organization of conversation thus provides for displays of mutual understanding and problems therein—one running basis for the cultivation and grounding of intersubjectivity (see App. A below).

Third position repair may be thought of as the last systematically provided opportunity to catch (among other troubles) such divergent understandings as embody breakdowns of intersubjectivity—that is, trouble in the socially shared grasp *of the talk and the other conduct in the interaction*.

THIRD POSITION REPAIR

Dealing with Trouble in Understanding

Participant attention to troubles in understanding is deployed in all the positions at which we find attention to other sorts of trouble in conversation.

Thus, for example, speakers of a turn may orient themselves to prospective problems in its being understood and may build into their talk—while the turn is still in progress and incomplete or, just after its possible completion, in what is called the “transition space” (Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 1974, pp. 705–6)—resources addressed to such potential problems.

For example, in the following utterance Marcia, in explaining to her ex-husband why their son is flying rather than driving back home, appears to pick up the possible ambiguity of the phrase “ripped off,” as between the literal tearing of a convertible car’s soft top and the idiomatic usage for robbery.

Excerpt 1 (MDE, MTRAC, 3:1)

Marcia: . . . Becuz the to:p was ripped off'v iz car which
iz tihsay someb'dy helped th'mselfs.

“Which is to say somebody helped themselves” seems directed to “disambiguating” this possible source of misunderstanding. Efforts by the speaker of some talk to deal with problems of understanding thus can be initiated in, or just after, the very turn in which the talk engendering these troubles occurs, as is the case with other sorts of troubles that talk can give rise to.

But if a speaker does not address potential troubles of understanding, or if a recipient of the talk claims such problems whether or not they have been addressed by the speaker, efforts to deal with problems of understanding can be initiated by the *hearer*. Virtually all such efforts (see App. A) are initiated in one place—the turn *after* the turn in which the source of the trouble occurred. (Note that I am referring here to the *initiation* of efforts to deal with some trouble; carrying through such repair may extend past the turn in which the repair is initiated.)

Thus, in the episode already cited, Marcia’s effort to explicate her usage of “ripped off” is itself not immune to problems of understanding (perhaps because of her ironic figure), and this problem is then addressed in next turn by the talk’s recipient, who offers a candidate understanding, which Marcia then confirms.

Excerpt 2 (MDE, MTRAC, 3:1)

Marcia: . . . Becuz the to:p was ripped off’v iz car which
iz tihsay someb’dy helped th’mselfs.

Tony: Stolen.
(0.4)

Marcia: Stolen. Right out in front of my house.

Given, first, the detailed capacity of speakers for designing their talk for the context and the moment in which it is being done, including its current-at-that-moment recipients (Goodwin 1979, 1981), given, second, the self-repair exercised by speakers on their own talk within and just after their turns, and given, third, the recipients’ next-turn addressing of troubles that have nonetheless crept into the talk, the vast majority of understanding problems are dealt with virtually “immediately,” as is the case with other types of troubles that can come up. Still, there is a recurrent set of circumstances, outlined in excerpt 3, that escape these processes.

What Is “Third Position Repair”?

Excerpt 3

A: Turn 1 (T1)

B: Turn 2 (T2)

A: ←

It happens that a speaker of a turn, *T1*, “releases” it as adequate, and its recipient finds in it no problem that warrants initiating repair in the next turn position. Accordingly, its recipient produces a next turn, *T2*, sequentially appropriate to his or her understanding of what the speaker of the prior turn was doing in *T1* and reflecting his or her understanding of what the prior speaker may have been referring to by various referring terms in *T1* (a process treated by Clark and Schaefer [1989] under the term “grounding”). And *T2*, built to be and understood as “responsive” to *T1*, thus regularly displays to the speaker of the prior turn the understanding that has been accorded it—an understanding that the speaker of *T1* may treat as problematic.³

After such meant-to-be-sequentially-appropriate next turns, in what we can term third position (where the misunderstood talk’s turn is first and the responsive next turn is second), the speaker of the problematically understood talk—the trouble source—can undertake to address the trouble by engaging in some operation on the source of the trouble, that is, the talk in *T1*. Several instances may serve to provide empirical displays of this otherwise abstract schema.

In excerpt 4, the press relations officer in a Civil Defense headquarters is asking the chief engineer for information to be distributed to the media (see App. B for transcription conventions).

Excerpt 4 (CDHQ, I, 52)

- Annie: Which one::s are closed, an’ which ones are open.
 Zebrach: Most of ’em. This, this, |this, this ((pointing))
 → Annie: |I ’on’t mean on the
 → shelters, I mean on the roads.
 Zebrach: Oh!
 (8.0)
 Zebrach: Closed, those’re the ones you wanna know about,
 Annie: Mm|hm
 Zebrach: |Broadway . . .

In excerpt 5, the therapist in a group therapy session for teenagers offers an observation on the dynamics of the discussion.

Excerpt 5 (GTS, I, 37)

- Dan: Well that’s a little different from last week.
 Louise: heh heh heh Yeah. We were in hysterics last week.
 → Dan: No, I mean Al.
 Louise: Oh. He . . .

In excerpt 6, while visiting the city in which her old friend Alice now

³ An account of some of the recurrent sources and types of “misunderstanding” addressed in these contexts may be found in Schegloff (1987*a*).

lives, Belle has called to say hello, and the talk turns to the prospect of their getting together.

Excerpt 6 (DA, 2)

- Alice: Well I'd like tuh see you very much.
 Belle: Yes. [Uh
 Alice: [I really would. We c'd have a bite,
 en (ta::lk),
 Belle: [Yeh.
 Belle: Weh- No! No, don't prepare any[thing.
 Alice: [And uh-
 Alice: I'm not gunnuh prepare, we'll juz' whatever
 it'll [be, we'll
 → Belle: [NO!
 → Belle: I don't mean that. I min- because uh, she en I'll
 → prob'ly uh be spending the day togethuh, so uh::
 → we'll go out tuh lunch, or something like that.
 → 'hh So I mean if you:: uh have a cuppa coffee or
 → something, I mean [that uh that'll be fine. But =
 Alice: [Yeah
 → Belle: = [uh- othuh th'n that don't [uh- don't bothuh =
 Alice: [Fine. ()
 → Belle: = with anything else.

In each of these cases, the arrows point to what I am terming "third position repairs."

This is the major sequential context, then, for what we may relevantly term "repair after next turn."⁴ In what follows, I want to focus attention on this analytically specified, but continually shifting, sequential position in conversation and the character of the repair that is initiated there. Repair in this position supplies, and is dedicated largely to, what I have already referred to as "the last structurally provided defense of intersubjectivity in conversation."

Composition of Third Position Repair

Third position repairs have a highly recurrent form and are constructed from four main types of components, some of which are themselves realized by a very few types of lexical tokens.⁵ I will initially refer to the

⁴ I call repairs undertaken in a next turn by the same speaker, and which merely happen to be after a next turn but are not in that position in an organizationally criterial way, "third *turn* repairs" in contrast to the third *position* repairs examined here (Schegloff, in press *b*).

⁵ In discussing the canonical form taken by third position repairs, some wonder whether I have ignored third position repairs that did not happen to be implemented in the canonical format. Excerpt 20, presented below as an example of fourth position repair, struck some as an instance of third position repair in deviant format. Else-

four components unimagatively as *A*, *B*, *C*, and *D*, complementing these with more descriptive characterizations as they are introduced in turn. As is implied by using a set of ordered terms even for the preliminary references, the components that are employed (and not every component is employed in every third position repair) have a canonical ordering. As I will try to show, this ordering is the product of determinate practices of constructing these repair turns. Limitations of space, here as elsewhere in this presentation, constrain all the elements of the account to a minimum.

The *A* component of third-position-repair turns serves to initiate the repair. Most commonly it takes the form of “no,” singly or in multiples (“no, no”; “no, no no”), or in combination with “oh” (“oh no”), which also occasionally stands alone (“oh”).⁶ Since excerpts 5 and 6 above, and most excerpts to be cited below, provide exemplars of these turn-initial particles, I will forgo separate displays of this “repair initiating component” here.

The *B* component is the one most likely to be absent from a third position repair. In fact, this component—an agreement/acceptance component—occurs virtually exclusively when the *T2* (the next turn) has treated the *T1* (the trouble-source turn) as a complaint, and the speaker of *T1* has responded with some sequentially implicated response type, such as an apology, an excuse, and so on. Then the *B* component serves to agree with or accept the “response to the complaint,” even though its speaker is about to go on to deny that his or her prior turn was doing complaining in the first instance.

Thus, in excerpt number 7, Agnes and Portia, sisters in their fifties, have several times missed getting together, and the telephone conversation from which this excerpt is taken began with a comment by Portia about another such failure. In Portia’s first turn in this excerpt she is

where, I examine several instances of third position repair that are indeed differently formatted (see Schegloff 1991b).

⁶ “Well” is also used as an *A* component, but in all the cases I have seen, the turn immediately proceeds to the *D* component—the repair proper. Such turns then take the form “Well I mean . . .” as in excerpt 12 below. Although third position repairs may initially appear to be disagreements with the prior turn, and no may appear to signal such disagreement, it should be noted, first, that in the remainder of these turns the speakers operate *on their own prior talk*, not on that of the other, and, second, that prior research (Sacks 1987; Pomerantz 1984) has shown that disagreements do not ordinarily have disagreement tokens directly after a prior turn and at the start of the disagreeing turn. The first component of third position repair, with “no” as its turn initial particle, is best understood as initiating repair, rather than as betokening disagreement. Indeed, it is a way of beginning to constitute the turn *as* a third position repair. Constituting it as a disagreement is done in other ways (departures from this claim are discussed below).

apparently initiating the close of the conversation (see Schegloff and Sacks 1973; Button 1987a), but this is taken by Agnes as a reprise of the complaint about not getting together (Schegloff 1987a):

Excerpt 7 (NB)

- Agnes: I love it.
(0.2)
- Portia: Well, honey? I'll pob'ly see yuh one a' these
day:s.
- Agnes: Oh:: God yeah,
- Portia: [Uhh huh!
- Agnes: [We-
- Portia: B't I c- I jis' [couldn' git down [there.
[Oh- [Oh I know.
- Agnes: I'm not askin [yuh tuh [come dow-
[Jesus. [I mean I jis'- I didn' have
five minutes yesterday.

At the arrowed turn, the repair-initiating component ("Oh") is followed by an acceptance of Agnes's excuse for not visiting, the *B* component.

In 8, Bonnie has called Jim, her on-again off-again boyfriend, with a last-minute invitation to a New Year's Eve party, and Jim has declined to give a firm commitment, saying that he has already been invited to several other parties. Then:

Excerpt 8 (NYI, 6-7)

- Bonnie: Because I'm not even sure if we're goin' to have
it yet because a buncha people say [maybe, maybe,
- Jim: [Yeah
- Bonnie: 't's buggin me.
(1.5)
- Jim: Oh uhh hh I'm sorry, Ihh
- Bonnie: No, that's okay, I mean y'know I can understand
because- this was just a late idea that me and
Barb had.

