

Positioning and interpretative repertoires: conversation analysis and post-structuralism in dialogue

Margaret Wetherell
THE OPEN UNIVERSITY

ABSTRACT. This article focuses on Schegloff's (1997) comments on critical discourse analysis and evaluates their force in relation to the analysis of a segment of a group discussion with three young white middle-class men concerning an episode in one of the participant's recent sexual history. The post-structuralist-influenced writings of Laclau and Mouffe (1985, 1987) are presented as an alternative analytic frame for the same data. The analysis examines the contextualization of the event which is the topic of the conversation and the positioning taken up and offered to the young man involved, drawing on the analytic concepts of interpretative repertoire and ideological dilemma. A critique of the post-structuralist concept of subject positions is developed and also of the methodological prescriptions Schegloff proposes for critical discourse analysis. The implications for critical discursive research in social psychology are discussed.

KEY WORDS: contextualization, Conversation Analysis, Critical Discourse Analysis, ideological dilemmas, interpretative repertoires, masculinity, participants' orientations, post-structuralism, sexuality, subject positions

As Teun van Dijk (1997) noted in a recent editorial for *Discourse & Society*, it is no simple matter to differentiate 'good' from 'bad' discourse analysis. Although it is not the case that 'anything goes' in discourse work, it seems unlikely that any single set of evaluative criteria will prove sufficient. This, however, does not preclude discourse analysts from attempting to advocate or legislate their own 'gold standard' for analysis (or editors from making evaluative judgements). And, indeed, in a recent article also published in *Discourse & Society*, the conversation analyst Emanuel Schegloff (1997) has tried to formulate just this kind of standard.

Schegloff takes to task various forms of (unspecified) critical discourse analysis and argues that such analyses should be grounded in what he describes as the 'technical' discipline of conversation analysis. Schegloff suggests that as a result of this technical exercise critical discourse analysts may find that the discursive phenomena of interest are quite other than they assumed. Conversation analysis is also offered as a corrective to what

Schegloff presents as the grandiosity of critical discourse analysts. This grandiosity is evident, according to Schegloff, when analysts impose, in an act of intellectual hegemony, their own frames of reference on a world already interpreted and endogenously constructed by participants. Finally, Schegloff suggests that conversation analysis provides a principled method for reaching some form of closure in the face of the infinite regress of possible interpretations stressed by deconstructionist and postmodern perspectives.

The aim of this article is to comment on and explore Schegloff's proposals in relation to some data and in this way to contribute to the wider debate about the criteria for the evaluation of discourse analysis. I argue that conversation analysis does indeed offer a useful discipline for discourse analyses conducted under a broadly 'critical' aegis but this discipline needs to be two way. Conversation analysis alone does not offer an adequate answer to its own classic question about some piece of discourse—why this utterance here? Rather, a complete or scholarly analysis (as opposed to a technical analysis) must range further than the limits Schegloff proposes.

This discussion is also relevant to and emerges from a particular disciplinary context—discourse analysis as it has been developing in social psychology. It has become common-place in social psychology in recent years to distinguish between two or more styles of discourse analysis (see Antaki, 1994; Burman and Parker, 1993; Parker, 1990; Widdicombe and Wooffitt, 1995). Typically, the boundary lines are drawn between styles of work which affiliate with ethnomethodological and conversation analytic traditions and analyses which follow post-structuralist or Foucauldian lines. Thus Widdicombe and Wooffitt distinguish between a discursive psychology offering a fine grain analysis of the action orientation of talk (e.g. Edwards, 1997; Edwards and Potter, 1992) and investigations concerned with the imbrication of discourse, power and subjectification which take their lead from the work of Foucault (e.g. Hollway, 1984; Marks, 1993).

In contrast to this division into 'molecular' and more 'molar' styles of analysis, or 'critical' versus 'non-critical' discourse analysis, this paper argues for a more synthetic approach in line with earlier attempts to weave a range of influences into a viable approach to discourse analysis for social psychological projects and topics (see Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Potter et al., 1990; Wetherell and Potter, 1992). I suggest that although the terms of engagement between post-structuralism and ethnomethodology/conversation analysis need revisiting, a stance which reads one in terms of the other continues to provide the most productive basis for discourse work in social psychology, in much the same way, for example, as cultural anthropologists and ethnographers of communication (see Duranti, 1992; Lindstrom, 1992; Maybin, 1997; Ochs, 1992) have found an eclectic approach to be the most effective. I first introduce the data at issue in this article, then review Schegloff's take on conversation analysis and some post-structuralist writings as two contrasting potential analytic frames, before returning to the data and an evaluation of the adequacy of what each offers.

'FOUR IN ONE NIGHT'

The stretch of discourse presented in the Appendix comes from a relatively large-scale project on the construction of masculine identities (Edley and Wetherell, 1995, 1996, 1997; Wetherell, 1994; Wetherell and Edley, 1998). Part of this project involved an intensive reflexive ethnography (Atkinson, 1989) conducted in and around the sixth form common room of a single sex boys' independent school in the United Kingdom and included interviews with small groups of white, 17–18-year-old male students. Each group of three was interviewed around eight times, meeting for an hour each week with the interviewer (Nigel Edley), for a period of approximately two to three months. The aim of this ethnography was to examine the construction of middle class masculine identities in one institutional site and the interviews covered aspects of the young men's daily lives, social relations within the common room, their anticipations of their future working and domestic lives, relationships with women and with male friends, sexuality, popular culture, feminism, homophobia, masculine stereotypes, and so on.

The material in the Appendix comes from the fifth session of one of these small group interviews (with Group C) around half-way into the session. The participants (Phil, Aaron and Paul) and the young women referred to in the conversation, but not the interviewer, have been given pseudonyms. This extract begins with the interviewer introducing a new topic of conversation, picking up on a previous but unexplicated allusion to some events involving Aaron during the weekend.

Extract One

1 Nigel: Okay yeah tell me about going with four people in one
2 night=

This formulation is heard as a request to Aaron for a description of the events which Phil eventually supplies with and on behalf of Aaron (lines 10–74). The description concerns Aaron's behaviour at a pub on the Friday night and at a party on the Saturday night and the nature of his involvement with four different young women. The discussion of this topic prompted by Nigel Edley (which in fact continues for many more turns than reproduced in Appendix One) moves on to consider the evaluation of the event (lines 76–93).

Extract Two

73 Phil: So that like took me aback somewhat (0.3) so that was
74 a good weekend for you
75 (.)
76 Nigel: Is that good?

After some discussion of the 'stick' or criticism Aaron received from his friends, Nigel intervenes once more to re-focus the discussion on the morality of Aaron's actions.

Extract Three

- 94 Nigel: =Yeah I mean I wasn't sort of saying is four in two
 95 days good I mean it's impressive [you know]
 96 Aaron: [hh [hhh] hh
 97 Phil: [hhhhh] hhhh
 98 Nigel: But I me::an like (.) it presumes that erm that's:: a
 99 creditable thing (.) yeah? Is it?

After Phil and Aaron discuss Aaron's position on 'the moral low ground' the fourth participant in the discussion (Paul) is invited into the conversation and asked for his views.

Extract Four

- 116 Nigel: Right (.) okay (0.2) what do you think Paul?

Paul defers giving an immediate response and establishes his views instead through a kind of Socratic dialogue which prompts Aaron and Phil to reformulate again the nature and status of what happened (lines 116–76).

The interviewer's questions key into two very pervasive and inter-related discursive activities—describing events (formulating their nature) and accounting for and evaluating those events. There is, of course, an enormous amount of interest in these data for the discourse analyst, including, for instance, the delicate business of telling a story on behalf of someone else, the large amount of ventriloquizing and reported speech, its use and discursive functions in Aaron's accounts particularly, the role of laughter, Phil's double position as Aaron's supporter and 'tormentor' and the organization of the discourse within the frame of interview. The aspects I wish to select for further discussion include the construction of multiple versions of 'what happened', and the related construction of what I call 'troubled' and 'untroubled' identities.

