D&S

Whose text? Whose context?*

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ABSTRACT. After a brief account of an old study on sociopolitical vs formalist styles of literary criticism and the lessons it taught about relating cultural objects to context, I turn to more recent work on talk-in-interaction and engage three themes: (1) That the events of conversation have a sense and import to participants which are at least partially displayed in each successive contribution, and which are thereby put to some degree under interactional control. Accordingly, academic accounts of the import of conversational 'texts' can be endogenously grounded, and this is a worthy analytic aspiration; (2) The pursuit of this goal mandates relevant senses of context to be consulted for analysis, and these are senses and aspects of context which are demonstrably relevant to the participants in the event being examined, not necessarily ones relevant to the inquirer doing the analysis; and (3) Its technical grounds and mandate aside, this is a useful contraint on analysis in disciplining work to the indigenous preoccupations of the everyday world being grasped, and serving as a buffer against the potential for academic and theoretical imperialism which imposes intellectuals' preoccupations on a world without respect to their indigenous resonance.

KEY WORDS: context, conversation, formal analysis, gender, relevance

INTRODUCTION

The title of this paper is 'Whose text? Whose context?' Perhaps I would do well to begin by saying what I mean to thematize by the use of that title.

It is surely by now a commonplace observation that persons who can be characterized by one set of category terms—such as male or female—can be characterized by many sets of category terms—terms of age, ethnicity, nationality, religion, residence locale, occupation, culinary disposition (vegetarian), pet preference, etc. One consequence of that is that it does not suffice to ground the use of one of these category terms to refer to people by saying that they *are*, after all, such a one (Sacks, 1972; Schegloff, 1991a). It is not enough to justify referring to someone as a 'woman' just because she is, in fact, a woman—because she is, by the same token, a Californian, Jewish, a mediator, a former weaver, my wife, and many others.

Similarly, the ways of formulating the context within which something

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occurred are multiple. The observations which I just made were in the context of introductory remarks to a talk, in the context of a panel on politics and aesthetics, in a potentially polemical context, in the context of American Association of Applied Linguistics (AAAL) meetings, of a professional convention, in the American midwest, in the Intercontinental hotel, in a setting specially attuned to multicultural concerns, in the absence of my wife, etc. These are also all true, and one cannot fully or distinctively ground the use of any one of them by virtue of its truth.

Finally, if one had to characterize what I am doing at the moment, one might say that I am presenting a paper, introducing my remarks, reading a text, arguing a point of view, responding to our chairs' invitation, gesticulating occasionally and suppressing gesticulation mostly, managing recurrent eye contact with members of the audience, and many others. And a similar stricture can be introduced here: none of these characterizations can get an adequate warrant by saying that it was employed because it is *true*—even though it *is* true. They are *all* true.

At a time when there appears to be deep skepticism about the possibility of establishing *anything* as true, we have here an embarrassment of truths. And of course this is why we have such a skepticism: because each truth, or at least many of them, is said to be appropriate to, the product of, but relative to, the perspective brought to the matter at hand. And in the apparent multiplicity, and continuing multiplication, of perspectives, truth seems to disappear in a hall of perspectival mirrors.

It is one thing to register that there are many ways to characterize a person, a stretch of conduct, or a setting or context in which the person enacts that conduct. It is quite another to claim that they are all equally warranted, equally legitimate, entitled to identical uptake and weight. But how should one discriminate? On what grounds should some characterization of any of these aspects of a sociocultural event be preferred to another?

One solution has been that of explanatory adequacy. In the social sciences, this point of view has a history which warrants calling it 'positivistic', though this is just one usage of that much abused term. On this view, that way of characterizing social actors, the context in which they act, and the things they say and do—that way is best which most reliably yields 'findings'—repeatable, reliable, objective, significant (for some, statistically significant) observations about the world. Some would add to this that the characterizations should not only yield such worthy observations, but that they also be elements of a theory or theoretical apparatus which lends those observations more general import.

Another solution—one which I will be defending—takes a different tack. For the events of human conduct, we are dealing with sentient beings who themselves orient to their context under some formulation or formulations; who grasp their own conduct and that of others under the jurisdictions of some relevancies and not others; who orient to some of the identities they separately and collectively embody and, at any given moment, not others. And because it is the orientations, meanings, interpretations, understandings, etc. of the *participants* in some sociocultural event on which the course

of that event is predicated—and especially if it is constructed interactionally over time, it is *those* characterizations which are privileged in the *constitution of socio-interactional reality*, and therefore have a prima facie claim to being privileged in efforts to *understand* it.

Now, as peculiar (and even outrageous) as it might seem to some, critical and political stances toward discourse often appear—in this way of thinking about the matter—to be 'positivistic'. But let us leave off the scientistic resonance of that term, for to some these days it is very nearly an insult, and I do not mean to insult anyone. Instead let me put it differently. The former of the two stances I have described allows students, investigators, or external observers to deploy the terms which preoccupy *them* in describing, explaining, critiqueing, etc. the events and texts to which they turn their attention. There is no guaranteed place for the endogenous orientations of the participants in those events; there is no principled method for establishing those orientations; there is no commitment to be constrained by those orientations. However well-intentioned and well-disposed toward the participants—indeed, often enough the whole rationale of the critical stance is the championing of what are taken to be authentic, indigenous perspectives—there is a kind of theoretical imperialism involved here, a kind of hegemony of the intellectuals, of the literati, of the academics, of the critics whose theoretical apparatus gets to stipulate the terms by reference to which the world is to be understood—when there has already *been* a set of terms by reference to which the world was understood—by those endogenously involved in its very coming to pass. (The issue is not unlike those who speak of Columbus having 'discovered' America, as if there were not already indigenous people living there.)

What I mean by 'Whose text? Whose context?', then, refers to this. Whose characterization of the conduct, and the context of the conduct, is to shape, to determine, to control our treatment of discourse? The very use of the term 'text' in my title was meant as a provocation, for it imposes on everything in the world the terminology of that praxis at which intellectuals, and literary intellectuals in particular, excel. I know that there is a technical usage involved here—a 'text' meaning only a field of significations, etc. Still, this is to insist, to impose, upon a world which may have very different concerns a preoccupation with its conduct as a field of significations.

Note that I said '... a world which *may have* very different concerns ...' And this brings me to a final point in this prefatory theme-setting. The term 'discourse' itself is in some respects like 'text'—demarcating a universe more for the concerns of those who will address it academically than for those whose efforts produced its objects. What gets addressed under the rubric 'discourse' is so varied that the default expectation should be the *non*-generalizability of what is said about some type of discursive object of attention to others. And this applies to what I have said so far as well. The considerations I have tried to establish early in this paper are the product of trying to come to terms with the events of *talk-in-interaction*. I think they have a kind of prima facie validity beyond that, but this is surely defeasible. On the other hand, the reach of talk-in-interaction may be more extensive

than is at first realized, and even if limited to this sub-domain, these introductory comments may have a bearing worth weighing heavily. Those who are preoccupied with very different kinds of discourse may nonetheless want to reflect on the relevance of the themes treated here to their materials.

