

Some Practices for Referring to Persons in Talk-in-Interaction: A Partial Sketch of a Systematics¹

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1. Introduction

Conversation-analytic work plays back and forth between poles on several dimensions. For one, it aims to account for observable regularities in *aggregates* of data, and at the same time to formulate analytic resources adequate to the understanding of *single* cases, situated in context. This dual commitment is exemplified in two of the papers especially familiar to linguists (if any are) because of their appearance in *Language*, namely, the papers on turn-taking and on repair (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974; Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks 1977). As we put it in the latter paper (1977: 362), "...we are interested in finding mechanisms which operate on a 'case-by-case' (or environment-by-environment) basis, yielding as a by-product some observable orderliness for the aggregate."

Another dimension of variation along which conversation-analytic work ranges embodies a dialectic embracing accounts both of the *systematic organization* of some analytically defined domain of practices (such as turntaking or repair) and of the *interactional occasioning* and situated exploitation of those systematically organized practices. The second of these dialectics operates between so-called *system-oriented* and *interaction-oriented* analyses of single episodes (Jefferson 1984: 23; Schegloff 1987a: 101-2). System-oriented analysis focuses on the way in which some single occurrence instantiates the systematic operation of the *domain* being studied (such as turn-taking, repair, person-reference); interaction-oriented analysis seeks to expli-

cate how the diverse particulars of that moment in that interaction (ordinarily drawn from analytically diverse domains) come to bear on the enactment and understanding of the conduct which composes the episode, even if for only selected elements of that conduct. Although not impossible, it is less common for single papers to encompass both of *these* commitments.

The present paper is system-oriented, although its goal is to provide an *increment* to our understanding of the organization of person-reference and a *framework* for its depiction, *not* an account of the domain as a whole. The themes focussed on should serve to position earlier work on person reference (especially Sacks 1972a, 1972b, and Sacks and Schegloff 1979) within the larger domain of practices for referring to (non-present) persons. (For the bearing of the parenthetical restriction cf. Note 37 below). Nonetheless, it would be valuable to address here the dual commitment depicted as the first dialectic above — to adequacy for general practices and aggregates of occurrences on the one hand, and to single cases on the other, while having the single case examined with attention to both systemic and interactional interests.

To this end, I exploit the inclusion in the present volume of the analysis by Cecilia Ford and Barbara Fox of the utterance “He had. This guy had, a beautiful, thirty two O:lds,” (reproduced in context as Excerpt (30) below). The paper by Ford and Fox is at one of the poles on the two earlier-mentioned dimensions: it focuses on a *single* case and pursues its interest in anaphora most closely via the *interactional* basis of what goes on in that episode. For example, its central themes concern the place of this utterance in the larger sequence structure in which it occurs and its interactional preoccupations, and, more proximately, the dynamic by which the speaker of the utterance fails to attract the displayed attention of his primary addressee and eventually shifts to another. The present paper seeks to complement the interactional focus of theirs by sketching some of the systematic resources informing, constraining, and being deployed in the utterance which they examine, as it seeks to complement its own more systematic general parts by bringing them to bear on this particular instance.

2. Analytic Theme

Let me begin by asking about talk-in-interaction — and English conversation in particular, for now — how reference to persons is accomplished.² How do

speakers *do* reference to persons so as to accomplish, on the one hand, that nothing but referring is being done, and/or on the other hand that something else in addition to referring is being done by the talk practice which has been employed? Relatedly, how is talk *analyzed* by recipients so as to find that “simple” reference to someone has been done, or that referring has carried with it other practices and outcomes as well?

Though framed in a general and abstract way, these questions are motivated by the particulars of singular references (indeed *any* single reference), and the contingencies of their production and reception. The omnirelevant issue for parties to talk-in-interaction (Schegloff and Sacks 1973: 299) — “why that now” — (for any “that”, for any “now”, in whatever sense of “why” may turn out to be relevant), has a relevant bearing on reference to persons as well. Any particular reference will pose that issue in production (regarding selection and implementation of a practice or form for referring) and in reception (regarding the proper, relevant understanding of what has been done by the use of some practice or form for referring), and insofar as any particular reference will be so attended by the parties, it becomes a task of analysis to provide an account for it. The alternative terms of the questions as I have formulated them above (“...on the one hand, that nothing but referring is being done, and/or on the other hand that something else in addition to referring is being done...”) reflects one step in such an account. Consider briefly a few of the person references in Excerpt (1) (which follows the end of an interruption in the interaction):

- (1) SN-4, 6:1-27
- 01 Mark: Where were we.
02 (0.5)
- 03 Sheri: I dunno.=’ve you been studying lately?
- 04 Mark: No, °not et aw-° not et a:ll. I hafta study this whole
05 week.<every ni:ght, {(‘hhh)/(0.8)} en then I got s’mthing
06→a planned on Sunday with Lau:ra,
07 (0.5)
- 08→c Mark: She- she wen- she ‘n I are gonna go out ‘n get drunk et four
09 o’clock in the afternoon.
- 10 Sheri: huh-huh ‘hhh[h
- 11 Mark: [It’s a religious: (0.3) thing we’re gonna have.
12 (0.3)
- 13 Mark: I d’know why:, °b’t
14 (0.5)
- 15->b Mark: Uh::m, (-) No- her ex boyfriend’s getting married en

- 16 she:'s: gunnuh be depressed so:,
 17 (0.8)
 18 Sheri: [She wasn't invited d'the]wedding;
 19 Mark: [(I'm g'nuh take 'er out.)]
 20 (0.8)
 21 Mark: (She d[oesn' wann]a go.)
 22 Sheri: [Hardly.]
 23 Mark: N[o no.]
 24 ?Ruthie: [hhih]hnh-hmh
 25 (·)
 26 Mark: Sh's tryin' t'stay away from the wedding °(idea).
 27 (0.8)

A reference like "Laura" (at "a") invites the recipients' recognition of the one who is being talked about as someone they know; a reference like "her ex boyfriend" (at "b") turns out to provide an account for the projection of depression on Laura's part (in a way which "Paul", or "a friend of Laura's", or "your cousin", or "her accountant" might not, even if they all referred to the same person); and "she" (at "c") does reference (or "re-reference") *simpliciter*, i.e. referring and nothing else. Hence, the way in which I have broached the undertaking: How do speakers *do* reference to persons so as to accomplish, on the one hand, that nothing but referring is being done, and/or on the other hand that something else in addition to referring is being done by the talk practice which has been employed? Relatedly, how is talk *analyzed* by recipients so as to find that "simple" reference to someone has been done, or that referring has carried with it other practices and outcomes as well?

These questions are framed differently than cognate questions in this domain in philosophy and linguistics, both of which have, of course, substantial histories of involvement with problems of reference, person reference, proper names, indexicals, anaphora, deixis, etc. But in what follows I draw minimally, if at all, from Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Bar-Hillel, Quine, Strawson, Donnellan, etc., on the one hand, or Bühler, Benveniste, Fillmore, Lyons, etc. on the other. The issues they raise, the distinctions they introduce, the problems they pose are engendered, naturally enough, by the agendas which they seek to advance with respect to the materials to which their disciplines are addressed. These materials are very different from the ones which I address, as are the agendas. But the accumulated thrust of these traditions of inquiry have come to compose part of the established core of work in this area, and have a heavy, institutionally enforced, *prima facie*

claim on attention. Though developed for very different jobs — often for jobs in formal logic, mathematics and/or the methodology of the physical sciences, they all too often are insisted into relevance for so-called “natural language” or “ordinary language,” with mixed results at best. This has reached the point where it now seems, paradoxically, necessary to distinguish “natural language” (as in “natural language processing”) or “ordinary language” (as in “ordinary language philosophy”) from actual talking, i.e. from the forms which actual talk-in-interaction observably takes, which turns out to look and sound quite different.

There is little reason *a priori* to assume that the analytic distinctions, thematics and problematics of these older disciplines, however appropriate to *their* analytic objects, have a first order relevance and adequacy for the empirical detail of actual talk-in-interaction. Indeed, reading in this literature suggests the contrary. In any case, the wisest course (though hardly the most popular or respectable one) seems to be to develop analytic tools which are directly responsive to the details of the data of quotidian talk-in-interaction (rather than adapted to it from other origins), and then to reflect upon convergences with past work addressed to other data and agendas, or the absence of such convergence.³

One way of thinking about this question — “how is reference to persons accomplished?” — as it pertains to talk-in-interaction is to see at work in this domain a not uncommon kind of organization, one with something of a *prima facie* rationality to it. A very large sub-set of the cases of the phenomenon (perhaps the largest sub-set) is partitioned off and given a relatively simple, often formal, solution or class of solutions. Of the remainder, once again, a very large — or largest — subset of instances is accorded a “simple” solution, etc.; that is, this procedure of large(st) sub-sets of cases being addressed with relatively simple solutions is repeated for each “remainder” from the preceding operation. How does this apply to reference to persons in talk-in-interaction, and conversation in particular?

3. Speaker and Recipient

It appears that by far the most common references to persons in conversation are to speaker and (addressed) recipient(s).⁴ Leaving aside forms for address and summoning (that is, vocatives) and considering only reference,⁵ and

taking note below of a range of interesting exceptions to this practice, it appears that the “simple” solution to the problem of reference for speaker and recipient is the provision of “dedicated terms”, namely the pronouns “I” and “you”. Although pronouns have often been treated as replacements or substitutes for nouns (for “pronoun” the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary II: 1686 offers “a word used instead of a noun substantive”), as Sacks remarked some years ago (1992: I, 349), I/you are the *central* forms for referring to speaker and recipient, and fuller noun phrases, if used, are substitutes for them, and not the other way around.

Clearly, the “dedication” of these terms is not unqualified.

On the one hand, the terms I/you can be used to refer to other than speaker and/or recipient respectively. For example, “you” may on occasion be used to refer more to the speaker than to the recipient. Sometimes this is as part of a more general usage of “you” for “everyone”, as noted by Sacks (1992: I, 349-50 [Spring, 1966]) with respect to data such as the following (from a call to a suicide prevention center):

- (3) SPC (Sacks, 1992:I: 349-50)
 A: Why do you want to kill yourself?
 → B: For the same reason everybody does.
 A: What is that?
 → B: Well, you just want to know if someone cares.

Sometimes “you” is used for speaker as a form which invokes what has elsewhere (Schegloff 1988a: 12-13) been termed (in contrast to “the impersonal ‘you’”) the “personal (and knowledgeable) ‘I’”, for occurrences such as the following:

- (4) Chicken Dinner, 51:29-36
 Vivian and Shane have just finished telling a story to Nancy and Mike about making a wrong turn into a one way street.
 (Simplified transcript.)
 Nancy: heh It's a scary *fee:ling*.=*r[eally*
 Vivian: [Yeah:=
 [*yi:s* () 'd *wre:ck*.
 Shane: [Yeah: It certainly *i:(h)s*.
 → Nancy: Y'see all these: (.) *ca:rs* *comin::-?*
 (0.9)
 Nancy: toward you with *th[eir* *headlight*]=
 Vivian: [*We:l* thank God]=
 = [there weren't that *ma:ny*.]
 Mike: = ['Member that guy: we *saw:.*]

Mike and Nancy then go on to tell a similar story, Mike having understood Nancy's "y'see" observation as introducing the relevance of her, and their, experience (*ibid.*).⁶

On the other hand, speakers can use terms other than I/you to refer to self or addressee.⁷

There is, first, a *speaker's use of other than "I" for self-reference*. This may take the form of the speaker's use of own name for self-reference, as in the well known comment of Richard Nixon to journalists at a press conference after his defeat in the election for Governor of California, "You won't have Richard Nixon to kick around any more."

This usage is not confined to the world of politics, as is attested in the following, by columnist Mike Downey (1987) in the Sports pages of the Los Angeles Times:

So, the other day, see, Mike Downey was reading this story in the paper about Bo Jackson, the Raider-Royal tailback-outfielder, and, in a discussion of his present condition and his future plans, Bo Jackson said: 'Bo Jackson has to do what's best for Bo Jackson.'