Before examining these features, however, I first set up conversation analysis as a potential analytic frame for this material, focusing in particular on Schegloff's (1991, 1992, 1997) writings on method and context, and then some post-structuralist writings (Laclau, 1993; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, 1987; Mouffe, 1992; Shapiro, 1992) as an alternative frame. How might each perspective understand discourse of this kind? What concepts are offered for analysing this talk?

CONVERSATION ANALYSIS

In traditional sociology, or in traditional social psychology for that matter, a satisfactory analysis of the kind of material found in the Appendix would relate the patterns found to some external social cause or some internal psychological motivation. The interest would be in Aaron's *actual* actions as these can be deduced from descriptions. In explanation it might be sufficient, for example, to say that Aaron's behaviour ('four in one night') is

caused by his attitudes towards women and his internalization of gender ideologies or perhaps could be caused by his developmental stage as an adolescent experimenting with sexuality.

What distinguishes the analytic frame of ethnomethodologists and conversation analysts, of course, is their disinterest in this question of external social or natural causes, and their rejection of the side-step which takes the analyst immediately from the conversation to something seen as real and determining behind the conversation (Garfinkel, 1967; Heritage, 1984). For Schegloff, talk-in-interaction of the kind exemplified in the Appendix represents 'a' or even 'the' prime socio-cultural site. It is the place where culture and 'the social' happen. And, what is of interest is what the conversation means for the participants as they intersubjectively build a social order.

Conversation analysts study the way in which social organization is accomplished in talk. According to Duranti and Goodwin (1992: 192), the study of conversation 'permits detailed analysis of how participants employ general, abstract procedures to build the local particulars of the events they are engaged in'. Such procedures, however, are seen as flexibly applied situated social practices rather than prescriptive, all-or-nothing, rules. Procedures might include, for instance, competence at turn-taking, recognition of sequential organization and conditional relevance such as that a question, for example, typically demands an answer (Schegloff, 1968).

Analysis proceeds from the general observation that in talk participants display to each other, as they perform their own contributions, their understanding of the setting and context, and their grasp of the emergent activities. Members of society display what they know—their practical reasoning skills and competencies. It is possible to see, for example, how utterances are designed to do tasks while the replies or turns of other participants demonstrate how those utterances are intersubjectively understood and are taken up (Sacks, 1992). The focus of conversation analysis is thus on the reflexive accomplishment of conversation. Conversation analysis attempts to provide a good description of conversational activities but is also an explanation of those activities in the limited sense that description depends on a particular view of the nature of social organization and social order.

Schegloff's (1991, 1992, 1997) writings on methodological principles are based on his analytic experience but also on this view of what conversation is and the relevance of this discovery for understanding social life. In his 1997 article, as noted earlier, his particular target is forms of critical discourse analysis which in developing accounts of topics such as gender and power relations become, as Schegloff sees it, loose and ungrounded and risk mistaking their object. Schegloff argues that although as members of society we (scholars and analysts) might know who is oppressed, who count as the 'good guys' (sic) and the 'bad guys' (sic), it is self-indulgent to import this knowledge a priori into analysis. Similarly, we should not impose our more scholarly and theoretical concerns, our preoccupations with topics such as the organization of ideological discourse, for example, upon lay members of society. He suggests that, paradoxically, a more satisfactory

kind of critical/political analysis might result if critical analysts focused instead solely on the endogenous concerns and orientations of participants.

This plea for the foregrounding of participant orientations and the backgrounding of analysts' concerns and categories is linked to a further requirement that all analytic claims should be empirically grounded. It should be possible to 'point' to the data and make visible the moments when things happen. The analyst must be able to show that participants had the orientation claimed for them and should be able to demonstrate how participants' subsequent behaviour in the turn by turn organization of talk *displays* this understanding.

Schegloff (1992) argues that talk has many potentially relevant contexts including what he calls distal or external contexts (such as the class, ethnic, gender composition of an interaction, the institutions and ecological, regional and cultural settings in which they occur) and proximate contextual variables (such as the sort of occasion participants take an interaction to be, the speaker/listener slots or roles available, and so on). The crucial thing, however, in the face of this omni-relevance and the infinitude of possible perspectives on what happened is what is relevant for the participants. Analysis, then, in this view, must be compatible with what Schegloff calls the internal sense of an interaction. It must take seriously the object of inquiry in its own terms and must recognize the hugely advantageous feature of studying talk-in-interaction that this is one socio-cultural site furnished internally with its own constitutive sense, with, as Schegloff (1997) states, a defeasible sense of its own reality.

SOCIAL POSTMODERNISM

In many respects the analytic frame provided by Laclau and Mouffe and by Shapiro could not be more different. Laclau and Mouffe's work has been aligned with what Nicholson and Seidman (1995) call 'social postmodernism'. This designation reflects their aim of mobilizing post-structuralist perspectives on discourse, signification and the decentred subject to develop more effective socialist and radical democratic political projects. Whereas Schegloff focuses on talk-in-interaction, Laclau and Mouffe make 'discourse' their topic. Whereas Schegloff takes members' methods as the organizing principle for the material he studies, Laclau and Mouffe focus instead on the structuring effects of 'discursive articulations' and 'nodal points'. While Shapiro recommends a genealogical eye towards the 'proto-conversations' which constitute institutionalized forms of intelligibility.

Laclau and Mouffe's understanding of discourse is an inclusive one. Discourse is equated with the social or with human meaning making processes in general. Their definition of discourse includes both linguistic and non-linguistic elements. As an example of this combination, Laclau and Mouffe (1987) ask their readers to consider the activity of building a brick wall. The entire activity of building is made up of speech acts ('pass me that brick') and physical acts (placing brick on top of brick) yet both kinds of

acts acquire their meaning in relation to each other and to the socially constructed and stabilized system of relations we recognize as 'building a brick wall'. They point out that not only is the 'being' of objects (such as bricks) established in this way, and therefore what these objects are for humans, but also the character, identity and the 'being' of social agents. Thus, again to use one of their examples, the 'discourse of football' establishes that a certain spherical object is a 'ball' while some bits of metal and netting become 'the goal'. Equally, any person who takes up a defined stance in relation to the spherical object and bits of wood becomes a 'player', or a 'goal-keeper'.

In other words, Laclau and Mouffe conceive the social space as a whole as discursive. Or, as Laclau (1993: 341) puts it, '(s)ociety can ... be understood as a vast argumentative texture through which people construct their reality'. In line with his inclusive concept of discourse and the quoted examples, Laclau is at pains to stress that the 'argumentative fabric' from which social realities are constructed is both verbal and nonverbal. For Laclau and Mouffe it makes no sense to distinguish between the discursive and the extra-discursive or talk and the world—there is rather an unceasing human activity of making meanings (the horizon of discourse) from which social agents and objects, social institutions and social structures emerge configured in ever-changing patterns of relations.

As good post-structuralists, Laclau and Mouffe argue that signification (and thus the social) is an infinite play of differences. Meaning can never be finally fixed; it is always in flux, unstable and precarious. The being of objects and people can never be encapsulated, once and for all, in a closed system of differences. Laclau and Mouffe balance, however, this emphasis on openness and non-finalizability, the 'radical relationalism' of the social, with claims about a process of organization rather vaguely described as 'discursive articulation' or the forming of 'nodal points', 'discursive clumps' or 'ensembles'. Things recognized as people and objects and the relations between these entities are pulled together or emerge in stable forms which may last for quite long historical periods. Power is recognizable in the formation of these articulations and nodal points. Indeed power seems to be the capacity to 'articulate' and to make those articulations not only 'stick' but become hegemonic and pervasive. The influence of both Foucault and Gramsci on Laclau and Mouffe's formulations is evident here.