In any case, the Colloquium's titular question—Are politics and aesthetics compatible?—requires a small modification of the question from my point of view, for 'aesthetics' isn't quite the word for the alternative to 'politics' for talk-in-interaction. I take the upshot of what is meant to be the 'design features' of the object under study, which make it—and make it recognizable as—what it is: a poem, a haiku, an aphorism, an interview, a conversation. In the arts and humanities we commonly subsume these design features under the rubric 'aesthetics'. Outside the arts/humanities domain they will be something else, but very likely still something formal. So perhaps the question can be rephrased as 'Are politics and formal analysis compatible?'.

With that modification, the answer I want to put forward to the question is, 'who knows'. But before we *can* know the answer, we need first to understand the object—the conversational episode—in its endogenous constitution, what it was for the parties involved in it, in its course, as embodied and displayed in the very details of its realization. Only then can we even begin to explore what forms a critical approach to it might take, and what political issue if any it allows us to address.

That said, I should also say that my approach to the topic of this Colloquium is not shaped *solely* by my work on conversation and other talk-in interaction, and it is only fair to fill you in on another source of the stance which I am taking, grounded in quite a different sort of material. Permit me then a bit of background—personal and biographical—which informs my coming to this topic.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE POLITICAL AND AESTHETIC IN LITERARY STUDIES

More years ago than I care to linger on, in what seems now another incarnation but has a recoverable continuity with this one, I wrote a Masters thesis (Schegloff, 1960) entitled 'The Moral Temper of American Literary Criticism, 1930–1960'. This was not itself so-called 'lit. crit.' It was written in a Department of Sociology, at the University of California, Berkeley, and it was a study in what was then still thought of as the sociology of knowledge, but was already being formed up as what we now call the sociology of culture, if not 'cultural sociology' or even 'cultural studies'. But the problem it addressed was grounded in classical sources in the sociology of knowledge, most notably the work of Karl Mannheim (1936, inter alia).

Mannheim had pointed out that periods of social and economic dislocation favored the emergence of modalities of thought informed by a historical, political and social-structural self-awareness. And he understood

the emergence into prominence of the very sociology of knowledge identified with his name by reference to such forces. This most global—or 'macro'—of hypotheses would have led one to anticipate that literary theory and criticism in a society passing through the great depression and World War II would gravitate toward historically, socially and politically informed stances. In point of fact, however, it was during just this period that that socially oriented 'style' of criticism—of which critics such as Edmund Wilson, Lionel Trilling, Philip Rahv, Irving Howe, Alfred Kazin and the like were representative—was overtaken by the so-called 'New Criticism', a brand of relatively formal criticism identified at the time with names such as John Crowe Ransom, Allen Tate, Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren. My thesis undertook to understand why this change in the tenor of literary studies occurred and why at just this time, and how we might reorient our understanding of the relationship between culture and society by virtue of this understanding.

I won't trouble you here with the details of the answer, though I will sketch the upshot in a moment. But let me just tell you that, from the outset, I knew who the 'good guys' and the 'bad guys' were. I was after all a *sociologist*, or an aspiring one. And I was at *Berkeley*—not yet the Berkeley of the Free Speech Movement and thereafter, but the earlier Berkeley which many still think of as the more authentic voice of the left. Wilson, Trilling, Howe—these were the good guys, at least by comparison to the others. The New Critics were, as I thought, narrow and technical. No social sweat dampened their brow; no political blood coursed through their veins. Or, when it did, it was conservative, aristocratic, nativist—identified with the so-called Agrarian Movement of what was still—in 1959–60 (not to mention the years in which they came to their ascendancy)—the Old South.[1]

It wasn't until later that I realized consciously the quite different effect the two bodies of critical work had had on me—my political and social predilections to the contrary notwithstanding. I had learned a lot from the formalists about how to read a poem, about the sound of a language and how it might be deployed to various effects, about the uses of ambiguity, and so forth. I learned a lot from the historical critics too, but I'm not sure I learned a lot about how works of literature are put together, how they work, how we read them, and the like. What I learned from these critics *presupposed* the former skills, both in the critics themselves and in their readers, but it did relatively little to enhance them, or so it seemed to me.

And this turned out to figure centrally in the understanding I came to have of the relative fates of the two genres of criticism. In a nutshell it was this: that the period in question saw a massive shift of American literary figures into the universities, many of them from that situation of intellectuals—what Mannheim had called 'freischwebende Intelligenz', or free-floating intellectuals—which especially fostered a critical stance toward established society. If one examined the so-called social location of men of letters (and they *were* mostly men), one found in the late 1930s and early 1940s a substantial proportion of contributors to the sociopolitically

oriented Partisan Review outside what we are pleased to call 'higher' education, and a very large proportion of contributors to the new-critical Southern and Kenyon Reviews on college and university faculties. By 1960, a very high proportion of contributors to both were in colleges and universities.

The relevance of this, translated from statistics to biography, was nicely captured by the poet and sociopolitically oriented critic Malcolm Cowley (1954) in a memoir entitled *The Literary Situation*. Cowley had been an expatriate in Paris for much of the 1920s, but returned to New York after the start of the Depression, and, to keep body and soul together, took a teaching job at the City College of New York. He was teaching a course on French Symbolist poetry, and assigned the students an array of readings in Mallarmé, Rimbaud, Verlaine, etc., while he lectured on the transformation of the bourgeoisie in *fin de siècle* France. He recounts how it dawned on him, several weeks into the term, that the students did not know how to read the poems, and that his socially analytic lectures therefore had nothing to connect to on the literary side. He gave up lecturing on the transformation of the bourgeoisie, and began making his classes into exercises in *explication de texte*, which is, of course, just what formalist criticism was ... and is.

There are two lessons I want to extract from this bit of sociology of culture, and explore with respect to the practice of contemporary discourse analysis which is concerned with talk-in-interaction.

One lesson one might learn from this is that, before undertaking to relate cultural artifacts to their so-called social, economic and political contexts, one might well undertake to grasp their constitution as objects in their own right. Indeed, this may be prerequisite to what aspires to the mantle of 'socially situated or critical analysis'. I say '*may be* prerequisite' because one can find in the course of such apparently 'preparatory' analysis that the social and political is indeed a constitutive element of the object in the first instance. But this is different as an *outcome*, a *finding*, a *result* of analysis, than it is as a *presupposition* of analysis, as a *definition* of what analysis should be.