Again, at the arrowed turn a repair-initiation component ("No") is followed by an agreement/acceptance component ("That's okay") that accepts an apology responding to an apparent complaint.

The third, or *C*, component of third position repairs may be termed "the rejection component." With it, the speaker overtly rejects the understanding that prior turn reveals *its* speaker to have accorded the trouble-source turn. Two of the three main formats employed in this rejection component specify "by name" just what the repairer understands the misunderstanding to have been. They are used for the two most common types of misunderstanding (Schegloff 1987a): problematic reference and problematic sequential implicativeness (or what action a speaker has meant to be doing with the turn). For the former, the recur-

rently used form is “I don’t mean *X*,” as in excerpt 4 above and many other instances. For the latter, the form is “I’m not *X*ing,” where *X* is the name of some action, as in excerpt 7 above (“I’m not askin you to come down”) or in 9 below. Here, Dan—the therapist in a group therapy session with teenagers—has offered a characterization of one of them (Al), which is understood by another (Roger) as a critique or complaint.⁷ Roger responds to the complaint against Al by asserting solidarity with his “buddy.”

Excerpt 9 (GTS)

- Dan: . . . See Al tends, it seems, to pull in one or two individuals on his side (there). This is part of his power drive, see. He’s gotta pull in, he can’t quite do it on his own. Yet.
- Al: W’l-
- Roger: Well so do I.
- Dan: Yeah. [I’m not criticizing, I mean we’ll just uh =
- Roger: Oh you wanna talk about him.
- Dan: =look, let’s just talk.
- Roger: Alright.

At the arrowed turn, after an agreement/acceptance component in which Dan agrees with Roger’s response to the perceived complaint, Dan specifically rejects that displayed understanding of his prior turn (“I’m not criticizing”).

It is striking that misunderstandings are both orderly and accessible to the speaker of what has been misunderstood, who might well be thought to be so committed to the design and so-called intent of the earlier turn as to be disabled from appreciating that (or how) it could be otherwise understood.⁸ In the formats described so far, the product of this understanding of the misunderstanding is itself displayed by name. On other occasions, however, although the misunderstanding is overtly rejected, it is not named but is referred to by a pronoun—“I don’t mean *that*” or “*That’s* not what I mean,” as in excerpt 6 above. These do not appear

⁷ Caution is necessary when drawing on material from settings that can be regarded as distinctive speech exchange systems, as therapy sessions often are. Such caution is especially relevant when modified turn-taking organizations may be involved (see n. 22 below). For a discussion of the serious analytic problems in formulating participants in the manner used in the text at this point, see Schegloff (1991a, in press a). Use of such characterizations introduces a measure of analytic informality into the present treatment, but does not appear to compromise the main issue being addressed by this article.

⁸ Indeed, on occasion the misunderstanding is not accessible to the misunderstood speaker, with consequences that cannot be taken up here. See “A Breakdown of Intersubjectivity” below.

to reflect a failure to grasp the misunderstanding, only some potential trouble in formulating it appropriately.⁹

The *D* component might be termed “the repair proper.” It is the component most likely to be present in any turn that is the locus of third position repair (although it too can be omitted, as in 7 above). This is the component in which the speaker carries out some operation or operations on a prior turn, so as to address the problematic understanding of it revealed by an interlocutor’s response.

One form that the repair proper takes is a repeat of the trouble-source turn, produced in a manner that displays, or does, “saying it more clearly.” In excerpt 10, James and Vic—two apartment house janitors in the Bronx—are discussing a broken pane of glass in a door in James’s building, when he (James) comes across his income tax refund while opening his mail. (Mike is an employee in the used furniture shop where the conversation is taking place.)¹⁰

⁹ For example, what is at issue in “Don’t prepare anything” appears to be the alternative senses one might communicate to a prospective host or hostess, one of which is “Don’t go to any special trouble or make anything fancy or elaborate,” the other of which is “Don’t make anything at all, I can’t eat.” It is not apparent how a misunderstanding of one of these for the other would be accommodated in the formats mentioned in the text.

¹⁰ For those (like one of the anonymous referees) who find the transcript’s rendering of working-class New York Polish and black dialect inaccessible, I offer here a proto-stenographic version (in normalized spelling and punctuation, and omitting overlaps, interruptions, etc.) of the transcript:

- James: Wait a minute, I’ve got to run ahead. Dadgummit, this is at least fifty thousand dollars.
Vic: He got his God d- you got your thing today?
James: And I don’t give a damn what door because I’ve got it here.
Vic: Did you get- Let me ask you this.
James: ((laughs))
Vic: Did you get your thing today?
James: What?
Vic: Your thing.
(0.6)
James: My thing?
Vic: Yeah.
James: I keep my thing with me all the time.
Mike: No, no, no man.
Vic: I’m not talking about that.
Mike: He means- he means- he means that thing.
James: ((laughs))
Vic: Did you get your thing today.
James: Yeah, I got it, yeah I got it; I know what you mean; I’m just kidding ((laughs)), I got it alright. etc.

Excerpt 10 (US, 47)

- James: WAIDAminnit, I gotta run ahead. Dad(gummit), this
is, at least hh eh- fifty thousn' dolluh ()
- Vic: ()
iz god d-ehh (you got your thing tuhday?)
He got
- James: (En' I don' give a damn what (door
cu:z) (I got it heah.
Did you get-
- Vic: Lemma (ask yih dis.
James: (AHHH hah hah (hah- yeh- heh-heh!
XX Vic: (Didju getchor thing tuhday,
- James: Wha:t.
Vic: Your thing.
(0.6)
- Mike: ()
- James: Mah thing?
Vic: Yea:h =
- James: = I keeps my thing with me aw:l (t h e t i m e.
Mike: (No:, no no (man)
→ Vic: (I'm, =
- = not (talkin about dat
Mike: (He means- he means-
James: (AHH hah hah hah!
Mike: He means dat (ti:ng.) nhinhh!
→ Vic: (Di:dju getchor thing, t'da: (y,
James: (Yeh I got it,
Vic: ((Well, Oh Wow:: ()!)
James: (Yeh I got it, I know whatchu mean I dus'
kidd'n(hh) eh heh heh! hh I got it (owright (t)
Vic: (Okay.)
- James: A(hh)heh a'ri. I got (my thi::ng,
Rich: (What's this thing),
(waitaminnit.) eh hah hah!
- James: Ehh heh heh (heh heh
Vic: (Ta:x. Yihknow,
James: Yeh.

Although in this episode Mike undertakes third position repair on behalf of Vic who is the speaker of the trouble source (marked by XX in the left margin), our discussion is directed to Vic's effort at repair. Note at the first arrow a rejection component ("I'm not talkin about that"), rejecting the understanding of "your thing" displayed in James's "joke," and then, at the second arrow, a resaying of the trouble source turn. Vic's effort at doing "clearer repeat" shows up in the transcript in the stretched sounds, the stress on "you" (in Di:dju) and the "extra punctuation" intonation drop, marked by a comma after "thing" in the transcript. (See also excerpt 13 below for use of the formulated punctuation "period"—as a method for "saying it clearer.")

This practice of “doing clearer repeat” is, however, quite infrequent in the data that I have examined. By far the most common format for this last component, the repair proper, is the repair marker “I mean” followed by one or more of four operations on the trouble source that are designed to recast the recipient’s understanding and, as we shall see, to provide an opportunity for another—different—response in next turn.

One type of repair operation takes the form “I mean” plus a contrast with the understanding of the trouble source displayed in *T*₂, which may have been made explicit in a preceding rejection component, as in excerpt 4 above or in 11 below, which is taken from a group therapy session with teenagers.

Excerpt 11 (GTS, V, 12–13)

- Roger: . . . it’s always this uhm image of who I am, ’n what I want people to think I am.
(0.2)
- Dan: And somehow it’s unrelated to what’s going on at the moment?
- Roger: Yeah. But t(h)ell me is everybody like that or am I just out of [it.
- Ken: [I- Not to change the subject but-
- Roger: Well don’t change [the subject. Answer me.
- Ken: [No I mea- I’m on the subject.
- I’m on the subject. But- I-I mean “not to
- interrupt you but-” uh a lotta times I’m sitting in class, I’ll start- uh I could be listening to the teacher and my mind’ll be four million miles away.
- Roger: That’s got nothina do wid’ it.
- Ken: No. I mean I’m thinking about someday what I’m going to be, an stuff like [that-
- Roger: [Heh wh(hh)en I grow up! heh [hhh hheh hhh hh
- Ken: [No, no or-or I could picture myself as being a- being a pilot of a big jet plane or some such- gut rot.

Note at the arrowed turns that Ken produces first a repair-initiating component (“no”), then begins the repair proper (“I mea-”) which he interrupts to respond to Roger’s responsive next turn in a variant of the agreement/acceptance component (here addressing himself to a complaint, rather than to the response to a complaint, with “I’m on the subject”), and then returns to the repair proper with “I mean” plus an idiom directly contrastive with the one in the trouble source, a turn-initial marker of divergence from immediately preceding talk, but a different one.

A second type of operation is the reformulation of the trouble source, a resaying of the same thing in different words, again framed by “I

mean.” In excerpt 12, a radio call-in show host is speaking with a caller who has recently developed a phobia about driving across bridges.

Excerpt 12 (BC, Beige, 14; Radio call-in show)

- Caller: . . . but- hh lately? I have fears a' driving over a bridge.
 ((pause))
- Caller: A:nd uh seems I uh- just can't uh (sit)- if I hevuh haftuh cross a bridge I jus', don't (goan' make-uh- do the) trip at all.
- Host: Whaddiyuh afraid of.
- Caller: I dun'kno:w, see uh
- Host: Well I mean waitam'n. What kind of fear izzit. 'R you afraid yer gunnuh drive off the e:dge? 'R you afraid thet uh yer gonnuh get hit while yer on it? =
- Host: = [What.
- Caller: [Off the edge 'r somethin.

The repair-initiation component here takes the form of “Well” plus repair proper (see n. 6 above), and the initial operation involves reformulating “Whaddiyuh afraid of” as “What kind of fear izzit.”

So also in excerpt 6 above, in which two different senses of “Don't prepare anything” appeared to be involved: the trouble-source speaker employs as her repair operation a reformulation, “So I mean if you uh have a cuppa coffee or something, I mean that uh that'll be fine. But uh othuh th'n that don't uh don't bothuh with anything else.”

A third operation that prosecutors of third position repair may employ in accomplishing the repair proper may be termed “specification.” Whereas the first operation introduced above involves using a contrast to the trouble source, and the second involves using a different way of saying the same thing, specification involves introducing candidate specifics included within the earlier formulation of the trouble source. Thus, in excerpt 12 above, after doing a reformulation with “What kind of fear izzit,” the speaker goes on to offer specific candidates: “ 'R you afraid you're gonnah drive off the edge?” and so on. In 13, recorded in a Civil Defense headquarters in the course of a major hurricane, the Civil Defense director (Lehroff) asks his chief engineer about the weather.