For Laclau and Mouffe, people or social agents are both passive and active. On the one hand, people seem to provide the energy required for meaning-making and articulation. On the other hand, as Mouffe argues, the individual subject becomes de-centred, not the author of his/her own discursive activity and not the origin point of discourse:

We can ... conceive the social agent as constituted by an ensemble of 'subject positions' that can never be totally fixed in a closed system of differences, constructed by a diversity of discourses, among which there is no necessary relation, but a constant movement of over-determination and displacement. The 'identity' of such a multiple and contradictory subject is therefore always contingent and precarious, temporarily fixed at the inter-

section of those subject positions and dependent on specific forms of identification. It is therefore impossible to speak of the social agent as if we were dealing with a unified, homogeneous entity. We have rather to approach it as a plurality, dependent on the various subject positions through which it is constituted within various discursive formations. (Mouffe, 1992: 372)

This position has important implications for traditional notions of ideology, false consciousness and objective group interests. The concept of false consciousness assumes that social agents have real or true identities (as members of the proletariat, for example) and real or true interests which go with those social identities which they may misperceive, simply not recognize or which can be obscured and invisible. Instead, Laclau and Mouffe (1987) argue that identity and interests do not operate in this way, in advance of social and discursive construction. Rather, ‘“interests” ... are a social product and do not exist independently of the consciousness of the agents who are their bearers’. (p. 118). Interests emerge from discursive configurations and must be mobilized and made discursively available.

In Shapiro’s writings it is possible to find an explication of Foucault’s notion of genealogy which helps articulate the kind of analytic activity which might emerge from these formulations. Shapiro argues that ‘(i)ntelligible exchanges are always situated ... the context–meaning relation subsumes a complex history of struggle in which one or more ways of establishing contexts and their related utterances has vanquished other competing possibilities’ (1992: 38). The task of genealogy, then, and analysis, is to render strange usual or habitual ways of making sense, to locate these sense-making methods historically and to interrogate their relation to power.

I return now to the material in the Appendix. There are two claims I wish to make in relation to these data which bear on the analytic frames presented here. First, in contrast to post-structuralist accounts of the decentred subject, but commensurate with conversation analysis and ethnomethodology, I want to emphasize the highly occasioned and situated nature of subject positions and the importance of accountability rather than ‘discourse’ *per se* in fueling the take up of positions in talk. Detailed analysis of conversation allows a different view of ‘constituted identities’.

Second, I argue that for a complete rather than merely ‘technical’ analysis of this material it is necessary to consider the forms of institutionalized intelligibility, to use Shapiro’s term, which comprise members’ methods. I will suggest that the way in which Schegloff marks the boundaries around conversation is unhelpful and unproductive. The more inclusive notion of discourse found in post-structuralist writing and exemplified in Laclau’s notion of the argumentative texture of social life provides a better grounding for analysis. In developing both these points I draw on analytic concepts from social psychological discourse analyses such as variability (Potter and Wetherell, 1987), ideological dilemmas (Billig et al., 1988) and interpretative repertoires (Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell

and Potter, 1988) which take a more integrated stance towards traditions such as conversation analysis and post-structuralism.

Troubled and Untroubled Subject Positions

Post-structuralist theorists, with their more global view, rarely have their noses pressed up against the exigencies of talk-in-interaction. Rarely, are they called on to explain how their perspective might apply to what is happening right now, on the ground, in this very conversation. Theoretical concepts emerge in abstract on the basis of often implicit assumptions about the nature of interaction, language or social life. The notion of subject position explicated by Mouffe (1992) is a good example, and its paucity becomes apparent if we consider in detail just some of the many positionings of Aaron in the material in the Appendix in relation to formulations of the nature of the event ('four in one night') and the way in which these positions and formulations are made troubled or remain untroubled.

One useful way into such analysis (Potter and Wetherell, 1987) is to look for variability in accounts and formulations—tracking the emergence of different and often contradictory or inconsistent versions of people, their characters, motives, states of mind and events in the world—and asking why this (different) formulation at this point in the strip of talk? One early formulation or positioning for Aaron comes in line 9:

Extract Five

- 1 Nigel: Okay yeah tell me about going with four people in one
 2 night=
 3 Phil: [=All::right ((bangs table))]
 4 Aaron: [hhhhhhh hhhhhh hhhhhh h] hh no:=
 5 Phil: =Go on=
 6 Paul: On the record=
 7 Phil: =Was it was it this f .hh
 8 (.)
 9 Aaron: I don't know I was a bit drunk=
 10 Phil: =I I'll tell he was drunk I'll tell you what I know
 11 [because] I am never drunk
 12 Nigel: [Hm mm]
 13 Phil: Because I'm dead smug [erm::]
 14 Aaron: [He's never] drunk it's true=

As conversation analysis reminds us, Aaron's positioning of himself as drunk is highly occasioned and needs to be seen in the context of the surrounding conversational activities. Nigel's request in line 1 for an account ('tell me') makes a description conditionally relevant as an appropriate next turn (Schegloff, 1968). Aaron, however, after registering what sounds like dismay at the emerging topic (line 4), and after some interventions from Phil and Paul, demurs ('I don't know I was a bit drunk'). Such 'dis-preferred responses' (see Pomerantz, 1984) usually come supplied with an account for 'non-compliance' and in this case the drunkenness provides the grounds. Phil's next utterance (line 10) indicates that he also hears Aaron in this way since he uses his own sobriety as a credential (legitimated by

Aaron) for why it might be appropriate for him to tell the story instead as a qualified witness. Indeed it turns out that this is one of those stories of prowess that may be better left to others to tell on one's behalf.

By now, however, several positions are already in play. Aaron's drunkenness has been laid on the table, while his laughter and 'no::' in line 4, Phil's urging ('go on') and Paul's insistence on the importance of being 'on the record' also establish a context and a range of positions for Aaron as well as an audience in relation to the as yet enigmatic event.

As Antaki et al. (1996) note in relation to the identity work in some data they analyse:

Such bringings-to-bear are briefly over and done, of course, but their accumulated record is what gives a person their (portfolio of) identities. Ephemeral as they might be, they become available for future invocation as instances of times when the person was (understood to be) a linguist, a Kennel Club member and so on. The speakers are doing three things at once: invoking social identities, negotiating what the features or boundaries of those identities are and accumulating a record of having those identities. They will be able in the next round of their interactional history, to draw on having all been exposed to this conversational display of identities. (p. 488)

Further examples of these activities of invoking social identities, negotiating their features and accumulating a record are evident in the following extracts, beginning with Extract Six. These examples illustrate the highly indexical nature of subject positions or the importance of the exact circumstances of the invoking for understanding what is invoked, just as it was necessary to look at the conversational circumstances surrounding Aaron's invocation of his drunkenness in Extract Five to fully comprehend this self-positioning. Extract Six begins with the conclusion of Phil's often interrupted narrative of Aaron's weekend:

Extract Six

- | | | |
|----|--------|---|
| 67 | Aaron: | =We were very lucky that day |
| 68 | Phil: | We were erm and we were walking back and he says |
| 69 | | oh I went with Janesy on Friday and I went yeah you |
| 70 | | went with three birds last night you went with one on |
| 71 | | Friday this was in his good month |
| 72 | Nigel: | Hm mm |
| 73 | Phil: | So that like took me aback somewhat (0.3) so that was |
| 74 | | a good weekend for you |

The context for what happened now becomes formulated as being part of or illustrative of a 'good month' or a 'good weekend'. Such 'fortune' could, of course, either be presented as agentic and internally attributed (seen as a personal achievement) or externally attributed as 'luck'. As is typical in talk (Edwards and Potter, 1992), both these possible, and potentially inconsistent, positionings emerge in the following discussion with Aaron later returning to the 'lucky' theme (see line 160 in Extract Nine) having raised it initially in line 67 (Extract Six) and more directly owning his 'good fortune' in the conversation which follows Nigel's next intervention.