Another lesson one might learn is that we have to establish, and reestablish for each next inquiry, what constitutes the *relevant* social context. My inquiry had begun with the socioeconomic-political context whose decisive importance we all 'knew'—the macro-structure of the society. But what I found was that the most relevant context was more narrowly and proximately bounded than the general socioeconomic dislocation to which Mannheim had called attention. It was the academic context into which literary people were being progressively drawn; the work tasks which confronted them there, especially teaching; and the nature of their 'clientele' in those teaching jobs. Each of these undoubtedly could be related in turn to so-called 'larger' social structural forces. But if we were trying to understand the refashioning of *literary analysis* during this period, what mattered most directly was the progressive incapacity of undergraduate students to read poetry with understanding, not the social class and cultural recruit-

ment of undergraduate populations which might explain that incapacity; what mattered most directly was the context which engaged the fashioners of literary analysis most directly.

Now there are lots of differences between literary objects of analysis and talk-in-interaction, and between the undertakings which try to grasp their respective characters. There are no direct lines between my efforts in the embryonic Sociology of Culture—with 'culture' understood as 'Hoch-Kultur'—and my efforts at understanding culture in the more anthropological and sociological sense, which is one important way of understanding conversation analysis as an undertaking. But I come to the present discussion chastened by an experience of 'knowing' a priori who the good and bad guys were, 'knowing' a priori the key defining features of the respective critical stances which were my 'texts', 'knowing' a priori what 'the context' was, 'knowing' a priori how the results were likely to come out, more or less, 'knowing' a priori—by which I mean before taking seriously the object of inquiry *in its own terms*—what sort of result the inquiry was to have—*ought* to have.

Yes, some might say, but is there such a thing as 'the object of inquiry *in its own terms*'? The very idea hints at a methodological and epistemological naivety that is unbecoming in our better universities; it seems to betray a touching belief in a 'reality'—and one which is accessible, furthermore—that seems unaffected by a properly sophisticated skepticism. Let me then make a clean breast of it. In my view, if ever there was an object of inquiry furnished internally with its own constitutive sense, with 'its own terms', with a defensible sense of its own reality, it is talk-in-interaction, and most centrally ordinary conversation. And it is that, of course, which I am here to talk about in the first instance.

By the time I finish, I want to have spoken to, or provided grounds for, three points. First, why I think that talk-in-interaction has an internally grounded reality of its own that we can aspire to get at analytically. Second, how the mandate to first understand the target 'text' in its own terms applies to talk-in-interaction. And third, the other of my aforementioned lessons, the need to rethink the issue of what a context can be—what can serve as *the context*; and *whose* context—whose *orientation* to context—is the consequential and warrantable one for our analysis. And so to the data.

THE DATA, WITH PRELIMINARY 'CRITICAL' GLOSS

In their proposal for this Colloquium, Claire Kramsch and Ruth Wodak noted that the several approaches invited to come together here 'each tends to choose texts that best illustrate its proponents' views'. In *their* text this was meant to refer to the choice between literary and non-literary texts, so I have tried to say a bit about literary texts, although that is not my own current central preoccupation, before coming to talk-in-interaction, which is. But it can have a bearing *within* each type of material as well. And so, in

selecting a 'text' to serve as the focus for my contribution, I have tried to select one that might be seen as involving at least some of the issues which most engage those who bring critical and political concerns to this Colloquium.

Let me initially characterize the data by reference to those concerns, thereby *introducing* their relevance, which I otherwise would wish to *contest*. The episode involves interruption and overlap, which are commonly taken to embody issues of conflict and differential power; its protagonists are male and female participants in a strained relationship, and the occasion is one in which moral evaluation and censure are at issue.

Marsha and Tony are the parents—now separated or divorced—of the teenaged Joey, who lives with his father in northern California, but has just spent a period of vacation from school with his mother in southern California. This was the day he was scheduled to drive back up north, and the exchange on which I will focus comes from the quite brief telephone conversation which Tony makes to Marsha. Here is what precedes the target excerpt, followed by the excerpt itself at lines 35–54 (see Appendix for transcription key):

(1) Stolen, 1:01–2:17

		((ring))
1	Marsha:	Hello:?
2	Tony:	Hi: Marsha?
3	Marsha:	Ye:ah.
4	Tony:	How are you.
5	Marsha:	Fi::ne.
6		(0.2)
7	Marsha:	Did Joey get home yet?
8	Tony:	Well I wz wondering when 'e left.
9		(0.2)
10	Marsha:	'hhh Uh:(d) did Oh: .h Yer not in on what pen'. (hh) (d)
11	Tony:	No(h)o=
12	Marsha:	=He's flying.
13		(0.2)
14	Marsha:	En Ilene is going to meet im:.Becuz the to:p wz ripped
15		off 'v iz car which is tih say someb'ddy helped th'mselfs.
16	Tony:	Stolen.
17		(0.4)
18	Marsha:	Stolen.=Right out in front of my house.
19	Tony:	Oh: f'r crying out loud,=en eez not g'nna eez not
20		g'nna bring it ba:ck?
21	Marsha:	'hh No so it's parked in the g'rage cz it wz so damn
22		co:ld. An' ez a matter fact snowing on the Ridge Route.
23		(0.3)
24	Marsha:	'hhh So I took him to the airport he couln' buy a ticket.
25		(·)
26	Marsha:	'hhhh Bee- he c'd only get on standby.
27		(0.3)
28	Tony:	Uh hu:[h,
29	Marsha:	[En I left him there et abou:t noo:n.
30		(0.3)

31	Tony:	Ah ha:h.
32		(0.2)
33	Marsha:	Ayund uh,h
34		(0.2)
35	Tony:	W't's 'e g'nna do go down en pick it up later? er
36		somethin like ( ) [well that's aw]:ful
37	Marsha:	[H i s friend]
38	Marsha:	Yeh h[is friend Stee-]
39	Tony:	[That really makes] me ma:d,
40		(0.2)
41	Marsha:	·hhh Oh it's disgusti[ng ez a matter a'f]a:ct.
42	Tony:	[P o o r J o e y,]
43	Marsha:	I- I, I told my ki:ds. who do this: down et the Drug
44		Coalition ah want th'to:p back.h ·hhhhhhhhh ((1.0))
45		SEND OUT the WO:RD.hhh hnh
46		(0.2)
47	Tony:	Yeah.
48	Marsha:	·hhh Bu:t u-hu:ghh his friend Steve en Brian er driving
49		up. Right after:: (0.2) school is out. En then hi'll
50		drive do:wn here with the:m.
51	Tony:	Oh I see.
52	Marsha:	So: in the long run, ·hhh it (·) probly's gonna save a
53		liddle time 'n: energy.
54	Tony:	Okay.
55	Marsha:	But Ile:ne probably (0.8) is either at the airport er
56		waiting tuh hear fr'm in eess
57		((conversation continues))

Tony has called to find out when Joey left, presumably so as to know when to expect him. It turns out that there is trouble: Joey's car has been vandalized, and this has happened, as they say, on Marsha's watch (as she puts it at line 18, 'Right out in front of *my h*ouse'). What is worse, nobody has bothered to inform Tony. In the segment of this conversation before us, two issues appear to be of concern: Joey and his itinerary, and the car and *its* itinerary. When Tony raises the latter issue (at lines 19–20: 'an eez not g'nna [...] bring it back?'), Marsha gives it short shrift—providing the minimal answer (line 21: 'No') and rushing ahead into a continuation of the telling she has been engaged in (the 'so' marks the remainder of the turn, which could have stood as an account for the 'no', as disjunctive with it, and conjunctive with her earlier talk). When that telling is brought to an analyzable conclusion (lines 29–33), Tony returns to the issue which he had raised before—the fate of the car (line 35). This is the segment on which we focus.