Well, it wasn't long after that that Mike Downey came across another story, this one about Mike Ditka, the coach of the Chicago Bears, whose players happen to be playing the Raiders today, and in the midst of a chat about a mistake he recently made, Mike Ditka said: 'Mike Ditka isn't right when he does things like that.' "etc.

Nor is it confined to the world of "public figures" (the vignette which follows is attributed to Spier 1969, as recounted in Sacks 1992: I, 711 [1967], but this is a widely reported feature of so-called "simplified register" in talk to children):

A kid comes into his parents' bedroom in the morning and says to his father, 'Can we have breakfast?' His father says, 'Leave Daddy alone, he wants to sleep.'"

Nor is it confined, within the "private sphere", to talk directed to children:

(6) Pink Book: Arthur and Rebecca

Rebecca and Arthur are talking on the phone, both aspiring to careers in "the entertainment industry." Rebecca has been telling Arthur about a script she has written which is being considered for the then-hit television series, "Cheers."

Rebecca: So that's goo:d. <Anyway> it would be a bla:st.

(0.3)

- Rebecca: 'n it would be:: (0.2) ya know it's fi:ne either
way(.) so:
(0.4)
- Arthur: Yeah
(1.0)
- Rebecca: So I haveta decide on {hhh/(0.3)} wh(h)at t'do next.
Arthur: W-with that 'un you mean?
- Rebecca: .hhh With tha:t 'n with {hhh/(0.3)} you:: 'n with
→ Arthur: With [me:? hha heh hah=
Rebecca: [everything.
→ Arthur: =<What're we gonna do> about Ar:thur.What're we
gonna do with him. ((sniff))

Here the use of his own first name by Arthur can be understood as marking the utterance as a putative quote of what others might be saying among themselves about him.⁸

And in the following episode from a family therapy session (Jones and Beach 1994, to appear), one participant who has been referred to by a third person reference form subsequently adopts that form for self-reference:

- (7) Jones and Beach, 1994
- Therapist: I see so they remember that you flunked first
grade and even though you're in third grade they
call you a flunking first grader?
- Son: But I don't flunk I didn't flunk Mom didn't
want me to pass cause I missed too much school
- Therapist: Oh she [wanted you to make=
Son: [Right
Mother: =No::
(.)
- Son: .hh But y[ou didn't[
→ Mother: [Mom [Mom made a trade with the
school if they would...

The mother's adoption of "Mom" as a form for self-reference is here part of a practice for disagreeing, one which adapts the format of repair by using the "Mom" as a frame for the clause which it begins and providing a replacement continuation, in the manner of a correction.⁹

As well, there is the use by speaker of "we" for self-reference, under such various circumstances, and to implement such practices, as speaking as and for a multi-person party (a family, a "position" in a discussion, etc.; cf. Lerner 1993) or as the agent of/for an organization. For example, in Whalen

and Zimmerman's (1990) account of calls to an Emergency Hot Line, they display a number of self-references by callers in which self-formulation with an organizational name is followed by a "we" reference:

- (8) Whalen and Zimmerman, 1990
- a. Caller: This iz thuh Maplegrove Care Home? (.) an uh
→ we- we've got uh man here...
- b. Caller: uh: this iz uh:da g .h Knightsuv Columbus Hall...
→ .hh we had some uh women's purses uh stolen...
- c. Caller: uh: t hi we got- uh this iz security at thuh
bus depot, Greyhound bus depot?
CT: Yes sir?=
→ Caller: =an we got a guy down here...

But when the caller uses "I" for self-reference, this is taken as an indication that it is a citizen calling on his own behalf, and not as an agent for an organization:

- (8) d.
→ Caller: Yes sir uh I go' a couple guy:s over here ma:n
they thin' they bunch uh wi:se-
→ CT: Are they in yur house? or is this a business.
Caller: They're over here ah Quick Shop (.) they fuckin'
come over here an' pulled up at thuh Quick Shop
slammin' their doors intuh my truck.
CT: Quick Shop?
Caller: Yeah.
→ CT: Okay uh- were you uh customer at that store?
Caller: Yeah

Note that the Call Taker (CT) first inquires about "your *house*" rather than business, and when given a business name ("Quick Shop"), takes it that the caller is a customer, rather than an agent, of the business.¹⁰

There is, second, a *speaker's use of other than "you" for addressed recipient*. Sacks, for example, in a lecture on "Pronouns" (1992: I, 711-15), offers the following exchange (ibid.: 711, reproduced from the New York Times) between President Lyndon Johnson and former President Harry Truman on the occasion of the latter's birthday:

- (9) Sacks, 1992:I:711
- Johnson: On behalf of Ladybird, Lindabird, and Lucy and I, we want to say happy birthday. We speak for one hundred and ninety million other Americans. Last night I read that a politician thinks a nation belongs to him, while a Statesman knows he belongs to a nation. That is the way we feel about you.
- Truman: You're as kind as you can be. And that is the way I feel about you. I don't think we have had a better President in a hundred years than we have right now, and I am tickled to death with him.
- Johnson: And I wanted you to come by and see me when you get back here.
- Truman: I'll make the first call on you when I get back to Washington.
- Johnson: Happy birthday again.
- Truman: I will do that because I think I ought to report to
→ the President. He might want me to do something.

Note the references at the arrow to "the President" and "he," both referring to the addressee who has just previously, in the same speaker's prior turn, been referred to as "you".¹¹

As with alternatives to "I" for the speaker, this is not restricted to public officials. In the conversation between Rebecca and Arthur cited above for its use of the speaker's name by the speaker for self-reference, the same sequence arrives a bit later at the following exchange:

- (10) Pink Book: Arthur and Rebecca
- Arthur: B(h)ut (0.5) <you know> I told 'im s- swe- we're
kinda on ho:ld,
(0.4)
- Rebecca: U[h huh
- Arthur: [for a liddle while I *think* [things throu:gh,
- Rebecca: [Wuh- we're
→ wai:ting for Ar:thur to *make* a de[cision.
- Arthur: [hhh w^hhh
.hhh but i(h)tz...

And there is some evidence that these two usages go together — that a speaker's self-reference by other than "I" may be followed by an interlocutor's reference to them by other than "you", as in the Arthur/Rebecca conversation. The exchange which follows is taken from a group therapy

session for teenaged boys in the early 1960's (names have been changed, but are consistent, i.e. the "Roger" referred to at arrow "a" is the Roger who is speaking, and who is addressed and referred to at arrow "b"; Dan is the therapist). They have been discussing Roger and his troubles:

- (11) GTS, 5:48 (NTRI#49)
- a→ Roger: But this is a unique case. Why uh Roger
 a→ Mandelbaum was a delinquent. Not why uh
 (h)half the wo(h)rld was delinquent.
- Dan: That's true.
 Roger: I couldn't apply it to everybody.
 Maybe some people.
- b→ Jim: What'd Roger do.
 Roger: Hm? What'd I do;
 Jim: Yeah.
 Roger: Wh- whaddyou mean. As a delinquent? ()
 Jim: Yeah. What'd you do.
 Roger: Oh I used to steal cars, break into houses, get in
 uh large fights, 'n (0.2) everything I wasn't s'posed
 to.
 (1.6)

At the "a" arrow, Roger's usage deploys language putatively appropriate to "case reports" and academic discussions, and gives a version of his case's title. A moment later Jim — another of the "patients" — uses a similar name reference form for Roger, and apparently *to* Roger, for Roger takes himself to have been addressed and responds, if only with a repair initiator, and one which replaces other forms of reference with the practices of "I/you".

It bears notice that when speakers use a "third person reference form" to refer to self or addressed recipient (in place of "I" or "you"), they select such terms as display (or constitute) the current relevance with which the referent figures in the talk — whether it is "the President", "the doctor", "daddy", "mom", the personal name of one being referred to *as a public figure* ("Richard Nixon", "Bo Jackson", etc.), and the like. That these terms can serve to display the relevance which the referent has to the ongoing talk points up a significant but otherwise hidden feature of "I" and "you", namely, that they mask the relevance of the referent and the reference at that point in the talk.¹²

Finally, it should be remarked that one regular alternative to "you" is a *third person reference form*, where the underlying issue may not at all be one

of selection among alternative reference forms, but rather the choice of action which the speaker will implement, and/or to whom the utterance will be addressed. Thus, for example, an episode which figures in a number of recent papers (Goodwin 1986; Schegloff 1987a, 1988b, 1992a) begins with this utterance by Phyllis:

- (12) Automobile Discussion, 6:12-21
 Gary: Hawkins is ru[nnin,
 Mike: [Oxfrey's runnin the same car 'e run last
 year,=
 → Phyllis: =Mike siz there wz a big fight down there las'night,
 Curt: Oh rilly?
 (0.5)
 Phyllis: Wih Keegan en, what.Paul [de Wa::ld?]
 Mike: [Paul de Wa:l]d. Guy out of,=
 Curt: =De Wa:ld yeah I [°(know) ['m.)
 Mike: [Tiffen.] [D'you know him;]
 Curt: °Uhhuh=I know who'e i:s,

Phyllis is here launching the telling of a story by her husband, Mike, to their hosts and other guests at a backyard picnic in early 1970's Ohio. Mike is referred to by the third person reference form of given name, but could also have been referred to by "you". But the choice between them turns on the type of sequence Phyllis elects to launch the telling, and the appropriate recipient for that sequence type. Instead of addressing *a telling* to the *guests*, she could, for example, have addressed herself to *Mike* with the start of a *request sequence* or a *suggestion sequence* — "Why don't you tell them about the big fight down there last night?" — making a response from *Mike* relevant next, to accede to the request/suggestion or decline it, as compared to the actual sequence, which makes the others relevant next speakers rather than Mike, with observable consequences for the launching of the telling (note, for example, the further increment of talk by Phyllis to coax Mike into participation). The one referred to in the actual utterance as "Mike" would then have been referred to by "you".

Some sequence types (most notably relatively dispreferred ones, such as requests) may specially motivate "tactful" trade-offs between action and addressee as reflected in their reference terminology, in which co-present parties may examine third person reference forms for camouflaged possible targeting of themselves. This may appear specially relevant when being the addressee may be seen as particularly "advantageous" or "disadvantageous",

as in the following request sequence recorded in the backroom work area of a university book store:

- (13) Bookstore, 22 (NTRI #549)
→ Loren: Uhm::, will somebody pass the paperbacks-
(1.0)
Loren: An:d the (
→ Cathy: Is that somebody me?
Loren: Mm hm.
(2.0)

Or the grammatical improvisation used to implement an offer of service in the coffee line at a university coffee shop :

- (14) EAS:FN (Jimmy's)
Server: Can I help who's next?

In such usages, speaker's eyes are regularly ambiguously aimed so as to avoid targeting particular individuals, the whole point being to induce *the set of possible recipients* to work out who the addressee will be taken to be.¹³ Gaze-behavior is thus put in bold relief as part and parcel of the organization of person reference, and especially where speaker and recipient are involved.¹⁴

An important point in all of this is that various reference outcomes may be the product of practices and choices made on other than reference-related grounds (just as sequence types may be selected for the reference forms they make possible; Schegloff 1993: 108-9). Because the boundaries between various domains of conversational organization are permeable, and the organization of an episode of interaction or the projects of its participants can involve trade-offs between different domains of interactional resources and practices, no domain can be explored systematically in hermetic closure from other domains of organization.

I have sketched a variety of other uses of the terms I/you than for speaker and addressee respectively, and other terms for these referents, to begin to document the theme that different forms of person reference can embody practices for implementing a range of *different other activities* (a theme which will carry through the remainder of this paper). It remains the case that these will be marked forms which will be understood to be doing other than simple reference. They invite a recipient/hearer to examine them for what they are doing *other* than simple reference to speaker or recipient; they are marked usages. The unmarked forms which do simple reference are "I/me" for speaker, and "you" for addressed recipient.¹⁵

4. Others: Locally Initial and Locally Subsequent Reference

But clearly the so-called third person pronouns — he/him, she/her, they — do not serve in the same fashion for references to other-than-speaker/recipient. “He/she” and their variants introduce another dimension altogether which is not implicated in reference to speaker and recipient,¹⁶ and which I refer to as “locally initial” vs. “locally subsequent” reference. This observation may appear so obvious as to not merit articulation (a problem which conversation analysts suffer often, but generally recover from), so let me suggest a few complications which may be less obvious initially.