Extract Seven

- 76 Nigel: Is that good?
 77 Phil: Well in his books yes you know=
 78 Aaron: =hhhh.h [yeah]
 79 Phil: [The thing] is you got so much stick for it
 80 Aaron: Well yeah I could take the stick because it was
 81 almost like (0.2) a good ego trip when everyone was
 82 taking the stick oh you got off with her ah ha ha
 83 yep I did so what's your problem? [Oh, er, errr]
 84 Nigel: [Hm mm]

Aaron re-frames the criticism he received ('stick') as 'a good ego trip' and to demonstrate how he handled it he constructs a piece of hypothetical dialogue with an imagined interlocutor where the interlocutor challenges him ('Oh you got off with her'), Aaron responds in a forthright way ('Yep, I did, so what's your problem'), leaving the imagined challenger confused and at a loss ('oh er errr'). The context for the event as something Aaron can be personally proud of becomes more firmly established invoking an as yet untroubled identity. In Extract Eight, Nigel as interviewer then attempts, in a complex discursive act, to repair a potential misreading of his earlier question in line 76: 'is that good?' His question leads to further formulations of Aaron's position:

Extract Eight

- 94 Nigel: =Yeah I mean I wasn't sort of saying is four in two
 95 days good I mean it's impressive [you know]
 96 Aaron: [hh [hhh] hh
 97 Phil: [hhhhh] hhhh
 98 Nigel: But I me::an like (.) it presumes that erm that's:: a
 99 creditable thing (.) yeah? Is it?
 100 (0.2)
 101 Phil: No because you're on the moral low ground
 102 Aaron: But I don't mind being on the moral [low ground]
 103 Phil: [Oh no you don't]
 104 mind I I it didn't fuss me at all you know and I wasn't I
 105 thought it was quite (.) it was quite impressive you
 106 know you're sort of thinking that's shocking because it
 107 never happens to me um:: .h hhh
 108 Aaron: Hhhh
 109 (0.3)
 110 Phil: But he was (.) by some people in the group he was li
 111 (.) they were just taking the piss it wasn't serious no-
 112 one it didn't really bother anyone at [all]
 113 Nigel: [Hm mm]
 114 Phil: It was like Aaron was on the moral low ground because
 115 he was like (.) gigolo Casanova whatever

In lines 94–5 Nigel first distances himself from Aaron and Phil's formulation of 'good'. He then notes, however, that the possible description 'impressive' might apply. Aaron and Phil's laughter may suggest that this is heard as a joke, as ironic or as problematic in some way. This reading seems likely because 'impressive' as a description follows Nigel's repair of his own

possible positioning as someone who might concur with the definition of 'good' emerging in previous turns. 'Good' framed as 'impressive prowess' has become a more troubled position especially when it is now put in line 99 in conjunction with 'creditable'.

In line 101 Phil (temporarily, as it turns out) concurs with Nigel's troubling of Aaron's position. He formulates Aaron's conduct as not creditable because he is 'on the moral low ground'. At this point Aaron has a number of choices—he could accept Phil's assessment in entirety, he could disagree with his description 'moral low ground', or he could reject the relevance of any of this description and evaluation of his behaviour. Interestingly, he accepts Phil's description but presents himself as someone who doesn't mind occupying that cultural slot. In the process, of course, the indexical nature of that social space 'the moral low ground' becomes evident. Aaron moves to untrouble or normalize this position. And Phil re-adjusts his own position accordingly (see lines 103–15), distancing himself from the identity of someone who might be 'fussed' by Aaron's behaviour. Having been initially disapproving and with a hearably strong moral line, Phil's criticism of Aaron becomes re-characterized as not serious: While the position of Aaron in combination with 'the moral low ground' become reworked to be in line with other recognizable characters in stories of male sexual performance: 'like gigolo, Casanova, whatever'.

The final part of the discussion where Paul enters more fully as a participant adds some new positionings for Aaron and reworks two positions already available.

Extract Nine

- 116 Nigel: Right (.) okay (0.2) what do you think Paul?
 117 (0.3)
 118 Paul: Did you=
 119 Phil: =Are you ap[alled?]
 120 Paul: [When you] .hh no (.) s [when you went out]
 121 Nigel: [Not appalled?]
 122 Paul: I jus I'll tell you in a minute when you went out
 123 Nigel: hh[hhh]
 124 Unknown: [hhhh]
 125 Paul: When you went out on that Friday (.) evening you were
 126 out on the pull yeah?=
 127 Aaron: =No
 128 Paul: This (.) you were not?=
 129 Aaron: =Just out [as a group]
 130 Phil: [Just out] as a group of friends
 131 Paul: On the Saturday you were out on the pull?
 132 Phil: No
 133 Aaron: .hh [not really]
 134 Phil: [He was] drunk=
 135 Aaron: =I wasn't drunk [unconscious] (.) I was very merry I
 136 Phil: [((inaudible))]
 137 was like (.) all erm (.) all like social guards were down
 138 Paul: Yeah (0.2) and (0.3) whe::n (.) so and (0.4) when you
 139 got off with the first one [did you]
 140 Aaron: [hhhhhhh hhh]

- 141 Phil: Who was first? Can you remember?
 142 Paul: On the Friday
 143 Aaron: Er:::m on the Friday that that was Janesy
 144 Paul: Did you have any sort of like intonation ((sic)) of
 145 carrying the relationship further?
 146 Aaron: No
 147 Phil: ((inaudible – sounds like one nighter))
 148 Paul: So so you basically went for as many pullings off as
 149 you could get in a weekend?
 150 Phil: No
 151 Aaron: I didn't go for it it just
 152 (.)
 153 Paul: It just happened?
 154 Aaron: Well yeah (.) it's not so much I thought right ((hits
 155 the desk)) this weekend (.) keep your pecker up lad
 156 you're away [it's] not like that it's just that I
 157 Phil: [hhh]
 158 (.)
 159 Paul: With any of them [did you feel]
 160 Aaron: [I get lucky very ((inaudible))]
 161 Paul: that they'd be like a follow on?
 162 Phil: He didn't know who half of them were do you .hh hh
 163 Aaron: Ah er I didn't (.) I mean it wasn't (.) I mean it wasn't
 164 like a right gitty thing to do it was like the other
 165 half knew as well that it wasn't gonna be
 166 (0.4)
 167 Phil: Mm
 168 Aaron: Erm (0.2) no it's it's you're getting it all wrong it's
 169 it's (0.2) it wasn't (0.4) errr Aaron come up with the
 170 phrase you want to say (.) it wasn't alright this kid's
 171 gonna get off with me then we're gonna go out oh no
 172 we're not gonna go out what a git it was (0.2) I'm
 173 gonna get off with this lad and that's alright
 174 Phil: Fancied a bit of rough you know
 175 Aaron: Fancied a bit of rough
 176 Phil: As and it was mutual I imagine

This is an enormous amount happening here which cannot be analysed in detail. What I wish to note is Paul's new description of Aaron's activities as 'out on the pull' (in line 126). This account seems to be heard as an uncalled for accusation in relation to the events of Friday night and Aaron and Phil issue denials and collaborate as a duet in attempting to reformulate and minimize the actions so described—'just out as a group of friends'. Interestingly, when Paul moves the conversation to the events of Saturday night Aaron's denial at this point becomes weak ('not really', line 133). In line 134 Phil offers another re-characterization for Saturday night. He summons up and recalls another available identity in Aaron's 'portfolio'—Aaron was drunk. In lines 135–7 Aaron modifies and qualifies this potentially damaging identity to lay the stress on drunkenness and loss of inhibition.