As it might be formulated both vernacularly and for the purposes of critically oriented analysis, we have here an interaction across gender lines, in which the asymmetries of status and power along gender lines in this society are played out in the interactional arena of interruption and overlapping talk, and this exchange needs to be understood in those terms. In this interactional contest, it may be noted, Marsha is twice 'beaten down' in a metaphoric sense but nonetheless a real one, being twice induced to terminate the talk which she is in the process of producing (at line 37, 'His

friend'; and again at line 38, 'his friend Stee-'), thereby indexing the power processes at work here. On the other hand, in the third interruption in this little episode (at lines 41–2), although Marsha does not this time yield to Tony's interruptive talk, neither does Tony yield to Marsha's. He starts while Marsha is talking, and brings his exclamation of commiseration to completion in spite of Marsha's ongoing, continuing talk. One could almost imagine that we capture in this vignette some of the elements which may account for these people no longer living together.

Now I find this way of casting and grasping this exchange problematic on many counts, as perhaps many of you do. There is, of course, much analysis along these lines out there, in terms both more and less sophisticated, in both the professional and the popular literature. Some of the issues raised by such analysis are raised in even its highly sophisticated versions (even if I have not produced one here). The reservation I wish to feature here is that such analyses make no room for the overtly displayed concerns of the participants themselves, the terms in which they relate to one another, the relevancies to which they show themselves to be oriented. Such analyses insist instead on characterizations of the parties, the relevancies, and the context, to which the *analyst* is oriented. I wish, then, to provide a moderately detailed (though quite compressed) analytic rendering of this exchange, the goal of which is to establish a version—even if only a partial version—of what was going on in it *for the participants, in its course.* And I wish finally to reconsider the bearing which this analytic account of the episode has—or should have—on the critically oriented take on it with which I began.

Let me say at the outset that one conclusion which I will want to draw from this exercise is that even where critical analysis is wanted, is justifiable, and can have its basic pre-conditions met, what it should properly be brought to bear on is an internally analyzed rendering of the event, the episode, the exchange, the 'text', if you wish to insist on literary diction. Whatever the differences between the analysis of literary discourse and quotidien talk-in-interaction, in this respect they are alike. You need to have technical analysis *first*, in order to constitute the very object to which critical or sociopolitical analysis might sensibly and fruitfully be applied. And then one may find it no longer in point.

And so I turn to a partial account of the object itself.

TALK-IN-INTERACTION: THE SEQUENCE AS A COURSE OF ACTION

We begin with Tony's return to the issue of the car at line 35.

Tony:	W't's 'e g'nna <u>d</u>o go down en pick it <u>up</u> lat<u>er</u>? er somethin like ( )

The design of the first unit of this turn is: WH-Question + candidate response + hedge via class extrapolation.

The Wh-Question—'What's he gonna do'—is thoroughly indexical; it does not specify what course of action is being asked about. Until specified

by the candidate response, it could be, 'What's he gonna do, take the first flight on Southwest, or take any airline he can get?'. That indeterminacy insulates it partially from premature response, but it is in any case designed and delivered in a fashion that marks it as a frame for a subsequent part. (It may be worth considering—though not now—what is getting done by framing it this way, rather than just asking, 'Is he gonna go down and pick it up later?' or even just 'Is he gonna pick it up later?'. What would each of these do or not do, as compared to the actually used form and construction?)

The subsequent turn-component offers a candidate answer to 'what's he gonna do', and that is 'go down and pick it up later'. The fact is Tony *does* put into the candidate response not only 'pick it up later' but also 'go down'. This may appear nit-picking, but there are several kinds of evidence that the nit turns out to be picked—by *Marsha*.

First, and least central for how the sequence develops but nonetheless probative, is the reappearance of the word 'down' in Marsha's subsequent response ('down at the Drug Coalition . . .' at line 43), a usage which echoes an element of vernacular poetics already included in Tony's turn, with its masked contrast pair, 'go DOWN and pick it UP', where the directionality is at best metaphoric in each.

Second, and most telling, is that Marsha's reply, when she gets to articulate it, addresses itself virtually exclusively to the 'going down'. She remarks that Joey will be 'driving DOWN with friends' (lines 49–50) and therefore will 'save a little time and energy' (lines 52–3), not to mention the money for another plane fare. There is no mention of his 'picking it up' or anything else after his driving back 'down' with his friends. I take this as some vindication of pitching the analysis at this level of detail; if the parties are hearing that way and responding that way—that is, with an orientation to this level of turn design—we are virtually mandated to analyze it that way.

I pass lightly over the third component of the turn unit noting only that it hedges commitment to the particular candidate response Tony has put forward, and that on completion of this component, the turn as a whole comes to possible completion. And Marsha apparently hears it that way, for just after this, she starts a next turn (lines 35–7).

Tony:	W't's 'e g'nna do go down en pick it up later? er somethin like ( ) [well that's aw]:ful
Marsha:	[H i s friend]

On possible completion of Tony's turn and question, Marsha starts an answer. That it is *an 'answer'* which she has begun is not obvious on delivery, at least not in the same ways in which it is obvious that a 'why' question is being answered when a next turn begins with 'Becuz . . .'. The claim that it is an *answer* which she is beginning can be warranted in post hoc fashion by noting that she tries twice to get this out (at lines 37 and 38) before succeeding on her third try (at line 48). Marsha builds these to be recognizable as three tries at the same utterance by starting each time with the same words. It is, of course, possible to say the same thing in different

words; 'using the same words' is a canonical practice for displaying or claiming that a current saying is the same as a prior saying or partial saying was *trying* to be (Schegloff, 1996). Seeing that what the third try comes to is an answer to Tony's question, we can see that that is what Marsha was *starting* to do at lines 37 and 38, hence my earlier claim that at Tony's possible completion, Marsha starts an answer. But of course Tony does not have this resource for making this determination. The whole of the answer hasn't happened yet, and the utterance's start is not designed to display 'answerness'.