Excerpt 13 (CDHQ, I, 46–47)

- Lehroff: What is the weathuh. Out in that area now.
- Zebrach: No winds, er it's squalling, rain, the winds are probably out of the north,- west, at uh estimated gusts of uh sixty to sixty five miles an hour.
- (): (Whew!)
- Zebrach: Sustained winds of about thirty five to forty five miles per hour. And uh anticipated duration,

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- Lehroff: How is the wah- weather period outside. Is it-
rain(ing)? uh windy? or what?
→ Zembrach: ('s what I said). 's windy?
(): ()
Zembrach: An' it's raining.
Lehroff: S' an' it's raining.
Zembrach: An' it's raining . . .

After initially doing “repeating it more clearly” Lehroff provides specifications of the sort of questions he “meant” to be asking (i.e., in vernacular rather than technical terms): “Is it raining or windy or what?”

A fourth type of operation used by repairers to recast the trouble-source turn may be termed “explanation.” Consider in this regard excerpt 6 above, in which Belle includes, as part of her repair, an account of how she will be spending her day. In 6 this is apparently used as a preliminary to a reformulation of the trouble source, “Don’t prepare anything.”

In 14, however, the explanation is not preliminary to another operation; it is the repair proper. Here, a caller to a talk show has been on “hold” and suddenly finds himself on the air. When he breaks off his initial utterance (just as he was about to introduce himself, in violation of the “ground rules” for such programs) with the exclamation “Oh boy,” the radio personality chortles at what he apparently understands as a sign of the zest with which the caller is taking up his opportunity.

Excerpt 14 (BC)

- Host: And now, dear hearts, let’s go to the next call.
Shall we?
Host: Good evening, WNBC,
Caller: Good evening, this is uh, oh boy.
Host: ehh heh heh hyah [hyah!
→ Caller: [No I was listening to the
→ commercial, and I’m just kinda- confused fer a
→ minute.
Host: [Sorry about that, it’s a little rattling.

At the arrowed turn, the caller offers an explanation of his prior turn that recasts it away from something that could properly be a laugh source, and, indeed, the host then offers a very different type of response, addressed to the type of turn which the trouble source has now been proposed to have been.

One other type of operation needs to be mentioned, one that does not occur with the “I mean” marker and that, unusual for the domain of repair, appears to be type specific for misunderstandings on the serious/nonserious dimension (Schegloff, 1987*a*; for other possible trouble-type-sensitive repair forms, see Schegloff [1991*b*]). The operation in these cases involves “characterization” of the trouble-source turn (typically by forms like “I was just kidding”) and withdrawal from the sequence in which

it was implicated. Excerpt 15 comes from the early moments of conversation between erstwhile close friends who have not spoken for a long time.

Excerpt 15 (TG, 7–13)

- Ava: I wan'dah know if yih got a-uh:m wutchimicallit.
 A:: pah(hh)king place th's mornin'. 'hh
 Bee: A pa: rking place,
 Ava: Mm hm,
 (0.4)
 Bee: Whe:re.
 Ava: t! Oh: just anypl(h)la(h)ce? =
 → Ava: = I wz jus' kidding yuh.

Bee's responses to Ava's inquiry show her to have taken it seriously and to be trying (through a series of next-turn repair sequences) to understand it so as to provide an appropriate answer. In undertaking to address this claimable misunderstanding, Ava recharacterizes the trouble-source turn as nonserious. Shortly thereafter the sequence is exited and the talk is turned topically in another direction.

These, then, are the components out of which third-position-repair initiated turns are built: a turn-initial particle that initiates repair, a response (agreement/acceptance) component to certain types of preceding turns, a rejection component in which the trouble-source speaker (and repairer) formulates the problematic understanding that has engendered repair, and the repair proper, accomplished by "clearer repetition," by characterizing the trouble-source turn as nonserious if it was taken seriously, and, most commonly, by one or more of four types of operations (more may remain to be described)—contrast, reformulation, specification, and explanation—commonly framed by the repair marker "I mean." Not all of these components need be present; any of them (including the repair proper; see excerpt 7 above) may be absent in any particular instance.¹¹ But whichever components are employed on any occasion, they are virtually always arrayed in their canonical order, the order in which they have been presented here. (The exceptions are taken up below.)

There is evidence of two sorts that this ordering is not incidental, but is the result of speakers' orientations to get the components into this ordering. The first sort of evidence comes from occurrences in which a speaker who is constructing a third position repair has begun to produce the repair proper, and then turns to incorporate an "earlier" component into the turn. Rather than completing the repair proper and then producing an agreement/acceptance or rejection component, repairers self-interrupt the repair component in progress, do the component that they

¹¹ Compare the second discussion of excerpt 9 below.

mean to insert, and then return to re-begin the repair proper that had been broken off.

In excerpt 11a (taken from excerpt 11, above), Ken intervenes after Roger has asked a question.

Excerpt 11a

- Roger: Yeah. But t(h)ell me is everybody like that or am I just out of [it.
- Ken: [I- Not to change the subject but-
- Roger: Well don't change [the subject. Answer me.
- Ken: [No I mea- I'm on the subject.
- I'm on the subject. But- I-I mean "not to interrupt you but-" uh a lotta times I'm sitting
- in class, I'll start- uh I could be listening to the teacher and my mind'll be four million miles away.

Note that in the arrowed turn, Ken begins with a repair initiator and then begins the repair proper with "I mea-." He cuts off the repair marker and inserts a variant form of an agreement/acceptance component, addressing himself directly to Roger's preceding complaint. Having inserted that *B* component in its proper place, he then resumes; that is, he re-begins the repair proper.

In excerpt 16, a high school student has called a radio call-in show to offer his views on a previously discussed topic, the rise of juvenile delinquency in the suburbs.

Excerpt 16 (BC, Beige, 4-6)

- Caller: Well I::, do not find this sho:cking becuz I think I c'n understan' why it's beek- it has been increasing in the suburbs. Becuz these kids don't uh:: they don't ro:b fer the purpose of obtaining the object usually.
- Host: Mmhm::,
- Caller: Many of 'em jes' do it as a way of uh::, taking some parta their ti:me, let's say yihknow en itchy finger so to speak.
- . ((1 1/2 pages omitted, re: why kids have so much time, problems of transportation, etc.))
- . Host: So that the kid who robs a store::, en gets away by car didn' do it buhcuz he couldn' get to the the drive in [yuh know.]
- Caller: [N o.] I-I-I reelize that too. But I-
- mean, I don't mean these people who're committing
- m:major crimes, b't I mean jus' the uh y'know
- school vandalisms yuh know like broken windows . . .

In the third position turn here (at the arrows), the caller starts with a

repair initiation, then does an agreement component that responds to the radio personality's response to the caller's apparent complaint on behalf of teenagers, and then begins the repair proper with "But I mean." However, he then abandons it, and inserts a rejection component ("I don't mean . . ."), before repeating the repair marker to re-begin the repair. Other instances work similarly.

These fragments show that the canonical ordering of the components of third position repair turns is not only the product of a first-order "natural" ordering, but is reinforced by a second-order procedure that overrides the in-course production of such turns, so as to have their components arranged in "proper order."¹²

The basis for this order is quite clear. The initiation component serves, as other repair initiators do (Jefferson 1974; Schegloff 1979*a*), to put its recipient on alert that what follows may not be more of whatever unit has been transpiring, but that the progression of the talk may be being interrupted for repair. It is there to do the job of initiation, and that requires initial position.

The *D* component does the repair proper, in many cases re-doing the trouble-source turn in some variant version. In any case, as will become clear below, it is built to provide for another opportunity to respond to the trouble source, as it is newly understood. It therefore requires final position in the turn, after which the recipient can take next turn for a new "response," if there is to be one. The rejection component, then, necessarily must come between these two. With respect to the relative positioning of a rejection component and an agreement/acceptance component (where one is to be used), an agreeing response to a prior turn—especially in the delicate matter of complaints—best comes as early as possible, and surely before the very sequential basis for the prior turn is subverted by rejecting the understanding on which it has been based.

Given this "rational" basis for the canonical ordering of the components, and the apparent operation of both first- and second-order practices for ensuring it, how shall we understand deviations from it? If speakers can interrupt components-in-progress in order to insert ones that "belong" earlier, what is to be made of cases in which they do not seem to do so?

Such cases provide the second type of evidence for the account that has been offered. For when we examine instances of "misordering," as well as some instances in which an especially common component is omitted, we find the actual form of the turn to be specially adapted to its local sequential context. The practices for constructing third-position-

¹² On first-order and second-order practices and organizations, see Sacks and Schegloff, (1979, p. 16) and Schegloff (1987*b*, p. 75).

repair turns are, then, not applied mechanically, but are employed to implement particular interactional tacks.

Consider, for example, excerpt 17. Frieda and Reuben have come to have dinner with old friend Kathy and her husband Dave. Kathy and Dave are in the academic world, Frieda and Reuben are “in real estate.” Shortly after arrival at Kathy and Dave’s apartment, the following sequence transpires.

Excerpt 17 (KC-4, 10)

- Kathy: You got all dressed up? just to see us?
Reuben: Are you kidding?
(pause)
Frieda: (I’m not dressed up [ripped])
Reuben: [I’m in my underform.
Frieda: I’m all ripped.
Kathy: Oh yeah
Frieda: Yeah
Kathy: (I can see the hole)
Frieda: [(all over)
Reuben: [()
Reuben: Don’t you recognize my uniform?
→ Kathy: Yes. No, I meant Frieda was (wearing) a fancy dress.

Kathy’s initial turn in this sequence appears to be doing a complaint (albeit a “mock” complaint), taking the formality of her guests’ dress as a possible sign of a changed state of their relationship. Reuben and Frieda collide in their respective moves to offer a defense. Frieda wins the turn to go first and downgrades the state of her dress. Then Reuben offers as an excuse that his suit is “a uniform.” So at the arrowed turn Kathy is speaking after an excuse has been offered as a response to her complaint.

Note then that her third position repair contains three of the components described above: a repair initiation (“No”), an agreement component with a response to a complaint (“yes”), and a repair proper (“I meant Frieda . . .”). But the *A* and *B* components are in reversed order.

Then note that the turn after which she is talking is a question of the yes/no type (“Don’t you recognize . . .”), and that a “no” answer would be understood as rejecting the excuse that the question proffers. So, just as one common token of reciprocity, “uh huh” (the so-called backchannel signal or continuer), cannot be employed after a yes/no question because in that environment it would be heard as a “yes” answer, so here the usual turn-initial particle for third position repairs cannot be used in turn-initial position because it would be heard as a “no” answer to the question and hence as a rejection of the excuse. The inversion of the repair-initiation and agreement/acceptance components here is, then, not a slip-up by the speaker, nor counterevidence to the account that has

been offered, but an adaptation of the constructional practices that I have already described to this particular sequential locus.

A similar account may be understood to pertain to excerpt 9.

Excerpt 9 (GTS)

- Dan: . . . See Al tends, it seems, to pull in one or two individuals on his side (there). This is part of his power drive, see. He's gotta pull in, he can't quite do it on his own. Yet.
- Al: W'l-
- Roger: Well so do I.
- Dan: Yeah. [I'm not criticizing, I mean we'll just uh =
- Roger: lOh you wanna talk about him.
- Dan: =look, let's just talk.
- Roger: Alright.