First, we need to distinguish locally initial or subsequent reference *forms* from locally initial or subsequent reference *occasions* or *positions*. Whenever a reference is introduced into the talk, we can distinguish the “slot” (so to speak) in which it was done from the form which was used to do it. It is not that the occasion need be specifiable independent of the doing of a reference (not, then, “slot” in that strong sense); only that the doing of a reference entails that there was an occasion or position for doing it, an occasion analytically distinguishable from the particular form used to accomplish it.¹⁷

Next we can note that there can be locally *initial* reference occasions and locally *subsequent* ones — the first time in a spate of talk that some person is referred to and subsequent occasions in that spate of talk in which that person is referred to. And, separately, we can note that there are locally initial reference *forms* and locally subsequent ones. Full noun phrases, for example, or names can be used as locally initial reference forms (this is without prejudice to their usability elsewhere); pronouns are transparently designed for use as locally *subsequent* reference forms.¹⁸

Finally, then, we can note that in the two-by-two matrix which results, all four combinations empirically occur. The most common (and, in this respect, unmarked) instances are composed of locally initial reference forms in locally initial reference positions, and locally subsequent reference forms in locally subsequent reference positions — that is, some full noun phrase for first reference and pronouns thereafter. But we also find locally subsequent reference forms in locally initial reference positions, and locally initial reference forms in locally subsequent reference positions. Although the cases that are unmarked by reference to initial/subsequent usage/position will generally still be of considerable analytic interest in other respects (e.g. the particular noun phrase employed), “mis-matches” between sequential position and reference

form invite immediate attention, both from participants (though not necessarily self-conscious, of course) and from professional analysts, and may be understood to achieve distinctive outcomes.

4.1. Locally subsequent reference form in locally initial position

Consider first locally subsequent reference form in locally initial position. For now I will limit myself to an anecdotal example. Many who lived through the day on which President Kennedy was assassinated may have encountered the following phenomenon, as I did. One could walk on the street or campus and observe others being approached — or be approached oneself — by apparently unacquainted persons who asked, “Is he still alive?” What was striking was that virtually without fail the reference was understood; and with great regularity that reference had taken the form of a locally subsequent reference in locally initial position. It served at the time as a striking embodiment of community, for each speaker presumed, and presumed successfully, what was “on the mind” of the other, or could readily be “activated” there. The locally subsequent reference term tapped that directly; it made virtually palpable the invocable orientation of its recipient, however invisible it might seem. In the convergence of their orientations lay “community”.

But we need not turn to national trauma for cases in point. A spouse or companion, returning from a meeting in which they were to find out from a supervisor whether they had received a raise or promotion, may be met upon arrival with the query, “So what did s/he say?” With that use of a locally subsequent reference form in a locally initial reference position the inquirer can bring off that this has “been on my mind throughout the interim,” that this is, in effect, a continuation of the earlier conversation.¹⁹

Note then that the notions of “locally initial” and “locally subsequent” occasions or positions are not, in one usual sense of the term, “objective”; they are rather *reflexive*. I mean that there is no fixed measure — whether in elapsed time, intervening turns, intervening topics, etc. — after which some “spate of talk” has lapsed, such that referring anew to someone referred to in it will now constitute a locally initial reference occasion, and that will *determine* what form of reference should be used. The so-called “continuity” or “coherence” of the talk is an enacted, interpreted and co-constructed affair, not an entirely inherited or pre-determined one. By use of a locally subsequent reference form a speaker can — within limits — seek to bring off

continuity across an intervening hiatus. That undertaking can fail if the recipient cannot “solve” the reference — indeed, cannot solve it effortlessly, that is, immediately. Even a slight pause before responding — if understood as involving work to recognize the reference, compromises the achievement of a “resumed same spate of talk”. And an orientation to possible solvability by *this recipient* may enter into a speaker’s invocation of this practice.

This reflexive character of “positions” is evidenced as well by the other “mismatch”. By use of a locally initial reference form a speaker can try to bring off “a new departure” in talk which is otherwise apparently referentially continuous with just prior talk. Note, for example, in Excerpt (17), the usage at arrow “a”.

- (17) SN-4,16:2-20
 02 Mark: So ('r) you da:ting Keith?
 03 (1.0)
 04 Karen: 'Sa frie:nd.
 05 (0.5)
 06 b→Mark: What about that girl 'e use tuh go with fer so long.
 07 c→Karen: A:lice? I [don't-] they gave up.
 08 Mark: [(mm)]
 09 (0.4)
 10 Mark: (°Oh?)
 11 Karen: I dunno where she is but I-
 12 (0.9)
 13 Karen: Talks about 'er evry so o:ften, but- I dunno where she is.
 14 (0.5)
 15 Mark: hmh
 16 (0.2)
 17 a→Sheri: Alice was stra::nge,
 18 (0.3) ((rubbing sound))
 19 Mark: Very o:dd. She usetuh call herself a pro:stitute,='n I
 20 useteh- (0.4) ask 'er if she wz gitting any more money
 21 than I: was.(doing).

Here, in close proximity to talk about “Alice” which has come to use locally subsequent reference forms (at lines 07, 11, 13), but whose sequence-topical unit has come to possible closure,²⁰ Sheri produces a turn with further talk about the same referent. She could treat this as a locally subsequent reference occasion, and again refer to her as “she”. She does not. She treats it as a new spate of talk, in which the referent will figure in a different way. She embodies this, and incipiently constitutes it, by use of the locally initial reference form.²¹

The reflexivity of this practice turns on being able to have it both ways. For example, that in Excerpt (17) the position (at line 17) seems at first to be locally subsequent; that the form employed is locally initial; that that form in that position can change that position to being locally initial — that is, can constitute this as a fresh spate of talk. This practice (if my account is remotely correct) adumbrates multiple stages in reference composition and reference analysis for any given reference for the participants, in which, for example, the second stage of the analysis can confirm the first (“looks like a locally subsequent position; it has a locally subsequent form; it *is* a locally subsequent reference”) or change it (“looks like a locally subsequent position; oops! it has a locally initial form in it; it’s a locally initial reference and we’re into a new sequence/topic”). This sort of reflexive relationship between position and what is *in* the position has appeared elsewhere in studies of conversation (for example, between the *position* and *form* of repair; cf. Schegloff 1992b: 1326-34) and resists reduction to more familiar, linear depiction.

4.2. Locally initial reference forms in locally subsequent position

In effect, the episode in Excerpt (17) which has just been discussed exemplifies the other “minor diagonal” cell in our four-fold matrix — locally subsequent reference positions in which are deployed reference forms which can be locally initial. References which embody this “mismatch” may serve to pose for co-participants the “problem”: what is being done by using that form and not a simple, locally subsequent reference form. The solution to that problem will, of course, depend on the particular reference form employed, and is therefore not accessible to a general account here. In Excerpt (17) “what was being done” was marking a sequence boundary and the initiation of a new topical departure.

That there is orderliness in this practice of deploying locally initial forms in locally subsequent positions was documented by a convergence of data fragments which emerged in Fox (1984) and (1987) — in which the locally *subsequent* reference occasion was filled with a name, as had been the locally *initial* reference immediately preceding. It quickly became apparent that a cluster of such instances all occurred in disagreement environments of some sort. I offer several cases in point to convey a sense of the phenomenon, but cannot take up the matter further here. (Excerpt (18), in which three of these

disagreement environments for locally initial reference form in locally subsequence reference position occur,²² is taken from the same occasion examined in the Ford and Fox paper.)

- (18) Auto Discussion, 5:35-6:22
- 35 Curt: [He- he's about the only regular <he's about the
36→ only go[od regular out there'z, Keegan still go out?
37 a Carney: [°(Help me up.)
38→ Mike: [Keegan's, %
39 Carney: [(gently,) ((% to % = (0.2)))
40 Mike: % out there(,) (he's,)/(each)
01 Carney: [Oghh!
02 Mike: [He run,
03 (0.5)
04 Mike: E:[r h e' s u h::]
05 Gary: [Wuhyih mean my:;]
06 Gary: My [brother in law's out there,]
07→ Mike: [doin real good this year'n] M'Gilton's doin
08 b real good thi[s year,
09→ Curt: [M'Gilton still there?=
10 Gary: =hhHawki [ns,
11→ Curt: [Oxfrey (run-?)/(runnin?) I heard Oxfrey gotta new ca:r.
12 c Gary: Hawkins is ru[nnin,
13→ Mike: [Oxfrey's runnin the same car 'e run last year,=
14 Phyllis: =Mike siz there wz a big fight down there las'night,
15 Curt: Oh rilly?
16 (0.5)
17 Phyllis: Wih Keegan en, what. Paul [de Wa::ld?]
18 Mike: [Paul de Wa:l]d. Guy out of,=
19 Curt: =De Wa:ld yeah I [°(know) ['m.)
20 Mike: [Tiffen.] [D'you know him_i
21 Curt: °Uhhuh=I know who'e i:s,
22 (1.8)
- (19) KC-4, 2:24-36 (simplified)
- 24 Sheri: [Look once a quarter et school is enough.=That's uh:: (·)
25 finals.
26 (??): (huh-)
27 Mark: I know whutcha mean. Me t[oo.<that's why I came here
28 d'night.'hh I came tih talk tuh Ruthie about borrowing
29 her:- notes.fer (·) econ.
30 (0.8)
31 Ruth: [Oh.

- 32→ Sheri: [You didn't come t' talk t' Kerin?
33 d (0.4)
34→ Mark: No, Kerin: (!) Kerin 'n I 'r having a fight.
35 (.)
36 Mark: After-sh' went out with Keith (the night be^ofore.)

The regularity with which re-use of a locally initial reference form in locally subsequent reference position occurs in the interactional environment of disagreement encourages the observation that that “mis-match” of position and usage is a practice for doing what might be called complex (or perhaps “pointed”) reference, in contrast to simple reference.

It is readily observable about the four instances in Excerpts (18) and (19) of the use of a locally initial reference form in locally subsequent position that the locally initial reference form is *the same form as was previously used*, and that it is employed by *the recipient of the first use*. On both counts, of course, there are uses which are quite different, and may be employed for different projects. Consider, however briefly, three other combinations of reference displayed in Excerpt (18).

First, note at Curt's line 11 and at Gary's lines 10-12 that we have, in each case, two mentions of a same referent, and both are locally initial reference forms — indeed, the *same* form, ostensibly with the second mention being in locally subsequent position; but in these instances the re-use of the same form is (unlike the instances examined just above) by the same speaker. These instances do not appear to represent “disagreement”; how are we to understand them? One environment in which such re-uses are employed is that of overlap; speakers who find their talk in overlap with talk by another may orient to its impending possible ineffectiveness, withdraw or drop out, and subsequently try to produce their utterance again in the clear. If/when they do so, they may display or claim that the talk being subsequently produced is *the same utterance* as they were producing before by using the same words (Schegloff 1987b, 1996). In effect, then, they are reconstituting the locally initial reference occasion by re-using the (same) locally initial form; it is not a re-mention, but the initial mention “for another first time”. And this may readily be seen to be implicated in Gary's talk at lines 10-12; he is just finishing the articulation of the name “Hawkins” when Curt interrupts with “Oxfrey”, apparently launching a new turn thereby. Gary drops out, and directly on the possible completion of Curt's turn (where recycled beginnings are regularly placed; cf. Schegloff 1987b: 74) re-tries the withdrawn utter-

ance and shows it to be the withdrawn utterance by beginning it as the previous try had begun.