Although Tony's turn *had* come to possible completion, it turns out not to have been complete. (That is why we talk about *possible* completion as the strategic element of a turn for turn-taking purposes.) After the possible completion of his turn, Tony produces a wholly new turn unit, and one engaged in a quite different action than the one which he has just brought to possible completion.

It should be noted that Tony does not do this, as far as we can tell, *by virtue* of Marsha's talk, for example, by virtue of its start not being engaged in 'doing answering'. For Tony launches this new unit virtually simultaneously with the start of Marsha's turn. So he's not 'interrupting' in the conventional vernacular sense.

Tony's additional unit stands in a different relationship to what had preceded than did the first. They are two different orders of response to what has happened: an 'emotional' one on his own and his son's behalf, and a pragmatic one on the car's behalf. As we saw, the two cohabited an earlier turn (at lines 19–20) in the opposite order, and here they are again. Their relatively disjunctive character is marked by the start of the second unit with 'well'—a so-called 'discourse marker' whose usual home is turn-initial position; but here it is, displaced well into a turn.

To call what Tony adds here 'an emotional response' is clearly a vernacular gloss. As a matter of action- and turn-construction, it is in the first instance an assessment of what has happened. As a matter of sequence organization, such an assessment makes relevant next an agreement or disagreement with the assessment. And so it is not just that Marsha's answering of Tony's question about the car is interfered with by his simultaneous talk. That simultaneous talk by Tony mandates *its own response next*, leaving Marsha with two things to do—answer the earlier question, and respond to the assessment. What does Marsha do?

Tony:	W't's 'e g'nna do go down en pick it up later? er
	somethin like ( ) [well that's aw]:ful
Marsha:	[H i s friend]
Marsha:	Yeh h[is friend Stee-]
Tony:	[That really makes] me ma:d,

What Marsha does is momentarily quit. Just for the one syllable 'ful' in 'awful' she drops out of the overlap, leaving off production of her turn-so-far. On possible completion of Tony's assessment, she offers an agreement token as a response to it ('yeh'), and then tries again to produce the answer

she was providing to Tony's question, using again the words she had used before, but getting a little bit further (one syllable further—'His friend Stee-'). In doing so, she is adopting the canonical practice for responding to a turn which has made *two* responses relevant like a turn with two questions (Sacks, 1987 [1973]): deal with them in reverse order, responding to the second one first, and the first after that (if it is still relevant and possible). Here, Marsha has stopped the response to the first of Tony's moves when she hears that there is a second, she responds to the second, and then returns to respond to the first. The only problem is the character of the response which she has provided to Tony's assessment.

Pomerantz (1984) has shown that in offering second assessments, and in designing agreements with a first assessment, it is often not enough to offer another assessment term of the same class or valence. Effective agreements ordinarily require some *upgrading* relative to the assessment with which they are agreeing. Same-valence assessments which are not upgraded, or simple agreement tokens, can constitute 'weak agreements', and can be taken as tantamount to virtual *dis*agreement or non-agreement. Commonly, the producers of the first assessment respond to such weak agreements with upgrades.

Marsha's response here to Tony's 'awful' is 'yeh'. And this is far from an optimal agreement. It is virtually pro forma, a token response to dispose of something which needed responding to, but hardly a vigorous alignment with the stance which Tony has taken up. It is, then, in various respects, a less than adequate response to his second move. And when Marsha restarts her answer to Tony's question, she finds herself in collision again, this time with Tony's reaction to her problematic response to his assessment.

Tony's reaction embodies an upgrade not only relative to Marsha's pallid 'yeh', but relative to his own prior assessment. He has upped the ante. This is carried, first, in the personalization of the assessment; it is no longer the event which is being described, but Tony's reaction to it—its effect on Tony. And second in the intensified strength of the assessment term itself, '*really* makes me mad'. An 'intensifier' is after all precisely an instrument for upgrading. Here then is the response to weak agreement I described a moment ago—upgrading in response, seeking to draw the previously weak stance into a more vigorous alignment with the initial assessment.

Note, by the way, that Tony's intervention here has the effect of getting the sequential follow-through to the second action in his prior turn brought to satisfactory resolution before the first part is addressed. In this respect he is aligned with what Marsha is doing. And the competing talk in which he does his assessment upgrade prompts Marsha again to drop out of the overlap, to abandon her incipient answer to the question about the car, and to deal again with the issue of the assessment of what has happened to Joey's car, and aligning with that assessment (lines 35–50).

Tony:	W't's 'e g'nna do go down en pick it up later? er something like ( ) [well that's aw]:ful
Marsha:	[H i s friend]
Marsha:	Yeh h[is friend Stee-]
Tony:	[That really makes] me ma:d,

	(0.2)
Marsha:	·hhh Oh it's disgusti[ng ez a matter a'f]a:ct.
Tony:	[P o o r J o e y,]
Marsha:	I- I, I told my ki:ds. who do this: down et the Drug Coalition ah want th'to:p back.h ·hhhhhhhhh ((1.0)) SEND OUT the WO:RD.hhh hnh
	(0.2)
Tony:	Yeah.
Marsha:	·hhh Bu:t u-hu:ghh his friend Steve en Brian er driving up. Right after:: (0.2) school is out. En then hi'll drive do:wn here with the:m.

Marsha's reaction to Tony's reaction is to provide a proper agreement, here by offering an assessment which is an upgrade on each aspect of what Tony has done. With respect to the assessment of what has happened, i.e. of the mischief itself, she upgrades 'awful' to 'disgusting'. As this is coming to possible completion, Tony chimes in with an expression of sympathy for their son, a position on which they can come together. But Marsha seems already committed to something else.

Although the transcript reads, and the tape sounds, as if Marsha is saying 'Oh it's disgusting as a matter of fact', there are substantial grounds for parsing this differently, namely, 'Oh it's disgusting. As a matter of fact I told my kids ...'. But we haven't the time to work through the grounds for this assertion.

What then is this about? 'As a matter of fact' often marks the claim that what is to be told, or has been told, is so, and is said, independent of local interactional grounds for saying it. It is used as a form of 'coincidence marker'. Here, Marsha's 'disgusting' is vulnerable to suspicion that it has been coerced by Tony's interruptive upgrade of his prior assessment in reaction to Marsha's tepid agreement; that Marsha is just going along, is saying what is necessary. Marsha can then be undertaking to offer evidence that this is not so, that she is articulating a view she had held independent of Tony's coaxing, and she offers in evidence an independent event which embodies it. In doing so, she adds to her assessment of the event (as 'disgusting') a depiction of its effect on her, her counterpart to Tony's 'really makes me mad'. Marsha's telling completely overrides 'Poor Joey'.