In lines 144–5 Paul goes on to develop more of his accusation—he

suggests that Aaron had no intention of carrying on the relationship and this helps instantiate what it means to be 'out on the pull'. The crux of the argument as Aaron subsequently interprets it seems to be about intention and responsibility. The pattern of responses suggests that Paul's rhetoric is persuasive and he has successfully created what seems to be a troubled identity for Aaron—the identity of being intentionally or callously promiscuous—going from one woman to another with no thought of a longer-term relationship. This formulation leads Aaron to first disavow the identity of a lad who deliberately goes out planning sexual conquests (someone who thinks 'keep your pecker up', line 155), then to try and reinstate the identity of 'being lucky' (line 160). Finally, he produces his longest description so far (lines 168–73) as he attempts to resist Paul's characterization through a formulation of his own mental state, his own talk to himself and the mental state and self-talk of the young women involved. He characterizes himself as not intentionally 'going for it', and posits the young women as similarly motivated by a casual sexuality so that his motives and state of mind were mirrored by the motives and state of mind of 'the other half'. Phil then collaborates with this account suggesting the young women 'fancied a bit of rough' and thus the encounter was mutual.

To summarize, multiple and potentially inconsistent subject positions are in play in this stretch of discourse for Aaron: he is drunk, lucky, on the pull, having a good month, on the moral low ground, engaged in consensual sexual play with young women who fancied a bit of rough, not intentionally going for it, his conduct is impressive and so on—indeed, this list does not exhaust all the positions evident in the complete discussion in the interview. The flow of interaction variously troubles and untroubles these positions. As we have seen, one formulation leads to a counter-formulation which is in turn resisted. In fact the question of how to evaluate Aaron's actions, as often happens in social life, remains unresolved and ambiguous, and these various threads and Aaron's 'portfolio' of positions remain available to be carried forward to the other contexts and conversations making up the 'long conversation' (Maybin, 1994) which is the sixth form common room culture.

To evoke a further analytic concept from social psychology, some order can be placed on these various positions by noting that they fit within several recognizable broader interpretative repertoires available to the young men. The term interpretative repertoire is an attempt to capture the 'doxic' (Barthes, 1977) nature of discourse. An interpretative repertoire is a culturally familiar and habitual line of argument comprised of recognizable themes, common places and tropes (doxa) (Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell and Potter, 1988, 1992; Wetherell et al., 1987). The repertoires in the quoted extracts include male sexuality as performance and achievement, a repertoire around alcohol and disinhibition, and an ethics of sexuality as legitimated by relationships and reciprocity (Hollway, 1984, calls this the 'have and hold' discourse). These interpretative repertoires comprise members' methods for making sense in this context—they are the common sense which organizes accountability and serves as a back-cloth

for the realization of locally managed positions in actual interaction (which are always also indexical constructions and invocations) and from which, as we have seen, accusations and justifications can be launched. The whole argument does not need to be spelt out in detail. Rather, one fragment or phrase (e.g. 'on the pull', 'social guards were down') evokes for listeners the relevant context of argumentation—premises, claims and counter-claims.

Re-evaluating Subject Positions

What, then, is the significance of this analysis (carried out in line with the spirit of Schegloff's methodological principles if not with his concern for detail) for Mouffe's post-structuralist account of subject positions? Mouffe (1992) presents subject positions as constructed in discourse, and the tenor of her account makes discourse the constituting agent. She argues that 'we can ... conceive the social agent as constituted by an ensemble of "subject positions" that can never be totally fixed in a closed system of differences, constructed by a diversity of discourses, among which there is no necessary relation, but a constant movement of over-determination and displacement' (p. 372). Subject positions, and thus the identities of participants in social life, are determined by discourses and in this sense are prior, already constituted, and could be read off or predicted from knowledge of the relevant discourse.

Mapped on to the material in the Appendix, this view has some cogency in the sense that Aaron and Phil's choice to position Aaron within a repertoire of male sexuality as performance and proud achievement constructs for him and for others a context which may have ramifications beyond his control or intention. Aaron is certainly positioned; but it also seems a misdescription to make discourse the active agent here. What more clearly fuels positioning is accountability or participants' orientations to their setting and the emergent conversational activities. It is also very clearly the case that what a subject position comes to be is only partly the consequence of which discourse it can be assigned to. We saw, for instance, that the invocation of positions and thus their significance and connotation is indeed local, highly situated, and occasioned. In effect, as Schegloff argues, the sense of an interaction depends on what kind of thing it is for participants.

Such a perspective gives a more grounded view on what Mouffe (1992) goes on to describe as the contingent and precarious nature of identity, and on Laclau's (1993) notion of the 'radical relationalism' or openness of social discursive practices. It is not so much that these features arise due to the nature of signification per se but because of the reflexivity built into social interaction and the emergent and transformative properties of that interaction. Contingency, precariousness and openness arise in part because utterances are designed to do interactional tasks and do not thereby entail descriptive closure and cognitive consistency. The replies or turns of other participants demonstrate how those utterances have been intersubjectively understood as well as performing further actions. And all of this is contingent on the interactional moment.

I do not wish to suggest, however, that critical discourse analysis should thus become Schegloff's 'technical' analysis or that I see 'technical' analysis as an initial necessary discipline which should be carried out before any other statement about a piece of discourse could apply. As noted earlier, I see the 'discipline' as two-sided. A post-structuralist approach allows a perspective on talk which helps more thoroughly account for 'why this utterance here'.

Argumentative Threads

If the problem with post-structuralist analysts is that they rarely focus on actual social interaction, then the problem with conversational analysts is that they rarely raise their eyes from the next turn in the conversation, and, further, this is not an entire conversation or sizeable slice of social life but usually a tiny fragment. Schegloff's methodological principles are fitted for the analysis of small pieces of conversation in detail. His recommendation that critical analysts first perform a 'technical analysis' is impractical—there may well be, for instance, thousands of interruptions which could be analysed in any social psychological or ethnographic study of discourse such as our work on masculinity. But, more crucially, Schegloff's suggestion rests on an unnecessarily restricted notion of analytic description and participants' orientation.

Schegloff argues that analysts should not import their own categories into participants' discourse but should focus instead on participant orientations. Further, analytic claims should be demonstrable. Schegloff's notion of analytic description uncontaminated by theorists' categories does not entail, however, that no analytic concepts whatsoever will be applied, as the example of his own analyses demonstrates. Rather, concepts such as conditional relevance, for example, or the notion of accountability, or preferred and dispreferred responses are used to identify patterns in talk and to create an ordered sense of what is going on. Presumably Schegloff would argue that this does not count as imposing theorists' categories on participants' orientations since such concepts are intensely empirical, grounded in analysis and built up from previous descriptive studies of talk. As already noted, the advantage for Schegloff of such an approach is that it gives scholarly criteria for correctness and grounds academic disputes, allowing appeals to the data, and it closes down the infinity of contexts which could be potentially relevant to something demonstrable—what the participants take as relevant.

It is not clear, however, when the concepts of more critical discourse analysts should be seen as crossing Schegloff's invisible boundary line from the acceptable deployment of concepts for the description of discursive materials to importing analyst's own preoccupations. Would a descriptive analysis, for example, guided by Foucault's concept of genealogy, of the 'institutionalized forms of intelligibility' organizing social relations in the sixth form common room of a boys' independent school and the interpretative repertoires and forms of common sense these make available to

Aaron, Phil and Paul count as importing theorists' preoccupations? Would Schegloff's boundary line be breached if, as part of such an analysis of the available interpretative resources, we attempted to develop a feminist commentary on the social and cultural significance of the patterning and the tensions and contradictions in the use of these resources not to mention their crass and highly offensive nature?