Note that this is *not* distinctively a practice for person reference; recycling the turn's beginning is a general practice in talk-in-interaction for managing utterances possibly impaired by overlap — or, as we shall see, possibly ineffective or being superceded on other grounds. When locally initial forms of person reference have occurred near the turn's beginning, they too may get recycled in this manner.

But a speaker's turn may not only be rendered ineffective by what *others* do. Speakers may themselves undertake to render a unit of their talk ineffective, that is, to deprive it of sequential consequentiality, in effect to bury it or cancel it. One way of doing so is to follow it directly (that is, with no opportunity for a recipient to begin a response, e.g. by use of a rush-through (Schegloff 1982) or even by pre-possible-completion self-interruption of the talk to be superceded) with further talk which will supercede the relevance of what preceded it in its constraint on ensuing talk by another speaker. Something like this appears to be what Curt is doing at line 11. In the ongoing activity in which he has been engaged with Mike of enumerating the "good regulars" driving at the local automobile race track, he appears to be venturing another candidate, one "Oxfrey". But as he is proffering this candidate, he buries the proposal under a subsequent inquiry about what car Oxfrey is driving — an inquiry whose very broaching suggests the trouble with the first start of the turn; Curt appears to have "suddenly remembered" having been told about Oxfrey's driving, and the way he builds the turn displays/claims just this "sudden remembering."

This "re-start" of the turn can be built to take various stances toward the prior start. It can recognize and "honor" the first start, while skipping ahead to a later tack. It could do this by using a locally subsequent reference form in the superceding utterance, which would then "refer" the recipient to the "Oxfrey" in the turn's first start for the solution of the pro-term. Or it could be designed to supplant the turn's first start (while not being able to erase it, of course; interaction *is not* a tape, though we may study it from one) by redoing the person reference with the same locally initial reference form, making this turn-constructional unit in that sense self-contained, and specifically declining to draw on the prior start as a resource for subsequent talk, thereby, in effect, sequentially deleting it. "Ineffectiveness" is thus something which a spate of talk may suffer and have its speaker undertake to remedy, or some-

thing which a speaker make seek to impose on her/his own prior talk on behalf of some other (or cumulative) project. In both these instances, the deployment of person reference — and specifically the matching of form and position with respect to local initialness/subsequentiality — is a deployable resource in non-person reference interactional and sequential projects.

It has almost certainly not escaped notice that Gary's two tries at "Hawkins" at lines 10-12 are themselves not his first tries to mention the referent who bears that name. We will linger a moment longer with this episode to examine another combination of attributes of these initial/subsequent issues — still *same* speaker using a locally initial reference form in locally subsequent position, but now an instance in which it is not the *same* locally initial form as was previously used, but a *different* one.

As already noted, what is going on in this episode is an enumeration of good regular drivers at the local track, but note as well that this follows on from an assertion by Curt that a driver whom they had been discussing (one "Al") was the "only good regular out there," (lines 35-36 in Excerpt (18)), an assertion with which Mike had begun to take issue. At lines 5-6 Gary is beginning to take issue as well; "Wuhyah mean + X" (i.e. "what do you mean" + X) is a common format for challenges (where X is either what in the preceding talk is being challenged, or is the basis for challenging it). Gary then is entering what has already been established as a "disagreement environment", with the consequence that what he says faces the contingency of disagreement in return. Rather than offering the candidate "good regular" who is the basis of his challenge with the reference form his knowledgeable interlocutors use (cf. Goodwin 1986: 289-93) — the "last name" form which he will use a moment later as his second try, he refers to him as "my brother-in-law". He thereby displays that he has an interest in the matter apart from the sheer assessment of the merits of the drivers as "good regulars", and puts his interlocutors on notice that their responses to his proposal take that into account. (He need not have worried; or perhaps it worked; they ignore his intervention entirely!) As it happens, this first proposal of Gary's is thoroughly implicated in overlap and is rendered accountably ineffective thereby (though not necessarily unregistered), and on his next try, rather than re-using the same words to show he is trying again the same utterance, he implements what is analyzably the same utterance in thoroughly different diction — diction now selected to approximate that of those knowledgeable about the activity, not only in regard to person reference, but in formulating their activities as well (Schegloff 1992a: 213).

Here again, then, a departure from the underlying “locally-initial-form-in-locally-initial-position” organization turns out to be implicated in some interactional project, and is a material resource in its implementation. There are almost certainly other environments, other practices, other interactional projects which mobilize person-reference practices on their behalf, and leave their mark at the surface of the discourse in part by departures from the default organization of person reference.²³ And all this without yet having mentioned the most familiar account for use of a full noun phrase instead of a pronoun — that there are several same-gendered references within the scope of a putative pronoun, which renders its use vulnerable to ambiguity, and which the full noun phrase avoids.

I have meant in the foregoing to develop enough texture to suggest the potential analytic interest of the observations with which I began about the relevance — introduced by the so-called third person pronouns — of the difference between locally initial and locally subsequent reference.²⁴ Let me just note, then, the further point that, of these two, locally *subsequent* reference occasions will, for obvious reasons, ordinarily far exceed locally initial reference occasions. We should then appreciate that for this largest subset of the remaining cases (after speaker and recipient reference have been provided for), there is a relatively simple and formal resource as the solution — the set of pronouns.²⁵ Linguists who work on anaphora may well bristle at the suggestion that the pronoun system is “simple,” but that it is, at least in comparison with the multiple practices operating to organize and structure locally *initial* reference forms.

5. Recognitional and Non-Recognitional Reference

And it is locally initial reference forms that need now to have their organization given an account. Here I need to review a bit of the 1979 Sacks and Schegloff paper (actually written in 1973), “Two preferences in the organization of reference to persons in conversation and their interaction.” Although quite brief, that paper’s arguments extend past what we need for the present account, so I will omit parts of that discussion, while enriching other parts beyond what was covered in the published version.

Reference to persons in conversation implicates, as a matter of primary interactional relevance, considerations of “recipient design”. That is, refer-

ence forms (for locally initial reference) are selected in the first instance with an eye to who the *recipient* is and what the recipient knows about the referent, or how the recipient stands with respect to the referent. Two types of reference forms are discriminated by their relationship to the recipient — *recognitional* reference forms and *non-recognitional* reference forms. The preferred practice (formulated here as an instruction to speaker) is: “if it is possible, use a recognitional.” What does this mean?

Recognitional reference forms are such forms as convey to the recipient that the one being referred to is someone that they know (about). The use of a recognitional reference form provides for the recipient to figure out who that they know the speaker is referring to by the use of this reference form.

Two common forms of *recognitional* reference are (personal) name and what we will call recognitional descriptions (or descriptors). Recognitional descriptors are forms such as “the woman who sits next to you,” “or “the guy you bought your car from,” etc.²⁶

The prototypical simple *non-recognitional* reference forms are expressions such as “someone”, “this guy”, “this woman”, etc. (By characterizing them as “prototypical simple non-recognitionals” I mean to note that they appear designed to do virtually nothing else but convey non-recognitionality; they do just “referring-as-non-recognizable.”) More elaborate non-recognitionals can take the form of non-recognitional descriptions. Consider, for example, “Let me ask *a guy at work*.”²⁷ Here the reference is fuller than the minimal “guy”, it is a description, but it conveys not possible recognizability by recipient, but “you don’t know this person.”²⁸ But this is only the start: there is, for example, an enormous inventory of terms for *categories of persons* which are also available for use, use which can convey the non-recognizability of the referent person to the recipient (cf. Sacks 1972a, 1972b).

That, then, is what is meant by the term “recognitional” in the formulated preference practice: “if it is possible, use a recognitional.” The conditional “If it is possible” refers to the following contingencies: a) If the speaker may (or ought to) suppose the recipient to know the referent; b) if the speaker may be supposed by recipient to have so supposed; and c) if the speaker may suppose the recipient to have so supposed. All three conditions must be met; no further extensions of this hall of mirrors are necessary.

For example, I need to suppose that you know Barbara Fox, and know her *as* Barbara Fox, to use “Barbara” as a recognitional reference form for her

in speaking to you. But unless *you* know that I suppose that, you won't hear my reference to "Barbara" as referring to this person, because you won't know that I relied on your recognizing this person from that form. That is the second contingency. So not only do I need to suppose *your* knowledge; you need to suppose *mine*. But unless I know *that*, unless I know that you know that I know that you know Barbara, I will not use the recognitional reference form, because I cannot count on your figuring out who, that you know, I am referring to with it.

There are various sorts of evidence offered in the "Two Preferences..." paper for the preference for using recognitional reference if possible, and a description of various undertakings interactants use to expand the scope of possibility.²⁹ Here I can mention only one, which we referred to as "try-marking".

On occasion a speaker will *suspect* that recipient can recognize the referent from some recognitional reference but be uncertain. On such occasions, speakers may employ the recognitional reference but mark it as a "try". In such "try-marked" recognitionals, the speaker produces the recognitional (ordinarily the name) with upward intonation (even mid-clause) and pauses momentarily. If recipient recognizes, they betoken the recognition with an "uh huh" or nod, etc. If they do not, they do not, and the speaker may offer a(nother) clue, often a recognitional description (one that is itself recipient designed to allow *this* recipient to figure it out), again with upward intonation, again followed by a place for success to be registered by recipient. As soon as success is marked, the speaker stops the referring work and continues the utterance. If two or three clues fail to produce success, the effort to employ recognitional reference may be abandoned. Such efforts to secure successful reference recognition *are pursued* rather than settling for the simpler, less extended and less problematic non-recognitional references which are always available (e.g. "someone", "this guy", etc.), — which is one embodiment of their status as preferred reference forms.³⁰

5.1. Preference for name over recognitional descriptor

There are other, related preferences which were not discussed in that paper, but which also appear to be oriented to by parties to conversational interaction. For example, within the class "recognitional reference", there appears to be a preference for the use of name over recognitional description. Consider again, for example, the exchange in Excerpt (17).

- (17) SN-4,16:2-20 (partial)
 02 Mark: So ('r) you dating Keith?
 03 (1.0)
 04 Karen: 'Sa frie:nd.
 05 (0.5)
 06 b→Mark: What about that girl 'e use tuh go with fer so long.
 07 c→Karen: A:lice? I [don't-] they gave up.
 08 Mark: [(mm)]
 09 (0.4)

At arrow "b" Mark refers to "that girl he used to go with for so long" — a recognitional descriptor. Note then that at arrow "c" Karen upgrades the reference to a name before answering the question. Though the name is given so-called "question intonation", Karen does not wait for a confirmation before proceeding (although Mark appears to provide one *sotto voce*); nor is this a "try-marked" usage, for Karen is not checking whether Mark can figure out who that he knows is being referred to by this reference form. Her introduction of the name simply provides that form of recognitional reference which is preferred, if possible, and here it is possible.

This upgrading is common, though generally ostensibly providing for confirmation by the speaker of the recognitional descriptor that the name reference is correct, which Karen does not do in Excerpt (17) — "ostensibly" because in some instances this is not a plausibly serious issue, as in the first of the excerpts below, and perhaps the others.

- (20) GTS 5:36 (NTRI #584a)
 01 Ken: ...if it took me three years I wouldn't fail on fixing
 02 the dishwasher,
 03 Roger: But if yer father was there, you:: you stand a chance,
 04 in yer mind.
 05 Ken: Yes. I do.
 06 Roger: Oh w(hh)ell you do(h)n' wanta take that chance so you
 07 uh hhhh [whenever possible].
 08→ Jim: [What happens if your girlfriend is (standing)
 09 and watching
 10 (0.4)
 11→ Ken: Patty?
 12 Jim: Yeh.
 13 Roger: It all depends on how much you were worried about
 14 the-the [image].
 15 Ken: [Well—

16 Roger: How much you eh-how many [how much damage t'yer image=
 17 Jim: [Is it just yer father, or is==
 18 Roger: =(in it-)
 19 Jim: ==it- is it's that-or is that just something (y'know
 20 takin the place of []).
 21 Ken: [I really don' know she's never
 22 stood around while I was tryin g to fix sump'n.
 23 Roger: And besides that you don't really fear of losing your
 24 uh image. With Patty.