The alignment on assessments having been achieved, Marsha once again tries to produce her answer to Tony's earlier question, and now is able to bring it to conclusion. There is, of course, more to be said about this, but we will have to do without.[2]

Suffice it to say that an account that would treat this brief exchange as but another exemplar of gendered discourse, whatever was further to be made of that, would have missed what it was demonstrably about *in the first instance—for the parties*. Can compelling critical discourse analysis sacrifice that?

But what could be meant by 'what it was demonstrably about *in the first instance—for the parties*'? Literarily speaking, what is meant resonates with

the now commonplace assertion that meaning is use (Wittgenstein, 1953), or with the claim that the import of an utterance is its way of speaking (Garfinkel, 1967: 29). The import of 'a way of speaking'—a practice of speaking—is what it can be used to do, the possible actions it can accomplish ... at least in part; a way of speaking, a practice, may have other import as well (for example, furnished by the distinctive biographical associations it may have come to have), but it—the practice—has at least this import.

But what could 'a practice of speaking' be 'used to do'? Specifying this is one task of analysis—of what I have been calling 'formal' analysis. It involves: (a) specifying the 'it', that is, that there is a practice underlying a bit of conduct, and what that practice is. In the preceding analysis, for example, that rebeginning a turn with the same words constitutes a practice of talking, deployed in characterizable contexts, for example, overlapping talk (first described as a methodical practice in Schegloff, 1987 [1973]); (b) showing what that practice seems designed and deployed to do (Schegloff, 1987 [1973], and, more generally, on the practice of using the same words to show one is saying the same thing that one was saying or trying to say earlier, Schegloff, 1996); and (c) showing that the products of that practice are understood by interactional co-participants to be possibly doing that action, that is, that this understanding is not merely the imposition of an external academic or professional analyst, but is the understanding of the co-participant, as revealed in ensuing talk which is built on just that understanding (Schegloff, 1987 [1973]; Sacks et al., 1974).

When the account of the exchange between Marcia and Tony claims to represent 'the import for the parties', it draws on work which shows that the practices deployed there are members' practices of talk-in-interaction, used on behalf of certain projects and linked to certain outcomes. In addition to the work cited in the previous paragraph, there is the work of Pomerantz (1984) cited earlier and that of Goodwin and Goodwin (1992). That responses to assessments are examined by co-participants for their alignment with the preceding assessment, that 'merely' same valence assessments or 'weak agreements' are not taken to be agreements but are treated as non-alignments with the first assessment, that the speaker of the first assessment may display such an understanding and act on it by redoing the assessment with an upgraded assessment term, etc., these are all grounded in demonstrable conduct of parties to interaction, and thereby are shown to be indigenous practices of interaction (Pomerantz, 1984; and the abbreviated account in Schegloff, 1996). The analysis of Tony re-entering the talk with 'That really makes me mad' as responsive to the weakness of Marcia's 'yeh' as a response to his prior assessment 'well that's awful' is, then, not a casual characterization, nor one warranted by claimed commonsense plausibility or by the cogency of some theoretical apparatus. Each of these 'contributions' has the prima facie appearance-in-context of the exercise of a members' practice of talking, fitted to a sequential and interactional context of deployment, and thereby made available for co-participant understanding along such lines, an understanding which the

immediately ensuing talk seems to show was in fact accorded it. Although defeasible, this is a strong analytically focussed and empirically grounded case for the claim that these understandings are 'the understandings of the participants', unlike assertions of the sort most likely to enter into critically accented analyses, which either do not make this claim, or do not make it explicitly, or do not offer empirical grounding for it. Again then: Can compelling critical discourse analysis sacrifice that?

AN IMPOSSIBLE HURDLE?[3]

There is nothing in the preceding discussion which necessarily either undercuts or underwrites critical discourse analysis. The upshot is only that critical discourse analysis be applied to a world refracted through the prism of disciplined and molecular observation, observation at the level of the lived reality of the events which compose it, and not to the world as refracted through the prism of 'casual' vernacular observation, constrained neither by the discipline of interactional participation nor by that of systematic empirical inquiry.

Though it prompts impatience in those who aspire to more global claims and assertions, over and over again close examination of brief exchanges which may initially appear to casual inspection to be utterly unremarkable, or even transparently characterizable in vernacular or commonsense terms, turn out to yield rather more complex, and differently complexioned, understandings. More sweeping accounts appear then to depend on *not* examining single moments or episodes closely, and this may help understand the common impatience, and often intolerance, of close analysis ... this, and the fact that such analysis often yields results uncomfortably at variance with commonsense understanding or ideological predilections. All the more reason, then, to have critical concerns be brought to bear only after an initial formal analysis has brought to the fore the import of the events for the participants.

Of course, understanding along such lines, for example along gender lines, can also, in principle, be shown in any particular case to be 'the understanding of the participants', but this needs to be *shown*. It *can* be shown. Before concluding this essay, a brief examination of another data segment may serve to demonstrate that no impossible hurdles have been erected here; that even after a stretch of interaction can be shown to implicate on the participants' part orientations to activity-relevant identities, aspects of central interest to critical discourse analysis may still be shown to be oriented to by the participants, even when these are ostensibly irrelevant to the activity at hand.

In the following exchange, Michael and Nancy are having dinner with Shane and Vivian. The occasion is being videotaped by Vivian for a course in which she has enrolled; the exchange occurs shortly after the start of the tape.

(2) Chicken Dinner 1: 18–29

1	Shane:	[ˈhehh huh ˈhhhh Most wishful thinkin
2	→	hey hand me some a 'dat fuckin budder willyou?
3		(0.8)
4	?Shane:	°°Oh::yeah°°
5		(1.1)
6	Nancy:→	C'n I have some t[oo
7	Michael:	[mm-hm[hm:
8	Nancy:	[hm-hm-^h[m [^he-ha-]haˈhehh]
9	Vivian:→	[Ye[h [I wa]nt]sometoo.]
10	Shane:	[N[o:.] [( )-
11	Shane:	No.
12		(0.2)

Shane's talk at line 1 is implicated in the closing of the preceding topic talk, and the 'hey' marks a disjunction and the start of a new sequence. Shane's body behavior has preceded his talk in this regard; his gaze shifts toward the butter—which is by Michael's place at the table—at the second syllable of 'wishful', he begins to point to the butter at the second syllable of 'thinkin', and he brings his arm pointing at the butter to full extension at the 'some' on line 2. Without spelling out in full the detail of the practice by which it is accomplished, it can be noted that Shane here (line 2) produces a request, that it is addressed to Michael, that Michael understands it to be a request and one which is addressed to him, and shows all this by beginning a compliant response. Indeed, he does this before the object of the request has been lexically formulated—he begins to reach for the butter just as Shane's point to it reaches maximum extension, at the word 'some'. For the activity enacted in this sequence-so-far, Shane and Michael are relevantly requester and requestee (or request recipient), respectively.