The crucial issue here, for Schegloff, is the point at which analysis departs from evident participant orientations and one problem from a critical perspective is that Schegloff's sense of participant orientation may be unacceptably narrow. We have seen already that in practice for Schegloff participant orientation seems to mean only what is relevant for the participants in this particular conversational moment. Ironically, of course, it is the conversation analyst in selecting for analysis part of a conversation or continuing interaction who defines this relevance for the participant. In restricting the analyst's gaze to this fragment, previous conversations, even previous turns in the same continuing conversation become irrelevant for the analyst but also, by dictat, for the participants. We do not seem to have escaped, therefore, from the imposition of theorists' categories and concerns.

Any piece of discourse analysis, of course, will involve restrictions on what is studied. Conversation analysis is not alone in this. If we adopt, however, Laclau and Mouffe's more inclusive notion of the 'argumentative texture' of the social and definition of discourse as the unceasing human activity of making meaning, a more productive sense of participant orientation and relevance is possible. Analysis works by carving out a piece of the argumentative social fabric for closer examination—a set of similar seeming conversational activities, say. Schegloff's approach demands that analysts then lose interest in the argumentative threads which run through this set as warp and woof connecting it in again with the broader cloth. The genealogical approach in contrast suggests that in analysing our always partial piece of the argumentative texture we look also to the broader forms of intelligibility running through the texture more generally. This is what Shapiro (1992) means by the concept of 'proto conversations'—the conversational or discursive history which makes this particular conversation possible.

With this tack, of course, we haven't solved Schegloff's problem of infinite relevance but, in practice, participants' orientations understood in this more inclusive way turn out to be manageable. As good ethnography of communication demonstrates (e.g. Cicourel, 1992; Lindstrom, 1992; Ochs, 1992) it is not necessary to say everything about the argumentative fabric of a society to say something, and something furthermore which is scholarly, complete, and insightful concerning participant orientations, and which takes those orientations as constructed by more than what is immediately relevant or set by the previous few turns in the conversation.

This point can be developed in another way. In effect, there are two approaches at stake to what counts as an adequate answer to the question—why this utterance here? For Schegloff, for example, the material in

the Appendix is adequately analysed when we have described the principal conversational activities and shown how participants' utterances contribute to and are occasioned by those activities. From my perspective, however, this is not an adequate account. An adequate analysis would also trace through the argumentative threads displayed in participants' orientations and would interrogate the content or the nature of members' methods for sense-making in more depth.

Why, for instance, does Aaron respond to Paul's accusation that he is 'on the pull' with an argument which formulates the young women involved as also wanting casual sex (lines 163–73), thus attempting to make his own actions no longer 'a right gitty thing to do'? Why, in this community, among these members, might this possibly work as an adequate justification? Why is this assumed to be a possible 'good defence'? It is important and interesting from a feminist perspective that these young men only appeal to some notion of autonomous female sexuality at this point in their conversation. Indeed, why is Paul's intervention heard in the first place as a critique which deserves an answer? Why in this community does it seem to trouble identity to 'be on the pull' but multiple sexual encounters can be also successfully framed as 'good'?

We should also be interested in the 'heteronormativity' (Kitzinger, personal communication) evident throughout this discussion which supplies a further taken for granted discursive back-cloth organizing these young men's participant orientations and their members' methods for making sense. A more adequate analysis of 'why this utterance here' would also explore the silences and the absences in this material—the argumentative threads which are hearably not part of these participants' orientations and everyday sense-making. Crucially, it would be concerned with the ideological dilemmas (Billig et al., 1988; see also Billig, 1987, 1991) evident in the struggle and collaboration over how to formulate Aaron and his actions. The movement of contextualization and the troubling of positions gives some insight into the contradictory and inconsistent organization of the broader interpretative resources these young men are actively working over as they try to negotiate both 'good' and 'gitty'. Surely a complete or scholarly analysis would try to clarify, interpret and discuss these resources.

CONCLUSION

In this article, I have tried to develop a critique of both post-structuralist writers on discourse and Schegloff's methodological prescriptions for analysts. I have argued that a focus on participants' orientations can be extremely revealing about the formation of subject positions. Such a perspective substantially changes our view of the subject constituted by discourse and his or her 'ensemble' of subject positions. I have also tried to suggest, however, that in accusing critical discourse analysts of intellectual hegemony, Schegloff is performing his own act of colonization in seeking to impose one narrow understanding of participants' orientations and rel-

evance on the field as a whole. A further central aim was to intervene in the construction within social psychology of contrasting camps of discourse analysts and to suggest further reasons for preferring a more eclectic approach.

What role, then, do I see for Schegloff's technical analysis? Is it, as he proposes, a first step in the long process of genealogical analysis or other kinds of critical discourse analyses focused on socio-political issues? My aim was not to endorse this division of labour—conversation analysis then ethnomethodology then post-structuralist analysis or ethnography of communication or critical discourse analysis—but to suggest that for social psychological discursive projects a more synthetic approach is required focused on the development of analytic concepts which work across some of these domains such as, for instance, the notion of positioning, interpretative repertoires, ideological dilemmas, and so on.

More specifically, critical discursive social psychology is that discipline which focuses on the situated flow of discourse, which looks at the formation and negotiation of psychological states, identities and interactional and intersubjective events. It is concerned with members' methods and the logic of accountability while describing also the collective and social patterning of background normative conceptions (their forms of articulation and the social and psychological consequences). It is a discipline concerned with the practices which produce persons, notably discursive practices, but seeks to put these in a genealogical context. It could be evaluated using Schegloff's 'gold standard'—empirical demonstrability—but other conventional criteria for evaluating scholarship are also relevant such as coherence, plausibility, validity, and insight—especially when analysts include, as I believe they should, investigation of the social and political consequences of discursive patterning.

APPENDIX: TRANSCRIPT AND TRANSCRIPTION NOTES

- 1 Nigel: Okay yeah tell me about going with four people in one
- 2 night=
- 3 Phil: [=All::right ((bangs table))]
- 4 Aaron: [hhhhhhh hhhhhh hhhh h] hh no::=
- 5 Phil: =Go on=
- 6 Paul: On the record=
- 7 Phil: =Was it was it this f .hh
- 8 (.)
- 9 Aaron: I don't know I was a bit drunk=
- 10 Phil: =I I'll tell he was drunk I'll tell you what I know
- 11 [because] I am never drunk
- 12 Nigel: [Hm mm]
- 13 Phil: Because I'm dead smug [erm::]
- 14 Aaron: [He's never] drunk it's true=
- 15 Phil: =Friday you went with Janesy on Friday?