Dan's arrowed turn contains three of the four components that have been described, but it lacks an *A* component, one of those which occurs most commonly. Here, as in the preceding case, the repairer is speaking after a response to a perceived complaint, and a turn-initial *no* is vulnerable to being heard as a rejection of that response. Here Dan does not invert the components. He omits the repair initiator altogether, beginning his turn with an agreement to the response to the complaint and then proceeding to provide for a reanalysis by his interlocutors of the trouble-source turn. Like the inversion of components, the omission of some components can be understood, therefore, as adaptations of the sequential practices of third-position-repair construction in the service of the interactional stance that the speaker means to take up. Inversion and omission of components can be ways of doing things or ways of avoiding doing things.¹³

Placement of Third Position Repairs

The account that has been offered of the recurrent form of third position repair has been based on turns appearing in the sequential position characterized in excerpt 3 above. But that schematic characterization, although offered as referring to *positions in a sequence*, has been treated as if it were also mapped onto *turns in a series*—as if the several positions in a sequence necessarily occurred in consecutive turns.

As it happens, most third position repairs are in fact found in the consecutive (or “serially”) third turn. But one payoff of developing an account of the format of third position repairs is that we are in a position

¹³ For example, if the rejection component is not part of a third-position-repair turn, if the putative misunderstanding is not overtly rejected, the effect may be a sort of “be that as it may” function (as, e.g., in excerpt 5).

to recognize its characteristic appearance wherever it occurs. It can then be observed that, although the vast majority of third position repairs are in the third turn after the trouble-source turn, not all of them are, and so they are surely not there *necessarily*. We can then ask, Are third position repairs that occur in other than the serially third turn placed arbitrarily, or is some other orderly placement in effect? If their placement is orderly, we can try to develop an account which will both describe where such repairs are if they are not in the serially third turn, *and* which will ground our understanding of the occurrence of most instances, which are in third turn.

Some instances of third position repair that are not in third turn appear quite straightforward. In excerpt 18, the dispatcher at the fire department is talking to someone who has called in a report.

Excerpt 18 (FD, IV, 66)

- Dispatch: Now what was that house number you said =
= [you were-
Caller: = [No phone. No.
Dispatch: Sir?
Caller: No phone at all.
→ Dispatch: No I mean the uh house number, [Y-
Caller: [Thirty eight
oh one?
Dispatch: Thirty eight oh one.

Here it seems quite clear that the third position repair, marked by the arrow, is displaced from serially third turn by the intervention of a next-turn initiated repair sequence (“Sir?” “No phone at all”) addressed to the “next turn,” the one displaying the misunderstanding.

Much the same is the case in excerpt 10 above, except there the intervention of next-turn-repair-initiated (NTRI) sequences was directed at the trouble-source turn itself, and there were two of them—first “What” and its response, and then “Mah thing” and its response. In both of these episodes, the next-turn initiated repair sequences entirely account for the displacement of third position repair from the serially third turn.

However, the third position repair in excerpt 17 above is not in the serially third position, and the intervening turns between it and the trouble-source turn are not taken up with repair. Is there an account that can deal with the “ordinary” cases in third turn, the ones displaced by NTRI sequences, and instances that seem to be anomalies, as does excerpt 17.

There *is* a formulation that appears to do both jobs. Although it sounds complicated, it is quite straightforward. Third position repairs are done *in the turn after a turn containing an utterance analyzably built to be “next” to some prior*.

The point is this. Although most turns respond to the immediately preceding talk, speakers can construct turns to address themselves to much earlier talk, even to talk occurring days or weeks previously. Especially by use of quotation formats (“Last week you were saying . . .”), speakers can locate any past talk—and even imagined talk—as what their ensuing talk is addressed to, is built as “next” to, although not all such efforts require as powerful a resource as quotation.

With this point noted, we can see that any turn can be built to display that it is addressed to some prior, and can then be understood as possibly revealing its speaker’s understanding of the earlier talk to which it is addressed. Then, after such a turn, the speaker of the earlier talk which is being “responded to” can address whatever problematic understanding the “responding talk” may reveal to be informing it.

So, in excerpt 17, after Frieda works through her response to Kathy’s complaint, Reuben undertakes to offer his response. His effort has been delayed not by NTRI sequences, but by Frieda’s response. Still, his “Don’t you recognize my uniform?” is understood by Kathy as addressed to her earlier turn about getting “all dressed up,” and so when she undertakes her third position repair, she is doing so *in a turn after a turn containing an utterance analyzably built to be next to some prior*, and it is that prior that is the trouble-source turn and to which Kathy’s repair refers.

A similar sequential logic is operating in excerpt 16, in which the third position repair is also placed at some distance from its trouble source.

Excerpt 16 (BC, Beige, 4–6)

Caller: Well I::, do not find this sho:cking becuz I think I c’n understan why it’s beek- it has been increasing in the suburbs. Becuz these kids don’t uh:: they don’t ro:b for the purpose of obtaining the object usually.

Host: Mmhm::,

Caller: Many of ‘em jes’ do it as a way of uh::, taking some parta their ti:me, let’s say yihknow en itchy finger so to speak.

· ((1 1/2 pages omitted, re: why kids have so much time, problems of transportation, etc.))

Host: So that the kid who robs a store::, en gets away by car didn’t do it buhcuz he couldn’t get to the drive in [yuh know.]

→ Caller: [N o.] I-I-I reelize that too. But I-
→ mean, I don’t mean these people who’re committing
→ m:ajor crimes, b’t I mean jus’ the uh y’know
→ school vandalisms yuh know like broken windows . . .

Note first the reference to “rob” in the teenage caller’s long initial turn. There is much ensuing talk on a variety of related matters in what follows and in the page and a half which has been omitted, but no pursuit or explicit mention of the matter of “robbing.” Then, in the first turn after the deletion, the radio host builds into his talk a reference to “the kid who robs a store” and thereby builds into the analyzable construction of his talk that it is addressed to a particular prior. The third position repair, however remote it may otherwise appear to be from the trouble-source turn that it operates on, is in the turn after a turn analyzably built to be next after some prior—*that* prior.

This same account deals with third position repairs displaced by NTRI sequences as well. In both 10 and 18, and in other such cases, when a responsive turn *is* finally produced and registered—whether the NTRI repair was directed to what later turns out to be the trouble-source turn for the third position repair (its *T1*) or to the response to it (its *T2*), the third position repair is in “the turn after a turn . . .”

Finally, the same account explicates how and why most third position repairs are found in the serially third turn. They are there because most turns containing utterances analyzably built to be next after some prior are in the turn *after that prior*. Consequently, repairs initiated in the turn after them are in serially third turn.

With this, we have completed an initial account of both the *position* and the *composition* of third position repair. Before further explicating the job it does, and what the alternatives to it are, it will be useful to introduce a further position for repair, one not discussed in earlier literature on repair and in some ways quite different from other forms of repair. It supplies a complement to third position repair in the more general locus of repair after next turn and needs therefore to be introduced as a resource.

Because of the efficiency of the organization of repair, the deeper into the repair space one goes—the “later” the position—the fewer trouble sources have gone undetected and have “survived” to have repair initiated on them there. By the time of fourth position, very few trouble sources have eluded repair, and it is hard to find many “specimens” for study. The discussion of fourth position repair is, therefore, based on only a handful of cases and should be treated with special caution.

FOURTH POSITION REPAIR

Position and Composition of Fourth Position Repair

The occasioning of fourth position repair is represented schematically in excerpt 19, as third position repair was represented in 3.

Excerpt 19

A: *T1* (e.g., *Q1*)B: *T2* (e.g., *A1*)A: *T3* (e.g., *Q2*)

B: ←

Speaker A does a turn, one which will turn out to be a trouble source; to track it, let us say it is an initial question. If B had some problem with *T1*, she or he could initiate repair in next turn. But if B does not encounter a problem in grasping *T1*, she produces a sequentially implicated next turn, *T2*; if *T1* was an initial question, then let us suppose that *T2* is an answer to that question.

If A found that *T2* displayed some problematic understanding of *T1*, then she could next employ a third position repair to address that problem. But if A finds no problem in *T2* itself, or in the understanding that *T2* displays of *T1*, then A can do a next turn, *T3*, predicated on the preceding sequence; let us say A does some sort of contingent, or follow-up, question—a second question. Now it happens that when B hears that second question at *T3*, it displays that the answer at *T2* had been predicated on a problematic understanding, indeed an incorrect understanding, of *T1*. So following *T3*, in fourth position, B undertakes to address this problem, by dealing with *T1* and the understanding which it was accorded.

This abstract schema was not abstractly derived. It describes particular empirical sequences, which we now must examine. Consider first excerpt 20, which occurs in a research organization just after the beginning of the year. Loes is the receptionist and keeper of supplies; Marty is a visiting researcher.

Excerpt 20 (EAS, FN)

Marty: Loes, do you have a calendar,

Loes: Yeah ((reaches for her desk calendar))

Marty: Do you have one that hangs on the wall?

→ Loes: Oh, you want one.

Marty: Yeah

Marty's question at *T1* can be understood as doing either of at least two actions. It can be the vehicle for a request for a calendar, or it can request to borrow a calendar (e.g., to check the day on which some future date falls). Loes apparently understands *T1* to be doing the latter of these actions, and in *T2* she offers as her answer a compliance marker and initiates the appropriate action. At *T3* Marty does a follow-up request (built as a "follow-up" by its use, e.g., of "one" to refer to calendar, requiring reference to his earlier utterance for the understanding of this

one).¹⁴ This follow-up request triggers in Loes a reanalysis of *T1*, a reanalysis whose product she proffers at *T4*.

As with third position repair, the schema represents these positions as occurring in consecutive turns, and the episode in 20 in fact runs off that way. But this is not necessarily the case for fourth position repair, any more than it was for third position repair. In excerpt 21, for example, Colonel Lehroff, the director of civil defense, is calling the home of the manager of the municipal truck yard.

Excerpt 21 (CDHQ, 15; Openings, 299)

- Phil: Hello?
Lehroff: Phil!
Phil: Yeh.
Lehroff: Josh Lehroff.
Phil: Yeh.
Lehroff: Ah:: what've you gotten so far. Any requests to
→ Phil: Oh you want my daddy.
Lehroff: Yeah, Phil,
Phil: Well he's outta town at a convention.