In the immediately following moments they become in effect deliverer and recipient respectively, as Michael and Shane consumate the request–grant sequence which Shane had initiated. This involves a choreography of movement which, were it not so common, one would be inclined to term extraordinary, in which Shane's hand shifts from a pointing to a receiving deployment in close coordination with Michael's reaching for the butter, grasping it and extending it toward Shane—a collaborative enterprise whose detailed explication is out of place in the present context.[4] Suffice it to say that its shape and reciprocity embody an orientation by Shane and Michael to their complementary capacities as deliverer and recipient, respectively.

While the request is still being articulated by Shane, Nancy and Vivian eye the butter, track its movement to Shane and his cutting a slab for himself, and produce the two requests at lines 6 and 9, respectively. These are requests to Shane, requests which potentially compete with each other and with his taking butter for himself. His response is the ironic or mock rejection of Nancy's request at line 10 and of Vivian's at line 11. Here, then, *they* are the requesters and *he* is the request recipient, and the request rejector. But then, after a moment's delay, he adds what can be taken as an account for the rejection. Here is the entire exchange:

(2) Chicken Dinner 1: 18–19

6	Nancy:→	C'n I have some t[oo
7	Michael:	[mm-hm[hm:
8	Nancy:	[hm-hm-^h[m [^he-ha-]ha'hehh]
9	Vivian:→	[Ye[h [I wa]nt]sometoo.]
10	Shane:	[N[o:.] [( )-
11	Shane:	No.
12		(0.2)
13	Shane:→	Ladies la:st.

At line 13, Shane's utterance displays an orientation on his part to categorical identities of the parties ostensibly unimplicated in the just-current activity and not otherwise evidently warrantable in context. Gender is relevant here after all, and 'counter-intuitively'. How so?

No extended account is possible here, but some suggestions may be in order to sketch one direction such an account might take, one which treats this next utterance as grounded in the activities just preceding, and seeks to understand the relevance of introducing gender as prompted by what has preceded.

The two requests by Nancy and Vivian while Shane is just helping himself to the butter can be seen to confront Shane with competing proprieties of action, ones embodied in various adages concerning orders of service: on the one hand 'first come, first served', on the other hand 'ladies first'. 'First come, first served' yields as the proper next action that Shane continue to help himself to the butter. 'Ladies first' yields as the proper next action that Shane defer continuing to serve himself and pass the butter (though to whom turns out to be problematic in his eventual actual passing behavior). 'Ladies last' is a reformulation of the rule which he is *not* observing, a reformulation which would be in accord with the course of action he adopts, and is offered as (an ironic) account of it.[5]

This is hardly a form of account which is likely to appeal to critical discourse analysts, but it does show that categories of analysis which are often central to such approaches can turn out to be relevant to discourse, and to be oriented to by the parties, even when not ostensibly relevant to the activities otherwise ongoing. Although in this case this orientation is made overt by the explicit mention of a category term, this is by no means necessary to establish the relevant orientation by the participants which earlier sections of this essay have argued for. Various accounts have been offered of conduct by which orientation to gender (to cite only one common preoccupation of critical discourse analysis) can be manifested without being explicitly named or mentioned (for example, Garfinkel, 1967: 116–85; Ochs, 1992; West and Zimmerman, 1987; see also Sacks, 1992, I: 590–96, II: 360–66; Schegloff, 1992b: liii–liv; 1992c: xxx–xxxi). One line of analysis which could enrich both 'formal' and critical discourse analysis would be the elaboration of those forms of conduct by which persons 'do' gender, class or ethnicities of various sorts, and by which they may be shown to display and invoke participants' orientations to those features of the interactional context.

I understand that critical discourse analysts have a different project, and are addressed to different issues, and not to the local co-construction of interaction. If, however, they mean the issues of power, domination, and the like to connect up with discursive material, it should be a serious rendering of that material. And for conversation, and talk-in-interaction more generally, that means that it should at least be compatible with what was demonstrably relevant for the parties—not necessarily their sequentially directed preoccupations, but, whatever it was, demonstrably relevant to them as embodied in their conduct. Otherwise the critical analysis will not 'bind' to the data, and risks ending up merely ideological.

CONCLUSION

In his essay, 'Explaining the Obvious' (1994: 124), the remarkable music analyst and pianist Charles Rosen—known for his treatment of western music in broad socio-historical context—comments on an analysis he has just offered of some music of Schubert:

> This may appear at first sight to be an issue of purely formal and technical description. Nevertheless, it is only by getting the formal aspect right that we can see how Schubert's music conveys a different view of experience, and reflects his age in its attempt to go beyond the rendering of what might be conceived as the underlying static conditions of appearance—the structure beneath the skin, so to speak—and to represent instead the very movement of phenomena. In Europe, after the intoxication of the French Revolution ...

What Rosen finds, then, is that 'getting the formal aspect right' is necessary for getting into a position even to *see* in Schubert's music the larger cultural and political themes one may wish to argue it embodies. And he concludes his essay with a theme purportedly distinctive to music, but perhaps even more relevant to discourse (p. 126):

> It is natural to look outside or beyond the music, to find the ways in which it can temporarily and provisionally assume different kinds of significance. Nevertheless, music will not acknowledge a context greater than itself—social, cultural or biographical—to which it is conveniently subservient. To paraphrase Goethe's grandiose warning to the scientist: do not look behind the notes, they themselves are the doctrine.

In our times, the relativization and perspectivalization of cultural analysis threaten the virtual disintegration of stable meaning and import into indeterminacy, and nowhere more than in discourse analysis. By analogy to physical entropy, there is here a kind of interpretive en-tropism. Discourse is too often made subservient to contexts not of its participants' making, but of its analysts' insistence. Relevance flies in all directions; the text's center cannot hold in the face of the diverse theoretical prisms through which it is refracted.

But ordinary talk-in-interaction, it seems to me, offers us leverage. The interaction embodies and displays moment-to-moment the products of its

own, endogenous mechanisms of interpretation and analysis, both of the utterances and actions which compose it and of the oriented-to context. These are the understandings *of the participants*. And their robustness and inescapable relevance is ensured by having subsequent moments in the trajectory of the interaction grounded in those very understandings, and built on them. More than music, more than literature, more than the visual arts, then, whose understanders and interpreters may have (many now think) no Archimedean leverage, either with respect to the objet d'art or with respect to other interpreters, talk-in-interaction *does* provide such an Archimedean point. But it is not *external*, as in the classical imagery. It is *internal* to the object of analysis itself. It is the product of the organization of practices of conversation itself, whose consequence is that contributions display their speakers' understanding of what has preceded.[6]

That is a big part of what we study in 'formal' analysis; that is how we try to ground *our* analysis. It has the virtue, if well done, of capturing—at least partly—the demonstrable indigenous import of the events and of their context *for their participants*. And if that is not what *critical* discourse analysis is to address itself to—discursive events *in their import for their participants*, then I'm not sure what it is about and what is to be hoped for from it. If it *is* what critical discourse analysis is to address itself to, then critical analysis and formal analysis are not competitors or alternatives. One presupposes the other; serious critical discourse analysis presupposes serious formal analysis, and is addressed to its product. Whether politics and aesthetics are compatible turns, in this view, on whether this arrangement can be made to work by those whose central impulse is critical.