- 16 Aaron: I did yes::
 17 Phil: Out down the pub I I missed this completely a
 18 complete shock to me=
 19 Aaron: =.hhhh
 20 Phil: Erm (.) went out down the pub one night as we do (.)
 21 erm I went home because I like live out of town er
 22 these stopped later (0.2) I was not aware of anything
 23 following night big party I mean there was like
 24 200 people there I would have thought big field (.) you
 25 know disco and all that shit (.) erm Aaron got
 26 absolutely out of his face (.) I was going out with
 27 someone she didn't turn up sh she rang me [and told me]
 28 Nigel: [Hm mm]
 29 Phil: She might not be going
 30 Nigel: Hm mm
 31 Phil: Um::
 32 Aaron: It was Karen
 33 Phil: It was Ka Karen erm something wrong [with her] mum
 34 Aaron: [hhhhh hh]
 35 Phil: wasn't it or something I can't remember what it was=
 36 Aaron: =Ah that's a good excuse
 37 Phil: Anyway [(0.2) sorry yes Aaron]
 38 Aaron: [hhhhh hhh hhhh]
 39 Phil: Erm so Aaron got really drunk and he went with
 40 Aaron: hhhhhhhhhhh[hhhh hhhh]
 41 Phil: [Jenny Baxter] (.) nice girl our year (.)
 42 Cathy Brewin=
 43 Aaron: =No it wasn't Cathy Brewin it was another Cathy=
 44 Phil: =Cathy Cathy someone
 45 Aaron: It wasn't Cathy Brewin=
 46 Phil: =And you don't know who the other one was do you?
 47 Aaron: No
 48 Phil: You forgot her name=
 49 Aaron: =Yeah=
 50 Phil: =Or didn't even find out=
 51 Aaron: =Right=
 52 Phil: =It was just you could see him at various points of the
 53 evening with this girl like on the floor in this field (.)
 54 and I knew it was Aaron but I didn't know who the girl
 55 was because she kept changing
 56 Nigel: Hm mm
 57 Phil: And you lost someone's purse didn't you?
 58 Aaron: Yeah (0.2) .hh hh
 59 Phil: And um (0.2) then we walked
 60 Aaron: hhhh
 61 Phil: we decided to walk back from this party it was like
 62 out past ((small village)) so we had to walk back to

- 63 ((local town))
 64 Nigel: Hm mm
 65 Aaron: .hh good idea Aaron .hh=
 66 Phil: =Yeah=
 67 Aaron: =We were very lucky that day
 68 Phil: We were erm and we were walking back and he says
 69 oh I went with Janesy on Friday and I went yeah you
 70 went with three birds last night you went with one on
 71 Friday this was in his good month
 72 Nigel: Hm mm
 73 Phil: So that like took me aback somewhat (0.3) so that was
 74 a good weekend for you
 75 (.)
 76 Nigel: Is that good?
 77 Phil: Well in his books yes you know=
 78 Aaron: =hhhh.h [yeah]
 79 Phil: [The thing] is you got so much stick for it
 80 Aaron: Well yeah I could take the stick because it was
 81 almost like (0.2) a good ego trip when everyone was
 82 taking the stick oh you got off with her ah ha ha
 83 yep I did so what's your problem? [Oh, er, errr]
 84 Nigel: [Hm mm]
 85 Aaron: [Errr]
 86 Phil: [None of them] were particularly pikey so you were
 87 alright really
 88 Aaron: No (.) they weren't .hh none of them were like majorly
 89 pikey .hh (.) one or two perhaps could have like
 90 (.)
 91 Phil: I don't know I don't know I think I know this Cathy
 92 bird I know Jenny I know Cathy thing I don't know who
 93 the other one was and neither do you so can't tell=
 94 Nigel: =Yeah I mean I wasn't sort of saying is four in two
 95 days good I mean it's impressive [you know]
 96 Aaron: [hh [hhh] hh
 97 Phil: [hhhhh] hhhh
 98 Nigel: But I me::an like (.) it presumes that erm that's:: a
 99 creditable thing (.) yeah? Is it?
 100 (0.2)
 101 Phil: No because you're on the moral low ground
 102 Aaron: But I don't mind being on the moral [low ground]
 103 Phil: [Oh no you don't]
 104 mind I I it didn't fuss me at all you know and I wasn't I
 105 thought it was quite (.) it was quite impressive you
 106 know you're sort of thinking that's shocking because it
 107 never happens to me um:: .h hhh
 108 Aaron: Hhhh
 109 (0.3)

- 110 Phil: But he was (.) by some people in the group he was li
 111 (.) they were just taking the piss it wasn't serious no-
 112 one it didn't really bother anyone at [all]
 113 Nigel: [Hm mm]
 114 Phil: It was like Aaron was on the moral low ground because
 115 he was like (.) gigolo Casanova whatever
 116 Nigel: Right (.) okay (0.2) what do you think Paul?
 117 (0.3)
 118 Paul: Did you=
 119 Phil: =Are you ap[palled?]
 120 Paul: [When you] .hh no (.) s [when you went out]
 121 Nigel: [Not appalled?]
 122 Paul: I jus I'll tell you in a minute when you went out
 123 Nigel: hh[hhh]
 124 Unknown: [hhhh]
 125 Paul: When you went out on that Friday (.) evening you were
 126 out on the pull yeah? =
 127 Aaron: =No
 128 Paul: This (.) you were not? =
 129 Aaron: =Just out [as a group]
 130 Phil: [Just out] as a group of friends
 131 Paul: On the Saturday you were out on the pull?
 132 Phil: No
 133 Aaron: .hh [not really]
 134 Phil: [He was] drunk=
 135 Aaron: =I wasn't drunk [unconscious] (.) I was very merry I
 136 Phil: [((inaudible))]
 137 Aaron: was like (.) all erm (.) all like social guards were down
 138 Paul: Yeah (0.2) and (0.3) whe::n (.) so and (0.4) when you got
 139 off with the first one [did you]
 140 Aaron: [hhhhhhh hhh]
 141 Phil: Who was first? Can you remember?
 142 Paul: On the Friday
 143 Aaron: Er:::m on the Friday that that was Janesy
 144 Paul: Did you have any sort of like intonation ((sic)) of
 145 carrying the relationship further?
 146 Aaron: No
 147 Phil: ((inaudible - sounds like one nighter))
 148 Paul: So so you basically went for as many pullings off as
 149 you could get in a weekend?
 150 Phil: No
 151 Aaron: I didn't go for it it just
 152 (.)
 153 Paul: It just happened?
 154 Aaron: Well yeah (.) it's not so much I thought right ((hits
 155 the desk)) this weekend (.) keep your pecker up lad
 156 you're away [it's] not like that it's just that I

- 157 Phil: [hhh]
 158 (.)
 159 Paul: With any of them [did you feel]
 160 Aaron: [I get lucky very ((inaudible))]
 161 Paul: that they'd be like a follow on?
 162 Phil: He didn't know who half of them were do you .hh hh
 163 Aaron: Ah er I didn't (.) I mean it wasn't (.) I mean it wasn't
 164 like a right gitty thing to do it was like the other
 165 half knew as well that it wasn't gonna be
 166 (0.4)
 167 Phil: Mm
 168 Aaron: Erm (0.2) no it's it's you're getting it all wrong it's
 169 it's (0.2) it wasn't (0.4) errr Aaron come up with the
 170 phrase you want to say (.) it wasn't alright this kid's
 171 gonna get off with me then we're gonna go out oh no
 172 we're not gonna go out what a git it was (0.2) I'm
 173 gonna get off with this lad and that's alright
 174 Phil: Fancied a bit of rough you know
 175 Aaron: Fancied a bit of rough
 176 Phil: As and it was mutual I imagine

TRANSCRIPTION NOTATION

The form of transcription notation used was modified from the system developed by Gail Jefferson.

One or more colons indicate the extension of the previous sound, e.g.:
 Tha::t

Laughter is marked by hh the number of hh is a rough marker of duration of laughter while .hh indicates an audible intake of breath.

A ? is used to mark upward intonation characteristic of a question.

Underlining indicates stress placed on a word or part of a word.

Extended brackets mark overlap between speakers. The left bracket indicates the beginning of the overlap while the right bracket indicates the end, e.g.:

hh[hhh]
 [hhhh]

Double parentheses indicate transcriber's descriptions.

Numbers in parentheses, e.g. (0.2), indicate pauses in tenths of a second while (.) indicates a micropause.

An equals sign = indicates the absence of a discernible gap between the end

of one speaker's utterance and the beginning of another speaker's utterance.