(21) Bookstore, 45 (NTRI #556)

01 Leslie: =I'm not sure- exactly- how yih want us tuh do this.
 02 (1.5)
 03 Leslie: -Les Moralistes=
 04 Jim: =Weh:ll
 05 (): ().
 06 (2.0)
 07 Jim: I'm- pretty certain we'll get a very fast response
 08→ from uh- (4.0) from the people.
 09 (1.0)
 10→ Jim: In New York.
 11→ Leslie: LaRousse?
 12 Jim: Yeah.
 13 Leslie: Okay.

(22) Adato, 5:1 (NTRI #553a)

08 Sy: Whereju get the filing box from.
 09 (pause)
 10→ Jay: Fro:m uh:: that fellow who usetuh sit uhmback of you,
 11→ who — who got fired.
 12→ Sy: Jordan?
 13 Jay: Jordan yeah.
 14 Sy: He gave it to yuh?
 15 Jay: NO he didn:t uh:: —
 16 Jim: heh! [heh!
 17 Jay: [Some other guy [took it off,
 18 Sy: [Yuh swiped it.
 19 Jay: No some other guy took it off his desk 'n gave ih t'me,
 20 But, that's- what- one does. One
 21 (pause)
 22 Sy: Pillage.
 23 Jim: hhh
 24 Jay: Hm?
 25 Sy: Pillagers y'know, — ra:nsacked iz desk.

In these excerpts, the single-headed arrows mark the recognitional descriptors, and the double-headed arrows mark the move by its recipient to “upgrade” the reference to name.³¹ But the move to upgrade to the use of a name may be initiated before a less-preferred reference form has been fully produced, in the very course of producing it. In Excerpt (25), Charlie is calling Ilene to tell her that a trip to Syracuse, on which she was planning to hitch a ride, had fallen through because the person he was to stay with was going away.

- (25) Trip to Syracuse, 1:10-11
 10 Charlie: hhhe:h heh 'h h h h I wuz uh:m: (·) 'hh I wen' ah:- (0.3)
 11→ I spoke teh the gi:r- I spoke tih Karen.

Here a person-reference well on its way to be a recognitional descriptor such as “the gir[l I was gonna stay with]” is cut off and replaced by a first name recognitional; “replaced” is used here in the strong sense, for the exact repetition of “I spoke to...” is designed to display that this is the same thing that was being said before, but for the change in person-reference form here introduced. Similar, though not quite as fully developed, is the following excerpt, in which Marjorie calls Priscilla, who works at a store called Bullocks, to ask about details of an incident observed by her friend Loretta while driving by.

- (26) Trio II, 1:01-20
 01 ((phone rings two times))
 02 Priscilla: H'llo:..
 03 (·)
 04 Marjorie: Priscilla?
 05 (·)
 06 Priscilla: Ye:a:h.
 07 (0.2)
 08 Marjorie: What ^happen'tuhda:y.
 09 (0.6)
 10 Priscilla: Whaddiyuh mea::n.
 11 (·)
 12 Marjorie: What happened et (·) wo:rk. Et Bullock's this evening.
 13 Priscilla: 'h h h h Wul I don' kno::w::..
 14 (·)
 15→ Marjorie: My-Loretta jus ca:lled'n she wz goin:g went by:
 16 there et five thirdu you know on'er way ho::me.
 17 (·)
 18 Priscilla: Yayahç

- 19 (0.4)
 20 Marjorie: a-A:nd, u-she sed that there wz (·) p'leece cars all over

Here, at line 15, what seems on its way to being “My friend,” or perhaps “My friend Loretta,” is arrested mid-course in favor of the unelaborated name reference, Loretta.

So the operative set of practices appears to be that recognitional reference is preferred to non-recognitional reference, even if other preferences — such as the one for minimization — must be relaxed to secure it (though only enough relaxation of that preference is indulged as is necessary). And among alternative forms of recognitional reference, there appears to be a preference for name over recognitional description, if it is possible. And both this (sub-)preference and the more general one get activated both by the referring speaker in the first instance, and by the recipient of the reference in the second.

Because in conversation persons for the most part talk recurrently *to* the same recipients *about* the same things, including about the same other persons, the vast majority of person references in conversation are to persons recognizable to recipient.³² Recognitional reference is, then, the largest chunk of reference usages for which organized resources are needed at this point.³³

There is a simple and elegant solution to the problem of providing appropriate recognitional reference, across the immense diversity of ways or “routes” of knowing that a recipient may know a referent. However it is that a speaker supposes the recipient knows the referent, *that* is how they can refer to the referent. If the recipient knows the referent by name, use a name; indeed, use *that* name.³⁴ If the recipient knows the referent in some other way, use *that* way as the reference form. In other words, the conditions that make the use of a recognitional reference relevant can also provide the form — the specific “value” — which the reference should take.³⁵ Here again, the majority of the remaining cases are partitioned off, and a relatively simple and formal solution is available for referring to them. (But see also Downing, this volume.)

6. Non-Recognitional Reference

What is left over — the entire range of *non*-recognitional reference — is still an immense territory, and one of deep importance for sociology, perhaps even

more than it is for linguistics. Most significant in this regard is its inclusion of all the category terms for types of persons in a culture's inventory, by reference to which are composed a society's understanding(s) of "the sorts of people" there are, what they are like, how the society and the world work — in short, its culture (cf. for example, Sacks 1972a, 1972b).³⁶ This is beyond the scope of what I can deal with here. Still, I have meant in part to situate that immense and important topic within the domain of the practices of referring to persons in talk-in-interaction.³⁷

7. "He had. This guy had, a beautif[ul, thirty two O:lds:" An Intersection with Ford and Fox

Although I have used this occasion to present a sketch of part of a systematic organization for person reference and to situate previously published accounts within their analytic domain, I began by taking note of the complementarity of such an enterprise and one which examines a particular usage within the full panoply of interactional factors which may be understood to be implicated in its production. The paper by Ford and Fox (this volume) undertakes such a project, and the usage which is its target — the replacement of a pronoun by a full noun phrase for a person reference, "He had. This guy had..." — turns out to involve just those sorts of reference forms which were taken up in the present, system-oriented account. So how do the resources I have tried to develop bear on the occurrence on which they focussed? Here again is the excerpt which they examined:³⁸

- (30) Auto Discussion 17:36-18:14
- 36 Curt: Didju know that guy up there et-oh. What th'hell is's
 37 name usetuh work up't (Steeldinner) garage did their
 38 body work. for'em. * ((* to * = (1.5)))
- 39 Ryan: Bo::
- 40 Ryan: Como:n, ou[t here c'mon!
- 41 Curt: * [Uh:::ah,
- 01 Ryan: °Bo Bo, Bo!
- 02 Curt: Oh:: he me[h- uh,
- 03 Ryan: [°Go get it!
- 04 (0.5)
- 05 Curt: His wife ra[n off with Bill McCa:nn. *

- 06 Ryan: [°C'mon!
 07 Ryan: °G'wan! Get it? ((* to * = (3.2)))
 08 (1.2)
 09 Ryan: Bo::, come here,
 10 Curt: * Y'know oo I'm talkin about,
 11 Ryan: B[o:,
 12 Mike: [No:,
 13 (0.5)
 14 Curt: °Oh:: shit.=
 15 Ryan: =Bo:.
 16 (0.5)
 17→ Curt: He had. This guy haf[d, a beautiff[ul, thirty two O:lds.
 18 Ryan: [°Bo:, [°Here Bo

Examining the first of Curt's turns here by reference to the person reference resources I have been sketching (that is, bringing to bear a domain-specific systematic account, rather than an interactional one, as per the second paragraph of this paper), a first observation is its designed orientation to the possible recognizability of Curt's intended referent to his recipient ("Didju know...," he is asking). Note that Curt struggles to find the most preferred form of recognitional reference, the name, but, unable to retrieve it himself (and therefore unable to offer it as a try-marked recognitional), he offers three descriptions as "clues" ("usetuh work up't (Steeldinner) garage;" "did their body work for 'em;" "His wife ran off with Bill McCann"), whose design to secure recognition from Mike is made explicit — if it was not already manifest — with the question to that effect at line 10.

This initial reference occasion, or these initial occasions, have been furnished locally initial reference forms of the sort preferred; recognizability being supposed as possible, Curt tries to provide recognitional references. He tries three recognitional descriptors; success would be displayed either by Mike upgrading the reference form to a name (as Karen does in excerpt (17) above), or claiming recognition on completion of one of these recognitional descriptors by nodding, providing recognition claims, etc. This reference has failed, an assessment which Curt himself apparently entertains with his "oh shit" at line 14. The two reference forms which Curt employs at line 17 are the two systematic alternatives to what he has just done, given its failure.

He has just provided three forms of locally initial reference. He is beginning the launching of the telling for which reference to this person has been introduced. Curt finds himself in what *could* be a locally subsequent

reference position; he has after all just been through a locally initial one. His first usage at line 17 is, then, a locally subsequent reference form in the locally subsequent reference position.

On the other hand, Curt has just tried three forms of the *recognitional* reference which is preferred, if possible. His recipient has achieved recognition from none of them, and, in response to a direct inquiry, has denied recognition (with unseemly precipitousness, as Ford and Fox point out). The “if possible” proviso having turned out to be unmet, recognitional reference is no longer mandated; indeed is not possible. The alternative, of course, is *non-recognitional* reference, and Curt reverts to one of the prototypes of non-recognitional reference, “this guy”.

Note that this last alternative can be seen to involve Curt in finding that the failure of his efforts at locally initial recognitional reference leaves him *still* in locally initial reference position. This is one of the alternatives specified via the *systematics* of person reference. On the Ford/Fox *interactional* account, it converges with Curt’s finding himself engaged with a new recipient, and one for whom recognitional reference is in any case not possible — an account by reference to the ensemble of *interactional* exigencies.

The usage under examination here — “he had. This guy had...” — has thus emerged as an orderly solution to the real time unfolding interactional contingencies encountered by Curt in trying to launch a second story with one co-participant who is competent but unwilling and another who is willing but incompetent. It is as well a solution drawing in an orderly way upon resources from a systematically ordered inventory or repertoire of reference practices for persons, fitted to a variety of reference objects and referring contingencies. It is in the intersection of such analyses — interactional and systematic — that we may hope recurrently to rediscover the varied ways in which idiosyncratic moments of interaction at particular junctures of people’s lives are composed out of quite formal, abstract and generally organized resources and practices of language and conduct in interaction (Schegloff 1972: 117).

8. Methodological Postscript

If the considerations which have been sketched in the body of this paper are indeed germane, i.e. that the interactional context, sequential organization, other word selections including prior references, and parties’ projects and

orientations to one another underlie and inform the practices of person reference in talk-in-interaction and in conversation specifically, then we might ask whether they should not be taken as “foundational”. What I mean is this.

Much of the work done on this and related topics by linguists of various persuasions has been grounded in other sorts of material than talk-in-interaction³⁹ — written texts, monologues, talk or writing produced under experimental or quasi-experimental conditions, and the like. In short these materials are not drawn from the naturally occurring interactional environments which seem to be the natural, primordial home for language use. It is not that these materials are unworthy of study, or that inquiry cannot be held as responsible for coming to terms with them, as with any other material. They may *well* be worthy, and they may *well* properly constrain our inquiry and our accounts. But in such materials, the primary and proximate interactional practices which undergird reference (of which anaphora is one aspect) — recipient design, relevance to the interactional project at hand, uptake of previous references or of just prior talk, parsing of just prior and projected sequence and topic structure — are largely or totally absent, often suppressed by specially designed circumstances of production.