APPENDIX: TRANSCRIPTION NOTATION

This is a simplified version of the notation described in Ochs et al. (1996). For a more extensive glossary, see their Appendix.

Um::	colons represent lengthening of the preceding sound; the more colons, the greater the lengthening.
I've-	a hyphen represents the cut-off of the preceding sound, often by a stop.
^Already?	the circumflex represents sharp upward pitch shift. Underlining represents stress, usually via volume; the more underlining, the greater the stress.
ni::ce	underlining directly followed by colon(s) indicates downward inflection on the vowel.
hhh hh .hh	'h' represents aspiration, sometimes simply hearable breathing, sometimes laughter, etc.; when preceded by a superposed dot, it
P(h)ut	marks in-breath; in parentheses inside a word it represent laugh infiltration.
hhh[hh .hh] [I just]	left brackets represent point of overlap onset; right brackets represent point of overlap resolution.
.,?	punctuation marks intonation, not grammar; period, comma and 'question mark' indicate downward, 'continuative', and upward contours, respectively.

( )	single parentheses mark problematic or uncertain hearings; two parentheses separated by an oblique represent alternative hearings.
(( ))	double parentheses mark transcriber's descriptions, rather than transcriptions.
(0.2) (.)	numbers in parentheses represent silence in tenths of a second; a dot in parentheses represents a micro-pause, less than two tenths of a second.
°mm hmm	the degree sign marks significantly lowered volume.

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NOTES

*This paper was prepared for the invited colloquium, 'Understanding Discourse: Are Politics and Aesthetics Compatible?' organized by Claire Kramsch and Ruth Wodak for the American Association of Applied Linguistics Annual Conference, 23–26 March, 1996, Chicago, Illinois. Although this colloquium was initially prompted by an impromptu impassioned exchange at the 1995 meetings of the Association between a leading 'critical discourse analyst' and a proponent of more traditional literary analysis, the present contribution is not designed to address specific writings in either of these directly. It addresses critical discourse analysis as a stance only at its end, and then only in the most general sense—as a stance which would put 'politically' grounded issues and questions (in some sense of that term) at the start or the center of inquiry, and as its guiding concern. Rather it is designed to speak to the question articulated by the Colloquium's title and to the theme of the colloquium proposal submitted by the organizers, whose substantive paragraphs follow:

> This proposed colloquium is meant to elicit a public debate on various approaches to understanding spoken and written 'texts'. There are a variety of ways of 'doing' discourse analysis: Are they all equally legitimate and are they all equally likely to bring about social awareness and ultimately social change? In Britain the debate has taken the form of a polarization between literary, stylistic approaches, and sociocultural critical approaches to discourse analysis. Both approaches are applied to literary and non-literary texts, although each tends to choose texts that best illustrate its proponents' views. In the United States, the debate has taken the form of a chasm between structuralist and post-structuralist, post-colonialist approaches to the reading of spoken, written or visual texts.
>
> Recent years have witnessed a hardening of these dichotomies and a widening of the gap between various views on the possibilities of bringing about social change through an analysis of discourse. The boundaries between these extreme positions are, however, more permeable than one

might think. Their exploration should be useful to address in particular crucial questions in education, such as: How much and what part of the context is relevant to understanding a text? Can the reading of literature lead to social action? Is discursive choice an aesthetic or moral choice? Can humanistic modes of discourse contribute to the hard sciences? This colloquium brings together scholars from various positions within the field of discourse analysis to explore precisely the transitional surfaces between them. What we really need to understand is the effect of the dichotomy between the polarities outlined above and other related 'disjunctions' among the modes of discourse available to us.

The text printed here includes a section omitted from the colloquium presentation in order to conform to time constraints (the section entitled 'Introduction') and one added for this publication (the section entitled 'An Impossible Hurdle?'), and incorporates a limited amount of citation to related literature, inappropriate to an oral presentation. Otherwise the text is substantially as presented at the colloquium. I am indebted to Claire Kramsch for responsive comments on the colloquium presentation which prompted me to clarify several points, and to John Heritage, Gene Lerner and Andy Roth for helpful comments on the written text.

1. The obituary section of the *Los Angeles Times* for 16 December 1995 (page A28) reported the death of Andrew Lytle, described as 'the last surviving member of the influential Agrarian writing group', whose 'comrades included Robert Penn Warren, John Crowe Ransom, Allen Tate and other writers based at Vanderbilt University'.
2. One intervention from the floor noted that what has been offered here was 'just one interpretation', and asked, 'aren't there others?' and 'which is right?'. There are undoubtedly others, though cogent ones are not quite as easy to produce as the comment intimates. Even more demanding is the challenge of providing other 'interpretations' for which evidence can be provided that the parties are oriented to that grasp or version of what is transpiring, and/or which are grounded in independent analyses of talk-in-interaction which explicate the practices which yield such interpretable stretches of talk and which show the methodicity with which such practices are linked to such outcomes (e.g. such types of responses to assessments to be linked to agreement or disagreement). The preceding discussion—in its effort to address these undertakings—aims to convert interpretation into warranted analysis. Whether or not there are 'other analyses' awaits the submission of efforts along those lines; determinations of 'which is right' awaits juxtaposition of the proposals and a determination whether comparative assessment is relevant and/or possible.
3. I am indebted to Gene Lerner for suggesting the usefulness of adding a discussion that speaks to the actual feasibility of introducing themes of interest to critical discourse analysis after formal analysis had already been employed to characterize what is going on in a spate of interaction.
4. My account of this exchange—both the detail given and the detail withheld—has profited from early work on 'object transfers' done by Blaine Roberts at the University of California, Irvine in the early 1970s.
5. That Shane deals with matters of etiquette, and shows his orientation to them, by reversing them, can be seen elsewhere in this exchange as well, for example, in his including in his request a term of impoliteness (indeed, obscenity) where a term of politeness ('please') might have been relevant.
6. The text of Goethe's paraphrased in the earlier-cited excerpt from Rosen reads, 'Do not look behind the phenomena, they themselves are the doctrine'.

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