As it happens, the phone has been answered by the truck manager's son, whose name is also Phil. When he hears the caller's identification of him as "Phil," he understands himself to have been identified, and he ratifies the recognition (these being the *T1* and *T2* turns). The next two turns (the ones that end up displacing the fourth position repair from the serially fourth turn) complete the identification sequence by the caller's self-identification and the answerer's registering of it (Schegloff 1979*b*). These turns derive from a wholly independent order of organization—the organization of openings (as an aspect of the overall structural organization of single conversations, as here implemented in an identification se-

¹⁴ Some have suggested that *T3* here is itself a repair initiation, indeed a third-position-repair initiation, and that it has not been so treated because it fails to conform to the canonical format described earlier. The upshot of this suggestion is that the entire analysis is subverted because the canonical format is used to exclude nonconforming cases, which is how a canonical format is arrived at in the first instance. I have three responses. (1) Third position repairs that depart from the canonical format can be, and have been, recognized (see discussion of "I was just kidding" above; see also Schegloff [1991*b*]). (2) In *T3*, Marty is not so much addressing himself to trouble in Loes's understanding per se as he is using what her conduct displays her understanding to have been as the occasion for specifying his request. It is critical that he does not design his turn to display himself to be engaged in repair (e.g., "No, I mean, . . ."), but rather as a follow-up request, as noted in the text. (3) Even were it the case that Marty was initiating third position repair on the understanding of which calendar he "meant," Loes's utterance is addressed to a *different* understanding problem—that he wants the calendar to keep (and not to borrow). This repair is addressed to the initial request, relative to which it is in fourth position, quite independent of the prior turn (*if*, again hypothetically, it *were* a repair initiation).

quence; see Schegloff 1986). The mutual identifications being completed, the caller proceeds to the first topic, a topic designed for the answerer whom the caller thinks he has identified and recognized and whom he had called to raise this very topic. But raising that topic (in *T3*, predicated on *T1* and *T2*) reveals to Phil that his understanding of *T1* was wrong, and his response at *T2* was thus predicated on an incorrect understanding. In fourth position, which in this case is *not* in the serially fourth turn but is nonetheless clearly fourth *position*, he reveals the earlier misanalysis by announcing the product of a reanalysis.

In still other cases, fourth position is displaced from serially fourth turn by the interpolation of NTRI sequences, as was also the case for displaced third position repair (for the analysis of such a case, see Schegloff [1988*a*, pp. 59–60]).

As I have already suggested, the basic format of fourth position repair has two components. First is what Heritage (1984*b*) has termed the “change-of-state” token, “Oh.” This is for the most part followed by a recharacterization of the *T1*, the trouble-source turn, as in “Oh, you want one,” “Oh, you want my daddy,” or (in the case referred to above and analyzed in Schegloff [1988*a*]) “Oh, you’re looking for him.” The proffered reanalysis is confirmed by the *T1* speaker, and the repairer then offers a new response to the *T1*. In one case, the proffered reanalysis is omitted, and the fourth position repair consists only of the “oh” and a revised response to the trouble-source turn. This is excerpt 22 below (which is also dealt with elsewhere [Schegloff 1988*a*]).

Excerpt 22 (Kraus dinner)

- Mother: 'z everybody (0.2) [wash for dinner?
 Gary: Yah
 Mother: Daddy 'n I have t- both go in different
 directions, en I wanna talk t'you about where I'm
 going (t'night).
 Russ: Mm hm
 Gary: Is it about us?
 Mother: Uh huh
 Russ: I know where yer goin,
 Mother: Where.
 Russ: To the uh (eighth grade)=
 = Yeah. Right.
 XX Mother: Do you know who's going to that meeting?
 Russ: Who.
 Mother: I don't kno:w.
 → Russ: Oh:: Prob'ly Missiz McOwen ('n detsa) en prob'ly
 → Missiz Cadry and some of the teachers.
 (0.4)
 Russ: And the counsellors
 Mother: Missiz Cadry went to the- I'll tell
 you . . .

The trouble-source (marked by *XX* in the margin) lends itself to analysis either as a request for information or as a preannouncement. Russ initially understands it as a preannouncement and forwards the sequence to its next part. Mother's next turn reveals that this analysis is incorrect, and Russ then (in fourth position, which is the serially fourth turn) registers reanalysis without proffering its product (*oh*), and then produces a new response to *T1* based on his reanalysis, in this case responding to it as a request for information by providing that information.

The Relationship of Third and Fourth Position Repair to Intersubjectivity

What third position repair is to the speaker of a trouble-source turn, fourth position repair is to its recipient's understanding of it. Third and fourth position are "self's" and "other's" (i.e., speaker's and recipient's) post-next-turn positions for dealing with problematic understandings of some turn (*T1*). This intimate, virtually mirror-image relationship of the two positions is evidenced in various ways.

Perhaps the most striking such evidence is the simultaneous occurrence of third and fourth position repair in fragment 9.

Excerpt 9 (GTS)

- Dan: . . . See Al tends, it seems, to pull in one or two individuals on his side (there). This is part of his power drive, see. He's gotta pull in, he can't quite do it on his own. Yet.
- Al: W'l-
- Roger: Well so do I.
- Dan: Yeah. [I'm not criticizing, I mean we'll just uh =
- Roger: Oh you wanna talk about him.
- Dan: = look, let's just talk.
- Roger: Alright.

We have already seen that in response to a perceived criticism of Al, Roger has asserted solidarity, and that at the first arrow Dan undertakes third position repair, omitting the repair initiation, thereby avoiding a seeming rejection of Roger's response to the criticism, but agreeing with it with an agreement/acceptance component, rejecting the understanding on which it was based in a rejection component, and offering a contrasting characterization in its stead.

Now note, at the second arrow, that Dan's agreement triggers a realization on Roger's part that his understanding of Dan's prior turn may have been faulty. At the same time as the speaker of that turn, Dan, is producing the critical and core remainder of his third position repair, Roger is producing a fourth position repair, in its standard format, "Oh,

you wanna talk about him.” Third and fourth position are here used simultaneously and to do the same thing—third by speaker of the trouble source, fourth by its recipient.

We are now, finally, in a position to specify how it is that repair after next turn, composed of third and fourth position repair, provide the last structurally provided defense of intersubjectivity. These two positions are used to deal with a *sequence* going, or gone, off track. At least two turns are involved in the trouble—the trouble-source turn and the “next” turn, which displays a problematic understanding of the trouble-source turn. The major job that is served at third and fourth position is the retrieval of “next turn position” so as to allow another, better “fitted” next turn to be done.

Third position repairs accomplish this by the *speaker* redoing his or her own prior (trouble-source) turn, after which *its* next turn position is there again to be redone. And, regularly, it *is* redone and is done differently. A look at virtually any of the third-position-repair segments cited in the course of this discussion will show this (see, e.g., excerpts 4, 5, and 18).

Fourth position repairs allow retrieval of the next turn position by the recipient of the trouble-source turn by having the *recipient* reintroduce the trouble source as *reunderstood*, which, when confirmed, provides a new next turn position after it, in which a new—and different—next turn can be done, as in excerpts 18 (“Well he’s outta town at a convention”) or 22 (“prob’ly Missiz Cadry . . .” etc.).

Thus a sequence going awry because of a divergence between the parties’ understandings of what is being done—a threatened breakdown of concerted action by virtue of an incipient loss of intersubjectivity—is caught at third or fourth position, and is set aright by realigning and meshing the parties’ understandings and immediately embodying them in a succession of actions that, in effect, replaces an earlier succession and that resumes the interaction’s course of action.

This is the sense in which these repair positions provide a defense of intersubjectivity. They are the last structurally provided positions because after these positions there is no systematic provision for catching divergent understandings. In general, after third position, such repair as gets initiated can at best be characterized as being initiated when the trouble source is “next relevant.” Of course, it may never again be relevant.

Third and fourth positions provide that whenever some future turn addresses itself to some earlier talk and displays its speaker’s understanding of that earlier talk, provision is thereby made for addressing trouble if there is any. And if a next turn predicated on a response to an earlier one reveals that that response was based on a problematic understanding,

provision is thereby made for retrieving that earlier turn and reanalyzing it, and re-responding to it based on the new analysis. These opportunities are engendered by the very fact of extending a sequence from some earlier talk. To the degree that further action is predicated on earlier talk, the understanding of that talk is in principle made available for review. The site of that review—composed of third and fourth positions—is the floating arena I have termed “repair after next turn,” and is the last structurally in-built defense of intersubjectivity in conversation.¹⁵

THE MULTIPLE REPAIR SPACE

Schematic Display of Multiple Repair Space

It is possible, perhaps even natural, to read the preceding account as describing a set of objective places in conversation that determine or constrain the form of repair initiated in them: a speaker, finding himself or herself at some position, initiates repair of the type and format appropriate to that position.

But this would be an overly restrictive way of understanding the organization of talk in conversation, and perhaps of the relationship more generally between action on the one hand and structure or context on the other. In a way, one could as well say that the form of repair “selects” which “position” a speaker is adopting and choosing to speak from. A sense for the basis of this claim can be developed in the following manner.

Recall first that, if one takes any repairable as a point of reference, it is “followed” by a “repair initiation opportunity space” of four positions, generally lodged at least in the immediately consecutive turns (a turn’s repair space can last “longer,” of course, if some later talk is then ad-

¹⁵ Some critical discussions of conversation analysis (e.g., Taylor and Cameron 1987, pp. 120–23) have argued that analyses of the activities being done by a turn are condemned to an infinite regress, because “professional” analysis of any turn must be grounded in the understanding displayed by an interlocutor in next turn, but the import of that next turn must itself be grounded in *its* displayed understanding in the turn following, etc. Although there are a number of difficulties with this idea, what is most relevant here is that third and fourth repair positions provide a “floating” arena for catching and addressing any displayed misunderstandings, an arena renewed for any turn at talk whenever some subsequent turn addresses itself to that earlier talk. When an utterance has “cleared” this repair space without repair being initiated, it may be treated as having had the understandings displayed of it effectively ratified. While this is not a foolproof test (see the text below, where I discuss the contingency of a speaker *not* initiating repair in third position even when a clear misunderstanding has been displayed and see n. 19 below), the availability of displayed understandings to immediate repair initiation is a substantial and compelling basis for anchoring interpretations of utterances. It is so for professional analysts at least in part because it is so for conversational participants—at least until warrant is provided in the talk that occasions a reconsideration.

dressed to it). That is, the following turns can have, as possible deployments of the talk in them, the initiation of next turn, third position or fourth position repair. These potentials must be understood to be there, to have been there, even if not activated (Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks 1977, pp. 374–75).

Recall next that nothing is excludable from the class “repairable,” including repairs and repair initiators. That means that every turn trails a repair space behind it. And that means that there is not a single repair space, but that if there is ongoing talk, there are ongoing *multiple repair spaces*. Consider what this looks like represented in a schematic diagram.

Consider six consecutive turns, *T1–T6*. For convenience, I will treat *T1* as the initial turn in its occasion; no talk has preceded it. I will treat the case of two interactants. For each turn, I will treat the production of some sequentially appropriate or sequentially implicated next turn as the central possibility, for simplicity alternating questions and answers, but will make explicit what alternatives are implied by the presence of multiple repair spaces. To minimize graphic complexity, I will not spell out all the possibilities.