They are suppressed or absent precisely because they appear to introduce elements of contingency, of variability, of idiosyncrasy, which are often taken to undermine the attainability of ideals of clarity, comparability, descriptive rigor, disciplined inquiry, etc. Meeting such goals is taken to require experimental control, or at least investigators’ shaping of the materials to the needs of inquiry — standardization (of stimuli, conditions, topics, etc.), conceptually imposed measurement instruments, etc. But in the name of science the underlying natural phenomena may be being lost, for what is being excised or suppressed in order to achieve control may lie at the very heart of the phenomena we are trying to understand. One is reminded of Garfinkel’s (1967: 22) ironic comment about the complaint that, were it not for the walls, we could better see what is holding the roof up.

The concern for the underlying natural phenomena also has a place in the rhetoric of positivist inquiry — validity. Until we study our phenomena in natural interactional environments, we will not know what should serve to anchor our conception of validity. Or, worse, we will think we *do*, and recruit what are in effect vernacular stipulations to do the job. Until we get a basic grasp of how these phenomena are organized and realized in their naturally

occurring contexts, we will not know where the findings from written texts, from experimental inquiry, etc. fit. Much like ethological studies of other species of animals in zoos, we did not know where the observations fit and what role to accord them until we had studies of the animals in their natural habitats.

Although all — or at least many — materials may be of value, they are not necessarily of *equal* value, or not necessarily of *equal* value at the same time, at the *present* time with its stage of inquiry. They may bear differentially on different aspects of the domain being studied. Or their value may not be equal at all points in the development of our understanding. The relevance of some materials may have to await the clarification of others, at least in part because the understanding gleaned from examining the phenomena in the environments in which they naturally developed and occur may enhance our capacity to derive optimum payoff from other sorts of materials, collected under different investigatorial auspices.

Related to the sort of material in which much of the past and current work in this area has been grounded has been a way of casting observations which may be worth re-examining in the light of the account offered in this paper.

If what I have been describing here is at all correct, then there is a variety of *resource forms for person reference* at the disposal of parties to interaction — for deployment by speakers and as resources for analyzing utterances by their hearers. And there are *practices* — for speaking and hearing/analyzing — for the accomplishment of adequate reference in talk-in-interaction. And we as academic students of this domain may develop models or hypotheses about how the domain is organized, models from which some investigators may elect to develop predictions.

But we must constantly bear in mind that this organized domain is implemented *by the participants*; it is easy to let the passive “how the domain is organized” obscure from our attention that *there are agents* here. The “practices” are practices which *they* deploy and employ. One question we need to address, then, and to be very clear about, is the assessment of any particular empirical occurrence in our domain of interest vis-a-vis the *practices of the participants* and the *predictions of the investigators* respectively.

Much work in this area seems to me to demote the relevance of the *agency of the participants* in the interaction, and to feature most centrally the *predictions of the investigators*. What happens, then, is that occurrences in the data which depart from the asserted basic form of organization — whether

thought of as “unmarked” in traditional linguistic terminology, or as “preferred” in the somewhat infelicitous terminology of CA — are treated in the first instance by reference to the *investigators’ preoccupations* — i.e. as failures of prediction — and only secondarily (if at all) by reference to *participants’ preoccupations* — as warranted uses of a dispreferred practice, whose warrant must be sought (and has been or will be sought by the coparticipants) in the circumstantial detail of the local context, or in the analyzable project of the speaker who used the form.

In the very name of science, then, we can be at risk of passing the opportunity to learn. Rather than just remarking about such (apparently) anomalous usages “that’s wrong” (as researchers), we instead ask “what was *that* about?!” — i.e. what *prompted* that, what was the speaker *doing* by doing *that*, by talking *that* way, by referring in *that* way? (For example, what is the speaker doing by re-referring to the same referent with the same, locally initial reference form?) It is because that is the way *recipients* appear to treat references, and because *speakers* orient to that practice of hearing/analyzing in constructing their talk, that we as investigators *miss* something central to the phenomenon if we do not ask it as well, and make our findings in response to that query part of our account of the phenomenon.

And here is the place of the intersection of such interactionally focussed inquiries as the one in Ford and Fox’ paper with the systemically focussed effort of this paper. For if we notice in the data what appears to be a counter-hypothetical, model-incompatible usage — like the replacement of a pronoun reference by a full noun phrase — and we wish to treat it not only as a failed prediction, as counter-evidence for a hypothesis or model, or even merely as “noise” or measurement error; if, that is, we want to explore it as the product of a practice deployed by a participant by reference to some feature of the interaction or some action or project which they undertake thereby to carry through, then we need to situate this product in the broadly examined context which might have motivated its deployment, as broadly examined a context as the speaker may have been responsive to. Calls for, or questions about, the generalizability of single case, interactionally focussed inquiries, then, precisely miss the point, for what they are doing is part of larger effort to allow the rhetoric of generalization not to obscure the very object we are trying to understand — which is how language and other forms of conduct in interaction are organized and deployed to accomplish those orderly domains of natural occurrence whose production we aim to lay bare.

The upshot of this Postscript, then, is that those who work with the materials of naturally occurring talk-in-interaction should think in terms of *practices* rather than in terms of *predictions*, and that investigators should increasingly work with such materials, in ways appropriate to them.

NOTES

1. This paper was first prepared for presentation at the Symposium on Anaphora, Aspen Lodge, Colorado, May 20-22, 1994. Because it was designed to coordinate with a paper by Cecilia E. Ford and Barbara A. Fox (this volume), it carried as a subtitle the target utterance for their paper: "A Companion Paper on 'He had. This guy had, a beautiful, thirty two O:lds.'" The present version still ends by relating the two undertakings, but is somewhat more focussed on the concern with the systematic organization of person reference resources. In this regard it draws on many years of lectures on this topic in my courses at UCLA, but picks out just a few themes (and not always the most basic ones) out of a complicated tangle. What I offer is really only a sketch, and I plead constraints of time and space; but even if I had much more time and space, I think our understanding (or at least mine) is at present at best a sketch; so I am offering a sketch of a sketch. My thanks to Cecilia Ford, Barbara Fox, Elinor Ochs and Sandra Thompson for helpful feedback on earlier drafts, and to Pamela Downing, whose independently motivated and developed paper (this volume) felicitously intersected my own at the conference, and who provided — both through her paper and through her comments on an earlier draft of mine — just the sort of thoughtful and provocative input which such scholarly symposia hope to foster. The resulting text does not always acknowledge these benefactors by name where their comments have left a mark, but the reader is nonetheless in their debt, as am I.
2. I have looked at talk-in-interaction in English; what I have to say may be relevant well beyond that limit, but I think in this area, the relevance of linguistic and cultural variation sets in far earlier in our inquiries than, for example, in research on sequential organization. I should also say that past experience recommends caution in applying the discussion to be developed about *person* reference to reference to place, time, actions, objects, etc., to which I can give no attention here (but see Schegloff 1972). Finally, the materials I draw on, and the relevant domain being explored here, includes a range of speech exchange systems (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974: 709 fn., 729-31), although conversation is central. In the absence of grounds for specifying the narrower domain, I often treat the larger domain of talk-in-interaction as the frame of reference (so to speak) for this discussion.
3. Closer (at least in animating impulse) to what I am after here is some work nearer to the intersection of anthropology with linguistics (e.g., Hanks 1990), though traditional methods of ethnographic field work and the forms of analysis which they support are, in my judgement, no longer adequate to the analytic tasks which now appear addressable. (See also the Methodological Postscript with which this paper ends.)
4. Some problems with these terms as formulations for the persons/roles they are meant to capture are suggested in Goffman (1979) and are further developed — with an eye to

grammaticalization — in Levinson (1988). I do not pursue here the considerations which they raise, though one upshot of those considerations is that in some language/culture configurations one could hardly avoid doing so.

5. The distinction is critical for interactional participants and (therefore) for professional analysts. The “you” which is the basic form for *reference* is taken as rude and offensive — and ordinarily as a term of last resort — for *address* or *summoning* (as in “Hey, you!”); and the use of given name (or title), which is common as *address* term, may be marked as a *reference* term for addressed recipient, as will be discussed below. That said, it is worth noting that *address* usages can be made the locus for sorts of interactional work similar to the more-than-referent-specifying work done by *reference* usages, including pointed deployments of intentional misidentification, as in the following excerpt.

(2) Automobile Discussion 8:1-14
 01 Carney: Yeah, th[ey all,=
 02 Mike: [They all-
 03 Gary: =hn-[-hn!
 04 Mike: [They all go down th[ere,=
 05→ Gary: [°Gimme a
 06→ [be[er Curt,
 07 Mike: =[N [o some- somebuddy so:mebuddy,]
 08 Carney: [It reminds me of those wrestl(h)ers.
 09 Carney: 'hhh
 10 Mike: So:me[body ra:pped=
 11 Carney: [hhh(h)on t(h)elevis[ion. °().
 12→ Gary: =[Bartender how about
 13 a beer. While yer settin[there.
 14 Carney: [°().

Here, the participants in a backyard picnic are discussing a fight at the local car races the previous evening when guest Gary turns to host Curt for another beer. When his first request does not “register”, his second begins with an address term fitted to the interactional project of the moment and the present sequential slot in it, whose referential adequacy is beside the point, or provided for by other than the term employed. (For an early discussion of “intentional mis-identification” in address position, cf. Sacks 1992: I, 417-26 [Spring, 1966].)

There appear to be systematic relationships in referring to a third person between (a) the form ordinarily used by the speaker *to address* the referent, (b) the form the speaker figures is used *by the current addressee to address* the referent, and (c) the term the speaker uses *to refer* to that referent, but these remain to be adequately specified. Cf. Note 34 below, and the related discussion in Downing (this volume).

6. Additional exemplars are provided in both these sources, as well as elsewhere (although incidentally to the main theme), such as the following from Heritage (1990), on point for the “knowledgable I” — that is (in contrast with the familiar “impersonal ‘you’”), a use of “you” which is taken to invoke a class of “relevantly knowledgable persons” of which the speaker is a member:

- (5) Chat Show: Russell Harty-Sir Harold Acton, re his sojourn in China
 Action: ...h h h h and some of thuh- (0.3) some of my styudents translated Eliot into chine::se. I think thuh very first (0.2)
 Harty: Did you learn to speak (.) chine [:se] [.hh] Oh yes. (0.7)
 → Acton: .h h h h You *cah*::n't live in thuh country without speaking thuh lang[uage it's imposs]ible .h h h h =
 Harty: [Not no: cour:se]

In engaging in particular activities in certain settings the use of the terms "I" and "you" may be extended to include referents largely inaccessible to those unacquainted with the setting or activity, as in the use of these terms in a physics laboratory working group for a symbiosis of physicist and physical phenomenon, as described in Ochs, Jacoby and Gonzales (1994: 163-168) and Ochs, Gonzales and Jacoby (to appear). On the use of "you" to refer to the speaker, see also O'Connor (1994).

7. I cannot undertake here to spell out these usages and what they are used to accomplish in any detail. In what follows, I limit myself to mentioning something of the range which a fuller treatment would aim to explicate more fully.
8. In this regard, then, it is a device for shifting the footing which the speaker marks himself as having with respect to what he is articulating, in terms outlined in Goffman (1979). See also Hanks (1990). It is occurrences like these which prompt a reevaluation of an initial sense that the account offered in this paper represented an extrinsic, analytic depiction of person reference, and not a set of alternatives available to a speaker, not a sort of "decision tree". The use by speakers of third person forms to accomplish self-reference suggests that, at least at a second-order level of organization, the set of practices sketched here *does* represent a decision tree of sorts, an organized set of resources by reference to which person reference for *any* referent can be selected by a speaker.
9. This excerpt allows the registering of a crucial observation. For the most part the present account elucidates organizational principles indigenous to the domain of person reference, operating to order the deployment of reference terms selected from among the alternative practices which compose a culture's resources in this regard. But in any given case, the deployment of a particular reference form — though compatible with the organization of the domain — may have been prompted more by features of the context *extrinsic* to the domain of person reference, including actions done by co-participants in the most proximate sequential context, and the tack which the speaker is taking toward them. (Such deployments may also be prompted by referential aspects of the context; cf. Schegloff 1988a.) However cleanly one may draw the distinction between "systemic" and "interactional" in formulating genres of analytic undertaking, the two are inextricably mixed in actual interactional events.
10. On the use of other-than-I for self-reference, see also discussions throughout Sacks' Lectures, such as Volume II: 303-317 [March 4, 1971], and II: 391-5, on "Agent-client Interaction" [May 10, 1971].
11. The usage here, as Sacks (*ibid.*) pointed out, brings into relevance the categorical identity of the recipient which is employed in lieu of "you", which "you" would not do. It may

serve here to refer to the "role" or the "office" rather than its incumbent, though not all uses of such terms do this. For example, in the earlier Excerpt (7), the mother's use of "Mom" echoes, and retrieves for countering, the son's earlier utterance, but does not specifically invoke "role". An array of materials which cannot be displayed here suggests that the definite article is used when "role" is being invoked — as in "Because I am the mother," not "I am your mother" (note the usage in Excerpt (9): "...report to the President...").