MARGARET WETHERELL is a Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Social Sciences, The Open University, Milton Keynes. Her research interests include work on discourse and identity particularly in relation to gender and race issues. She is the author (with Jonathan Potter) of *Discourse and Social Psychology* (1987) and *Mapping the Language of Racism* (1992) as well as (with Nigel Edley) *Men in Perspective* (1995). ADDRESS: Social Sciences Faculty, The Open University, Walton Hall, Milton Keynes MK7 6AA, UK. [email: M.S.Wetherell@open.ac.uk]

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This article benefited from discussion of an earlier draft and related debates in the discourse groups at the Open University and Loughborough University, United Kingdom, and Massey University and Auckland University, New Zealand. I am particularly indebted to Derek Edwards for his thoughtful responses to my initial arguments and to Charles Antaki, Stephanie Taylor, John Clarke, Celia Kitzinger, Katie MacMillan and Jonathan Potter for their comments. Thanks also to Nigel Edley not only for his useful suggestions but also for allowing me to use an extract from our joint research on masculinity which was funded by United Kingdom Economic and Social Research Council Grant No. R000233129.

REFERENCES

- Antaki, C. (1994) *Explaining and Arguing: The Social Organisation of Accounts*. London: Sage.
- Antaki, C., Condor, S. and Levine, M. (1996) 'Social Identities in Talk: Speakers' Own Orientations', *British Journal of Social Psychology* 35: 473-92.
- Atkinson, P. (1989) *The Ethnographic Imagination*. London: Routledge.
- Barthes, R. (1977) *Roland Barthes*, trans. by Richard Howard. New York: Hill and Wang.
- Billig, M. (1987) *Arguing and Thinking: A Rhetorical Approach to Social Psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Billig, M. (1991) *Ideology, Rhetoric and Opinion*. London: Sage.
- Billig, M., Condor, S., Edwards, D., Gane, M., Middleton, D. and Radley, A. (1988) *Ideological Dilemmas*. London: Sage.
- Burman, E. and Parker, I., eds. (1993) *Discourse Analytic Research*. London: Routledge.
- Cicourel, A. (1992) 'The Interpenetration of Communicative Contexts: The Example of Medical Encounters', in A. Duranti and C. Goodwin (eds) *Rethinking Context*, pp. 291-311. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Duranti, A. (1992) 'Language in Context and Language as Context: The Samoan

- Respect Vocabulary', in A. Duranti and C. Goodwin (eds) *Rethinking Context*, pp. 77–101. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Duranti, A. and Goodwin, C., eds (1992) *Rethinking Context*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Edley, N. and Wetherell, M. (1995) *Men in Perspective: Practice, Power and Identity*. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Edley, N. and Wetherell, M. (1996) 'Masculinity, Power and Identity', in M. Mac an Ghail (ed.) *Understanding Masculinities*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
- Edley, N. and Wetherell, M. (1997) 'Jockeying for Position: The Construction of Masculine Identities', *Discourse & Society* 8(2): 203–17.
- Edwards, D. (1997) *Discourse and Cognition*. London: Sage.
- Edwards, D. and Potter, J. (1992) *Discursive Psychology*. London: Sage.
- Garfinkel, H. (1967) *Studies in Ethnomethodology*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Heritage, J. (1984) *Garfinkel and Ethnomethodology*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Hollway, W. (1984) 'Gender Difference and the Production of Subjectivity', in J. Henriques, W. Hollway, C. Urwin, C. Venn and V. Walkerdine (eds) *Changing the Subject*. London: Methuen.
- Laclau, E. (1993) 'Politics and the Limits of Modernity', in T. Docherty (ed.) *Postmodernism: A Reader*, pp. 329–44. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. (1985) *Hegemony and the Socialist Strategy*. London: Verso.
- Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. (1987) 'Post-Marxism Without Apologies', *New Left Review* 166: 79–106.
- Lindstrom, L. (1992) 'Context Contests: Debatable Truth Statements on Tanna (Vanuatu)', in A. Duranti and C. Goodwin (eds) *Rethinking Context*, pp. 101–25. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Marks, D. (1993) 'Case-Conference Analysis and Action Research', in E. Burman and I. Parker (eds) *Discourse Analytic Research*. London: Routledge.
- Maybin, J. (1994) 'Children's Voices: Talk, Knowledge and Identity', in D. Graddol, J. Maybin and B. Stierer (eds) *Researching Language and Literacy in Context*. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.
- Maybin, J. (1997) 'Children's Voices: The Contribution of Informal Language Practices to the Negotiation of Knowledge and Identity Amongst 10–12 year old School Pupils', unpublished PhD thesis, Open University.
- Mouffe, C. (1992) 'Feminism, Citizenship and Radical Democratic Politics', in J. Butler and J.W. Scott (eds) *Feminists Theorize the Political*, pp. 369–85. New York: Routledge.
- Nicholson, L. and Seidman, S. (1995) *Social Postmodernism: Beyond Identity Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ochs, E. (1992) 'Indexing Gender', in A. Duranti and C. Goodwin (eds) *Rethinking Context*, pp. 335–59. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Parker, I. (1990) 'Discourse: Definitions and Contradictions', *Philosophical Psychology* 3: 189–204.
- Pomerantz, A. (1984) 'Agreeing and Disagreeing with Assessments: Some Features of Preferred/Dispreferred Turn Shapes', in J.M. Atkinson and J. Heritage (eds) *Structures of Social Action: Studies in Conversation Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Potter, J. and Wetherell, M. (1987) *Discourse and Social Psychology*. London: Sage.
- Potter, J., Wetherell, M., Gill, R. and Edwards, D. (1990) 'Discourse: Noun, Verb or Social Practice?', *Philosophical Psychology* 3: 205–17.
- Sacks, H. (1992) *Lectures on Conversation*, Vols I and II. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Schegloff, E.A. (1968) 'Sequencing in Conversational Openings', *American Anthropologist* 70: 1075–95.

- Schegloff, E.A. (1991) 'Reflections on Talk and Social Structure', in D. Boden and D. Zimmerman (eds) *Talk and Social Structure*, pp. 44-70. Cambridge: Polity.
- Schegloff, E.A. (1992) 'In Another Context', in A. Duranti and C. Goodwin (eds) *Rethinking Context*, pp. 191-229. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schegloff, E.A. (1997) 'Whose Text? Whose Context?', *Discourse & Society* 8: 165-87.
- Shapiro, M. (1992) *Reading the Postmodern Polity*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Van Dijk, T. (1997) 'Analysing Discourse Analysis', *Discourse & Society* 8 (1): 5-6.
- Wetherell, M. (1994) *Men and Masculinity: A Socio-Psychological Analysis of Discourse. End of Award Grant Report*. London: Economic and Social Research Council.
- Wetherell, M. and Edley, N. (1998) 'Gender Practices: Steps in the Analysis of Men and Masculinities', in K. Henwood, C. Griffin and A. Phoenix (eds) *Standpoints and Differences: Essays in the Practice of Feminist Psychology*. London: Sage.
- Wetherell, M. and Potter, J. (1988) 'Discourse Analysis and the Identification of Interpretative Repertoires', in C. Antaki (ed.) *Analysing Everyday Explanation*. London: Sage.
- Wetherell, M. and Potter, J. (1992) *Mapping the Language of Racism: Discourse and the Legitimation of Exploitation*. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Wetherell, M., Stiven, H. and Potter, J. (1987) 'Unequal Egalitarianism: A Preliminary Study of Discourses Concerning Gender and Employment Opportunities', *British Journal of Social Psychology* 26: 59-71.
- Widdicombe, S. and Wooffitt, R. (1995) *The Language of Youth Subcultures*. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.