<i>T1</i>	A:	<i>Q1</i>			
<i>T2</i>	B:	<i>A1</i>	NTRI (<i>T1</i>)		
<i>T3</i>	A:	<i>Q2</i>	NTRI (<i>T2</i>)	Repair 3d (<i>T1</i>)	
<i>T4</i>	B:	<i>A2</i>	NTRI (<i>T3</i>)	Repair 3d (<i>T2</i>)	Repair 4th (<i>T1</i>)
<i>T5</i>	A:	<i>Q3</i>	NTRI (<i>T4</i>)	Repair 3d (<i>T3</i>)	Repair 4th (<i>T2</i>)
<i>T6</i>	B:	<i>A3</i>	NTRI (<i>T5</i>)	Repair 3d (<i>T4</i>)	Repair 4th (<i>T3</i> , 1)

This diagram may be read as suggesting that, at *T2*, speaker B has an alternative to an answer as sequentially implicated next turn, namely an NTRI addressed to *T1*.

At *T3*, alternatives to a sequentially appropriate next turn (such as another question) include both an NTRI on *T2* and a third position repair on *T1*.

At *T4*, alternatives to a sequentially implicated next turn, such as an answer (if *T3* had been a question), include an NTRI on *T3*, a third position repair on *T2*, and a fourth position repair addressed to *T1*.

At *T5*, the same alternatives are available (with, of course, different trouble-source turns being addressed).

At *T6*, the same alternatives are still available, but now the fourth position repair option may be addressed not only to *T3*, but to *T1*.

Finally, if we remove the restriction that *T1* be the first utterance of the conversation, *T1*, *T2*, and *T3* would include the same complement of alternatives as the others, for they would have prior turns as potential trouble sources to which repair initiation could be addressed.

The result is that, as of the beginning of any turn position, it is, in

principle, a place for a sequentially appropriate next turn, *or* an NTRI, *or* a third position repair, *or* a fourth position repair.¹⁶ Accordingly, “third position” or “fourth position,” while being objective positions with determinate characteristics, are not fixed and are not positions in which speakers may “find themselves.” One’s position may be a sort of choice, turning in part on what is to be treated as the repairable—if, indeed, repair is to be initiated at all, which may also be an option. It will be helpful to explicate some of these claimed alternatives, choices and options empirically, and not merely as abstract possibilities in formal schemata.

Some Actual Alternatives

A first alternative to repair after next turn is this. A “next turn” that is treated as displaying a misunderstanding of prior can sometimes be seen in other ways—for example, as an interactional tack that its speaker is taking, such as a joke or wisecrack. In 10 above, for example, James’s “I keeps mah thing with me all the time” is treated as based on a misunderstanding of prior turn, which warrants third position repair. It could as well be treated as a “joke first” response (Schegloff 1987*a*, pp. 212–16), to which the appropriate next turn is a laugh, after which a second, “serious” response may be expected. Thus, in excerpt 23, Ava has been describing her class schedule at college in response to an inquiry from Bee to the effect that “You’re only in school late on Wednesdays.” Then Bee, who attends adult continuing education, responds in light irony (for the sense of “early” and “late” is generically different for her school setting):

Excerpt 23 (TG, 434–42)

Ava: En then, the same thing is (uh) jus’ tihday is
like a long daycuz I have a break,
(0.7)

Bee: Hm:.
(0.6)

Bee: hh Not me:; hhuh uh-hhuh hhh! I go in late every
day hh!

¹⁶ Elsewhere (Schegloff et al. 1977, pp. 372–75), my colleagues and I showed that repair on each of several classes of repairable is initiated from each of the positions and also that repair on some same trouble-source token is initiated from the several positions. So, in principle, any utterance can have repair initiated on it from any of the positions. It does not follow, however, that every repairable can have repair initiated on it from every position, or that every turn position is a place from which each positional type of repair can be initiated. Particular trouble sources may not be addressable for particular types of trouble from each position, and particular turn “slots” may not, given what has immediately preceded them, lend themselves to positional repair types.

- Ava: Eyeh hh|h!
 Bee: [No this'z- No I have my early class tihday
 et four thi:rdy.

Rather than addressing the problematic understanding of what counts as “early” and “late,” Ava appreciates that a little joke is being made, and offers a little laugh in response, after which Bee employs the “joke-to-serious transitioning no” and offers a serious exchange account of her schedule.

A first alternative to repair after next turn, then, is to see, instead of a misunderstanding warranting repair initiation, a different tack being taken, with its own sequentially appropriate next.

A second alternative is this. If “next turn” is understood as indeed displaying a misunderstanding of its prior, then speaker of that prior—of the trouble-source turn—need not initiate repair, but can “let it go,” in other words, he or she can treat the responsive turn as if it were sequentially appropriate and correct. The misunderstood speaker may then later redo the misunderstood talk of the trouble-source turn as a “new utterance”; that is, do it not in the manner of “doing it again,” but doing it for “another first time,” to use Harold Garfinkel’s felicitous phrase.¹⁷ Here again, as in the first alternative described above, instead of repair, the speaker of some problematically understood talk produces a sequentially appropriate next turn.

Consider excerpt 24, in which two older women (sisters) are talking on the phone (“Bud” being Ann’s husband).

Excerpt 24 (NB)

- Ann: Well I tellyuh b- uh Bud might go back up t'the
 boat, He's out ridin' a bike now en 'e thought
 'eed [go up'n getta pa:per.
 Betty: [Oh:::
 Betty: Oh 'e wasn' going- 'e didn' go fishi-eh-deh
 [didn't go go:lfiŋ then
 Ann: [Oh I can't go-
 Ann: Huh. Oh God I can't go inna boat fer a lo:ng time.
 'E siz “No boating er no:;,”
 → Betty: Awww.
 Ann: [“-golf,”
 → Betty: [Bud wasn't playing golf?
 Ann: No.
 → Betty: Oh:: . . .

¹⁷ In not stopping the action ongoing in the talk to deal with “trouble,” this alternative resembles what Jefferson (1987) terms “embedded correction,” both of these practices involving, then, ways of dealing with problematic talk without the apparatus of “repair.”

Note that Betty's first turn in this excerpt presents an inference touched off by Ann's prior—actually, ongoing—turn, an inference about Bud. But Ann's response reveals her to have heard that inference as about herself, and she responds with what appears to be a complaint that she has been told (whether by Bud or by a "he" who is her doctor) that she cannot go boating, and so on. In the following turn, then, Betty could deal with this displayed misunderstanding with a third position repair: "No, I don't mean you, I mean Bud." She does not. At the first arrowed turn, she does a sequentially appropriate response to a complaint—an expression of sympathy or condolence, "Awww." Then, at the second arrow, she "redoes" the trouble-source turn, but with modifications that allow it to come off as being said here for the first time, features fitted to its current sequential environment rather than the sequential environment of its prior saying. I will mention three of these.

Note first that the second saying drops a marker of sequential linkage to prior turn, a sort of "inference marker," with which the first saying ended: "then." Its retention in a saying of the turn that is no longer adjacent to the inference source could underscore the character of this saying as a repeat, and the source of the inference is no longer in prior turn.

Note second that the "topic" of the inquiry is referred to in the first saying as "he" and in the second saying as "Bud." Again, the first saying followed a turn in which Bud was referred to by name, and the pronoun is an appropriate way of marking subsequent reference to a same referent. In the second saying that sequential proximity has been lost, and in the intervening talk another referent has been mentioned (a "he" who may not be Bud but the doctor) to whom "he" might inappropriately be taken to refer.

Note finally that the first saying is initiated by "Oh," a particle which regularly marks a "change of state" (Heritage 1984*b*), which can serve as an interruption marker and initiator, and which here serves as a "touch-off" marker (as I believe Sacks termed it), displaying that what was just said in the turn-in-progress has touched off what the oh-speaker is about to say. The second saying is not initiated in the same manner, for, of course, it is not interrupting, and what it will be saying has not just been touched off. However, the change-of-state token is not omitted entirely. It is simply displaced from turn-initial position to third position in the question/answer sequence (at the third arrow), where it marks change-of-state.¹⁸ The shift is fitted to the displacement of the inference from a position directly after its source to a later point in the talk.

¹⁸ Note that "oh" marks an *interactional* event, not necessarily a *cognitive* one. By the time B says the utterance whose confirmation she acknowledges with "oh," she

The second alternative to repair after next turn, then, recognizes that there has indeed been a misunderstanding but adopts nonrepair ways of dealing with it.¹⁹ One by-product of such a practice should be mentioned. A speaker who declines to initiate repair on such a misunderstood turn may in effect appear to have endorsed the understanding of it which has been displayed in the response. But on some occasions, participants will prefer that result to actually initiating repair.

If “next turn” cannot be understood as embodying some interactional tack which its speaker is taking but *is* understood as displaying a misunderstanding of the prior, trouble-source turn, and the speaker of the trouble-source turn *is* to initiate repair, there is still an issue of alternatives. The speaker of the misunderstood turn may be in a position to initiate either (1) third position repair on his or her own prior turn *or* (2) next-turn initiated repair on the prior turn, the one which stands in a problematic relationship to the misunderstood turn. Between these two alternatives, the preference for self-correction (were it to be operating here as it does between same-turn and next-turn repair) would issue in a preference for third position repair, for that form of repair involves the repairer initiating repair on his or her own talk rather than on the talk of another.

But there appears to be a constraint on doing third position repair, which if not met seems to make doing third position repair problematic. A speaker of some prior talk must understand some next turn after it—some recognizably “responsive” turn—well enough to appreciate, first, that it is based on a misunderstanding of that to which it meant to be responsive, and, second, what that misunderstanding is. Such a grasp of the “responsive” turn seems necessary for the prospective repairer to know how to design a relevant repair (including, e.g., what to reject in a rejection component).

It is striking that this constraint is regularly satisfied (see Schegloff 1968, p. 1082). Misunderstandings are not randomly wrong; there appear

has long since (in interactionally temporal terms) “known” what she here registers interactionally. Overt cases of such a divergence between the cognitive and the interactional should serve to alert investigators not to treat “oh” as necessarily marking *when* something has been learned or inferred.

¹⁹ Of course, a misunderstood speaker may let the misunderstanding pass, and *not* redo the misunderstood utterance later either (see Heritage and Atkinson 1984, p. 14, n. 6). Thus, not all troubles, however clear and ripe for repair, are dealt with—either overtly or covertly. And the absence of repair is not a *guarantee* that a next turn reflected an acceptable understanding of prior. There may, of course, be other aspects of the talk—so-called hidden agendas—which elude the understanding of a recipient (by design or not), and these may not manifest themselves in any specific turn, nor may there be any interest on the speaker’s part in repairing such failures to understand.

to be at least some systematic connections between what some talk is “designed” to do or to refer to, and what it will be understood as doing or referring to, *either* correctly/acceptably or not (cf. Schegloff [1968, p. 1082] on the systematic mistakability of certain forms of greeting for summoning and [1987a] for a range of other systematic misunderstanding types). And not only are the misunderstandings orderly, but they are apparently understandable to speakers of the misunderstood talk, who might have been taken to be so committed to the sense that their talk was designed to embody that they would be incapable of seeing what sensible alternatives were available in it.

Sometimes, however, misunderstood speakers do not grasp that they have been misunderstood, and they may then simply fail to understand talk designed to be responsive to their own. In that case, we do indeed find them employing NTRIs rather than third position repair, for the trouble source is then not their own prior talk, which they see has been misunderstood, but the other’s talk, which they fail to understand.