12. This, of course, does not pertain to languages and cultures which have more than a single term for speaker and addressed recipient. It can be noted that such language/cultures may differ in *precisely this regard*, that is, in the display or masking of relevance.
13. Here is one instance in which a theme elaborated on behalf of the interests in reference of philosophy and logic may be observably relevant to quotidian usage. The offer in Excerpt (14) seems specifically to exploit what Donnellan (1966) termed an "attributive" usage — referring not to a specific individual but to such a one as would be described by the reference form. The awkwardness and setting-specificity of the utterance — which appears designed to collapse two sequences into one, "Who's next?" and its response, and "Can I help you?" and its response — gives one pause about how such philosophically grounded analytic distinctions relate to actual conversational practice. (For another discussion of collapsing two sequences cf. Levinson 1983: 356-64.)
14. Cf. C. Goodwin (1979, 1981). On the other hand, gaze-direction is not always the key resource in locating who is cast as the recipient referred to by "you;" other descriptive or referential material in the turn may be decisive. See the discussion in Lerner (1993: 225), where the question "Did you cook this all the way through?" locates the one known by all the participants to have been the cook as the addressee being referred to by "you", even though the speaker's gaze is not directed at her.
15. On the other hand, in some settings and registers — for example, in talk in which organizations are implicated — other forms for self- and recipient reference may become established as the "default", and "I/you" will be examined for what specially *they* are doing.
16. But see Note 24 at the end of this discussion.
17. This notion is, I presume, transparent for linguists and is invoked by such concepts as "zero anaphora", which I understand to refer to a reference occasion which has no form occupying it, or which is occupied by a form with no surface realization (though the usage discussed in the text here is itself unrelated to zero anaphora).
18. Downing (this volume, note 11, and p.c.) points to a number of speaker practices which may qualify this rather stark differentiation, such as forms containing demonstratives or definite articles apparently requiring reference to previous linguistic context (e.g. "this Hart") or forms such as proper names articulated with low stress, which may much more readily be hearable as locally subsequent, and may resist treatment as locally initial.
19. Uses of locally subsequent forms in locally initial position can invoke other kinds of resources as well. In the following excerpt (discussed as well in Sacks 1992: I, 762-3 [Spring, 1968]) two nurses are discussing various patients in their care:

- (15) SBL (NTRI #569a)
- A: How *is* missuz Hooper.
- B: Uh oh, about the same.
- A: Mm, mm mm mm. Have they uh th-uh Then she's still continuing in the same way,
- B: Yes, mm hm.
- A: Well, I hope uh he can con- uh can, carry on that way, be [cause-
- B: [Well he wants to make a chay- a change.

No "he" has been mentioned in the preceding and ongoing spate of talk; yet it appears clear that the term is used here to refer to *Mr. Hooper*. The "he" reference serves to constitute an extension of "talk on this topic" by invoking recipient's (B's) knowledge of the matters being talked about to solve what — that is relevant to this topic — this person-reference could be referring to. On the co-selection of terms for various sorts of reference by reference to, and thereby constituting, topic, cf. Schegloff (1972: 96-106).

In a later conversation involving the same "B" with another interlocutor, the same locally subsequent form in locally initial position is employed, but is checked out by the recipient, and thus is upgraded to the preferred reference form:

- (16) SBL, 1:10:5 (NTRI #605a)
- A: Oh, is this Mrs. Hooper?
- B: Yes...
- .
- .
- .
- A: Isn't she the one who- I think I heard about it the daughter in law told me- wasn't she playing golf [at the Valley Club?
- B: [Yes that's the
- B: That's the one
- A: and had an aneurism.
- B: Yes
- A: suddenly
- B: Mh hm
- A: They thought at first she was hit with a golf (0.2) ball or bat or something, but it wasn't that. [It was a ruptured aneurism, and=
- B: [uh huh
- A: =uh th- they didn't want Dr. Williams at St. John. They took her down to UCLA
- B: Yes uh huh
- A: And it- and it left her quite permanently damaged (I suppose).
- B: Apparently. Uh he is still hopeful
- A: The husband
- B: uh huh and you never just uh you just never saw such devotion in your life.

20. There have been two topic proffers (at lines 02 and 06, respectively), each of which has been rejected (at lines 04 and 07-11-13 respectively), most decisively by recipient's denial of access. At lines 14-16, the topical sequence is allowed to lapse; in the silence which follows the denial of access it is made clear, most notably by Mark, who was the topic's initiator, that the matter will not be further pursued (specifically by his interpolation of a minimal receipt token at line 15).
21. This is not the only place where a linguistic resource not *prima facie* designed for sequence-organizational uses has consequences for sequence continuity or disjunction. Goldberg (1978), among others, discusses amplitude shifts in this regard. The possibility of multiple resonances for such linguistic resources recommends that the book not be closed on what any given instance of a practice (such as referring) is being used to accomplish. Barbara Fox reports (p.c.), for example, the observation that a great many assessments are done with full Nps, with the implication that the use of "Alice" at line 17 in Excerpt (17) is part of a practice for doing assessments, or assessments of a certain sort. In principle, of course, this is not incompatible with its use to constitute the start of a new sequence, for the assessment here is used to do just that. But before proceeding much further along this path one would want some analytic explication of the observed co-occurrence of assessment and full NP (which is itself, of course, distinct from proper name), and a specification of how (if at all) "full NP-ness" is a relevant feature of the practices of doing assessment; there is surely no lack of instances of assessments employing pronouns.
22. The first is discussed at length in Schegloff (1987a, 1988b), and turns on a horizontal or "negative" headshake by Mike, conveying incipient disagreement, just before the first reference to Keegan at "a".
23. Another common one is the use of a repeat of a locally initial form to register, receipt or validate a reference (typically a "recognitional reference", on which see below) which had been treated as problematic. For example, in Excerpt (18), in Phyllis' follow-up to her staging of a story-telling by Mike, she introduces the two central protagonists of the story, at line 17.

(18 partial)

17→ Phyllis: Wih Keegan en, what. Paul [de Wa::ld?]
 18→ Mike: [Paul de Wa:]d. Guy out of,=
 19→ Curt: =De Wa:ld yeah I [°(know)] ['m.)
 20 Mike: [Tiffen.] [D'you know him_i
 21 Curt: °Uhuh=I know who'e i:s,

Note that the mention of the second of these characters is treated as presenting some problems. First, Phyllis displays a momentary mock word search before his name. Then Mike, coming in in response, treats the name itself as inadequate identification, and begins to offer further identifying information. As part of a receipt turn which claims the adequacy of the reference, Curt repeats it. (And see Note 33 on another use of a locally initial form in locally subsequent position to provide for "normalized" re-reference to otherwise possibly problematic referents.)

Note as well, while the fragment is before us, Phyllis' mention of "Keegan", who has just been mentioned at line 36 (in Excerpt (18)) as the first candidate exception to Curt's pronouncement about "good regulars". The repeat of his name here may well be a way in which Phyllis shows that that mention of Keegan is what has triggered the launching of

this storytelling. I draw here on Jefferson's observation (1978: 221-2) that one way storytellings get launched is by some sort of disjunction from the otherwise ongoing talk, followed by an "embedded repeat" of the item which has prompted the telling, and by reference to which the telling is relevant-in-context. Here, then, is yet another special project marked by re-use of a locally initial form in apparently locally subsequent position — and again one in which the launching of a new sequential unit is implicated (and again one not specific to person reference).

24. At the outset of this discussion (p. 448, and fn. 16), I suggested that this differentiation between locally initial and locally subsequent is introduced where third person reference is concerned, and does not pertain to references for speaker and recipient. There would then seem to be nothing serving to "anchor" the pronoun reference forms in these cases, nothing like the ordinary use of locally initial full noun phrase reference forms in unmarked usage, and like the invocation of convergently oriented-to relevant matters in the case of the use of locally subsequent reference forms in locally initial reference positions. However, the organization of telephone conversation is illuminating in this regard, for in them is made vocally accessible what may be accomplished tacitly in co-present interaction (Schegloff 1979). One of the key undertakings in the opening phase of telephone conversations is the establishment of some mutual identification or recognition of the incipiently interacting parties (Schegloff 1986). Even talk which does not overtly appear directed to this project can be shown to be implementing it nonetheless. In telephone conversation, then, these early identification/recognition sequences serve to establish and anchor the identifications which I/you may subsequently index. In co-present interaction, much of this work may be accomplished visually *en passant*, and on occasion the result of such mutual visual inspection will be the undertaking of introduction sequences by the incipiently interacting parties, or, on occasion (e.g. at social gatherings, as seatmates on long trips, etc.), by parties who have already interacted — though these may be "misplacement-marked" (i.e. marked — by phrases such as "by the way" — as placed other than where they belong or as displacing whatever might relevantly/properly occur next; Schegloff and Sacks 1973: 319-20). Although at the surface level reference to speaker and recipient may not have differentiated forms for locally-initial and locally-subsequent reference, then, the *issue* is not irrelevant to those reference usages.

25. By "simple" I mean, in this context, not only that it is doing referring alone, but that the selection practices for arriving at a particular pronoun reference term — at least in English — require orientation only to number and gender, whereas if a full NP is to be used a whole set of consequential selection issues come into play (cf. below on recognitional/non-recognitional forms, and the discussions of "membership categorization devices" in Sacks 1972a, 1972b). Even in languages with more complex pronoun systems, it would be surprising indeed if the selection practices for full NP reference forms were not substantially less "simple."

It is important to reaffirm that, in spite of the apparent proliferation in the text of exemplars of full noun phrases used to do subsequent reference and of the practices they are said to instantiate (and it is a very mild proliferation), the vast majority of locally subsequent references are implemented by the use of pronouns. There is, of course, more to be said about them, for actual usage may diverge in unfamiliar ways from our conventional understanding. "They," for example, is used for singular as well as for plural reference — among other environments to refer to organizational personnel or individuals acting as agents for organizations (the very ones who may refer to themselves, singly, as "we"). Cf. Sacks (1992: I, 568-77 [Spring, 1967]).