In excerpt 25, B has called a radio call-in show to ask what remedy there might be for a suspended driving license.²⁰

Excerpt 25 (BC, Beige, 20–21)

1. Host: How long ‘ave you had the suspensh’n.
2. Caller: eh, since Febooary d’t’ird.
3. Host: Since February the third. You uh: wha’diyuh do,
4. fer a living.
5. Caller: Eh::m I woik inna driving school.
6. Host: Inna dri:ving school.
7. Caller: Yeh. I spoke t’you many ti:mes.
8. Host: Oh Yeah. You gottuh beautiful thing goin’.
9. Haven’tche.
10. Caller: Yea::h,
11. Host: ^lYou can’- You can’ make a living.
12. Caller: No, I manage yih know, I go by bus, de fellas
13. drive me over you know,
14. Host: Yeh but ha’di- whaddiyuh do et school.
15. ((pause))
16. Caller: Excuse me?
17. Host: Whaddiyuh do et school.

²⁰ A few “ground rules” of this program are relevant to the understanding of this fragment. Callers are not allowed to identify themselves by name, and this is apparently a problem for those callers who call frequently and come to count themselves as acquaintances of a sort. They may find themselves starting to self-identify as a matter of “routine” (Schegloff 1986) before aborting the self-identification, as in excerpt 14 in the text above. They sometimes find ways of making themselves recognizable or find themselves recognized by some attribute recalled from an earlier call. This appears pertinent in excerpt 25 in the text, when A reacts sharply to the information that B works in a driving school, and B apparently takes it as having been “personally recognized”—“Yeh, I spoke to you many times.”

18. Caller: Whaddiyuh mean “ ’n school.”
 19. Host: Well you work ettuh driving school, [right?
 20. Caller: [Yeh but I
 21. jus’ go to the motor vehicle ’n awl that. I’m not
 22. en instructor yett.
 23. Host: [Oh I see. Y’don’ ’aftuh worry
 24. about that.
 25. Caller: No,
 26. Host: Okay.

Here, mutual understanding seems to be disintegrating as early as lines 5–6. By line 11, the host seems to be displaying misunderstanding, but the caller does not seem to grasp this. He is therefore not in position to see that “What do you do at school?” is predicated on the puzzle of a driving instructor who has lost his license. Were the caller to grasp that this question reflects a misunderstanding of “I work in a driving school” (line 5), he could do a third position repair, for example, “No, I’m not an instructor, I just deliver messages.” Without that grasp, he simply cannot understand what the host is asking him. When his NTRI (line 16, “Excuse me”) elicits only a repetition of the trouble source, he can only initiate repair again on the same trouble source. Eventually, the nature of the trouble becomes available to him.

We can see here one of the senses in which various positional types of repair are alternative at some given turn slot. In excerpt 25, NTRI and third position repair are alternatives after “What do you do at school?” (line 14). But that does not necessarily mean that the recipient of that turn can choose which one to do. The constraints on doing a third position repair are not met here, and speaker B “can only” do an NTRI. Still, the character of the multiple repair space organizes and provides the terms of the alternatives that inform that sequential slot.

In excerpt 25, a recipient of a turn does not understand how it is a next turn, or what sort of next turn it is, to his own prior utterance. In third position repairs, the speaker of a turn does understand how an interlocutor’s ensuing talk is designed to be a next, or responsive, turn but treats that as reflecting a misunderstanding of what is being responded to. In a fourth position repair, one who has responded to another’s utterance comes to see from the consequence that that response engenders that the response was based on a wrong understanding of that which was being responded to. In each of these positions, one of the participants, at some point, “realizes” that the talk has gone off the track, that the participants are not operating with the “treatably same” understandings of what is being talked about and of what is being done through the talk. These are the “defenses of intersubjectivity,” and they are structurally provided in the sense that the contingencies of “responding,” and the turn-taking and sequence organizations of conversa-

tion, provide opportunities for assessing and addressing incipient divergences whenever a “response” is due or has been recognizably done *as a response*. It may be useful to examine one instance that exemplifies what can happen to an interaction in which none of these devices works to allow an incipient breakdown of intersubjectivity to be spotted and dealt with.

A Breakdown of Intersubjectivity

Excerpt 26 is taken from a radio call-in show, recorded in the late 1960s, while the Vietnam war was in progress. The discussion has turned to the topic of possible withdrawal. “A” is the radio “host” and “B” the caller. It will be necessary to provide rather a long excerpt.

Excerpt 26 (BC, Red, 103–6)

- A: Our settlement. Whatever it should be, will pertain to the action of our forces.
- B: So then we killed- uh we could still leave a vacuum there. Because if the South Vietnamese gov'mint-
- A: We could, If we pulled
out wrong? Yes.
- B: So if the Sie- uh South Vietnam gov'mint doesn't go along with ours. Then we just go uh say goodbye 'n we leave the shores. This's what- that'll accomplish ().
- A: Ye- Uh, D'you have-
- A: D'you remember a thing called “the Korean War.”
- B: Oh yes.
- A: D'you remember the talks at Panmunjum,
- B: Uh (fuh) years. Yes.
- A: Alright, now I'm gunna tell you something that I personally observed in Seoul during that period. There were two groups of people going up 'n down the street haranguing the crowd:s, doing their darndes'to sell the people on::, no talks at Panmunjum. No peace with the eh:: with the North etcetretcetera. Checking with some friends of mine in Intelligence, I c'n tell you. Uh, which I did at the ti:me, I c'n tell you that those two groups of people represented on the one hand, the North Koreans, an' on the other, Synman Rhee, an' the South Koreans. The Chinese and the Americans were locked knee deep in a confrontation in that wa:r, but neither the North or the South Koreans was willing yet—tuh let their allies quit fighting each other, in order to try an' get outta the thing.
- B: Those are certainly not the conditions that prevail
- A: now, At one time, the Thirty Seventh Div- the Thirty Seventh Regiment, under Mike McKayliss, was drawn up, facing South. Tuh keep Syngman Rhee from sending his people across the D.M.Z.

- B: Well yeh, Bu' that's not the conditions that prevail
a→ now there [you know.
A: [No bu' what I'm saying to you i:s, thet if
it got that m- ba:d, or it got necessary, our primary
concern, we have a concern for South Vietnam's
b→ territorial integrity which is why we're the:re. But
our primary concern regarding our personnel, any
military commander has that primary loyalty.
B: [No? Are:n' we
c→ there because of U.N. uh — doctrine?
A: [No:::
B: [Aren't we there under the [the ()-
d→ A: [Where didju ever get that
cockeyed idea.
e→ B: Whaddy mea:n.
A: U.N. doctrine.
B: We're there, representin' the U. N. No?
A: Wouldu- You go ask the U.N., you'll get laughed out.
No.
B: We're there because- of our interests.
A: [Yes.
B: [We're not there wavin the U.N. flag?
A: We're- There's no U.N. flag there. Thet's not a United
Nations force. The United Nations has never taken a
single action on this.
((pause))
A: [I-
B: [No. I think (this ti::me)- I think you're wrong.
A: Sorry sir, I'd suggest yuh check yer facts.
B: I think y- I uh [()
f→ A: [I will refrain from telling you you
don' know what cher talking about,
B: [I wish you would.
A: [I just suggest you
talk- you check yer facts.
B: [I wish you would.
B: Because this's what I read in- in the newspapers.
[That we represent-
A: [Well, then you been reading some pretty ba:d
newspapers.
B: [We represent the U. N. there.
A: [F'give me, but I gotta go.
A: Sir, I would suggest thet if that's the case you switch
newspapers.
B: Well I hope I c'n call you ba:ck an' correct you.
A: L'k you check it out. 'n call me.
B: I'll do [so.
A: [Okay?
B: I certainly will.
A: Mm gu'night.

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After the radio host reads several commercial announcements and takes the next several calls, the caller represented in 26 is reconnected with the host as per excerpt 27 below.

Excerpt 27 (BC, Red, 156–58)

- A: Good evening, WNBC
B: You asked me tuh call you back, an' I did.
A: Yessir.
B: A::n' uh, My reference is the World Almanac, page seven hundred an' seven: tee r::n, nineteen sixty eight Almanac,
A: l Mmmhmm?
A: Mmmhmm
B: -states thet we're there, under the U.N. d- command.
A: Where- Wai'min'. Waitamin'. Wai'min'. Wai'min. Now either we're talking about the U.- Oh yer talkin 'bout Vietnam,
B: I'm talkin about Korea.
A: Oh.
(pause)
A: Well now we go back an' do it all over again.
B: Well what- you asked me tuh check up on it, ()
A: l No.
No, I thoughtchu were talkin about Vietnam. 'at's why I was arguin' with yuh.
B: Oh no.
A: No, [of course we were i-uh-
B: () unilateral ()
A: l We are there now under U.N. auspices, although we committed our troops before we even bothered tuh check with the U. r N.,
B: l Right. Right.
That's all, then we misunderstood each l other.
A: l Yeah. My apologies.
B: Righto.
A: Right. Gu'night sir,

At arrows *a*, *b*, and *c* in 26, the interlocutors' discussion of both South Korea and South Vietnam makes use of a succession of "there" references in which they lose track of what each is talking about. That leads A to believe that B is asserting that the United States is in South Vietnam under U.N. auspices, whereas B is making that claim about the United States presence in South Korea. Neither catches that there has been an error in reference deployment or reference understanding,²¹ each rather

²¹ This is perhaps the clearest instance in this article of a misunderstanding based on what Sacks (in press) called, in an early (fall 1967) discussion of many of the matters discussed here, a trouble in the "tying techniques," i.e., the techniques by which one utterance is "tied to" (or relates itself to) another.

prepared to believe the other either ill-informed or ill-tempered. The misunderstanding leads to overt disagreement, to overt challenges and negative assessments (e.g., at arrow *d*), and eventually (at arrow *f*) to what amounts to an insult. In fact, before the call is closed, the parties are virtually shouting at one another. At the close of the call, there has been something tantamount to a rupture in the relationship, such as it was.

As it happens, the parties are once again put in contact with each other, and have another opportunity to sort out that there has been a misunderstanding. An apology is extended and accepted, the relationship (remote as it is) is restored, and the conversation is closed on an amicable note.

But this second chance (or *n*th chance) is an artifact of the mass media setting of the exchange.²² Once the initial conversation had closed on a nasty note, the parties might well have never spoken again. This may appear to matter little when the participants are a caller to a call-in show and its host. But the interactional consequences of undermined intersubjectivity can be the same when the interlocutors are husband and wife, employer and employee, heads of state, and so on, with far more serious consequences for relationships, employment histories, and the like, including life itself (cf. Whalen, Zimmerman, and Whalen 1988).

CONCLUSION

When a source of misunderstanding escapes the multiple repair space, a whole institutional superstructure that is sustained through talk-in-interaction can be compromised. And since virtually anything in the talk can be such a source of misunderstanding, the potential for trouble for that institutional superstructure can be vast. It is against those systematic potentials for subversion of social order that repair after next turn is the last structurally provided defense.

²² It is appropriate to remark that the account offered here has been for "conversation," and not necessarily for all speech-exchange systems or organized forms of talk in interaction. Because the organization of repair is mapped onto a turn-based organization of talk, variation in the setting or context, or anything that can involve some transformation of the turn-taking system by which the talk is organized and may well carry with it differences in the organization of repair, and, with them, changes in the provisions for defending intersubjectivity (see Button [1987] on the absence of third position repair from employment interviews). One instructive setting may well be formal performances and ceremonies. Novice performers are often instructed not to try to initiate repair on miscues in their performance, and many seasoned performers and civil and religious functionaries avoid addressing themselves to the fixing of "mistakes." This has, in part, to do with unavailability of sanctioned options (e.g., in next turns) for spectators to enter into the effort to repair trouble.

What then can be said about this little package to which the management of intersubjectivity appears to be entrusted? Several simple but general points can be registered.

The defense of intersubjectivity is *procedural*, putting tools in the hands of the participants for doing what needs to be done, with no "substantive" prespecification of what, for example, the trouble might be or what its sources or "causes," of what sort of work might need doing, and how it should be done.

Which is to say, as well, that it is *party administered*. One upshot of that feature is that adequacy of understanding and intersubjectivity is assessed not against some general criterion of meaning or efficacy (such as convergent paraphrase), and not by "external" analysts, but by the parties themselves, vis-à-vis the exigencies of the circumstances in which they find themselves. Ordinarily such adequacy is evidenced by the appropriateness (as assessed by the previously misunderstood party) of the revised response that the repair operation engenders. Surely this is the sort of thing that Schutz (1962, pp. 16, 27 ff.) and Garfinkel (1967, chap. 1) had in mind by the phrase "adequacy for . . . practical purposes."

The defense of intersubjectivity is *locally managed, locally adapted, and recipient designed*. That is to say, although always a present resource, it is invoked by parties as local circumstances make relevant and for problems as they arise for just those parties in just those circumstances (even, e.g., if those problems take forms that no one else but those parties could understand).

The defense of intersubjectivity is *interactional and sequential*, coordinating the parties' activities in achieving a joint understanding of what is going on and how those events might have been incipiently misunderstood. It is set into operation in a turn-by-turn metric at just the point at which problematic understanding appears incipiently consequential, as evidenced in the ostensibly interactionally responsive conduct of an interactional coparticipant. In this regard, both the interactionally "responsive" character of conversation and the presence of the "author" of what is responded to are critical.

All of this is to say that the locus of order here is not the individual (or some analytic version of the individual) nor any broadly formulated societal institution, but rather the *procedural infrastructure of interaction*, and, in particular, the practices of talking in conversation.

Although this is not the appropriate occasion for a detailed explication of the matter, it may be of interest to consider briefly the relationship of the position informing the present analysis (and *mode* of analysis) to strands of contemporary sociological theorizing that appear to be related to it.

In many of the above-mentioned respects the account offered here

appears to be fundamentally at odds with a stance such as the one adopted by Habermas. Although “communicative action” is at the heart of his theorizing (Habermas 1984, 1987), and has been from early on (1970), and although “understanding” is central to his view of it, his work is virtually devoid of any examination of actual communicative action in ordinary social life. He has, of course, insisted (1984) on the need for a preempirical pragmatics, if not an a priori one, presumably to serve as necessary leverage for a critical theory. But in appropriating contemporary speech-act theory (largely taken over from Searle 1969), he has contributed to the subversion of his own goals by relying on an analytic resource that in effect casts action as atomistic, individualistic, atemporal, asequential, and asocial.

Habermas is but one of the contemporary theorists who cast talk and interaction in a central role in the dramatic structure of their theories, while relying almost entirely on others’ accounts of them. Habermas appropriates Austin and Searle; Collins and Giddens adopt Goffman. But it is becoming clear that, whatever their merits, none of these students of linguistic action and/or conduct in interaction is a reliable guide to the organization of action-in-interaction at the level of detail that increasingly seems relevant. Theories made to stand on such supports can quickly lose their grounding in reality.

In the juxtaposition of theories such as those of Habermas, Collins, or Giddens with the empirically grounded mode of inquiry presented here, one may legitimately reject the question of how such empirical results are to be mapped to the terms of such theories—a question often put to analyses like the one presented here. Instead—and to the degree that empirical work appears to have conveyed the organization of action and interaction relevant to the parties²³—one should ask what grounds there are for continuing to take seriously theories whose analytic center of gravity is located elsewhere.²⁴ I have already pointed out (Schegloff 1987c, p. 229), “One can argue . . . that any discipline that takes the understanding of human action as its goal must be answerable to such microanalysis as seems to offer a rigorous account of the details of social action *in its own terms*. . . . Compatibility with the terms of a microanalysis adequate to the details of singular bits of interaction is a (perhaps *the*) major constraint on articulation with other orders of theorizing.” It is such a microanalysis that I aim to advance in this article.

²³ By “relevant” I mean not “available to lay articulation” (not, then, what I take it Giddens [1984, p. 7] terms *discursive consciousness*), but rather “demonstrably oriented to in the actual conduct of the interaction.”

²⁴ Unless, of course, they are the sort of theory for which evidence of this sort is not relevant in the first instance, in which case it surely makes no sense to juxtapose the two.

In all the respects mentioned earlier in reviewing the upshot of the preceding analysis, the device for the management and defense of intersubjectivity is of a piece with the organization of the activity in which it operates—ordinary conversation.

As it happens, this activity—conversation and its transformations into other forms of talk-in-interaction—is the vehicle through which a very great portion of the ordinary business of all the major social institutions (and the minor ones as well) gets addressed and accomplished. It is evident that much—even most—of the work of such institutions as the economy (in its several institutional contexts), the polity (in *its* several contexts), the institutions for population replacement (courtship, marriage, socialization, and education), the law, religion, social control, culture, and so forth, is accomplished in episodes of talk-in-interaction. A resource for the management of intersubjectivity for the activity of conversation and other forms of talk-in-interaction has, on that account alone therefore, a very broad provenance. But two sorts of observations may be offered about the bearing of this account with respect to intersubjectivity regarding nonconversational (or nontalk) occurrences and features of the social world.

On the one hand, much of the grasp of the world that informs the sentience and conduct of members of a society is, or can be, managed (crystallized, assessed, challenged, clarified, revised, confirmed, shared, reinforced, etc.) through talk, including objects of understanding that are not themselves talk. Any reference to an object, person, action, dream, fantasy, that is, anything real, or unreal but mentionable, and indeed anything understood to be presumed or presupposed by what is said or conveyed, can be made the object of talk—not necessarily a topic, but what the talk is understood to bear on. Thus in providing for the management of intersubjectivity in talk, provision is made as well for the management of intersubjectivity regarding whatever can enter into the talk.

On the other hand, from the account of the management of intersubjectivity in conversation, some guidelines are offered for the exploration of related practices in other domains.

First, if the practices are not indigenous to the practices of *talk*, then they should be anticipated to be indigenous to whatever other activities are involved, relative to which intersubjective understanding is under examination. Thus, for example, for work practices that require coordination but whose work environment interferes with ordinary communication through talk (e.g., high-rise construction riveting), mechanisms for intersubjectivity should be sought in whatever forms the practices of work take. If these are gestural (in the literal sense, not the adaptation of it as a metaphor in symbolic interactionism), for example, they may depart in various ways from the turn-taking practices that appear to

organize talk, and one might expect that a repair organization through which intersubjectivity is managed will be of a piece with that organization. Where those practices differ from those of conversation, one may ask whether vulnerability to losses of intersubjectivity, or to the failure to catch it, is enhanced, or whether defenses of intersubjectivity are provided for in other ways.

Second, the more general import transcends the specific concern with intersubjectivity discussed here. It is that activities and their organization can be, and should be, studied locally (that is, in the environments of their natural occurrence) and through the detailed examination of the indigenous practices through which it is (or they are) composed. And further, that much more of what composes the social world than has been imagined by most sociologists may be investigated in terms of activities and their procedural infrastructure. A whole domain of inquiry awaits.

APPENDIX A

A Note on the Organization of Repair

A bit of background on the notion “repair” may be of use here. Past work has given strong indications of a fundamental form of organization in talk-in-interaction that provides mechanisms for the participants to deal with an immense variety of troubles in speaking, hearing, or understanding the talk. These range from inability to access a word when needed or to articulate it properly, to transient problems in hearing (e.g., due to ambient noise), to variously based problems of understanding; the “variety of troubles” thus includes various classes of problems and a virtually unlimited array of “sources” or “causes.” This “self-righting mechanism” that allows talk-in-interaction to keep itself going in the face of such “problems” we have termed the organization of *repair* (Schegloff et al. 1977).²⁵ A brief resumé of some main features of the organization of repair will provide the context for the specific concerns of this article.

In describing this organization of repair in talk-in-interaction, it has proved fruitful to discriminate between the *initiation* of efforts to deal with trouble (whatever the type of trouble), and the subsequent trajectory of such efforts to *success or failure*. Furthermore, there appear to be distinct differences between *repair initiated by the speaker* of the talk in which the trouble occurs, and *repair initiated by others*. Repair initiated

²⁵ As used in this context, the term “repair” is not addressed to all divergences or difficulties of understanding, only ones presented by the production and uptake of the talk itself.

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by the speaker of trouble-source talk is initiated in various positions relative to that talk; virtually all repair undertaken by others than the speaker of the trouble source is initiated in the *turn after the one in which the trouble source occurred*. Further, whereas repair initiated by speakers of the trouble regularly proceeds directly to *solve the problem* if possible, repair initiated by others ordinarily restricts itself to *raising the problem*, that is, *initiating* the repair, but leaving it for the speaker of the trouble source to actually accomplish the repair (see Schegloff et al. [1977] for further elaboration). Third position repair is, then, to be understood by reference to this organizational context.

APPENDIX B

Transcription Conventions

A brief guide to a few of the conventions employed in the transcripts may help the reader in what appears to be a more forbidding undertaking than it actually is. It is apparent from the excerpts printed in this article that some effort is made to have the spelling of the words roughly indicate the manner of their production, and there is often, therefore, a departure from normal spelling. Otherwise:

- Arrows in the margin point to the lines of transcript relevant to the point being made in the text.
- () Empty parentheses indicate talk too obscure to transcribe. Letters inside such parentheses indicate the transcriber's best estimate of what is being said.
- [Left-side brackets indicate where overlapping talk begins.
-] Right-side brackets indicate where overlapping talk ends.
- ((points)) Words in double parentheses indicate comments about the talk, not transcriptions of it.
- (0.8) Numbers in parentheses indicate periods of silence, in tenths of a second.
- ::: Colons indicate a lengthening of the sound just preceding them, proportional to the number of colons.
- becau- A hyphen indicates an abrupt cut off or self-interruption of the sound in progress indicated by the preceding letter(s) (the example here represents a self-interrupted "because").
- He says Underlining indicates stress or emphasis.

A fuller glossary of notational conventions can be found in other sources (see, esp., Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 1974; Atkinson and Heritage 1984, pp. ix–xvii.)

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