26. The apparent "objectivity" and absolutism of personal names might seem to set them in contrast to deictic terms, ones whose "referent", "meaning" and usability are relative to context and occasion of use, properties of speaker and recipient, etc. The prototype deictic terms are demonstratives, such temporal and place references as "here", "now". etc., and, for person reference, the pronouns. The terms and practices of their actual use suggest, however, that they are as "situated" and "indexical" as classical deixis. The use of name by a speaker to refer to a person can be as contingent on the addressed recipient and the context of usage as any classically deictic form. In conversation, name is a recognitional reference form and its use to refer to someone is predicated on the speaker's supposition about the recipient's knowledge, and related suppositions as detailed below.
27. Taken from the data which Ford and Fox present (this volume). On the use of relative clauses in doing non-recognitional reference, cf. Fox and Thompson (1990), one of the few linguistic studies of reference drawing upon conversational data. For work on person reference based on Italian conversation, cf. Duranti (1984).
28. Some descriptors may be ambiguous with respect to "recognition-ality", "the guy who lives across from me" may elicit from its recipient at some point, "am I supposed to know this person?" That is, sometimes *external* analysts may not be able to determine whether a form is recognitional or not, though it is clear to the recipient, for whom it was after all designed. But on occasion it may be ambiguous to the recipient himself or herself.
29. Expanding the scope of possibility, as for example when a speaker introduces a name to provide for its subsequent usability as recognitional reference, is one form "programmatic relevance" takes (Sacks 1992: I, 336-40 et passim, for somewhat differently focussed senses of the term). In such uses, names are clearly being used outside the scope of a more narrowly drawn and straightforwardly applied criterion such as "...in circumstances where the speaker thinks that the recipient is already familiar...etc.", but nonetheless is being used *by reference* to that consideration. That is, the preference for recognitional reference — "if possible, use a recognitional" — may have applications, extensions and consequences beyond the more narrowly drawn criterion, strictly applied.
- The import of the "programmatic relevance" of some practice is that it is not only that, the conditions for it being met, the practice is (or can be) invoked. Establishing the conditions can be undertaken so as to permit the practice to be invoked. Or: Invoking the practice can be a way of introducing into relevance (and even into existence) the conditions which it presumes. The last of these may well be involved in occurrences (described in Downing, this volume, and Schegloff 1972 with respect to place reference) in which persons are embarrassed by not recognizing a name qua recognitional reference, a response which seems to turn on the recipients realizing from the use of the name that they were supposed to be familiar with it, not just in the cognitive sense but in the normative one.
30. Try-marking is perhaps the most elaborately enacted scenario of referring as an interactional achievement, but the relevance of this characterization is not limited to these elaborated episodes. See also Clark and Wilkes-Gibbes (1986), Geluykens (1992).
31. Of course, non-recognitional descriptors also get upgraded to recognitionals, and to name recognitionals, if possible, as was proposed in Sacks and Schegloff (1979:180. For example:

- (23) GTS, 4:21 (NTRI #533)
- Ken: ...Well to change the subject, uh did he ever say anything about a kid named Nick Correlli? Uh well he was a real good friend of this Nick Correlli. An' he w-he is the same kinda guy. [I mean-
- Jim: [How about a guy named Hogan?
- Ken: Bill Hogan?
- Jim: Bill Hogan.
- Ken: Yeah I know him real well.
- Jim: I do too he's a [bitchin guy.
- Ken: [He-he is another nut.=
- =He [is exacy like McGee. he's a real nut.
- Jim: [Yeah.
- Roger: Went to the same mental institution.
- Ken: Ye(hh)h. We all did.

Here the referent is first mentioned with a non-recognitional descriptor ("a guy named Hogan," like the earlier-mentioned "a guy at work"). "Bill Hogan" offers a try to convert the reference to a recognitional, and, after confirmation, makes that explicit, "I know him real well."

But reference can also get down-graded, on occasion beginning with confident recognitional name usages, being supplemented with recognitional descriptors in response to recognition trouble, and devolving eventually into non-recognitional references, as in the following:

- (24) SN-4, 8:03-21
- 03 Sheri: Who ws the girl that was outside (his door_i)
- 04 (0.8)
- 05→ Mark: Debbie.
- 06 (0.8)
- 07→ Sheri: Who's Debbie.
- 08 Mark: °(Katz.)
- 09 (0.7)
- 10→ Mark: She's jus' that girl thet: uh:, (0.2) 'hh I met her
- 11 through uh:m::, (1.0) I met 'er in Westwood.=I (caught
- 12→ that-) (-) 'Member I wenttuh see the premie:r of (0.3)
- 13 Lost Horizon_i [()
- 14 Sheri: [I DID'N KNOW YOU did,=
- 15 (??): [()
- 16 Sheri: =[Was it go]od?
- 17 Mark: =[I didn't-]
- 18 Mark: I di'nt git tuh git in en see: (h)it, b't tha[t's a diff-]
- 19 Karen: [O:(h)h you]
- 20 went t' watch the sta:r[s,
- 21 Mark: [Everyone thinks thet I di:d get-
- 22 get tuh go in en see it becuz someone to:ld someone,

Here Mark answers Sheri's question with a confident, first name only, recognitional reference. When Sheri cannot solve it, Mark begins to supplement it with a description whose "definite description" start ("...that girl that...") projects that a recognitional

description is being provided. But that description is abandoned, as is made obvious by the "her" following the 2/10 second pause, that being the first element of the talk incompatible with its being a continuation of the first turn start. "I met her through..." is equivocal-so-far as to whether it is being built as a recognitional or a non-recognitional descriptor. By the end of this turn, Mark is seeking to secure Sheri's recognition of a past event as a resource on which to draw in identifying the referent who began assuredly as "Debbie". (She ends up being a character in the story Mark introduces to identify her, one of two simply referred to as "the girls".)

32. This is even more the case if we think about the predominant forms of human habitation and settlement over time and place, in which persons knew, and knew about, few others that were not known to their interlocutors.
33. It is important to recall that "at this point" refers to locally *initial* reference. Reference forms which would be *recognitional* references as *initial* references may not be so in locally *subsequent* position. There they may serve to re-refer to a referent who was initially introduced by a *non-recognitional*, as in the following excerpt from the Automobile Discussion:

(27) Auto Discussion 12:2-17

- a→ Gary: I usetuh go over there with my cousin.
 °(when he had a car)/°(over that track),
 (1.2)
- b→ Gary: His name wz uh, [Tucker.
 Pam: [You c'n come'n sit'n talk with us if
 you want,
 Gary: (They had a-)[McGill from,
 Kid: [(I don't want to.)
 Gary: =[°(Knotsville)
 Pam: =[Ehhtha(h)t's ! 'hh That's good,
- c→ Gary: Sam's from Bellview. °He had a, Oh Two. lh wz a,
 modified. [Six cylinder::_i
 Pam: [()
 Mike: [Oh yeah th[at's goin way
 ba:ck. [
 Gary: [°(That's a lo:ng
 time ago).
 Gary: Tha wz a lo:ng time a[go.
 Mike: [Yeah.

Here Gary introduces his referent at "a" as "my cousin", which appears to be non-recognitional (though it could be otherwise), a cast reinforced by providing a last name as an identification at "b". When Gary refers to this person as "Sam" at "c", this is a "recognitional reference" only in the sense that this is a referent who has already been introduced into the talk — i.e. one "recognizable" because this is a subsequent reference, not because the referent was already known to be known to the recipient.

34. This practice can, of course, be constrained by others. My students may well know that my wife knows me (and addresses me) as Manny, but may be constrained (some of them anyway) from referring to me that way when talking to her, even those who themselves know me (and address me) as Manny.

35. If “name” appears privileged in person reference, as suggested by the exclusive focus on it in Sacks and Schegloff (1979) and in the discussion here (as well as in Downing, this volume), it may be because it most often satisfies the exigencies of this practice. Where there are alternative ways the recipient knows the referent, recognitional descriptors may be selected or constructed from among them which serve, enhance, implement, etc. the activity or topical project(s) of the interaction at that moment.
36. The power and immensely broad penetration of these categories (whose “names” are a major resource for non-recognitional reference, as well as of description for already referred-to referents) and the common sense knowledge organized by reference to them can hardly be exaggerated. The abstract and anonymous categories can come to override and reinterpret even directly observed events, enacted by particular, identified individuals. Thus, when Mike begins to tell the story whose launching has threaded through many of the data excerpts used throughout this paper, a story about a fight which he observed between Keegan and DeWald, it is received at various points in its telling by such recipient comments as Curt’s “little high school kids” (7:03) or Carney’s “It reminds me of those wrestlers on television” (8:08-11). The power of the categories then operates both in the context *of* the telling in competition with the particular individuals being told about, and in the context *in* the telling to reinterpret the fighting as categorial conduct and *not* situationally induced — and therefore potentially dramatic — conduct.
37. I need to mention again a remaining reservation about the domain under examination here. It concerns whether this discussion, in dealing with references to other than speaker and recipient, pertains to reference to *non-present* persons, or to reference to persons more generally. There are practices available to the participants when referring to co-present parties (other than addressee) which have simply not been examined with sufficient care to assess how they fit (*if they fit*) with the present account. For example, one party to the interaction can observe another persistently eyeing yet a third, or simply noticing what a third is doing, and can then remark “S/he is going to...”, i.e. use a locally subsequent form in locally initial position, by exploiting the observed gazing behavior of the addressed recipient, and (by the way) conveying to that recipient that their gazing behavior has been noticed.

On the other hand, “I/you” references to speaker and recipient appear to be treated by other co-present parties as locally-initial references, such that next references to that referent within that spate of talk properly take locally subsequent forms. Thus, with respect to self-referring “I” being followed by locally subsequent “she”:

- (28) Auto Discussion, 2:4-10
Carney has stood up and begun walking to the other side of the picnic table.
- 04→ Carney: °I gotta move.
05 (1.0)
- 06→ Mike: Oh look-eh-she gonna g'm down here'n break those two u:[p.=
07 Carney: [ehhhh!
- 08 Mike: =se[e:?
09 Curt: [Aw[: ma:n,]
10 Mike: [hah hah] hah hah[hah.

And with respect to recipient-referring “you” being followed by locally subsequent “she:”

- (29) SN-4, 3:28-40
 28 Mark: 'hhhh Ennyway-, 'hh u:m(-) we were havin' this orgy='s
 29→ this okay t'talk about? this doesn't offend you does it?
 30 Sheri: No=
 31 Ruth: =No=
 32 Mark: =Oh.=
 33 Mark: ='hhhpt-hh well it shou[ld.
 34→ ?Ruth: [Sh's not ma:ried [yet.]=
 35 Mark: [hhh]=
 36 =Yea[h, ('t's alright)

The "you" at line 29 apparently refers to Sheri; although no video record is available for this co-present interaction, it is Sherry who answers first, reflecting an analysis on her part that the question had selected her as next speaker, and the absence of overlapping talk by the others reflecting an analysis by them that someone else had been addressed with this question and thereby selected as next speaker, to whom they defer. When Ruthie re-refers to her as "she" at line 34, the formulation as "not married yet" picks up a topical thread from earlier in this conversation concerned with Sheri's impending wedding. The "you" and "she" are, then, co-referential, and practices of locally initial and subsequent reference apply here as elsewhere.

Perhaps it can be left at this: the tack taken in this paper (and the others it is meant to accompany) is proposed for reference to non-present persons, and, subject to modification and supplementation, to person reference more generally. For relevant recent discussion bearing on this issue, cf. Lerner (1993).

38. Two separate interactions are tracked in this extract, and they are intercalated in the transcript. While Curt is involved with Mike and Gary, Gary's young son Ryan is trying to attract the attention of Curt's dog, Bo — at lines 39-40, 01, 03, 06-09, 11, 15 and 18. Some of the utterances recorded on these lines overlap with utterances in the Curt/Mike exchange, but those that do not have the graphic effect of masking silences in the Curt/Mike exchange. Two longish silences of this sort are marked in the transcript by asterisks, and the duration of the silence is reported in double parentheses to the right. For those wishing to examine a less encumbered representation of the Curt/Mike exchange, I reproduce it below shorn of the parallel interaction:

(29a) Auto Discussion 17:36-18:14 (simplified)

- Curt: Didju know that guy up there et-oh. What th'hell is's
 name usetuh work up't (Steeldinner) garage did their
 body work. for'em.
 (1.5)
 Curt: Uh:::ah,
 (0.5)
 Curt: Oh:: he meh- uh,
 (0.5)
 Curt: His wife ran off with Bill McCa:nn.
 (3.2)
 Curt: Y'know oo I'm talkin about,
 Mike: No.,
 (0.5)

Curt: °Oh:: shit.
(0.6)

→ Curt: He had. This guy had, a beautiful, thirty two O:lds.

39. Obviously there is work, and there are linguists, across the range of persuasions to which/whom this postscript need not be taken as relevant. It is meant for, and about, whoever it is descriptive of.

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